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- Abstract - 
This thesis explores the importance of tolerating and facilitating uncertainty as it is 
recognised by British Independent and Kfeinian psychoanalysis and contemporary 
British magic realist fiction. In Part I, I offer some theoretical investigations, arguing 
that postmodem and some psychoanalytic discourses, namely Lacanian 
psychostructuralism, remarkably fail to address the challenges facing subjects in late- 
twentieth, early twenty-first century consumer culture. In their inability to tolerate 
paradoxes and uncertainty, these discourses objectt& the subject, through processes of 
depersonalisation, derealisation and desubjectification. To redress these problems, I 
offer the work of British psychoanalysts, specifically, that of D. W. Winnicott and 
Melanie Klein and her followers. These perspectives, I argue, better serve the 
contemporary subject by recognising the importance of paradox and helping develop 
facilitating environments for the realisation of creative experience. 
In Part II, I examine how the play of paradox is fostered in contemporary British 
magic realist fiction. Specifically, I look at how these narrative strategies attempt to 
move away from the vicissitudes of internal and external, certainty and uncertainty, 
reason and unreason, to negotiate a Winnicottian third, potential space. The 
conceptualisation of such a space, I believe, offers a place from which we can begin to 
dialogue, to draw ourselves out of the oppositional dialectics that have plagued the 
bourgeois subject. I believe that in the novels of writers such as Jeanette Winterson, 
Joanne Harris, John Fowles, John Murray and, most especially, Angela Carter, we can 
find alternatives to bourgeois conceptions of reason and rationality, alternatives that are 
not based on the paranoid-schizoid, primitive processes and depersonalisation 
necessitated by the Enlightenment and capitalism but instead upon, in Kleinian terms, 
depressive ambivalence and the recognition of whole-objects. 
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Instructions from the manual 
could not have been much more plain 
the blues are still required 
the blues are still required again 
past territorial piss-posts 
past whispers in the closets 
past screamin' from the rooftops 
we live to survive our paradoxes 
Men here of the secret 
they pass in upholstered silence 
they only exist in crisis 
they only exist in silence 
past territorial piss-posts 
past whispers in the closets 
past screamin' from the rooftops 
we live to survive our paradoxes 
Nve'll live to survive our paradoxes 
The Tragically Hip, "Springtime in 
Vienna" 
-Introductions and Rationale - 
"Life consists entirely of uncertainties, " I said. 
"No, my ffiend, it does not; who could survive if it did? " 
I 
... 
I 
"I have come to rob you of the certainty, the guarantee, 
the safety you so greatly prize, " 
"Satan's work! " 
(Madsen 1995,263-4) 
Life, explains David Madsen's gnostic dwarf above, consists entirely of 
uncertainties. But this fact is denied by the 15"' century Inquisitor who is the dwarf's 
nemesis. The work of exposing these illusory certainties, robbing us of the imaginary 
defences and guarantees and making us confront our paradoxes - the work of 
psychoanalysis - is the work of Satan. Paradoxes put us in the uncomfortable 
position of not knowing what we think-, or how we feel. We are faced with the 
proposition of "both-and" rather than "either-or" (see Murray. 1 996,6 1). Instead of 
yes or no, love it or hate it, paradoxes force us to answer "maybe" or, worse, "I don't 
know. " We tend to prefer whenever possible, therefore, the eradication of paradox 
and the resulting comfort thatwe find in the illusion of certainty that exists in binary 
thinking. And there are many discourses and institutions in our culture that help us 
on our way to this anaesthetised comfort, including, I argue in this dissertation, 
capitalism, postmodernity and some forms of psychoanalysis itself. But we are 
seduced into this repose at the expense of experience. 
Perhaps more than for other psychoanalytic schools, paradoxes are at the 
heart of both the clinical experience and psychological theory of British Kleinian 
and object-relations psychoanalysts. Melanie Klein highlights the importance of 
moving from the paranoid-schizoid position, where paradoxes stir up anxiety so 
intolerable that we defend ourselves by splitting, denial and violent attacks, to the 
depressive position that, despite its name, is a more contented state of object- 
relating, when we can accept and survive the paradoxes presented by objects, the 
world and ourselves. Wilfred Bion, a prominent Kleinian, and W. R. D. Fairbairn, a 
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member of the Middle Group or Independent School of British psychoanalysis, 
further explain how we use our intellectual prowess as a defence mechanism to 
combat the more uncomfortable aspects of objects or ideas that present uswith 
irreconcilable conflict. Donald W. Winnicott demonstrates that paradoxes can have 
positive value, and thus emphasises that we need to learn how to tolerate these 
conflicts, to "survive our paradoxes. " Without paradox, he says, we cannot have 
experience, or cannot experience a life, either as individuals or as a culture. 
One of the central paradoxes of psychoanalysis that always seems to sit 
uncomfortably with psychoanalytic practitioners, theorists and critics alike is 
psychoanalysis's discursive status. Is it a science? or is it a narrative practice? If it is 
a science, what is the object of our inquiry? The drives? The unconscious? The ego? 
Language? Affect? Surprisingly, or perhaps not, this dilemma is not often addressed 
by psycboanalysts or those literary and cultural critics who utilise psychoanalysis in 
their own analyses. Freud himself was famously schizoid in this regard. He 
desperately wanted psychoanalysis to be a science, distinct from narrative practices, 
and it would seem that he generally considered his theoretical invention worthy of 
such a status. And yet, be always seems to have been aware that the practice of 
psychoanalysis and its theories made such an identification unlikely, if not 
impossible. For example, in the "Prefatory Remarks" to his case study of "Dora, " 
Freud discusses the difficulty in presenting the material in an acceptably scientific 
way. He believes, however, that "the publication of the case in a purely scientific 
and technical periodical should [ ... 
] afford a guarantee against unauthorized readers" 
and discourages those who would read his narrative "as a ronzan. ý clef designed for 
their private delectation" (1905b, 37). Quite literally at the opposite end, in the 
"Postscript" to this same case study, Freud delves into the importance of the 
transfei-ences in analytic practice, the presence of which he would later claim "put 
our scientific pretensions to shame" (1916-17,493). In the Dora postscript, Freud 
admits that the failure of the analysis was largely due to his own inability to be truly 
objective, to identify and master the transferences that Dora brought with her into 
the consulting room (see 1905, especially 160-1). But Freud took great pride in this 
unscientific component of psychoanalysis, and he used it to differentiate 
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psychoanalysis from other medical practices. By making the transferences an 
essential ingredient in psychoanalysis, he banished the possibility of its acceptance 
as a discourse that is predicated upon knowable, quantifiable cerlainties. At the very 
outset of his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanaljsis, Freud explained that while 
most medical techniques are introduced to patients in such a way as to "minimize its 
inconveniences and give him confident assurances of the success of treatment, " with 
psychoanalysis there are no such certainties provided; the analyst should, in fact, 
explain that the path they are embarking upon is difficult and likely to unhinge 
whatever certainties the analysand maintains (1916-17,39). 
If we follow the lineage of the Ur-father -we see this fundamental paradox 
dealt Nvith by his descendants in a whole range of ways. Freud's progeny are still 
undecided as to their status. Today, we find some people for whom psychoanalysis 
is, undisputcdly and unproblematically, a science like physics or chemistry. We find 
others who, following the apparent postmodern. eradication of metanarratives, are 
incapable of attributing any scientific status to psychoanalysis whatsoever. There are 
literary critics that insist, despite Freud's protestations, that the case study of Dora is 
simply a story, a narrative to be read like any other. Some of these literary critics, 
however, are paradoxically attracted to psychoanalysis for the very reason that it 
offers scientific certainties in a field - literary studies - that is notoriously short on 
objective positions from which to speak. (This was, at any rate, what I think first 
attracted me to psychoanalysis during my undergraduate studies. ) The 
psychoanalysts of the British school, by and large but not without exception, seem 
not to be too greatly troubled by psychoanalysis' uncertain status. Others, however, 
such as Jacques Lacan, regard as paramount the need for psychoanalysis to be 
recognised as a science. But this, I will argue, is not only a betrayal of Freud's own 
conception of psychoanalysis, but - and this is the more serious accusation - the 
drive to scientisation ultimately damages the subjects that psychoanalysis purports to 
help. 
In Part I of this thesis, I begin with an analysis of the contemporary subject 
and its environment, both of which are vaguely described as "postmodem. " I 
proceed to explain why I feel that the psychoanalytic model presently dominating 
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literary and cultural criticism, that is, Lacanian Psychostructuralism, is largely 
inadequate to redress the specific conflicts and crises that this subject endures. I 
argue that Lacanian theory, by taking solace in the certainty offered by the signifier, 
does not enable us to negotiate the paradoxes that are necessary for experience. In 
contrast to this, I offer some ideas presented by British psychoanalysis, those 
Kleinian and (primarily, in this study) Winnicottian concepts that encourage us to 
tolerate uncertainty and show us how to live to survive our paradoxes. In the second 
half of Part II re-examine subjectivity, language and, finally, literature through the 
lens of British psychoanalysis. But I am often asked if we really need more 
psychoanalytic visions of language, literature and subjectivity. Do we not already 
have tried, tested, and some would say, well-worn psychoanalytic conceptions of 
these issues? But Lacanian psychostructuralism and a peculiarly Lacanian Freud 
enjoy a status in the humanities that I find leaves many of their basic assumptions 
unchallenged. The introduction of a competing psychoanalytic perspective, 
therefore, might seem unnecessary, or merely doctrinal nit-picking. But I need to 
make it clear that my objections to Lacanian thought in literary and cultural theory 
are not mere academic exercises. It will also become clear that I do not wish merely 
to alter some of Lacan's initial premises, but through British object-relations 
radically to review our conceptual isati ons of psychoanalysis and, consequently, how 
we use psychoanalysis to conceive of the subject and culture. 
I offer here s9me initial investigations into how we may conceive of a 
Winnicottian and Kleinian approach to language and literature not as an end in itself 
but as a means to redress the contemporary crises of subjectivity, crises that I feel 
not only have literary and cultural theorists thus farfailed to address but may have 
implicitly - and sometimes explicitly - provoked and perpetuated. As opposed to 
orthodox Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, the work of Winnicott and Klein 
has until recently been left relatively unexplored in literary and cultural studies. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that Lacan is the psychoanalyst of choice for so many 
literary scholars, as Lacan's sweetly scented signifiers tempt us with the elevation of 
language to the most privileged place in subjective experience, ' while Winnicott and 
Klein threaten to inflict narcissistic injury by not privileging language to the same 
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extent and therefore force us to confront uncomfortable but necessary uncertainties 
in our conceptions of the subject. I hope that some of the unique contributions to 
literary and cultural studies that object-relations can offer will become evident 
throughout this thesis, but it might help to bear in mind the following points. First, 
and most fundamentally, I maintain Winnicott's insistence upon the primacy of 
being over knowing. Winnicott's maxim, "After being - doing and being done to. 
But first being" (1971,85) is the guiding principle that infuses everything that 
follows, and this reversal of the orthodox psychoanalytic project reveals to us new 
and better ways of examining subjective experience. For Winnicott, the subject 
comes into being through experience that is creative, understood not solely as the 
gift of artistic genius but a potential means of relating to the world in everyday 
experience. This creativity can be found in the productive negotiation of paradoxes 
that are characteristic of what Winnicott calls the potential spaces of subjective 
experience, those liminal areas that deny the opiatic solace of dualist binaries that 
are constructed as defences against the uncertainty that accompanies almost all 
human experience. These spaces are not simply metaphorical but real and material; 
they are the intersubjective locations of culture where we find creative articulations 
of language, literature and our own idiomatic voices. And finally, I insist throughout 
that these issues have material consequences and political implications in our 
cultural, socio-political and economic environments. 
I will then explore the possibilities for object-relations approaches to 
language, strategies that I think present us with an understanding of language as 
embodied, inscribed on the psycbe-soma and idiomatic to subjective experience. 
Such languages are thus potential tools to be used in helping us to survive the 
paradoxes between union and separation, internal and external worlds, subject and 
object, and thus lead us to realise subjective being. Finally, I offer an conception of 
literature as a liminal experience in a potential space of play, an investigation I will 
take up in the second part of this dissertation'when I examine contemporary British 
"magic realisf' fiction and the attempts to negotiate the paradoxes to be found there. 
I will also explore alongside these new psychoanalytic approaches to language and 
literature the work of Mikhail Bakbtin,, %vho I believe similarly sees language and 
6 
literature as a place "in between" reader and writer. I think that by bringing 
Winnicott into dialogue with Bakhtinwe may achieve a better understanding of how 
subjects use language, how we experience literature, what processes are involved 
and what possibilities literature offers for the creative, re-ontologising play of 
subjects. 
In Part II, I move from psychoanalysis that recognises the productive and 
creative potential of paradox to literature that explicitly fosters such uncertainty, 
providing us perhaps with those objects and spaces that allow us to revel in 
productive paradoxes. Many of the texts I examine in Part 11 have in no small way 
helped to shape the theoretical ideas that I present in this study, and so, rather than 
regarding Part 11 as an illustration of a theoretical model in some linear progression 
from thesis to object of analysis, this chapter should, rather, be regarded as 
something to be read alongside the theory, not imposed onto it from without. While 
choosing to focus on this mode 2 of literature has the advantage of providing a stark 
illustration of the theory I wish to present, I do recognise that I open myself to the 
accusation that these ideas may only be applicable to this specific literary genre. 
This is a criticism I must accept for now, though I believe that the parameters I set 
for what may be included in this category are wide enough to permit the exploration 
of a variety of literary styles and strategies. I do not know at this point if what I say 
in Part 11'will prove true for all forms of literature; but I must also admit that I am 
not overly concerned that it do so. I am not interested in presenting a meta- 
theoretical, objective methodology for all literature, understanding that not only is 
such a task impossible but that such a project itself kills the very kind of pluralism 
and dialogue that is essential to the kind of creative play that I seek to foster. I must 
leave it to future study to consider other literary genres and cultures. 3 
More specifically, I have chosen to structure these analyses around magic 
realist texts that originate in Britain. The reasons for this are straightforward: with 
the increasing proliferation of magic realist texts in contemporary literature 
throughout the world, it would be impossible to consider all relevant texts here. 
While it would doubtless be a valuable exercise to note the similarities between 
Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez and Angela Carter and Arundhati Roy, it would be careless 
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and irresponsible not to acknowledge simultaneously the important differences, the 
specific battles that they are waging, the specific discourses to which they are 
responding and the specific traditions with which they play. I will focus here 
therefore upon a few British authors who utilise this tradition: John Fowles, Sarah 
Waters, Joanne Harris, Patrick McGrath, John Murray, Jeanette Winterson, D. M. 
Thomas (occasionally), J. K. Rowling (with many reservations), but most especially 
Angela Carter, in particular, her works The Infernal Desire Machines ofDr Hoffman 
(1972) and Nights at the Circus (1984) which I think most closely share my 
concerns. 4 Of course, the status of any of these authors as "magic realist" is 
contestable. Carter was suspicious of the term applied to her work because she 
rightly perceived herself to be reacting to different social forces than those that 
produced Garcia Mdrquez (see Haffenden 1985, Peach 1998), and Sarah Waters, 
while comfortable with the term "gothic, " does not consider herself to be explicitly 
"magic realist. "5 This hesitancy to identify oneself as magic realist I suspect comes 
from a general resistance to classification, but there is also I think a genuine respect 
for the socio-political conditions that define magic realism's perceived origins in 
Latin America. As I do not want this to become an exercise in formalist literary 
criticism, I -%vill not here become mired in the minute of what constitutes a "magic 
realist" or "fantastic" text, as for example Todorov so painstakingly does, although I 
do offer some ideas as towhat I think charaqterises this mode at the beginning of 
Part 1. Certainly, there are some texts I discuss here that I know already may not be 
deemedproperly magic realist by most definitions, but with my own desire to 
proliferate and sustain irresolvable paradoxes, it would be hypocritical of me to 
insist on resolving categorically what does and does not qualify for inclusion. 
I believe that magic realism, as a mode of literature, can be historically and 
ideologically located. For some (for example, Zamora and Farris), magic realism is 
the dominant tradition of literature, dating back to the epics and pastorals of the 
Greeks, and is continued throughout the middle ages and European Renaissance, 
eclipsed only temporarily by the "mimetic constraints of nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century realism" (Zamora and Farris 1995,2). For others (for example, Monle6n), 
the fantastic is a specific tradition enabled by the dominance of Enlightenment 
8 
rationality and therefore exists only from the 1760s to the 1930s (Monle6n 1990). 
While it is probably true that some elements of what we would today call "magic 
realism" are to be found in a range of epochs and cultures, my study needs to focus 
on those specific socio-political and historical considerations of magic realism as it 
is manifest in contemporary British literature. Just as magic realism has developed in 
Latin American, Indian and African literature as a response to the tyrannies of 
imperialism (new and old) and the imposition of an objectivist cultural and literary 
ideal, I find that unique traditions have arisen in Euro-American literature to respond 
to specific cultural practices that threaten to deny subjective creativity. The use of 
magic realism to respond to (post)colonialism in developing nations is mirrored by 
the use of magic realism in industrialised Western nations to respond to 
(post)modemism and its discourses, including capitalism, patriarchy, homophobia, 
racism and religion. 
Doctrine and Identities: A Note on Psychoanalytic Schools 
In this study, I will be referring to a variety of psychoanalytic schools, and this will 
necessarily entail reproducing doctrinal ideas and identifications using a larger brush 
than I -would like. I will doubtless miss some nuances that distinguish schools of 
thought, or individuals within certain schools. For example, my reader will 
immediately notice that though I refer to "British psychoanalysis, " Anna Freud and 
her followers are glaringly omitted. This is not meant to diminish the immensely 
important contributions that this school has made; its battles with the Kleinian group 
during the Controversial Discussions of the early 1940s helped distinctive Meinian 
and Independent voices to emerge, and enriched the culture of British 
psychoanalysis (see Grosskurth 1986; Hinshel-vvood 1991,253-5). This omission is 
due simply to my preference for Kleinian and Independent thought. I do not rule out 
dialogue with the Anna Freudians, and only some of object-relations criticisms of 
"orthodox" or "classical" psychoanalysis apply to this school. 
This brings me to another clarification. When I refer to orthodox 
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psychoanalysis, I am referring to psychoanalysis that is primarily governed by the 
tenets of classical Freudian thought - including, for the most part, the Lacanian 
school. Critics and colleagues object to my identification of Lacan as "orthodox, " 
but for semantic reasons only (for example, "Lacan isn't orthodox, he's very 
original... "), and this might seem an odd term to apply to a man excommunicated 
from the International Psychoanalytic Association. But this label is justified when 
one considers the fundamental assumptions of psychoanalysis' various schools. The 
most obvious difference between what is referred to as orthodox psychoanalysis and 
object-relations lies in the former's focus upon the nature of the drives and the 
latter's focus upon the object upon which the drive is directed. "In orthodox 
Freudianism the object is merely the vehicle for the instinct on its way to discharge" 
(Young 1996c). The drives that lie at the heart of classical psychoanalysis' 
biologism, -a biologism that Lacan was trying to eschew - are recast in his 
psychostructuralism as drives in the service of symbolic determinism. Mile Klein 
adhered to the theory of drives, she never imagined these drives to exist 
independently, unattached to objects (Bott-Spillius 1983,327). 1 should note for the 
record that Lacan disapproved of a revisionist re-branding of "classical" 
psychoanalysis as "orthodox" as he saw it as a pejorative word that denigrated those 
who were true to Freud's true message (see Lacan 1953,7), though as I will discuss, 
his own loyalty to Freud is doubtful. Despite the obvious. and usual obstructions to 
clearly demarcated boundaries, I accept these as useful starting places to identify the 
unique nature of object-relations psychoanalysis. 
There are some that now question - not Nvithoutjust cause -whether Klein 
can be properly considered an object-relations theorist; her emphasis on the death 
drive making such an identification difficult. 6 Orthodox psychoanalysis, however, 
tends to see the subject as first and foremost pleasure-seeking, while object-relations 
theorists, following Klein's lead, eponymously regard the subject to be object- 
seeking. This marks a fundamental shift from the biology that governs much early 
psychoanalytic explorations, and in turn implies a shift from a focus on the subject 
itself and its intrapsychic forces to a focus on the subject's relationswith others. 
In addition to this distinction, I consider at least two other fundamental 
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assumptions. First, orthodox or classical psycboanalysts generally believe in primary 
narcissism, the initial stage of development where the infant does not recognise 
objects external to itself, takes its own ego as the object of libidinal love and 
believes in a fusion between itself and its mother. 7 The Kleinian and object-relations 
schools, on the other band, believe that the infant is object-seekingfrom birth. Many 
find that this is Klein's most fundamental theoretical difference from orthodox 
psychoanalysis and ego-psychology, although only British-school theorists seem to 
recognise this difference (see Mitchell 1981; Segal 1983; Bott-Spillius 1983,328-9; 
Hinshelwood 1991,354-60). This issue of primary narcissism marks not only an 
important theoretical division, but is also indicative of an even more fundamental 
ideological divide, and one that I think has radical consequences for how orthodox 
and object-relations psychoanalysis conceive the subject. Second, another criterion 
upon which I think -we can distinguish object-relations from orthodox psychoanalysis 
is perhaps less doctrinally inscribed but I think represents a much more significant 
difference in approaching the psychoanalytic scene itself. Freud, working within 
nineteenth-century rationalism, initially conceived of psychoanalysis as the "talking 
cure" - the idea being that if one could translate that which is unconscious into 
consciousness, one could cure an analysand through Enlightenment (see, for 
example, Freud 1916-17,486). For Lacan, similarly, analysis is prise de conscience 
- the act of becoming aware - whereby in articulating unconscious desire, words 
magically relieve the subject ofwhatever ails it. Although I do not think that Freud's 
vision of psychoanalysis was limited to this first notion of a cure, this is the 
rationalist, Enlightenment conception of psychoanalysis that Lacan seizes upon, and 
I find that this limited conception of psychoanalysis is shared by almost all orthodox 
approaches. Object-relations theorists accept that this is one strategy by which they 
can help their analysands, but are not limited by this narrow conception, 
emphasising instead the benefits of containing, facilitating, nursing, holding, in 
addition to interpretation. I do not want to discuss this at length here, as I will return 
to this issue later in the first section and in the second when I examine how this 
purely rationalist approach to subjectivity is challenged by contemporary 
psychoanalysis and literature alike. 
II 
Finally, I must also admit here to sometimes negotiating a path between 
Klein and Winnicott that purist disciples of either theorist may find problematic. 
Although I primarily employ Winnicott in this study I do not see myself as 
exclusively "Winnicottian, " whatever that means. There are times when I 
idiomatically use Kleinian tenninology and concepts That Winnicott himself found 
(at best) unhelpful and (at worst) inaccurate and ideologically suspect. I mention this 
not in a sel f-important attempt to highlight original thinking but so as to anticipate in 
advance any doctrinal inconsistencies that some may perceive in this study. 
12 
Endnotes 
1. See Minsky (1998). 
2. Discussing Todorov, Rosemary Jackson states that "It is perhaps more helpful to 
define the fantastic as a literary mode rather than a genre, and to place it between the 
opposite modes of the marvellous and the mimetic. The ways in which it operates 
can then be understood by its combination of elements of these two different 
modes... " (32; see also the discussion of the fantastic as a genre in Cornwell 1990 
34-41 and especially 140-59). 1 tend to accept Jackson's identification, but as I will 
repeatedly express with regards to the pedantic semantics that tend too often to 
dominate discussions of the fantastic, I do not wish to become entangled in haggling 
over such terms. As will become clear below, I like the identification of the fantastic 
as a mode between others that is impossible - and undesirable - to pin down. 
3. Others, however, have applied Winnicott's notion of the potential space to other 
periods and genres of literature, for example, Shakespeare (Schwartz), Romantic 
poetry (Turner) and twentieth century modernist and postmodernist fiction 
(Schwab). 
4.1 am not alone in reading Carter through the lens of British psychoanalysis; Linda 
Ruth Williams (1995) and Linden Peach (1998) both find it advantageous to read 
Carter through Winnicott and Klein rather than the orthodox Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalytic models. 
5. In conversation. 22 Oct. 2001. 
6. Stephen A. Mitchell (198 1), for example, sees Klein as a transitional figure 
"straddling Freudian drive theory and relational concepts" (39 1), offering Fairbairn 
as the "purest and most comprehensive" object-relations theorist. See also 
Hinshelwood 1991,367-73. 
7. Green explains that there are different types of "primary narcissism": 
Sometimes he [Freud] refers to absolute primary narcissism as the 
reduction of tension to the zero level in accordance with the Nirvana 
principle; sometimes he refers to the result of the passage from 
autoeroticism to the subject's unification. 
(Green 1986,97) 
My meaning of primary narcissism here corresponds to the second of Freud's 
conceptualisations. 
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- PARTI - 
Theoretical Investigations 
What's Wrong Now? Postmodern Subjects 
L ... ] there is a great but abstract world, where people are out of 
contact with each other, egoistically sealed-off from each other, 
greedily practical; where labor is differentiated and mechanized, 
where objects are alienated from the labor that produced them. It 
is necessary to constitute this great world on a new basis, to 
render it familiar, to humanize it. 
(Bak-htin 1981,234) 
Who'sAVhose Postmodern? 
The problem of postmodernism - how its fundamental 
characteristics are to be described, whether it even exists in the 
first place, whether the very concep is of any use, or is, on the 
contrary, a mystification - this problem is at one and the same time 
an aesthetic and a political one. 
(Jameson 1991,55) 
"Postmodemism" is not a term I like using. I am becoming increasingly suspicious 
of it - for reasons that should become clear below - and I sometimes feel as though I 
use it merely as a convenient shortcut for a complex subject and environment. But, 
following Jameson, I find that I cannot not use the terrn. As my own starting point 
for thinking about contemporary culture and art, it has informed so much of my 
thinking with regard to the ideas I am trying to convey here. There are doom-sayers 
in every culture, proclaiming this or that to be a threat to whatever myths that society 
treasures the most; in our culture, it is "the subject" that has assumed this privileged 
place of cherished, and therefore endlessly persecuted, artefact. Having said that, I 
do believe that in our contemporary society we face a specific set of challenges to 
our experience as subjects, but I do not want to make the error of confusing and 
conflating the manifestations of severe psychopathology %vith general cultural 
malaise. 
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I am not sure whether the term "postmodern crises" is an accurate 
description of the contemporary threats to subjectivity. Part of this uncertainty stems 
from the fact, of course, that everyone seems to have their own conceptualisation of 
"the postmodern. " I cannot pretend here to present a version of postmodernism that 
'will satisfy everyone, but I Nvish to highlight certain features of our contemporary 
society that for me constitute the postmodern. First, when I refer to postmodernism, I 
am referring primarily to cultural, not solely aesthetic, phenomena. When I speak of 
postmodem I am not referring to only the death of metanarratives, pastiche, self- 
reflexivity, irony, simulacra, ahistoricity, or the myriad of other age-old literary 
devices that are sometimes said to be postmodernism, although these I think emerge 
in response to the cultural milieu. My postmodern -which is not to exclude others 
I 
- is the postmodem that is concerned only Nvith surfaces, where meaning is 
unattainable or unnecessary, where the play of signifiers is privileged over the 
signified, and representation is an end in itself This postmodem is the marketplace 
of the bi-and, not of things but of images, where we invest our libidinal and 
emotional energies in the logo, the commodity, the word. This is the postmodern of 
late-capitalism, but whereas Jameson finds that the postmodem cannot have come 
about without some fundamental mutation in the sphere of culture (1991,47-8), 1 
wish to demonstrate that the postmodem subject does not mark a radical break from 
its ancestors but is the inevitable child of bourgeois capitalism, the Enlightenment 
and Cartesian reason. I also do not like the terin "late capitalism" - as Eagleton says, 
-sve really have no idea how developed capitalism is at this point (1996,90) and 1, for 
one, do not want to tempt fate. (Perhaps the terms "consumer" or "postindustrial" 
society are more appropriate; see Jameson in Lyotard 1979, xvii. ) Also like Eagleton, 
I see the culture and products of our capitalism - including, I Nvill suggest, some 
postmodem theory - as a "wholly reffied, rationalized, administered regime" 
(Eagleton 1990,369). 
My conceptualisations of postmodernity are also informed by the clinical 
perceptions of many object-relations analysts, though none that I have found refer 
explicitly to "postmodernity" - rightly, they are likely to be wary of conflating their 
clinical perceptions of specific analysands with cultural epidemics, and though I 
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offer their case studies as examples of the postmodem malaise, I need likewise to 
proceed -with caution. Although they differ in terminology, contemporary object- 
relations psychoanalysts generally find the traditional pathologic categories - 
neurosis, psychosis, hysteria - inadequate to describe the analysands that they find 
on their couch. 2 By this I do not mean that we have seen the "end of the bourgeois 
ego, or monad, " and therefore the "end of the psychopathologies of that ego" 
(Jameson 1991,15). Rather, I think, there has been a change in the 
conceptualisations of the self since the inception of psychoanalysis. I do not 
subscribe to the idea that we have seen the end of the bourgeois self, the death of the 
isolated, complete individual and the birth of a fragmented being: it is more likely 
that, theoretically, we have come to appreciate how the self always has been 
fragmented, although I suspect that most contemporary capitalist subjects are as 
likely to be enchanted by the thought of their own individual autonomy and 
completeness as their ancestors were two hundred years ago. There have been 
changes in the capitalist mode of production, and therefore in the conception and 
constructions of self, but I find that too many postmodem critics overestimate how 
different a creature the contemporary, "late capitalist" subject is from the bourgeois, 
nineteenth century or modernist "monad. " 
Instead of neurotics and psychotics, we find analysands diagnosed as 
suffering from a "borderline" state, that is, possessing symptoms characteristic of 
both of these traditional categories - though as Didier Anzieu points out, this label is 
ironic given that the most common feature of such subjects is an absence of borders 
or limits (1989,7; see also Green 1986,30-83). 3 Other object-relations analysts 
describe many analysands who are seen to be victims of pathological defensive 
splitting - of sign from referent, signifier from signified, if one wants to use this 
tenninology, but this splitting is only symptomatic of a more fundamental splitting 
of subject from object, of psyche from soma, of what it means to knoiv from what it 
means to he. Winnicott offers a starting place for conceiving of these psychic 
processes: three anxieties associated with insecurity (1952) arising from problems 
with the earliest developmental processes. Taking his cue from Klein, Winnicott 
identifies three early processes that are essential to the development of subjectivity: 
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integration, personalisation and realisation - the last of these Winnicott seems least 
able to label and spends the most time trying to understand (see Winnicott 1945). 
Failures or difficulties in any of these processes lead to deep-seated conflicts and 
anxieties throughout life. Disintegration or unintegi-ation involves a lack of 
boundaries, a poor relationship between the self and the environment and the 
inability to distinguish between the two, the inability to tie oneself together, the 
"feeling that the ego is in bits" (Klein 1946,10) due to excessive splitting. This does 
not mean that Winnicott, Klein or object-relations theorists in general see the subject 
as "unified" in a sense opposed by postmodern enthusiasts of the fragmented self. 
Writers from other psychoanalytic schools are too quick to leap to this assumption, 
gleefully thinking that they have caught object-relations in a pre-postmodernist 
episteme 4 or as endorsing the bourgeois monadic self (see, for example, Lacan 1953 
and Lowenstein 1994). Anzieu, in his excellent examination of The Skill Ego, 
perceives his analysands to be lacking boundaries, limits and "livable territories" in 
their embodied experiences of themselves, thus leading to a threat of disintegration 
(1989,8). Ian Craib (1989) points out that unintegration also hinders the ability to 
relax, "which in infancy depends upon the presence and safety of enviroranent 
supplied by the mother" (16 1), which is also related to Winnicott's conception of the 
cccapacity to be alone" (195 8). And, as Walter A. Stewart reports, "a definition of 
boundaries of the subject is essential for all later discussion" (1964,171) of the 
subject, of a self or selves - indicating that before we can be neurotic, or psychotic, 
or hysterical, that we must address this more fundamental issue of boundaries. 
Depei-sonalisation - another increasingly common diagnostic categorY5 - describes 
the lack of a relationship between the psyche and soma, which -we can also relate to 
subjects who are disaffected (McDougall 1989,93), unable to realise embodied 
experience. Such subjects thus rely upon only a false-entity mind-psyche that enters 
into aworld of objects which demands compliance from the subject. Analysands 
lack emotional engagement with their environments, and complain of a general 
sense of non-being, of existing merely as empty objects - or signifiers - in a world 
6 
of meaningless objects. Bion describes such analysands as automatons, unable to 
establish relations with others; "he feels able only to establish the counterpart of a 
17 
relationship in which such sustenance can be had as inanimate objects can provide" 
and in analysis "he can have analytic interpretations that he feels to be either flatus 
or contributions remark-able for what they are not rather than for what they are" 
(1962,12). 
Finally, Winnicott describes "the feeling that the centre of gravity of 
consciousness transfers from the kernel to the shell, from the individual to the care 
orthe technique" (1952,99). As with the corresponding developmental process, it is 
on this third anxiety that Winnicott focuses most of his attention, and again a 
suitable label seems to elude him. As Winnicott eventually labelled the process 
"realisation, " we may call this failure derealisation, though I also often employ the 
term desubjeciffication here, as I regard the movement of attention, or the centre of 
gravity, from the individual to the technique to be an objectification of the subject, 
where the structure becomes more important than the self, the relations between 
signs or commodities more important than the relations between subjects or 
producers. 7 Such subjects have no sense of themselves as real, again not in a 
Lacanian conception of what is "real, " but having no sense of themselves as 
subjects, beings with internal life, living in a responsive external world; there is 
"nothing at the centre, " nothing but a void, only emptiness and hunger (Winnicott 
1986,49-52). Desubjectification implies the consistent negation of the creative 
element and the imposition of a discourse, or any system, that demands compliance 
from the subject. The failure of this developmental process can be seen implicitly to 
inform much of Winnicott's identifications of psychopathology, not only the 
fundamental issue of creativity and compliance but also the distinction between the 
true and false selves. 
The "Normal" Postmodern Analysand 
Many contemporary object-relations psychoanalysts have noted the appearance of 
these or similar anxieties in their analysands. Christopher Bollas and Joyce 
McDougall, for example, independently describe the norniotic and the normopath, 
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abnormally normal analysands who are ebaracterised by "the numbing and eventual 
erasure of subjectivity, in favour of a self that is conceived as a material object 
among other man-made products in the object world" (Bollas 1987,135). Bollas 
notes that "We are attending an increasing number of disturbances in personality 
which may be characterised by partial deletions of the subjective factor" (1987, 
135); he cites "blank selves, " "blank psychosis" and "organising personalities" as 
cousins of the normotic, "who has been successful in neutralising the subjective 
element in personality" (136). In a rare explicit psychoanalytic reference to the 
social mode of production that would doubtlessly satisfy even Jameson, Bollas 
regards the normotic to be "a commodity object in the world of human production" 
(13 6), like Bion's depersonalised analysand who cannot relate to others but only to 
inanimate objects. Such an individual is more concerned Nvith systems than the self 
and complies with the discourses thrust upon him, perhaps, as I suggest later, like 
the subject conceived by psychostructuralism. McDougall adds that normopaths are 
entirely concerned with surfaces, resisting all attempts to analyse meaningfully 
"anything to do with their inner psychic world, insisting on external reality as the 
only dimension of interest" (McDougall 1989,93). Subjective meaning for the 
normotic and the normopath is only ever temporarily lodged in an external, foreign 
object, objects that cannot be introjected and cannot contain or express meaning for 
8 the subject. For Bollas and McDougall, as for Bion's automaton, analysis is 
characterised by an erasure of meaning, an attack on any connection with the 
analyst. 
Waging Battle Against the Shadows of Old Enemies: 
The Failure of Postmodern Discourses 
Postmodernism describes not only a cultural phenomenon but also a particular 
critical environment, or "theoretical discourse, " to borrow Jameson's term, 
including certain imaginings of post-structuralism. But postmodern theory, I suggest, 
has remarkably failed to address the crises of subjectivity experienced in the 
postmodern world. In fact, this theoretical postmodern has consistently exacerbated 
19 
these problems by accepting and perpetuating the fetish of the signifier, the focus 
upon solely epistemological concerns and limited conceptualisations of subjectivity. 
Of course, not all critical theory in literary or cultural studies needs to redress these 
crises, but I find that too many contemporary critics claim that they are writing about 
the subject but are, instead, focussed only upon the ideas to which they have sworn 
greater loyalty. It is my belief that the inability of postmodem theory to redress the 
crises of the subject is fundamentally due to the strategic defence mechanisms and 
ideological assumptions it shares with postmo-dem culture. Part of my suspicion of 
the term and concept of postmodernism lies in the fact that the postmodem is only 
ever perceived in terms of epistemological crises -a perception that derives from 
the single-minded rationality of Enlightenment thinking that perpetuates the 
ontological crises that I think-, with Winnicott, are increasingly the real threat posed 
to subjectivity. 
There is an interesting correlative here between the worlds of academia and 
contemporary corporate capitalism. Since the 1980s or thereabouts, it seems that 
capitalism's increased emphasis upon the brand, the signifter of the commodity 
rather than the commodities themselves and their production has been mirrored in 
academia's own emphasis on identity, on the signifiers of the self rather than the 
subject. In No Logo (2000), Naomi Klein offers a history of recent academic protest, 
from the death-of-the-author, transgressive, anti-authoritarian 1960s, to the "ID 
warriors" and "political correctness wars" of the 1980s and 1990s, to what she 
regards as a new critique of twenty-first century capitalism that rebels against the 
brand and tries to re-position human beings at the centre of global politics - whether 
this latest phase actually germinates or withers in the pod remains to be seen. 
Neither Klein nor I (nor Eagleton), wish to denigrate any of the advances made by the 
movement towards a more inclusive or "politically correcf' language and 
representation - that is best left to the backlash from the right - but I think we 
should ask: to what extent do these identity wars - still the main thrust of a great 
deal of critical theory - reflect the corporate obsession with the signifier, the brand? 
Klein investigates how in the 1980s the issue of representation was "no longer one 
tool among many, it was the key" (2000,108) and this, Klein suggests, is when an 
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important transformation occurred: images and symbols, "mirrors and metaphors, " 
the lens through which we regarded ourselves and our political struggles, became 
confused with, or at least more important than, reality itself 
So outraged were we media children by the narrow and oppressive 
portrayals in magazines, in books and on television that we convinced 
ourselves that if the typecast images and loaded language changed, so 
too would the reality [ ... ] 
The more importance we placed on representational issues, the more 
central a role they seemed to elbow for themselves in our lives - 
perhaps because, in the absence of more tangible political goals, any 
in I ovement that is about fighting for better social mirrors is going to 
eventually fall victim to its own narcissism. 
(N. Klein 2000,108-9,124) 
Just as corporations relentlessly seek to promote the identity of the brand, a brand 
that is emptied of any depth or real signification, reflecting only itself, literary 
criticism has focussed so intently upon the sign or the signifier that these have come 
to overshadow, and sometimes replace, the referent or the subject. Since the 1980s, 
the period of Jameson's late-capitalism, successful corporations have sought to 
produce brands, not products, moving from a "commodity marketplace" to an 
"image-based" one. 9 "'Brands, not products! ' became the rallying cry for a 
marketing renaissance led by a new breed of companies that saw themselves as 
'meaning brokers' instead of product producers" (N. Klein 2000,21). And since the 
1980s, postmodem politics in academia have been more focussed upon the image, in 
naming and the symbolic process that we use to identify ourselves at the expense of 
the subject itself Like the corporations, it seems as though postmodem academia is 
trying to free itself from the "corporeal world of commodities, manufacturing and 
products to exist on another plane" (22). What we have failed to notice, Klein 
suggests, is that these battles for representation are easily accommodated by 
corporate capitalism that is itself more interested in marketing and manipulating 
signs. "Identity politics weren't fighting the system, or even subverting it. When it 
came to the vast new industry of corporate branding, they were feeding it [ ... I the 
21 
victories of identity politics have amounted to a rearranging of the furniture while 
the house burned down" (113,123). 
Terry Eagleton similarly notices failures in our Post-Modem (insisting upon 
the institutionali sing capitals) discourses, including deconstruction, post- 
structuralism, certain shades of post-colonialism and post-feminism and the "cult of 
otherness" (2001,19). In one of his scathing polemics in The London Review of 
Books, this time (1999) against Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's discursive strategies - 
primarily, what he sees as the deliberately alienating and obscure prose of 
deconstruction and post-structuralism - Eagleton finds that such discursive practices 
are a symptom of a "politically-directionless" (read: American, liberal) Left. Thus, 
without a major political outlet, postmodern theory adopts a self-reverential outlook; 
it becomes "unpleasantly narcissistic, " as Eagleton claims, and becomes a symptom 
of the Reason it pretends to battle (1996,7; 1999,4). Eagleton finds that many of 
(American) postmodemism's victories are hollow: their ahistorical sense of self- 
importance leading to "a certain chronic tendency to caricature the notions of truth 
adhered to by its opponents, setting up straw targets of transcendentally disinterested 
knowledge in order to reap the self-righteous delights of ritually bowling them over 
[ 
... 
] For nobody who had read a government communiqu6 can be in the least 
surprised that truth is no longer in fashion" (1990,378-9). Or as he phrases it in an 
1985 article in The New Left Review, "Postmodemism [ ... ] commits the apocalyptic 
error of believing that the discrediting of this particular representational 
epistemology is the death of truth itself, just as it sometimes mistakes the 
disintegration of certain traditional ideologies of the subject for the subject's final 
disappearance" (1985,70). 
Eagleton also rips into Post-Modemism for what he regards to be typically 
American, liberalist, have-my-capitalism-and-my-conscience-loo pseudo-leftists, 
who have found "a way of being politically radical without necessarily being anti- 
capitalist [ ... I Like much cultural theory, it can allow one to speak darkly of 
subversion while leaving one's actual politics only slightly to the left of Edward 
Kennedy's" (1999,6) - damning words indeed. Postmodern theory, Eagleton finds, 
"is all rather closer to Walter Pater than to Walter Benjamin" (1985,69). The. 
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ceaseless bombardment upon metanarratives has had its positive impact, Eagleton 
finds, but has become "a convenient doctrine for those -%vho dislike what the system 
does while doubting that they will ever be strong enough to bring it down" (1999,6). 
Eagleton, like Naomi Klein, finds that Post-Modemism manifests itself in a 
misguided elevation of representation. "The post-structuralist emphasis on 'subject- 
position' is oddly akin to the existentialist obsession with authenticity: what matters 
is less what you say than the fact that you are saying it" (1999,6). 
Eagleton, like Jameson, sees postmodemism. as a "logical" response to the 
type of capitalism to be found in our age. Eagleton, however, further empbasises 
how postmodern theory also grows out of - and is, in some way, colliplicit with 
this mode of production. Postmodern theory, Eagleton finds, thus makes a 
"theoretical virtue out of historical necessity" (1996,16), triumphantly endorsing a 
move to schizoid, decentred subjects that are a cultural and economic inevitability - 
rather like welcoming the Second Coming only after the dead are rising from their 
graves. Postmodern theory is not, therefore, a i-esponse to a particular brand(ing) of 
capitalism, but an extension of it. For Eagleton, postmodernism forgets that "the 
hybrid, plural and transgressive are at a certain level as naturally coupled with 
capitalism as Laurel is with Hardy" (1996,39). Postmodernism is not, therefore, 
merely "some sort of theoretical mistake. It is among other things the ideology of a 
specific historical epoch in the West" (1996,121). In their book on global 
capitalism, Empire (2000), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri similarly claim that 
postmodemism and posteolonial theory are symploniatic of the shift in power and 
economic relations that characterises capitalism today. In this sense, they see 
postmodemism as being on par with Islamic, Christian and Nationalist 
fundamentalism, the difference being that postmodernism appeals to the winners in 
the game of global capitalism, fundamentalism to its losers (150). 10 Like Naomi 
Klein, Hardt and Negri feel that postmodernism has failed to identify the "real 
enemy" and, in the process, is too easily assimilated by capitalism: 
the postmodemist and postcolonialist theorists Nvho advocate a 
politics of difference, fluidity and hybridity in order to challenge the 
binaries and essentialism of modem sovereignty have been 
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outflanked by the strategies of power. Power has evacuated the 
bastion they are attacking and has circled around to their rear to join 
them in the assault in the name of difference This new enemy not 
only is resistant to the old weapons but actually thrives on them, and 
thus joins its would-be antagonists in applying them to the fullest. 
(Hardt and Negri 2000,13 8) 
Eagleton and Hardt and Negri all rain on the postmodern parade in ironic 
celebration of its radical opposition to the bourgeois Enlightenment. "A long time 
ago, " Eagleton sardonically historicises, "we fell into an obscure disaster known as 
Enlightenment, to be rescued around 1972 by the first lucky reader of Ferdinand de 
Saussure" (1996,23). Hardt and Negri deflate the belief that "Enlightenment is the 
problem and postmodernism is the solution" (2000,140), claiming that 
postmodemism is only a skirmish against the "tradition of modem sovereignty" - 
not an insignificant endeavou r, they concede - rather than an all-out war against all 
facets of Enlightenment and modemity. Postmodernism becomes very confused, 
Hardt and Negri fi nd, when it looks to liberate us from the contemporary 
manifestations of power because they cannot recognize these for what they are, as 
they are fighting along side each other. "Postmodemists are still waging battle 
against the shadows of old enemies" (142). "The structures and logics of power in 
the contemporary world are entirely immune to the 'liberatory' weapons of the 
postmodem politics of difference" (142), Hardt and Negri suggest, because we fight 
alongside them using the same weapons: the politics and economics of difference 
and demographics. To signal how well postmodemists are faring in this global 
struggle, Hardt and Negri conclude that "postmodem theories focus their attention so 
resolutely on the old forms of power they are running from, with their heads turned 
backwards, that they tumble unwittingly into the welcoming anus of the new power" 
(142). 
Naomi Klein, Eagleton, Hardt and Negri do not Nvish to paint all 
contemporary theory with such damning broad brushstrokes - postmodernists are not 
just the "lackeys of global capitalism, " clarify Hardt and Negri (138). But there are 
numerous instances of the corporate obsession with brands mirrored in our elevation 
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of the disembodied signifier in postmodern theory, where signifiers are transformed 
from a tool of subjective communication to the totality of the subject itself Just as 
global capitalism keeps us in a world of brand names and meaningless commodities, 
we come to live in the symbolic order where everything and everyone is a signifier, 
and affect is relegated to that which we cannot represent, that wbich we cannot put a 
label on. This is not to say that postmodern academia has been a conscious co- 
conspirator in furthering the development of contemporary global capitalism, ' I nor 
does it mean that these movements in academia or capitalism have only begun since 
the 1980s, as some wrongly accuse Klein's economic analysis of not sufficiently 
historicising the development of capitalism. 12 
These political, economic and philosophical developments can be traced 
back to eighteenth-century discourses of capitalism and Enlightenment, if not 
earlier. Marx's concept offietishism applies not only to the practices of capitalism in 
the last two hundred or so years but also increasingly to our conception of the 
subj ect-as-sign. As with religion, the brand, the signifier, "the products of the human 
brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter 
into relations both with each other andwith the human race" (Marx 1867,165). 
Marx argues for a society in which the "social relations between individuals in the 
performance of their labour appear [ ... ] as their own personal relations, and are not 
disguised as social relations between things, between the products of labour" (Marx 
1867,170); both capitalism and our theoretical strategies increasingly confuse this 
relation, inverting it, substituting the relationship between things, between signifiers, 
for the real relations that exist between people. We need to examine to what extent, 
in Robert Young's words, the subject has been de-ontologised in favour of the 
ontologisation of the signifier (1989). 
Postmodemism also over-estimates how its own tenets have seeped into 
culture as a whole. While reading postmodernists' observations on the death of the 
metanarratives expressed by an academic and artistic elite, one cannot but notice 
that metanarratives continue to proliferate and maintain as firm a grip upon Western 
culture as ever before. "For every post-structuralist fastidiously sceptical of truth, " 
Eagleton observes, "there are millions of ordinary folk out there for whom seeing is 
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believing" (2000b, 34). Religion has had to concede its monopoly as the 
unchallenged metadiscourse, but it is still there and now shares hearts and minds 
-with science, capitalism, pharmaceutical-psychiatry, individualism, and an almost 
endless list of such upstarts. An American President cannot get elected without 
openly worshipping God, or at least the religious right that represents him, and in 
Ontario, the Conservative Party swept to power in two successive elections, 
seducing the majority of voters with their no-nonsense appeal to the unassailable 
metanarrative of Common Sense (a cause also briefly taken up by William Hague's 
Conservatives in 2001 British general election, and also something which implicitly, 
I think, underlies the appeal of George Bush, Jr. ). Postmodernism itself may not be 
immune to the charms and promises of such transcendental certainty; while 
declaring the death of metanarratives, postmodem culture and theoretical discourses 
alike have not given up the quest for such metanarrative to call their own. Eagleton 
finds that the anti-foundationalism of Post-Modernism has become itself the central 
organising principle, now occupying "the lofty transcendental place vacated by 
previous candidates for the job, such as God, Geist or Reason" (2000,10). 
Thus, postmodemism does not mark as radical a break in human thought as 
we might hope. The Impossibility of the Metanarrative is the new metanarrative, and 
a convenient one for capitalists on both the left and right. As I shall demonstrate 
with regard to transgression in Part H, universal particularism is no effective 
response to universal universalism. Eagleton is frustrated by his Post-Modem 
enemies' (this time, Stanley Fish and, it seems, most American academics) failure 
"to grasp that such a militant particularism is just the flipside of the vacuous 
universalism it deplores, rather than a genuine alternative to if' (2000,11). Eagleton 
quotes Peter Osbome, who pointed out that "the narrative of the death of 
metanarrative is itself gander than most of the narratives it would consign to 
oblivion" (1996,34). Jameson similarly remarks how theory "has seemed unique, if 
not privileged, among the postmodem arts and genres in its occasional capacity to 
defy the gravity of the zeitgeist and to produce schools, movements, and even avant- 
gardes where they are no longer supposed to exist" (Jameson 1991, xvi); critical 
theory has constructed against its own better judgement, in other words, 
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metanarratives that tell us that such discourses are untenable. It is symptomatic that 
Lacanian ideas are so widely assimilated by so many contemporary critics of all 
schools both in the UK and North America - from Juliet Mitchell to Judith Butler to 
Jameson and even Eagleton - despite being prescriptive and dogmatic, while British 
psychoanalysis, particularly the Independent school, which is explicitly determined 
to remain unswayed by doctrinal authoritarianism, is largely ignored in 
postmodernism theory. Flax, who extols the decentring, positive aspect of 
postmodemism, correctly finds that "object-relations theory is more compatible with 
postmodernism than Freudian or Lacanian analysis because it does not require a 
fixed or essentialist view of 'human nature"' (1990,110), although I would say that 
at least implicitly all versions of psychoanalysis posit some conception of human 
nature, though this need not necessarily be as bad a thing as postmodernism 
suggests. What is dubious is the way in wbich the concept of an essential human 
nature is maintained by stealth: although part of Lacan's appeal in the postmodem 
environment lies in his apparent social constructivism, he does posit his own brand 
of human nature, as I will demonstrate below. 
But what alternative do we have? Many seem to appreciate these problems of 
(post)structuralist, postmodem critical theory without uncovering the underlying 
trouble or envisioning an alternative "way out. " For example, I agree -with Jameson 
that "postmodernism is the consumption of sheer commodification as a process" 
(199 1, x) and that postmodernist theory is a symptom of late capitalism. But whereas 
Flax, Jameson and others regard postmodern theory to be those discourses that 
radically seek to abandon the very concept of "truth, " I find that many of those 
postmodern discourses seek to ground an objective approach to subjectivity in 
language, in the rationality of the subject, following the lead of Saussure, Uvi- 
Strauss and Lacan, who are themselves only following in the thoroughly Enlightened 
footsteps of Descartes (again, as 1 explain below). For instance, in the generally 
astute "The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, " Jameson acknowledges that 
postmodern "depthlessness" finds its prolongation in contemporary theory, but later, 
in the same sentence, follows Lacan's depthless,,, vholly linguistic conceptualisation 
of schizophrenia (1991,6). Or, again to pick unfairly on Jameson, be recognises the 
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"waning of affect" in postmodem culture (1991,10), but nevertheless follows a 
psychoanalytic conceptualisation of the subject which excludes affect, the emotions, 
and examines only representation, the signifier, the image. This depersonalising 
tendency of postmodem theory can be seen most often and evidently in thework of 
Jacques Lacan, who draws together two of literary and cultural studies' favourite 
sons in the monstrous hybrid of psychostructuralism. 
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People Aren't Words: Critiques of Lacanian Psych ostru ctu ral ism 
X (aged 9): Daddy, what is analysis? What do you do with your 
patients? 
* (his brother, aged 111/2): Analysis is... analysis. Just like you do 
logical analysis or grammatical analysis at school, well, 
Papa does the same thing with his patients. 
* (peremptorily and rather indignantly): Oh, no! People aren't 
words! 
(conversation between a psychoanalyst's sons; from Green 1973, xiv) 
It remains to me to prove to you whether or not this notion can be 
developed into a concept capable of scientific use, that is to say, 
capable of objectifýing facts of a comparable order in reality, or, 
more categorically, of establishing a dimension of experience 
whose objectified facts may be regarded as variables. 
(Lacan 1966,8) 
it is a hallmark of madness when an adult puts too powerful a 
claim on the credulity of others, forcing them to acknowledge the 
sharing of an illusion that is not their own. 
(Winnicott 1951,231)" 
With my interest in psychoanalysis, I am most familiarwith those approaches to 
contemporary literature and culture that employ Lacanian perspectives, and I might 
seem to single out unfairly this school of thought for criticism. I do recognise that 
Lacanians have provided many interesting and sometimes important readings of 
literature. However, the ubiquity of Lacanian concepts in our (postmodern) 
theoretical discourses and the manner in which his terms and ideas have been taken 
up in our everyday discursive language necessitates, I think, some unrepentant 
criticism. I would eventually like to construct a more dialogic debate between Lacan 
and object-relations approaches to literary and cultural studies, but I fear that right 
now Lacan's voice is too loud, too overpowering in this space for play. To me, it 
seems as if we have aligned ourselves with Lacan's scientisation of psychoanalysis 
in order to claim a positivistic status for our own literary and cultural analyses. 
Despite our collective efforts, psychoanalysts, linguists and literary critics 
share some persistent, niggling problems: Prematurely declaring the death of the 
metanarrative, we live in a culture that cherishes the promises such discourses offer. 
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Most discourses still at least unconsciously wish to offer certainties and unassailable 
objectivity. However, psychoanalysis and literary and cultural studies lack an 
invariable object that can be subjected to such scientific scrutiny, and we look 
enviously upon chemistry, physics or biology that do have such an object, and 
therefore reap the benefits of respectability, recognition and funding that a 
discursive status bestows. Freud, linguists and literary critics have all adopted a 
simulation of scientific methodology - Freud's case studies, structuralism's 
synchronic analysis, formalism's archetypes, for example - but still lacked an 
acceptable clearly defined object. The subjective element of Freud's analyses, the 
spoken word and storytelling always taint what seek to be objective, water-tight 
discourses. But Lacan declares that there is a foundation upon which we can erect 
such a discourse, an object that is shared by the linguist, the psychoanalyst and the 
literary critic: the signifier. 
There are many places where I disagree, %vith Lacan, varying in degrees of 
seriousness and severity: His theory offers only an intrapsychic picture of the 
subject, where that painted by object-relations is intersubjective; 14 Lacan's 
worldview is thoroughly patriarchal, however useful and interesting some feminist 
interpretations of his work have been (Julia Kristeva, for example); I find that his 
concepts of desire and lack serve to naturalise a capitalist conception of the subject; 
his belief in primary narcissism is unsupported by neonate studies. I'will address 
these issues in, %vbat follows to an extent but here I want to focus on the aspect of 
Lacan's thought that I think relates most directly to my conception of postmodern 
subjective experience, and wbich I think is most directly addressed by the authors I 
examine in the next section. I find that the Lacanian fetishism of language and the 
objectification of the subject - central to the Lacanian project as a whole - not only 
is incapable of redressing the crises of postmodemity but actively exacerbates and 
perpetuates the postmodern crises of subjectivity. How is it that language, a too[ of 
human communication, becomes more worthy of our study than the subjects who 
fashion it for their use? I have tried to isolate this target as much as possible for the 
sake of maintaining focus in this limited space, though this issue is so fundamental 
to the difference between Lacanian and object-relations thought that other issues are 
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bound to enter this space. 
Lacan's Scientisation of Psychoanalysis 
r ... ] you will scarcely be able to reject ajudgement that the 
philosophy of today has retained some essential features of the 
animistic mode of thought - the overvaluation of the magic of 
words and the belief that the real events in the world take the 
course which our thinking seeks to impose on them. 
(Freud 1933,201)15 
If psycho-analysis is to be constituted as the science of the 
unconscious, one must set out from the notion that the 
unconscious is structured like a language. 
(Lacan 1973,203) 
The most fundamental problem I have with Lacanian conceptions of psychoanalysis 
can be summed up by his insistence on examining the subject wholly on 
epistemological grounds, and thus conceiving of a subject that is desubjectified, 
reduced to a mere object of scientific study. This is necessitated by Lacan's desire 
for psychoanalysis to assume its place with biology and mathematics as a pure 
science; however, psychoanalysis has no object which can be subjected to scientific 
scrutiny, so Lacan, with a prestidigitation borrowed from Saussure, elevates 
language to this privileged place. 
Saussure, in pulling an objective rabbit from a hat of infinite variation, offers 
hope to psychoanalysts and literary critics desperate for scientific legitimacy. But 
Saussure explicitly shows why and how he performs the trick, discussing the 
problems of creating a science of language at the outset of his Course in General 
Linguistics (1915): 
Language at any given time involves an established system and an 
evolution. At any given time, it is an institution in the present and a 
product of the past. At first sight, it looks very easy to distinguish 
between the system and its history, between what it is and what it 
was. In reality, the connection between the two is so close that it is 
hard to separate them. Would matters be simplified if one considered 
31 
the ontogenesis of linguistic phenomena, beginning with a study of 
childreWs language, for example? No. It is quite illusory to believe 
thatwhere language is concerned the problem of origin is any 
different from the problem of permanent conditions. There is no way 
out of the circle. 
(de Saussure 1915,9) 
In this move, Saussure is determining what science would regard to be acceptable 
primary qualities of language, "qualities which can be treated mathematically and 
which are thought not to vary according to subjective bias" (Young 1990). This 
identification of primary qualities in scientific studies, Young tells us, originated 
with the Cartesian definition of matter in the seventeenth century and form the basis 
of contemporary scientific practice. Young cites a 1975 Royal Society document on 
Qualities, Units and Symbols which shows that modem science still uses the 
Cartesian criteria for matter, adding only a handful of new qualities to Descartes' 
original length, breadth and height, such as electrical current and luminous 
intensity. 16 
Saussure admits, however, that his solution is an imperfect one. 
So however we approach the question, no one object of linguistic 
study emerges of its own accord. Whicheverway we turn, the same 
dilemma confronts us. Either we tackle each problem on one front 
only, and risk failing to take into account the dualities mentioned 
above; or else we seem committed to trying to study language in 
several -%vays simultaneously, in which case the object of study 
becomes a muddle of disparate, unconnected things. By proceeding 
thus one opens the door to various sciences - psychology, 
anthropology, prescriptive grammar, philology and so on - which are 
to be distinguished from linguistics. These sciences could lay claim to 
language as failing in their domain; but their methods are not the ones 
that are needed. 
One solution only, in our view, resolves all these difficulties. 
The linguist must take the study of linguistic structure as his primary 
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concern, and relate all other manifestations of language to it. Indeed, 
amid so many dualities, linguistic structure seems to be the one thing 
that is independently definable and provides something our minds 
can satisfactorily grasp. 
(Saussure 1915,9) 
Saussure's solution, therefore, involves a paring away of those elements of language 
that prevent language from being a pure object for a science of linguistics; he thus 
deals not with language, langage, but with langue, language that has been stripped 
ofparole, the subjective and variable element of language, the study of which lies in 
the various domains of psychology, anthropology, prescriptive grammar and 
philology. This fictional entity of langue provided Saussure with a means to achieve 
many invaluable insights into how language may work-, and, for subsequent 
structuralists and post-structuralists, how the myriad of signs within any closed, 
synchronically conceptualised system may relate to one another. However, this 
methodological fiction has taken on a life of its own, permeating and dominating the 
very fields that Saussure wisbed to exclude from his science so as to focus on a 
single aspect of the relations between signs. Rather than putting the psychological 
and anthropological analysis back- into Saussure's findings, it seems as though 
psychology (Lacan) and anthropology (L6vi-Strauss) have instead taken Saussure's 
object to be their own, having fortuitously stumbled upon an object of study upon 
which to ground their science. 
Lacan mourns the transformation that occurred in psychoanalysis around 
1920, a symbolic date that marks a change in psychoanalysis in general but 
specifically and significantly in Freud's own thought, with the publication of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, to a more humanist approach to subjectivity. Lacan perceives 
this change to be detrimental to psychoanalysis' status as a science: 
The present disdain for research into the language of symbols - which 
can be seen by a glance at the summaries of our publications before 
and after the 1920s - corresponds in our discipline to nothing less 
than a change of object, whose tendency to align itself at the most 
commonplace level of communication, in order to come into line 
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with the new objectives proposed for the psychoanalytical technique, 
is perhaps responsible for the rather gloomy balance sheet which the 
most lucid writers, have drawn up of its results. 
(Lacan 1953,34) 
Lacan fears that psychoanalysis will not be accepted as a science because of the 
tendencies of contemporary (post- 1920) technique. "If psychoanalysis is to become a 
science - for it is not yet one - and if it is not to degenerate in its technique - and 
perhaps that has already happened - we must get back to the meaning of its 
experience" (Lacan 1953,30) by which, I take it, he means a return to Lacan's 
mythical, pre-1920 Freud. Lacan no doubt sees psychoanalysis as being under threat 
in a secular culture that places "faith" only in the absolute certainties of scientific 
method, and certainly his fears are not without some foundation (see Young 1999). 
"Psychoanalysis has played a role in the direction [or 'guidance] of modem 
subjectivity, and it cannot continue to sustain this role without bringing it into line 
with the movement in modem science which elucidates it" (Lacan 1953,46). But, 
Lacan asks, "Can [Freud's] results form the basis of a positive science? " "Yes, " he 
answers, "if the experience is verifiable by everyone" (1966,9). But how in 
psychoanalysis, which has always struggled in vain to construct a metapsychology 
upon which all practitioners can agree, are there experiences that can be verified by 
everyone? For Lacan the answer is simple - too simple: "Whether it sees itself as an 
instrument of healing, of formation, or of exploration in depth, psychoanalysis has 
only a single intermediary: the patient's WorX' (1953,9). In a rare unguarded 
moment, Lacan admits that there is a "problem of grounding, %vhich must assure our 
discipline its place amongst the sciences: a problem of formalisation, in truth very 
much off on the'wrong foot, " although this is also a warning against the "Romantic 
viewpoint' 'that Lacan sees as coming to dominate (British) psychoanalysis that does 
not concurwith his privileging of language (46): 
For it seems that, caught by the very quirk in the medical mind 
against which psychoanalysis has had to constitute itself, it is with the 
handicap of being half a century behind the movement of the 
sciences, like medicine itself, that we are seeking to join up Nvith 
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them again. 
It is in the abstract objectification of our experience on 
fictitious, or even simulated, principles of the experimental method, 
that Nve find the effect of prejudices which must first be sNvept from 
our domain of Nve ivish to cultivate it according to its authentic 
structure. 
(Lacan 1953,46-7) 
Lacan objects to psychoanalysis' exclusion from the brotherhood of sciences 
because it does not fit into a conception of science that "has become degraded in 
the positivist reversal, which, by making the human sciences the crowning glory of 
experimental sciences, in actual fact made them subordinate to experimental 
science. This conception is the result of an erroneous view of the history of science 
founded on the prestige of a specialised development of the experiment" (1953,47). 
The concept of what qualifies as a science Lacan sees as being hijacked by the 
nineteenth-century positivists and experiential methodology, so Lacan claims that he 
wants to set up a "new order of the sciences" which is actually a return to the "age 
old" scientific tradition established by Plato in Theaetetus (47). Theaetetus, 
Genevieve Lloyd explains, was a mathematician, a slightly younger contemporary of 
Plato (1979,108). Both Theaetetus and Plato in his work Theaetetzis, it seems, 17 
emphasises the need for exact definitions in logic and science (111). 
Two ironic points need to be highlighted from this conception of 
psychoanalysis as a science and the setting up of Plato's Theaeletus as a 
methodological influence. First, the other psychoanalysts that Lacan derides for 
weakening the scientific status of their discipline, those who he sees as conspiring 
with the nineteenth century experimental method - he means American ego- 
psychology and British object-relations - are generally much less interested 
(especially in Britain) in securing a scientific status for psychoanalysis. Although 
Lacan accuses them of "objectifying experience, " these analysts generally provide 
much more "evidence" for their conclusions, something glaringly missing in Lacan's 
writings. Compared with other psychoanalytic schools - and especially when 
regarded alongside Freud, Klein and object-relations - Lacan offers us very few case 
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studies. Nancy Fraser (1992) also finds that "Lacan himself was remarkably 
unconcerned with empirical confirmation and that recent research on the 
development of subjectivity in infants and young children does not support his 
views" (185). Lacan does not present his own case material, but endlessly re-reads 
Freud's own case studies. But I am taking issue -%vith Lacan's methodology, his 
ideological assumptions and his rationale for constructing the subject as he does; 
like Fraser, I am not really concerning myself herewith the issue of whether or not 
Lacan's theory is actually cori-ect, that is, an accurate picture of subjective 
development and experience. For that, I would have to bring empirical evidence that 
contradicted Lacan's findings. 
Second, despite wanting to reverse the tide of positivism, Lacan's adopted 
methodology is actually the same as that of his nineteenth century forefathers. 
Lacan's strategy is thoroughly consistent with those scientific practices established 
by Descartes in his identification and isolation of those primary qualities that will be 
the object of his study. Inspired by, and envious, of Uvi-Strauss's use of linguistics 
to scientise anthropology, Lacan decides to adopt the "mathematicized fon-n in 
which is inscribed the discovery of thephoneine" (1953,47): 
In our time, in the historical period that has seen the formation 
of a science that may be tenned human, but which must be 
distinguished from any kind of psycho-sociology, namely, linguistics, 
'whose model is the combinatory operation, functioning 
spontaneously, of itself, in a presubjective way - it is this linguistic 
structure that gives its status to the unconscious. It is this structure, in 
any case, that assures us that there is, beneath the ten-n unconscious, 
something definable, accessible and objectifiable. 
(Lacan 1973,21) 
Lacan regards language and the linguistic structure to be a valid primary quality, a 
suitably objective, definable, accessible means through which to examine the subject 
because it exists before the subject and independently of it. This gives Lacan the 
object he envied in the other sciences and mathematics: "The primary character of 
all symbols in fact brings them closer to those numbers out of which all the other are 
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compounded" (Lacan 1953,59). And this object ("Prinzaty Language" Lacan 1953, 
57) must be kept sterile: The subject can play no role in shaping language - through 
emotional or creative input - because such influences would taint the purity of the 
scientific object. 
Lacan's rereadings of Saussure are an attempt to add more scientific weight 
to Freud's at times frighteningly porous science. But in order still to brand his 
psychostructuralism "psychoanalysis, " Lacan has to show that his addition of 
Saussure into the Freudian mix is actually entirely consistent with Freud's own 
intention. We find the claim repeated in Lacan's writing that "what I have just said 
has so little originality, even in its verve, that there appears in it not a single 
metaphor that Freud's works do not repeat with the frequency of a leitniotif in which 
the very fabric of the work is revealed" (Lacan 1953,21-2) -a highly dubious claim 
and one that does not sit well with Lacanians' claims that Lacan is a very original 
thinker. For some Lacanians, Lacan is the "founding theoretician of the post-Modem 
Age" and Lacan's discoveries take precedent over Freud as it is Lacan, and not his 
psychoanalytic father, that heralds a new, specifically Lacaniall episteme (Sullivan 
1991,36), another dubious claim that I will demonstrate to be unfounded. '8 And 
because Lacan's reading of Freud is limited to a handful of Freud's (most early) 
works, often one finds that Lacan must present us with a wholly inaccurate picture of 
Freud, eliding differences between himself and his master, or repudiating Freud's 
revisions of his own work. For example, in an attempt to justify his emphasis on the 
symbolic (vaguely social constructivist) when Freud focussed so much attention on 
the drives (mostly biologically determinate), we find Lacan making the outrageous 
claim that "In any event one had only to go back to the works of Freud to gauge to 
what secondary and hypothetical place he relegates the theory of the instincts" 
(Lacan 1953,26). Another example shows Lacan calling for a revision of Freud's 
1925 essay, "Negation, " where Freud opens the door for the British focus upon 
affective processes and pathologising reified intellectual processes (see Lacan 1953 
16, n. 39). In order to assert his allegiance to Freud, Lacan must also refute all other 
psychoanalysts' claims to Freudian fidelity. Therefore, we find Lacan decrying 
psychoanalysis practised "in the name of the theory of the ego or of the technique of 
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the analysis in defences - everything, that is, which is the most contrary to the 
Freudian experience, " because, for Lacan, Freud's only discovery was "that of the 
domain of the incidence in the nature of man of his relations to the Symbolic order" 
(1953,38). Setting himself as the only true heir, he chastises other pretenders to the 
throne. Displaying no sense of irony or self-awareness, he warns that "Each analyst 
presumes to consider himself the one chosen to discover the conditions of a 
completed objectification in our experience, and the enthusiasm which greets these 
theoretical attempts seems to grow more fervent the more dereistic they prove to be" 
(Lacan 1953,54). 
Despite some painstaking efforts, Freud seems much less concerned with the 
scientific status of psychoanalysis than some of his followers. According to Meira 
Likierman, "the supposed 'dichotomy' between the scientific and humanistic Freud 
is not a feature of the original" (1990,117) and is, instead, a product of translating 
difficulties and squabbling disciples, It seems, however, that Lacan ignores those 
inconvenient places where Freud himself accepts psychoanalysis' "weakness, " as 
Lacan labels the subjective millstones around psychoanalysts' necks. Freud, 
remember, explains that the necessary involvement of the transferences "puts our 
scientific pretensions to shame" (1916-17,493), and although Freud insists that his 
case studies not be read as narratives but as scientific documents to be kept from 
"unauthorised readers" (see his "Prefatory Remarks" to Dora, 1905b), his own 
language was much less scientific or alien than his official English translators would 
have us believe. Consider, for example, how Freud's EslIchloberich, literally 
meaning "it, " "I" and "over-I, " were rendered more scientifically acceptable by their 
classical translation as id, ego and sipei-ego (see Young 1985; Likierman 1990). 19 
These words, like Theactetus' mathematics and Lacan's algebra, are chosen in order 
to fix upon them a meaning suitable to an authoritative discourse, to nail meanings 
down and to stop them escaping to be tainted by unauthorised users. 
Both the strength and plague of science is that as "supposedly 'neutral' and 
objective, further questions about what might be masked by or foreclosed in this 
move are forestalled" (Flax 1990,101). Psychoanalysis, as it is constructed here by 
these authoritarian, scientific impulses, also attempts to shed its own historical, 
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political, cultural and ideological contexts. This is dangerous, Young explains, 
because it "diverts our gaze so that we will not ask what forces in a society evoke a 
theory and into what cultural, political and ideological debate these scientific theory 
enter and what role they play" (1985), therefore reducing our ability to examine not 
only the discursive practice itself but the cultural environment from which it 
emerged. But with the full force of livo sciences behind it, Lacan's promise of a 
theorythat puts our own object of study - language - at the very heart of what it 
means to be a human subject proves too tempting for literary critics to resist. 
I also find that Lacan's and postmodernism's enchantment with Saussure's 
creation is typical of the rationalist tradition from which they emerge and that, 
despite Lacan's claims for a messianic salvation from such Enlightenment 
epistemologies (see, for example, Sullivan 1991; Lowenstein 1994), by employing 
Saussure he actually re-enforces the Cartesian subject split between mind and body, 
the individual and the social, language as a system from its use in hunian speech. 
This rationalist splitting is Vologinov's objection to structuralism: 
The idea of the conventionality, the arbitrariness oflanguage, 
is a typical one for rationalism as a whole, and no less typical is the 
comparison of language to thesystein ofinatheinatical signs. What 
interests the mathematically minded rationalists is not the 
relationship of the sign to the actual reality it reflects nor to the 
individual who is its originator, but the relationship ofsign to sign 
ivithin a closed systenz already accepted and authorised. In other 
words, they are interested only in the inner logic of the system of 
signs itseýf, taken, as in algebra, completely independently of the 
ideological meanings that give the signs their content. 
(Vologinov 1973,23)20 
Given this exclusive focus upon the sign, having eliminated the subjective referent 
as an inconvenient variable in an otherwise unassailable scientific formulation, the 
signifier comes dominate the signified, as it has in postmodern theory: even 
signifieds have uncomfortable, subjective component, an unknowable mental 
concept, particular to each individual. 
39 
In her critique of Lacan, Fraser begins by noting that "there are goodpl-inta 
facie reasons for feminists to be suspicious of the structuralist model" (180). For 
Fraser, 
the structuralist model brackets questions of practice, agency, and the 
speaking subject. Thus, it cannot shed light on social identity and 
group formation. Moreover, because this approach brackets the 
diachronic, itwill not tell us anything about shifts in identities and 
affiliations over time. Similarly, because it abstracts from the social 
context of communication, the model brackets issues of power and 
inequality. 
(Fraser 1992,181) 
The implicit rationalist, patriarchal bias of Saussure suits the explicit patriarchal 
conception in orthodox Freudian and Lacanian implication that the subject does not 
develop any capacity for a self, symbolisation and history until it enters into the 
Oedipal phase. For Lacan, as for early Freud, the father is of primary, even sole, 
importance in the socialisation of the infant. Lacan therefore relegates the infant's 
experiences with the first caregiver, usually the mother, to "the imaginary" and "the 
real" and what analysis of these experiences is permitted is all filtered through the 
patriarchal law of the father .21 Lacan's apparent advantages 
for feminism - the 
promise of a more social constructivist Freud and a less biologically-dependent 
psychoanalysis - are only an illusion, says Fraser, because while Lacan demonstrates 
that the social, symbolic order genders subjectivity, his metapsychology necessitates 
that this symbolic order be phallocentric "since the attainment of subjectivity" in 
language "requires submission to 'the Father's Law" thus resulting in an "ironclad 
determinism7' (182). Thus for Fraser, Lacan has replaced Freud's biologism with 
psychologism, "the untenable view that autonomous psychological imperatives given 
independently of culture and history can dictate the way they are interpreted and 
acted on within culture and history" and symbolicism, "the homogenising reification 
of diverse signifying practices into a monolithic and all-pervasive 'symbolic order, ' 
and, second, the endowing of that order Nvith an exclusive and unlimited causal 
power to fix people's subj ectivities once and for all" (182). "The form alone in 
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which Language is expressed, " Lacan tells us, "defines subjectivity. Language says: 
4you will go such and such a way, and when you see such and such, you will turn off 
in such and such a direction" (Lacan 1953,61-2). There is in Lacan's 
metapsychology, therefore, very little room for subjective agency and creativity in 
such an authoritarian structure. Lacan finds that the Oedipal complex 
marks the limits that our discipline assigns to subjectivity: that is to 
say, what the subject can know of his unconscious participation in 
the movement of the complex structures of marriage ties, by verifying 
the symbolic effects in his individual existence of the tangential 
movement toward incest which has manifested itself ever since the 
coming of a universal community. I 
(Lacan 1953,40, see also 126) 
In otherwords, the limits of subjectivity in psychoanalysis lie only in what we can 
come to learn of our inevitable and unconscious participation in the pre-ordained 
symbolic, Oedipal game. For Lacan, however, focussing on the relationshipwith the 
father is necessary because it guarantees the objectivity of his science. If the subject 
has real agency, it would be impossible to ground any objective conclusions because 
of the infinite variation and bias that such agency would imply. Everything must 
therefore be reducible to the symbolic order; the real is inadmissible into analysis, 
and even the "imaginary economy has meaning, " Lacan tells us, because "we gain 
some purchase in it, only in so far as it is transcribed into the symbolic order, where 
a ternary [i. e. Oedipal] relation is imposed" (1954-5,255). This is the first and 
perhaps most fundamental concept of classical Freudian and Lacanian theory that 
Klein reverses: she displaces the penis and castration anxiety as the central, most 
horrific trauma and in so doing, displaces the rationalist, patriarchal episteme that 
informs Saussure, Freud and Lacan. 22 
I do not want to spend too much time here arguing the specific pros and cons of 
Lacan's structuralist basis. However, there are some issues to which I wish to draw 
attention. First, we cannot assume that Lacan's readings of Saussure are correct. 
Although Lacan is perfon-ning a conscious re-interpretation of Saussure's work-, he 
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holds a misplaced faith in the phallus as a transcendental signifier and a dubious 
split between the signifier and the signified, both conceptualisations that, many have 
pointed out, would be rejected by Saussure. After all, "Language is as much 
signified as it is a signifier" (Flax 1990,104), and the signified persists, even in the 
postmodem corporate brand, unwelcome though it may be for Lacan's science. 
And of course Saussure's own theories are not without their critics. Norman 
Holland, in "The Trouble(s) with Lacan" (1998), suggests that the adoption of 
Saussure's theories of language is one of three fundamental flaws in Lacan's 
thinking. Lacan's remedy for Freud, the use of modem linguistics that was 
unavailable to his master, is a poisoned pill: Holland points out that by "modem 
linguistics" Lacan meant "tum-of-the-century-already-out-dated linguistics" that do 
not bear up to scrutiny, even by the mid-twentieth century when Lacan adopted these 
ideas. And regardless, one could argue that Saussure's Course - first published in 
1915 - was available to Freud, and before his most productive period of 
metapsychological speculations; why, therefore, did Freud not use it himself? Borch- 
Jacobsen asks: 
Why did Freud see none of this? That is the question that all 
revisionist theories must address if they want to present themselves as 
psychoanalytic. Since Freudian revisionists cannot simply say that the 
founder was wrong, they must present the new theory as more 
embracing or "deeper" than the old one. That way, they leave 
classical theory untouched, while suggesting that its validity is only 
relative. 
(Borch Jacobsen 2000,16) 
I think that some schools and "revisionists" (a term Borch-Jacobsen uses somewhat 
dismissively) have answered this challenge: Freud could not see early object 
relations or a socio-environmental constructions of gender in his historical place as a 
nineteenth century patriarchal rationalist. I am not sure if Lacan is as successful in 
his answers. He once offers the explanation that "The psychological prejudices of 
Freud's day were opposed to acknowledging the existence of any reality in 
verbalisation as such, other than its ownflatus voc&' (Lacan 1953,16), but to 
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historicise Freud is to call attention to the subjective bias of his science, something 
that Lacan is not eager to do as he so often cites Freud as authoritative source for his 
own conclusions. In place of Saussure, Holland offers Chomsk-y, Nvho, ironically, has 
his own, very derisive opinion as to the scientific status of linguistics: 
Modem linguistics shares the delusion - the accurate term, I believe - 
that the modem "behavioural sciences" have in some essential 
respect achieved a transition from "speculation" to "science" and that 
earlier work can be safely consigned to the antiquarians. [ ... ] to a 
considerable degree, I feel, the "bebavioural sciences" are merely 
mimicking the surface features of the natural sciences; much of their 
scientific character has been achieved by a restriction of subject 
matter and a concentration on rather peripheral issues. 
(Chomsk-y, qtd. in Green 1973,218). 
it would seem that Green, like Holland, would endorse Chomsky as the 
psychoanalysts' linguist, finding him "closer to Freud than any other linguist" (1973, 
249). Later in this study, I Nvill examine Bakhtin's theories of language as an 
alternative partner to psychoanalytic ways of thinking about language. 
The Objectification of the Subject, or, Why Lacanian Theory Cannot Redress 
the Crises of Postmodern Culture (even if it cared to do so ... ) 
To make any advances, all knowledge must objectify the parts which 
are objectifiable. 
(Lacan 1953-54,206) 
Postmodern end-of-history thinking does not envisage a future for 
us much different from the present, a prospect it oddly views as a 
cause for cclebration. 
(Eagleton 1996,134) 
Just because certain celestial bodies can be studied only by means 
of a telescope does not mean that celestial bodies have the same 
nature as a telescope. 
(Roustang 1998,57) 
1 
Just as Saussure must jettison psychology, anthropology, prescriptive grammar and 
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philology to look exclusively at the relations between signs to claim a scientific 
status for linguistics, Lacan must jettison the "mystical experience" (Lacan 1973,9) 
that taints the purity of his object: the subjective bias, "the texture of experience, " 
which get relegated to the status of secondary qualities (see Young 1990; 1994,1 - 
11). In an attack upon British psychoanalysis (I suspect specifically upon 
FairbaiM), 23 Lacan condemns the concentration upon non-linguistic elements in 
analysis, and the (British) psychoanalytic inclination to pathologise an over- 
investment in the intellectual processes (see my discussions of Winnicott, Jones, 
Fairbaim and Bion below). 
If analysis should come round to exposing its weakness, it will be 
advisable not to rest content -%vith recourse to affectivity - that taboo- 
word of the dialectical incapacity which, with the verb to 
infellectualise (whose accepted pejorative connotation makes a merit 
of this incapacity), will go down in the history of the language as the 
stigmata of our obtuseness regarding the subject. 
(Lacan 1953,10-1. ) 
Lacan regarded the signifier to be an algebraic sign, devoid of meaning and therefore 
available for a formulaic systernatisation. In privileging the signifier in order to 
claim credibility for psychoanalysis as a science, Lacan therefore must empty the 
sign of its secondary qualities, cleaving the signifier from signified and referents. 
Primary qualities exist, therefore, in nature, while secondary qualities exist only in 
the subjective mind. One consequence of this relegation of secondary qualities, 
Young explains, is that sounds cannot belong to the birds and colours cannot belong 
to the flower (I 996c). But even Lacan appreciates that "Only a subject can 
understand a meaning" (1966,9) and so, by eliminating the subjective element in 
language and in analysis, he empties the sign and subject of meaning. There is no 
room for subjects in Lacanian analysis except via the symbolic order: "I identify 
myself in Language, but only by losing myself in it like an object" (Lacan 1953,63). 
Lacan does acknowledge the subjective element: his entire theory of the Real is an 
acceptance that there are qualities of analysands which elude the analyst, which lie 
beyond Language. In Lacanian methodology, therefore, subjects lose their status as 
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subjects, becoming mere inanimate, affectless objects. This contradiction lies at the 
very heart of Lacanian theory. As Roustang succinctly explains, 
For if, on the one hand, science excludes the subject and, on the 
other, this same subject is the object of psychoanalysis, then the title 
of subject must be retained, in order to have us believe that the term 
still refers to an embodied and individualised subjectivity. The 
Lacanian operation is thus necessarily double - in other words, 
perfectly contradictory. On the one hand, it has to retain subjectivity 
as it appears in psychoanalysis in the form of the divided subject 
(divided, for example, between the conscious and the unconscious), 
and on the other, he has to empty it of all embodiment, humanisation, 
affectivity, and so on, in order to turn it into a purely mathematical 
object, which itself is obviously only one dimensional, or even 
lacking all dimension. 
(Roustang 1998,54)24 
Subjects are not subjects, but objects enslaved to the Word, to the objectively 
knowable mathematical system. It is the Word that "confers a meaning on the 
functions of the individual" (Lacan 1953,19); "Man speaks [ ... ] 
but it is because the 
symbol has made him man" (39). It could be said, therefore, that the Lacanian 
conceptual isation of human nature - and we must not be deceived into thinking that 
there is no such conception, despite the social constructivist aspirations of his 
followers - "leave us utterly bereft of a sense of the subject or of any foundations for 
common humanity or moral discourse" (Young 1996c). In Lacan's symbolic- 
determinism, not only the agency of the subject is lost, but the subject itself is rent 
asunder. 
Lacan's subjects are thus disembodied and depersonalised, and although 
Lacan would protest that the body is not excluded from consideration in his 
psychoanalysis, the conceptualisation of what constitutes embodied experience for 
Lacanians and object-relations theorists is radically different. Lacan, for example, 
describes the body as "the hysterical nucleus of the neurosis where the hysterical 
symptom reveals the structure of a Language and is deciphered like an inscription 
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which, once recovered, can without serious loss be destroyed" (Lacan 1953,21). 
Andr6 Green similarly finds that "Lacan's work is exemplary in this regard, not only 
because affect has no place in it, but also because it is explicitly excluded from it" 
(1973,99), although Green does point out that early in Lacan's Nvork (before 1953), 
this aversion was less dogmatically pronounced as it became in later years. When 
faced, in 1974, with the accusation that he neglects affect (in a question, however, 
posed not by a critic but by one of his most pre-eminent followers, Jacques-Alain 
Miller), Lacan responds that what the body discharges is not affect, but thought (see 
Lacan 1974,20). "Affect, " after all, "befalls a body whose essence it is said is to 
dwell in language" (1974,23). 25 As if by queer coincidence, Lacan "paradoxically" 
f inds that the psychoanalytic session "normally proceeds to its termination without 
revealing to us very much of what our patient derives in his own right from his 
particular sensitivity to colors our calamities, from the quickness of his grasp of 
things or the urgency of his, %veakness of the flesh, from his power to retain or to 
invent - in short from the vivacity of his tastes" (1953,29) - of course, this is 
fortunate, since his theory denies that these elements are necessary in analysis. Lacan 
therefore derides those psychoanalysts who try to bring the affective, subjective 
element back into analysis. 
For this paradox does not become resolved in the efforts of 
certain people - like the philosophers mocked by Plato for being 
driven by their appetite for the Real to go about embracing trees - 
who tend to take every episode in which that fleeting reality puts 
forth its shoots for lived reaction of which they show themselves so 
fond. For these are the very people who, making their objectivewhat 
lies beyond Language, react to our rule of "Don't touch' 'by a sort of 
obsession. Keep going in that direction, and I dare say the last word in 
the transference reaction will be a reciprocal sniffing between analyst 
and subject. 
(Lacan 1953,30) 
Since Lacan cannot accommodate subjective affect in the analytic scene - lest these 
secondary, subjective qualities taint his primary object - he minimises its 
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importance in subjective experience, reducing it to functions of Language. Flax 
agrees: "Lacan's psyche is radically severed from and other than the soma; even the 
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unconscious has nothing to do with the body" (1990,128). As Eagleton observes: 
"Nothing could be more disabling than a ruling rationality which can know nothing 
beyond its own concepts, forbidden from enquiring into the very stuff of passion and 
perception. How can the absolute monarch of Reason retain its legitimacy if what 
Kant called the 'rabble' of the senses remains forever beyond its ken? " (1990,14). 
Freud's unconscious is physical, bawdy, archaic, animalistic, but Lacan's is 
thoroughly knowable, rational; the unconscious, after all, is structured like a 
language, following pre-ordained laws and logic. Freud's instinctual drives - 
notoriously animalistic sources of unpredictable energy - are transformed by Lacan 
into thoroughly knowable elements in a thoroughly conventional science, "Because 
energy is not a substance, which, for example, improves or goes sourwith age; it's a 
numerical constant that a physicist has to find in his calculations, so as to able to 
work [ ... 
] something strictly verifiable [ ... 
] Each and every physicist knows clearly, 
that is to say, in a readily articulated manner, that energy is nothing other than the 
numerical value of a constant" (Lacan 1974,18). Even Lacan's sacred phallus is 
likewise disembodied. It is purely symbolic, and does not refer to the penis; the 
phallus has no bi ological referent, and therefore "castration, " for Lacan, is only 
symbolic and based on language and desire, whereas for Freud and Klein it 
represents a real, physical threat (compare, for example, Klein 1928 and Evans 1996, 
1404). 
Because Lacan is loath to admit the subjective qualities of analysands into 
analysis, he is even more concerned not to admit the subjective bias of the analyst - 
the countertransference, the recognition of which is one of the great strengths of 
British psychoanalysis and, I think, further study of which Nvill have important 
implications for cultural and literary studies. Begrudgingly admitting that Freud 
addresses the countertransference in his study of Dora, Lacan limits its 
conceptual isation to "the analyst's prejudices and presumptions" - because any 
subjective bias of the objective scientist is always an undesirable mistake - and finds 
the term "in my opinion cannot be extended beyond the dialectical reasons for the 
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error"(Lacan 1953,69; see also, for example, Burgoyne and Sullivan 1997,141- 
8). 27 
As an ex-devotee of Lacan, Frangois Roustang is both insightful and scathing 
on Lacan's objectification of the subject in The Lacanian Delusion (1998). With 
first-hand, in-depth knowledge of Lacan's methodology, Roustang's objections cut 
to the core and expose the attempts to cover the contradictions that inevitably arise 
from Lacan's project. Roustang's central premise is the same as my own: that 
Lacan's attempt to scientise psychoanalysis has hazardous consequences for the 
potential for subjective experience: 
In declaring that language was the sole object of psychoanalysis, 
Lacan believed it could be given a scientific basis, for he was then on 
terrain where something objective could be grasped. But in reality, 
something quite different happened: The instrument psychoanalysis 
employs in order to function took the place of its object, an object 
that belongs - and this bears repeating - to the order of subjectivity, 
singularity, affectivity and life. On the pretext of finally revealing the 
object of psychoanalysis, Lacan placed himself on familiar ground, 
but this meant forgetting what he was there to find out. With the 
unconscious structured like a language, something is knowable, but 
there is nothing left to he known [on peut savoir que1que chose, mais 
il n ýv a plus rien ii savoir]. 
(Roustang 1998,113-4) 
Roustang, for me, does not go far enough in one respect: he too often seems to share 
Lacan's assumption that language is the only instrument available to the 
psychoanalyst through which to regard the subject. Object-relations has shown that 
most communication is affective, unconscious and yet structured decidedly unlike a 
language or in any logical way; the unconscious, like the emotions, is governed by 
the most primitive processes. For object-relations analysts, psychoanalysis has more 
means at its disposal than mere language and conscious knowledge as the tools of 
the trade: the transferences, countertransferences, holding, containing, facilitating 
are all other equally if not more important means of conducting analysis. Even if one 
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takes language to be the only tool available to the psychoanalyst, however, this does 
not mean that the subject or the unconscious are reducible to language. Roustang 
challenges Lacan's infamous assertion that "The unconscious is structured like a 
language" (1973,203) as being a sophism "because the instrument of research is 
confused with the object of research" (Roustang 1998,57). Roustang points out that 
saying "The unconscious is structured like a language" is tantamount to saying 
"Since we can only see certain objects by looking at them, these objects are 
structured like eyes" (112) and that "Just because certain celestial bodies can be 
studied only by means of a telescope does not mean that celestial bodies have the 
same nature as a telescope" (57). Even if language were the only means through 
which we can apprehend the unconscious, that does not mean that the unconscious is 
therefore necessarily structured like a language. This should be obvious, but the fact 
that it is not is a testament to Lacan's rationalist wizardry and symptomatic, perhaps, 
of our need to believe him. 
Lacan's fetishism of language leads to a consistent mis-identification of what 
ails the subject. For example, as I already discussed, Jameson uses Lacan's 
description of schizophrenia as a breakdown in the signifying chain (see Jameson 
1991,26). Schizophrenia is not brought about by a break in signification but the 
inability to symbolise is symptomatic of schizophrenic processes, principally 
splitting (see Klein 1930; Bion 1955; Segal 1957). Bion clarifies, for example: "I do 
not wish it to be supposed that I ignore the peculiarity of the schizophrenic's object 
relations, of which verbal thought, for all its importance, is but a subordinate 
function7' (Bion 1955,222). Again Lacan mistakes the linguistic symptom for the 
disease, the object for the subject. It is not a breakdown in the chain of signifiers that 
gives rise to the schizoid postmodem subject but radical splitting of self/other, 
signifier/signified, mind/body, subject/object. 
Therefore, in his effort to scientise psychoanalysis, Lacan himself is guilty of 
the derealisation of the subject, moving the centre of gravity from the kernel to the 
shell, the care, the technique. Although it is exceedingly inconvenient for our 
certainties in fields that, by definition, evade such easy objectification, we cannot 
satisfy our rationalistic impulses and defensive needs by objectifying the subject. 
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Through Lacanian theory we can adopt a subject that is knowable, but without affect 
and without emotional responses - so for the sake of the subject, and for 
subjectivity, we should resist this impulse and learn to survive these paradoxes. 
Lacan's Rationalism and the Bourgeois, Narcissistic Subject 
In the end Lacan recreates the myth of a solipsistic 
disembodied self. Despite his heroic self-image as a brave 
Nietzschean negator of bourgeois culture, elucidating our primal 
alienation and fractured selves, Lacan replicates rather than 
dismantles a domýinant strain of modem Western thought 
extending from Descartes through Sartre. The subject is not 
"decentred. " 
(Flax 1990,107) 
When he was twenty [ ... ] 
he had believed that happiness was a 
quality which resided in its possessor and bore no relation to his 
environment. But now he was a little older and had learned his 
theory was difficult, if not impossible, to work out in practice. 
(Carter 1971,82) 
As Flax so concisely puts it above, despite the rhetoric portraying his struggle as an 
epic of radical reversal of the Enlightem-nent (see, for example, Lowenstein 1994, 
especially 716-7) and the initiation of a radical new episteme (see, for example, 
Sullivan 1991), Lacan presents us a thoroughly rationalistic, bourgeois subject, a 
subject entirely suited to study under the Enlightenment scientific discourses and to 
go shopping in the malls of (post)modern capitalism. Despite his protestations, 
Lacan's theory rests on classical Cartesian mind-body dualism. The Lacanian subject 
is affectless, depersonalised, the psyche split from the soma, and his methodology is 
similarly typical of Enlightenment reason that comes to know that which is irrational 
so as to rationally contain and control it through knowledge; he confines that which 
escapes his rationalist schema to the real, locking it away so as to not have to 
confront it. 
Lacan himself admits to this Cartesian lineage - to a degree. In The 1,6111- 
Fundainental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, Lacan discusses Freud's Cartesianism. 
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For Lacan, Freud, like Descartes, starts from the question of certainty: of what can 
one be certain? Lacan sees that whereas for Descartes, I doubt, therefore I think, 
therefore I am, for Freud, I doubt, therefore there is resistance in the signifier, 
therefore I am. Lacan sets the signifier in the place of Cartesian god, as that which 
confirms our existence, offering certainties to ease the anxiety of doubt, though he 
gives credit for this to Freud. Lacan's Freud, therefore, "places his certainty, his 
Geivissheit, only in the constellation of the signifiers" (1973,44). And for Lacan - 
but certainly not for Freud as Lacan tries to make us believe - "there is only one 
method of knowing that one is there, namely, to map the network. And how is the 
network mapped? " (1973,45): By recourse to Saussure's scientific structure of 
signifiers. But Lacan's existence, his sum, therefore, is guaranteed by the signifier, 
limited to the signifier and, as with Descartes, limited to the epistemological 
concerns of subjectivity. Lacanians, such as Lowenstein (1994), would argue that 
Lacan, like Freud, decentres Descartes' autonomous ego. This is true, to an extent, 
but in positing an ego that is only an object, he is not, I argue, radically reversing the 
Cartesian trend of perceiving subjectivity but merely progressing to the next 
inevitable stage a view of the subject necessitated by rationalist discourses. This 
move, however, is strenuously resisted by many contemporary subjects and the 
magic realist authors I consider in Part 11. 
A Foucaultian analysis of Enlightenment discourses shows us the 
power/knowledge strategies at work in Lacan's theory. Just as reason itself creates 
the barrier beyond which lies the unreasonable, so too language creates a barrier on 
the other side of which lies the abyss of the Real, that which Lacan cannot admit into 
his analysis of the subject. Lacan draws the line, defining what is to be allowed in a 
psychoanalytic science, at the limit of what is knowable through language. On the 
one side of this line is the symbolic, on the other, the Real, bracketed-off as forever 
unknowable. Rather than confronting the uncertainty of that which lies beyond a 
rationally knowable, accessible and consciously verifiable language, Lacan tries to 
make a virtue of the inaccessibility of the Real. Like the Oedipal father, he issues the 
prohibition "Don't touch! " to those that would identify with his phallic conception of 
psychoanalysis. That which lies beyond language is deemed to be only an "illusion, " 
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the "errors of existence" (see Lacan 1953 72-3). "In other words, " Roustang mimics 
Lacan, "nonverbal communication is permanently there in analysis, but I'm going to 
show you how not to have to bother with it. " (1998,40-1). In order to deflect this 
persistent, irrational character of analysis and to keep psychoanalysis wholly rational 
and free from subjective infection, as demanded by sciences in an Enlightenment 
episteme, Lacan places this element of immediacy, the personality, the substance of 
the subject, outside the limits of psychoanalytic experience. But then, Roustang tells 
us, 
Lacan wants to distinguish between physics and psychoanalysis by 
reintroducing subjectivity, but at the same time he wants to give 
psychoanalysis a force akin to that of physics. To do so, he has to 
have us believe that the subjectivity peculiar to psychoanalysis has 
been accounted for, while draining it of its content so as to make it 
manipulable, in the same way that a scientific object is manipulable. 
(Roustang 1998,48) 
As I quoted earlier, Lacan regards those analysts who have an "appetite for the Real" 
to be like those philosophers mocked by Plato for embracing trees. 28 But Lacan even 
tries to rationalise the irrational. He reassures his audience that nothing will escape 
his objectification: 
This is the first time that I'm granting that there is something 
irrational [in analysis]. Don't worry, I take this term in its arithmetical 
sense. There are numbers which are called irrational, and the first one 
which comes to mind, however unfamiliar you may be with this 
thing, is 12, which brings us back to the Meno, the archway though 
which we passed to begin this year. 
(Lacan 1954-5,256) 
The subject is thus completely capable of being studied by a rationalist discourse - 
that which lies beyond the capacity of such a discourse is deemed madness, defined 
(12) and confined, thus neatly placing Lacan in a tradition of "psychology" dating 
back to Pinel in the middle of the seventeenth century (see Foucault 1965). Although 
Roustang finds this to be a "same strange form of reasoning, " there is nothing unique 
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about Lacan's move. Classical, orthodox Freudian analysis, Robert Young says, is a 
"story of Nvell-drawn and Nvell-guarded borderlines, " it is "a model based on keeping 
the irrational at bay" (1994b) and this is the strategy that Lacan canonises. A model 
like Lacan's that regards the ego only in terms of its adaptive function, 
depends on a model of the mind where there is a border between the 
rational and irrational, between ego and id, which is policed by the 
ego's platoon of keepers of the peace [ ... 
) In a classical neo-Freudian 
model, the irrational goes on one side of the line and the rational on 
the other. In the Kleinian model they are jumbled, and we are 
constantly shuffling between these two basic positions, managing 
paired emotions - love and hate, envy and gratitude -with constant 
difficulty, living much of the time near the edge or, perhaps I can say, 
in the borderlands. 
(Young 1994b) 
In terms of power-relations, the mechanisms that patrol the border between rational 
and irrational, ego and id are those institutions - including, to a degree, 
psychoanalysis itself - that theorise, colonise the irrational in defence of bourgeois 
Reason. For Lacan (and Lacan's Freud), even "the Real is rational" because even it 
follows logical laws of desire and language. Lacan's methodology is steeped in the 
"essential procedure through which the psychoanalyst, in his experience, conjugates 
the particular to the universal; through which, in his theory, he subordinates the Real 
to the rational" (Lacan 1953,139). As -%ve shall see, Klein and object-relations offers 
us a means to reject this dichotomy - and, to a degree, the power relations that it 
supports - forcing us to live in the borderlands, to survive the paradoxeswith which 
we are necessarily confronted, to "bring the Otherness of psychosis nearer to the rest 
of life" (Young 1994b). 
The Lacanian subject is therefore that bourgeois, isolated monad, again, 
despite his protestations. We find in Lacan the same strict division of 
rational/irrational as in the seventeenth Enlightenment and our own (post)modem 
society, the same surveillance and containment of what threatens the rational order. 
Also, orthodox psychoanalysis focuses upon the intrapsychic mechanisms of the 
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subject, the instincts that drive the subject; the object-relations school, on the other 
hand, focuses upon intersubjectivity, those objects that the instincts are directed 
towards. Therefore, from the outset the Lacanian approach begins from an inward- 
looking view of the subject in isolation, even if, when looking in, he finds nothing. 
Lacan and Lacanians claim that Lacan's subject is "intersubjective" by virtue of the 
subject's participation in the symbolic order, but this conception of subjectivity is 
not "intersubjective" by object-relations standards, in the sense that it is not a 
relation betiveen subjects that is being examined. Lacanian subjects relate not to 
each other but to the symbolic structure; Lacan's intersubjectivity is limited to "the 
intersubjectivity of the Word" (Lacan 1953,54), which actually removes subjects 
from the equation (in order that they not prejudice the results). In the process, Lacan 
removes agency and the impact of environmental factors upon the subject. Roustang 
says, 
The subject is alienated in the signifier, to the point of having no 
other existence than that of a pure locus of passage from one signifier 
to another. Similarly, the Symbolic refers to the structure subtending 
the subject, even if he goes as far as to disappear in it. The human 
individual had been reduced to the form that constituted him in 
imaginary rivalry; hence, at a later stage, we find that there are no 
subject-to-subject relations that are not governed by effects of 
signifiers. 
(Roustang 1998,115) 
Lacan appeals to social-constructivists who wish to reject a sphere of interiority or 
any concept of human nature - indeed, the Lacanian shift away from Freud's 
biological determinism was largely responsible for his initial (and perhaps 
sustaining) appeal. But Lacan has replaced a biologically determined human nature 
with a psychologically and symbolically determined human nature; instead of our 
lives being inevitably governed by instincts, or genetic material, we are inevitably 
governed by an unalterable, ultimately authoritative linguistic structure. This is not 
social-constructivism, because it makes no allowance for the social, the specitile 
socio-cultural environment in which subjects develop; these necessarily subjective 
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socio-cultural factors are similarly reduced to the symbolic order. The language that 
provides the basis for Lacan's supposed intersubjectivity is a logic, a system, that 
exists as external to all subjects. Not only is this structure disembodied, but the 
environment is governed not by other subjects that can respond dynamically to one 
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another but by a pre-inscripted system of laws and codes. One is plugged into a 
structure inwhich the infant will proceed through the imaginary and symbolic 
orders, want to kill the father, fuck the mother, and so on and so on, regardless of 
any failures or successful adaptations in the environment. 
The subject Lacan conceives is isolated and a narcissist, forwhom the 
external world only exists as a means or obstacle to the realisation of its desire. Flax 
refers to this as Lacan's "ontology of narcissism" wherein Lacan "transforms Freud's 
concept of narcissism into an ontological and incontestable theory of human nature" 
(Flax 1990,91). Such a theory of human nature serves not only Lacan's ideological 
purposes, but also, as I argue below, as a defence against the uncertainty and the 
unknowability of the external world. Narcissism in object-relations theory is only 
one aspect of human development, a defence mechanism that can be employed by 
the subject in time of need, but Lacan universalises narcissism, seeking "to persuade 
us that narcissism is the natural state of the human being" (Flax 1990,93), and locks 
us in a narcissistic conception of the world from which there is no escape. Rather 
than marking a break from a bourgeois conception of the monadic self, Lacan's 
fragmented self is actually symploinatic of the bourgeois narcissistic subject: only a 
narcissist desires the perfect unity of self, and the perfect unity of self and other, 
which Lacan sees as the impossible goal and source of perpetual subjective lack. 
Lacan's conception of the "other" is also indicative of this narcissism. His theory is, 
despite some clever distractions, totally solipsistic: His "other" is not a dynamic, 
active and embodied entity outside the self. Lacan's other is always a projection of 
the ego, existing only in the imagination (imaginary), and his Other, although an 
actual subject, is inscribed in the symbolic but represents the IiInit of our knowledge 
as it is beyond our signifying practice. And like the subject itself, the other is 
imagined to be similarly narcissistic, thus always hostile to the subject's desire. 
"Lacan (like the child? )" Flax speculates, "assumes that the mother herself is a 
55 
narcissist who can be satisfied only by being restored to narcissistic perfection" 
30 (Flax 1990,98). 
Intersubjective exchange and affective, and consequently effective, 
communication is thus impossible for the Lacanian subject. The transference, for 
example, is limited to simply the "normal error of existence" comprising feelings 
easy assimilated under three headings: "love, hate, and ignorance" (Lacan 1953,73). 
Any such intersubjective connection - other than that sanctioned by the Word - is 
illusory; as Fraser explains, "affiliation falls under the rubric of the imaginary. To 
affiliate with others, then, to align oneself with others in a social movement, would 
be to fall prey to the illusions of the imaginary ego" (Fraser 1992,184). Therefore, 
group affiliation - and, ultimately, collective political agency - for Lacan is 
impossible. 
Another consequence of this intersubjective bar is that, for Lacan, love is 
also impossible because the subject is "unable to turn two into one [faire de 11112 
avee dezrr]" (Roustang 1998,86). Instead, for Lacan, love - and all affective states, 
which only really include love and hate - is a function of the symbolic (1953,26). 
Love, Lacan conceives, is "an intersubjective accord imposing its will and harmony 
on the torn. and riven nature which supports it" (Lacan 1953,26). For Lacan, there 
can be no love because union, fusion between the subject and the other is 
impossible. This is true, of course, but such a conception of love is wholly 
narcissistic: only a narcissist ever expects to be completely satisfied, only a narcissist 
ever expects to experience "some kind of pre-established harmony" (Lacan 1966, 
24), only a narcissist ever expects to experience fusion with the other, the single 
Being ("Mn") that Lacan mistakes for love, and this is why Lacan's love always 
faces an "imminent lapse into the mirage of narcissistic altruism" (1966,158). The 
desire of the subject can never be fulfilled for Lacan because total fulfilment for the 
narcissist is impossible, and Lacan's subject is inherently narcissistic. Thus for 
Lacan, hell is other people, and Lacan's Hobbesian subject is always conflicting with 
the other, its environment, its culture, as these seek to place limits upon the 
insatiable, inherently narcissistic desire of the subject. Object-relations 
psychoanalysis demonstrates, however, that such a relationship between self and 
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environment, inner and outer worlds is not inevitably and always thus, but once 
Lacan has negated the possibility of meaningful relationships with the caretaker and 
the environment, all that is left for the subject in Lacanian theory is to come into 
being through an alienating process. Lacan's self is, therefore, "necessarily a false 
self in Winnicott's sense, but unlike Winnicott, Lacan believes that no other 'true' 
self is possible" (Flax 1990,106). Winnicott's "true self' does not, of course, refer 
to an authentic being or "soul" but a mode of relating to the external world in a 
creative way (I return to this below), which is inconceivable in Lacanian thought. 
Again, despite Lacanian accusations to the contrary, Kleinian and object-relations 
theorists are not so naive, such throwbacks to a pre-Freudian episteme, that they 
maintain a belief in an unitary self. For example, while not making grandiose claims 
for anti-establishment self-importance, Riviere can quietly point out that "We cling 
to the fiction of out absolute individuality, our independence, as if we owed nothing 
to anyone and nothing in us had been begged, borrowed or stolen" (1955,359). 
Lacanians would, no doubt, find nothing in this statement to grumble about. But 
there is an important difference between condemning the attitude of omnipotence 
that acts as a defence against uncertainty (characteristic of subjects of most ages, I 
suspect, not only the Enlightenment) and to extemporise that all subjects are 
therefore forever and inevitably narcissistic, alienated and isolated. 
These conceptions of the other also apply to the pre-oedipal experience that 
Lacan has little time for, since this is the time before the subject is inserted into the 
symbolic. As Flax points out, despite everything else in Freud's theory that 
contradicts it, Lacan follows certain early Freudian conceptions of pre-oedipal 
experience as narcissistic (primary narcissism) and vastly under-estimates the 
importance of the matemal care in the development of the subject and its 
psychopathologies. " What notions of the pre-oedipal experience that do exist for 
Lacan are, again, intrapsychic and not intersubjective by object-relations standards: 
Klein and especially Winnicott consider the environmental set-up of the infant, 
where the adaptive failures and successes of the caretaker are paramount. Lacan's 
mothers are Others, unwittingly and uncontrollably subjected to the vicissitudes of 
their infant's narcissistic drives. 
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Mothers exist for infants only as extensions of their own bodies [ ... ] 
In keeping with the narcissistic premise, Lacan presumes that infants 
want total, instant, and perfectly timed responses to their wishes or 
needs and experience any deviation from such responses as painful 
frustration. 
(Flax 1990,94) 
As we shall see, the Winnicottian infant also experiences painful frustrations, but 
these are seen as necessary adaptive functions. Narcissism for Winnicott is not the 
starting point, the structural basis of subjectivity, but a defence against the too 
imperfectly, or too perfectly, timed responses of the mother. Whereas for Lacan we 
are narcissistic from birth and remain so throughout our lives, for Winnicott 
narcissism is seen as the bitter recourse of a subject unable to function in theworld. 
Where Lacan does recognise that "modem man [ ... 
] does not recognise his 
very own raison d'&re in the disorder that he denounces the world" (1953,44), his 
solution sounds remarkably counter-productive: 
But a Nvay out is offered to the subject for the resolution of that 
impasse when his discourse is delusion. Communication can validly 
be established for him in the common task of science and in the posts 
which it commands in our universal civilisation; this communication 
'will be effective within the enormous objectification constituted by 
that science, and it will permit him to forget his subjectivity. He will 
be able to make an efficacious contribution to the common task in his 
daily work and will be able to furnish his leisure time -with all the 
pleasures of a profuse culture which [ ... ] will give him the 
wherewithal to forget his own existence and his death, at the same 
time as that to misconstrue the particular sense of his life in a false 
communication. 
(Lacan 1953,45) 
Although Lacan obviously regards science as a potential salvation for the woes of 
modem and postmodem subjects, as I have suggested throughout, the discourses of 
science that reduce the subject to objects of scrutiny actually contribute to the 
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depersonalisation and derealisation of the subject. Wilden's note on the above 
passage instructs us that by the common task of science, Lacan also means 
"knowledge" and "learning, " but still not affect; Lacan further desires that the 
subject find its salvation in a disinterested, disembodied reason, personified in his 
disinterested, disembodied scientific analyst who admits no subjective bias, that is, 
countertransference. Lacan's suggestion that in the distractions of culture the subject 
can find stability by forgetting his own existence and death echoes Dr. Holmes and 
Sir William Bradshaw who tell Septimus Smith in Woolf's Mrs. Dalloivay, "Try to 
think as little about yourself as possible" (Woolf 1925,86). Drs. Lacan, Holmes and 
Bradshaw suggest that the means to health in a scientific society that regards you 
only as an object is to accept your own objectification (see also Lacan 1953,55-6). 
Because of this inherent narcissism, I am sometimes bewildered by how readily 
Marxist or socialist strategies have adopted a Lacanian framework for their own 
conceptions of society and subjectivity. True, the Marxist-inspired Lacanians point 
out that the symbolic order into which the subject is inserted is the social order that 
is alienating, and on that reading, Lacan can provide valuable insights into the 
subject in a particular capitalist mode of production. Also the Lacanian denial of 
interiority and focus upon rationalist, logical structures do have something in 
common with classical, scientific Marxism - most obviously a common root in 
Enlightenment rationalism. But as I have already discussed, group affiliation for 
Lacan belongs to the imaginary and illusory (in a thoroughly negative sense of the 
word). Fraser reasons that "from a Lacanian perspective, collective movements" 
such as feminism and, I add, socialism, "would by definition be vehicles of delusion; 
they could not even in principle be emancipatory" (1992,184). In a Lacanian world 
we are caught in a hopeless contradiction -%vbere opposition is self-defeating, always 
re-confirming the existing hegemonic dominance of structure. "It is the irony of 
revolutions that they engender a power all the more absolute in its actions, not 
because it is more anonymous, as people say, but because it is more reduced to the 
words which signify it" (Lacan 1953,46; the limits of transgression and the 
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possibilities of real political agency are themes I return to in Part 11). Critics and 
colleagues have argued that Lacan is trying only to describe the subject in our 
depersonalizing, desubjectifying, culture, the culture that is itself dominated by the 
rationalistic privileging of the representation. However, rather than exposing these 
mechanisms as ideological constructs, he naturalises them by universalising his 
mythology of infantile development. To say, for example, that the phallus is the 
transcendental signifier that dictates all meaning in the symbolic order naturalises 
patriarchal ideology. But also to say that desire is insatiable naturalises the capitalist 
ideology that wishes us to imagine ourselves insatiable consumers. What is an 
ideological construct - the vicissitudes of supply and demand in the capitalist mode 
of production - is accounted for with recourse to a mythical psychological 
determinism, wherein our very status as subjects depends upon our inevitable 
unconscious participation, as per Ldvi-Strauss, in a symbolic order of exchange. 
Lacan's narcissists are "unable to experience interpersonal relations as a reciprocal 
rather than a zero sum game inwhich one person's gain is invariably the other's 
loss" (Flax 1990,95). The belief that it is "Only through what we lack and therefore 
want do we become aware of our being" (Lowenstein 1994,720) must be a very 
satisfying philosophy for the brands who depend on that lack - and the empty 
promise of fulfilment - for their survival. Capitalism, in this formulation, is not a 
particular mode of production but the only means through which we can come into 
being. 
Winnicott warns against strategies that rely on biological determinism 
(Freud's instincts) or symbolic determinism (Lacan's language), seeing these as 
tantamount to using the Garden of Eden to explain the Fall, mythologies to explain a 
mysterious present. 32 If the subject is destined to be fundamentally isolated, 
fundamentally narcissistic, and suffer from an inevitable lack, as Lacan would have 
us believe, is a social or socialist culture even conceivable? In Part 11,1 Nvill argue 
that the Lacanian interventions into the political sphere, transgression and 
jouissance, derived from and for the narcissistic bourgeois subject, provide an 
unsatisfactory, limited conception of the political re-evaluations offered by magic 
realist fiction. 
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Theactetus' Children: (Postmodern, Lacanian) Theory as Defence Mechanism 
We cannot help ourselves and, as with other things that we cannot 0 help in ourselves, we make up elaborate explanations, reasonable 
rational explanations, to chant away the powerful things that don't 
belong to us. 
(Winterson 2000,168) 
"The answer is man, " said Oedipus to the Sphinx, causing 
her to throw herself over the cliff in humiliation. But is that the 
question as well, the only question? Certainly it was not for the 
ancient Greeks. For the tragic poets, as well as Socrates, "know 
thyself' meant knowing one's place in the cosmos. Do we really 
want to reduce this question to "know thy own motivation, " a 
question that is all too readily pressed into service as protection 
against narcissistic injury. 
Knowledge becomes a defence not just because humans 
do not like to be narcissistically wounded, but because a focus 
strictly on man tends to be recurvate. 
(Alford 1999,13 5) 
"What lies behind the analyst's attitude? " Lacan asks. 
The concern to provide the dialogue with a participant who is as 
devoid as possible of individual characteristics; we efface ourselves, 
we deprive the speaker of those expressions of interest, sympathy, 
and reaction that he expects to find on the face of the listener, we 
avoid all expression of personal taste, we conceal whatever might 
betray them, we become depersonalised, and try to represent for the 
other an ideal of impassibility. 
(Lacan 1966,13) 
For Lacan, the analysand's "emotional demand" is a "trap" that he insists 
psychoanalysts avoid (1966,13). No psychoanalyst, of any school, would deny that 
there are instances in analysis, or in life, when one must defend oneself from the 
excessive projections and emotional demands of others; however, Lacan elevates 
such defences to a moral imperative as a guarantee of psychoanalysis' scientific 
status. Lacan's rejection of the potential uses of counter-transference, his emotional 
detachment from his work-, function as a defence that excludes the emotional 
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component of analysis and of subjectivity. 
Such a defensive posture is not unique to Lacan. Psyche-somatic splitting and 
defensive emotional detachment are common in everyday life, for example, in 
professions that must deal -with death and pain everyday (soldiers, doctors, nurses). 
Such splitting, moreover, is a key prerequisite of many of the Enlightenment's 
discourses - the sciences, capitalism, utilitarian ethics, postmodernism, - that 
function and gain legitimacy through the negation of the variables such as emotional 
responses and subjectivity. Eagleton argues that it is an epistemological pre-requisite 
that since the emergence of bourgeois capitalism, "Knowledge burst out of its ethical 
constraints and began to operate by its own internal autonomous laws" (1990,367). 
But part of the strength of object-relations psychoanalysis I think lies in its refusal to 
make a virtue of enacting such a split in analysis, recognising that objectivity is not 
an ideal but a defensive posture that is not always desirable or useful in analysis - 
(see, for example, Winnicott 1947; Kohon 1986; Young 1994). Consequently, -we 
can re-evaluate how we come to knou,, trying to denaturalise knowledge as divorced 
from affect and to offer alternative conceptions of reason and knowing. 
For Winnicott, such psyche-somatic splitting can be the result of a break in 
the continuity of being in early infantile development. When the caretaker is good- 
enough, that is, adequately responds to the adaptive needs of the infant (holding and 
frustrating), the "mental activity of the infant turns a good-enough environment into 
a perfect environment, that is to say, turns relative failure of adaptation into adaptive 
success" (Winnicott 1949,245). When the caretaker is not good-enough, however, 
the psyche develops as afalse entity and finds afalse localisation in the mind. This 
mind-psyche, now split from the body, usurps the environmental functions (holding, 
containing, adapting), and mental functioning (thinking, the intellect) becomes a 
thing in itself, dominating the subject's relationship to its environment. As Katherine 
E. Agar concisely phrases it, "An intellectual solution for frustrated needs results in 
the tyranny of mind" (1998). 
This splitting also brings into being afalse selfthat is often tied-up with the 
mind-psyche, prematurely assuming the nursing functions for the subject (Winnicott 
1971,144; 1986,43). The function of the false self is, Winnicott tells us, "similar to 
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the function of the Ego, in early Freud, turned toward the world, between the Id and 
external reality [ ... ] Other writers have used the following term to describe similar 
states: Observing Ego" (1986,43). This identification (from Winnicott's early 
noteS33) is interesting in that the false-self or "Observing Ego" invites a comparison 
with Lacan's definition of the ego as alien to the subject itself. But what is important 
to recognise here is that for Lacan the ego is alivays alien to the subject. For 
Winnicott, the false self - although necessary - is not the only means through which 
we relate to our environment. While a part of normal subjective experience and 
object-relations, the false self can become extreme (pathological) when it is taken as 
real, as the subject itself, not defending the subject from hostile environments but 
fully taking over, preventing even the formation of the true self Again, I must 
emphasise that this true self does not, as some Lacanians would have it (see, for 
example, Lacan 1953,25; Lowenstein 1994,716-7; Hall 200 134 ), represent some 
naive belief in a human essential self. The true self, "what ever that may be" 
(Winnicott 1960,142), is an elusive entity that we may liken to Bollas' idiom (see 
below). It is "the source of personal impulses" (1986,43), the source of the 
"spontaneous gesture and the personal idea [ ... ] Only the True Self can be creative 
and only the True Self can feel real" (1960,148). Rather than an entity, the true self 
is a process, a means of relating to the world. But through constant exposure to 
environments that are not good-enough, that are perceived to be too hostile or 
threatening to the subject, the false self subsumes the true self, not pennitting the 
latter even a secret life. The false self is thus the surface representation of an 
unintegrated subject, incapable of depth or feeling. Unable to act creatively, the 
subject is seduced into compliance and a compliant false self is the subject's only 
response to its environment. 
Psyche-somatic splitting as a defence against poor object-relations may also 
manifest itself in other ways. British analysts consistently show how the scientific, 
the rationalist, the intellectual impulse is an attempt to gain mastery over the feared 
unknown elements and to re-enforce phantasies of omnipotence. Freud described an 
"intellectual function in us which demands unity, connection and intelligibility from 
any material, whether of perception or thought, that comes within its grasp; and if, as 
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a result of special circumstances, it is unable to establish a true connection, it does 
not hesitate to fabricate a false one" (Freud, 1913,154). Jones (1908) explains how 
rationalisation functions as an intellectual process to conceal repressed feelings. 35 
Fairbairn discusses the process of intellectualisation, a schizoid tendency to over- 
value the thought processes, to privilege the mind-psyche over affective, bodily and 
environmental functions (see Fairbairn 1940; Winnicott 1949; see also Riviere 
1955). 3' ' Such a subject has difficulty with emotional contacts with other people, and 
"tends increasingly to substitute intellectual solutions for his emotional problems for 
attempts to achieve a practical solution of them within the emotional sphere in his 
relationships with others in the outer world" (Fairbaim 1940,20). The intellectual 37 
libidinises thought processes so "ideas tend to become substituted for feelings, and 
intellectual values for emotional values" (1940,20). These schizoid tendencies, 
Fairbairn believes, are behind the contemporary "obsessional appeal of science, 
based as this is upon the presence of compulsive need for orderly arrangement and 
meticulous accuracy" (6). 
Such a personality, %vhen he is in love with an intellectual system 
which he interprets rigidly and applies universally, has all the 
makings of a fanatic - which indeed is what he really is. When, 
further, such a fanatic has both the inclination and the capacity to 
take steps to impose his system ruthlessly upon others, the situation 
may become catastrophic - although at times it may admittedly be 
potent for good as well as for evil. 
(Fairbaim 1940,21) 
The intellectual, doubtless someone we'will all recognise from our own experience, 
is also characterised by narcissistic attitudes of omnipotence, a sense of isolation and 
detachment and a preoccupation with inner reality (1940,6). 
But I am not claiming that Lacan or his followers are themselves sebizoids, 
or that postmodern subjects are en masse. I do think-, however, that postmodern 
theory employs some schizoid defences, particularly its exercises in 
intellectualisation. With the relentless privileging of the signifier, contemporary 
theory divorces mind from body, substituting intellectual, quantifiable, systematic 
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problems for emotional ones. One reason I think we are so enchanted by Lacan is 
because he offers us a strategic model for creating an object of study, a science by 
which to systematise our study of the world that offers us certain knowledge and 
does not make us engage our emotional responses, responses that might reveal more 
of our true selves than is comfortable. This has not been without certain advantages, 
but we should not delude ourselves that postmodern theory marks a break with 
Enlightenment rationalism. On the contrary, post-structuralist, postmodem, 
psychostructuralist theory perhaps more efficiently than any other discourses splits 
and confines the variables that threaten to taint it - the body, affect, the subject. 
Although, again, I do not want to psychopathologise all postmodern theorists, 
it is interesting to consider how Freud might regard postmodem theory. Freud, I 
think, would label as "psychotic" the negativity of many contemporary discourses - 
the foci upon absence, false selves, the lack of the subject and the unbridgeable gap 
between subjectivities. Jacques-Alain Miller contends that "what we call the subject 
in analysis is nothing more than a function of the combination of signifiers" (199 1, 
33) . 
38 Freud regarded negativism as a splitting of the intellectual function from the 
affective process - much to Lacan's displeasure. As'with Fairbairn, Freud saw 
negative judgement as an intellectual substitute for repression that indicates a 
withdrawal of libidinal energies from objects (Freud 1925a, 438,441). Such 
negativity defends against the possibility of having to mean, a theme I shall return to 
when I examine Bion's conceptualisation of thinking below. Finlay-de Monchy 
similarly identifies postmodernism as "a psychotic defence against loss of referential 
identity" (Finlay, 1989,59; see also Finlay-de Monchyforthcoining and Young 1989, 
1996c). Postmodem theory too often echoes the apathetic adolescent cursed by the 
anguish of existential angst - nothing matters, nothing is real, whatever, nevermind. 
For Eagleton, there is an Oedipal relation between postmodemists and their 
modernist fathers, as the former squirm "with some embarrassment at the gap 
between the big talk of the father and his feeble deeds" (1996,63). 
This image of the negating teenager also shows us how such a defensive 
theoretical position may also be positioned Oedipally. Andr6 Green, writing on 
Greek tragedy, asks "If King Oedipus is the tragedy par excellence, the fundamental 
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question is, why is this unremitting relentless questioning, this passion for 
knowledge, so indissolubly linked with parricide and incest? " (Green 1979,229). 39 
Without wanting to evoke an "anxiety of influence, " I think that such negative 
Oedipal positions are a common feature in a great deal of postmodern and post- 
structuralist theory. There seems to me to be an uneasy relationship with Fathers, 
one's discursive ancestors; on the one hand, Lacan, for example, must acknowledge 
his debt to Freud, Saussure, Hegel, Kant. Not only are they his predecessors, but he 
also depends on them to lend him authenticity: Lacan often evokes the Fathers' 
Word, their Law, to secure the objectivity of his science. How do we know that 
language exists as signifiers, and sigifieds? Saussure tells us so. How do we know 
that human relations are defined by a master/slave dialectic? Hegel tells us so. How 
do we know about the unconscious, repression, sublimation? It is all in Freud, if only 
we return to his original works. Yet, like any son, Lacan has a simultaneous need to 
distinguish himself from the Father, to set himself apart. Thus Lacan, who relies on 
Freud and pledges loyalty to him, must destroy, devour, possess Freud and 
reconstruct him in the son's image. Lacan's Freud, a pioneer of symbolic- 
determinism, certainly does not reflect any Freud that I have read, and while I do not 
withhold from anyone the right to reread any text, I am not sure that Lacan's Freud, 
enamoured with signifiers, exists anywhere but in Lacan's imagination . 
40 Thus, there 
seems to me to be a nervous tension in the work of Lacan and his followers, both 
incestuous and parracidal; whether this is much greater than with any other 
theoretical strategy remains to be seen. 
We also see a violence in much Lacanian and postmodern theory if we 
explore the passion for knowledge in terms of the relationship with the mother. 
Klein's conception of the epistenzophillic instinct, a healthy, normal desire to know, 
is originally directed towards the mother's body and her internal contents. Here too 
we have a reading of postmodern theory that illustrates an (pre-)Oedipal relation 
gone awry. For Klein, 
The infant, still underdeveloped intellectually, is exposed to an 
onrush of problems and questions. One of the most bitter grievances 
which we come upon in the unconscious is that many of these 
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ovenvhelming questions, -which are apparently only partly conscious 
and even when conscious cannot yet be expressed in words, remain 
unanswered. Another reproach follows hard upon this, namely, that 
the child could not understand words and speech. Thus his first 
questions go back beyond the beginnings of his understanding of 
speech. 
(Klein 1928,188) 
Typically, for Klein, she sets the origins of epistemophilia, the desire to know, 
before language - furthering the notion that the ability to use language does not 
mark any significant break in subjective development . 
41 These grievances, the early 
anxiety of not knoiving, if not lessened by the adaptive functions of the caregiver, 
ccgive rise to an extraordinary amount of hate. Singly or in conjunction they are the 
cause of numerous inhibitions of the epistemophillic impulse" (Klein 1928,188). 
These inhibitions lead to feelings of impotence and being incapable, exacerbated by 
the Oedipal situation. To defend against such helplessness, the anxiety of knowing 
nothing definitely, the infant experiences disturbances in symbolisation and speech, 
the deflection of meaning and a sadistic aim to possess, appropriate or destroy the 
unknowable, which for Klein is the mother's the body. 42 Curiosity towards the 
mother and her internal contents becomes "intrusive, rending, devouring, 
primordially bound to the desire to scoop out and possess the content's of the 
mother's body" (Alford 1999,13 1). We can see these mechanisms at work in 
postmodern theory, in the certainty offered by structuralism and Lacan's 
psychoanalysis, devouring and destroying the subjective, unknowable quantity, and 
the emptying of meaning from the sign. Thus the epistemophillic impulse is 
transformed from a instinctual curiosity involving the body and its processes to a 
sadistic defence against narcissistic injury that enacts a psyche-somatic split, 
privileging the abstract knowledge that is divorced from emotional processes. 
Attempting to confine one's self to exact, authoritative definitions that defy play is 
thus a defence mechanism though - again to recall Theactetus - certainly not one 
unique to our age. 
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However, despite these assaults - the depersonali sing, desubjectifying, 
intellectual i sing efforts of postmodern. theory - the subject persists, insisting upon 
existing. As Lisa Erdman exclaims to Freud in D. M. Thomas' The Ofite Hotel, "La 
thiorie cest hon, inais qa neinpiche pas dexister"; theory is good, but it does not 
prevent things from existing, or, more accurately, it does not prevent existence. 43 
The subject insists upon its being through a range of strategies - for some this 
manifests itself in psyche-somatic symptoms, some scar or mutilate their own 
bodies, some utilise defence mechanisms that have until now been mistaken for 
psychopathology. Some even employ language. 
We need, therefore, to develop strategies for examining subjectivity that 
appreciate these efforts and can recognise them for what they are: resistances to 
discourses that threaten to rend subjectivity asunder. Our theoretical strategies 
should tolerate and nurture the subjective element, regardless of the uncertainties 
and paradoxes Nvith which it conrronts us. 
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Winnicott's Potential Spaces: New Psychoanalytic Approaches to 
Postmodernity 
I do not offer object-relations as an infallible cure-all to contemporary subjective 
crises, or pretend that object-relations does not have flaws of its own. 44 But, I want 
to argue - sornewhat tentatively - that object-relations offers a means to redress 
many patriarchal, bourgeois Enlightenment ways of thinking about the subject, 
knowledge and reason that postmodem culture and theory face. 
The recognised inadequacy of the traditional categories in psychopathology 
and changes in the needs of analysands has, for many psychoanalysts, forced a 
corresponding alteration in both practical approaches to and theoretical 
conceptual i sations of analysis. Kleinian and Independent psychoanalysts, therefore, 
move away from the epistemologically-centred psychoanalysis that sets as its focus 
and aim only self-knowledge, the showing and telling of repression and desire. From 
Ernest Jones' earliest essays, we can see that the culture of British psychoanalysis - 
infused with the ideas of Ferenezi via Klein and Balint - -%vill prove to be much 
different from Lacan's scientisation. Whereas Lacan's Freud founded a science of 
signs, Jones' beloved Professor devoted himself to "the science of 'feeling 
psychology"' (Jones 1908,9). And whereas Lacan utilises reason in analysis, putting 
egowhere id was, making conscious the unconscious, Jones bemoans the 
subordinate position that feeling has assumed in academic psychology at the expense 
of the "intellectual processes. " (Ironically, however, it was Jones, with James 
Strachey, who produced the scientised English translation of Freud I discussed 
earlier. ) Freud's great innovation was not the linguistic component of the talking 
cure, argues British psychoanalysis, but the understanding of primitive processes and 
the communication of emotions, to the point where "one may fairly question 
whether there exist any mental processes in the formation and direction of which 
feeling does not play a part of the first rank" (Jones 1908,8-9). This re- 
conceptualisation of psychoanalysis has led to a number of significant changes in 
how we conceive of psychoanalysis and of the subject on the couch and in culture. 
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First Being: Subjective Ontology 
There's my life, why not, it is one, if you like, if you must, I don't 
say no, this evening. There has to be one, it seems, once there is 
speech, no need of a story, a story is not compulsory, just a life, 
that's the mistake I made, one of the mistakes, to have wanted a 
story for myself, whereas life alone is enough. 
(Beckett 1967,93) 
"Thunder and lightening, did yuz think I was dead? " 
(Carter 1984,118) 
The first and most fundamental aspect of Winnicott's work- that offers an 
opportunity to redress the crises of a postmodernism thus perceived, I feel, lies in his 
insistence upon the primacy of subjective being. In this, Winnicott insists that the 
principal aim of psychoanalysts, and also by extension, cultural and political 
theorists, should lie in the realisation of the subject's own being as a subject, as a 
material, embodied entity. "After being - doing and being done to. But first being. " 
(Winnicott 1971,85). Ontology must precede epistemology (but not ignore it) 
because, simply, it is pointless to construct a meaningless knowledge of entities that 
do not exist. 
I find the concept of the subject's being a difficult one to convey in 
acceptably "scientific" terms, and this is probably a sign thatwe are on the right 
track. The language I use here reflects what I perceive to be a general tendency in 
contemporary British psychoanalysis, beginning I think with Winnicott, towards a 
discourse that actively works to accommodate uncertainties - my meaning in this 
respect will hopefully become more clear as I proceed. I find thatwhat I am trying to 
get at is concisely described by Christopher Bollas in the concept of heing a 
character (1992). 
To be character, to release one's idiom into lived experience, requires 
a certain risk, as the subject will not know his outcome; indeed, to be 
released into being, not as a knowable entity per se, but as an idiom 
of expression explicating a human form. Even in these moments of 
self expression the individual will not know his own meaning, his 
reflections will always lag behind himself, more often than not 
70 
puzzled by his itness, yet relieved by thejouissance of its choosings 
I ... 
I 
(Bollas 1992,54) 
To be a character is to enjoy the risk of being processed by the object 
- indeed, to seek objects, in part, in order to be metamorphosed [ ... ] 
To be character is to gain history of internal objects, inner presences 
that are the trace of our encounters, but not intelligible, or even 
clearly knowable: just intense ghosts Nvho do not populate the 
machine, but inhabit the human mind [ ... I 
(Bollas 1992,59) 
Being a character, then, means bringing alongwith one's articulating 
idiom those inner presences - or spirits - that we call on to contain, 
now and then transferring them to receptive place in the other, who 
may knowingly or unknowingly be inhabited by them. 
(Bollas 1992,62)45 
I do not wish to explore the minute detail of this conception all at once here, but the 
above passages contains some central themes that dominate my considerations. In 
order to become a subject, there must be a degree of play, of risk, and uncertainty 
and liminality in the subject's experience of the world. And our being is largely 
unknoivable; the creative experiences that allow us moments of self-realisation are 
not rational and do not follow any systernatised or formalised logic. This does not 
mean that they are simply "beyond language, " but that language, instead of an 
organising principle of our experience, is only one piece or tool of our being that 
permits the communication of affective processes. Subjective being is also 
dependent upon a paradoxical but productive tension between our inner world, a 
sphere of interiority that contains the "Presences that are the trace of our 
encounters, " and an external world that is populated with other subjects that may be 
receptive, or hostile, to our communications. 
Winnicott's maxim and Bollas' character also reminds us that subjective 
being cannot be assumed a priori. For Lacan, too, subjectivity cannot be assumed a 
priori, but again I warn against cliding the important differences that exist between 
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Lacan and an object-relations approach, despite the illusion of parallels generated by 
their similar terminology. For Lacan, the subject comes into being through language, 
and subjectivity is achieved through recognition and a knowledge of one's self and 
is therefore an epistemological becoming of the subject who knolvs. For Winnicott, a 
very different subjectivity is achieved through creativity and the realisation of being 
and is therefore an ontological becoming of the subject -Vvho can simply be. This 
difference is perhaps most clearly explained by an examination of Lacan's and 
Winnicott's respective conceptualisations of the mirror phase (see Lacan 1966,1-7 
46 and Winnicott 1971,111-8). For Lacan, who first theorised a mirror phase, the ego 
is formed by an identification with its own image in the mirror. 47 Thus for Lacan the 
ego is based only in an image, from the imaginary, mis-recognised as the self, a 
deceptive illusion, alien and not to be trusted. 
The mirror stage is a dramawhose internal thrust is precipitated from 
insufficiency to anticipation - and which manufactures for the 
subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession 
of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image [ ... 
] to the 
assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark- 
with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. 
(Lacan 1966,4; see also 6) 
For Winnicott, -%vho claims to have been influenced by Lacan's work in this respect, 
the mirror is the mother's face that gives back to the baby part of the baby's own 
self. Thus the mother provides a good-enough environment for the baby who realises 
that she is alive in a world that recognises his needs and is capable of responding 
accordingly. For Lacan, the mirror forins the ego, splitting the infant and fracturing 
the deceptive illusion of fusion between itself and the ideal mother, providing the 
basis for the subject's objectification in the symbolic order. For Winnicott, the 
infant, already bom with a nascent ego, comes into being through creative 
interaction with its environment, with its embodied, not imaginary, caretaker(s) that 
will foster productive illusions and paradox. 
"Subjectivity, " Finlay-de Monchy clarifies, "is not a neutral apriori presence 
but something, %vhich emerges time and again out of the discreteness and intricacy of 
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experience - an etching on surfaces made by meeting the other's impression of one, 
as in the 'mystic writing pad"' (forlheonfing, 500- 1). Flax also finds that "The 
'psychological birth of the human infant' does not occur simultaneously Nvith his or 
her physical birth [using Margaret Mahler's phrase]. Psychical birth is a distinct 
event occurring within a finite and easily determined period of time; psychological 
birth is a complex process stretching over roughly the first three years of life [or 
longer! ]. Psychological birth emerges out of the interaction of physical, relational, 
and mental processes" (1990,111). And again, both Flax and Finlay-de Monchy, like 
Bollas and Winnicott, find a necessarily intet-subjective component to subjective 
becoming, not subjects' relating through an all-consuming, pre-ordained structure, 
but dynamically, having a direct and immediate, mutual impact on others. 
What is Creativity? 
For Winnicott the subject comes to realise its status as a subject through creative 
play. Creativity for Freud is something that has its genesis in child's play, but in 
adult experience Freud sets creativity in opposition to reality. "The opposite of play 
is not what is serious but what is real" (Freud 1908,132); creativity creates worlds 
that are unreal, and leads us to phantasy, to daydreams. Thus for Freud, as a 
sublimation of libidinal impulses, there is a sense that creativity "has at its root a 
sense of the pathological [ ... ] The view that the creative is a 
life-force that 
materialises in specific individuals because of the errors in their development" 
(Gilman 1997,602). Klein developed the idea of play and recognised how the games 
of children, and the inhibition of play, assume central importance in adult's abilities, 
or inabilities, to negotiate the demands of the real world. In Kleinian theory, the 
creative impulse of the artist arises from guilt and a desire to make reparations to an 
object damaged by aggressive phantasies. These objects, regarded in the paranoid- 
schizoid position as split and persecutory, need to be repaired, re-integrated in the 
depressive position (see Klein 1929,1937; Fairbairn 1938; Stokes 1955). 48 
For Winnicott, however, the possibility exists that creativity may characterise 
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all of our experience, and is essential in the realisation of subjective being. The 
creative impulse, for Winnicott, is 
something that can be looked at as a thing in itself, something that of 
course is necessary if an artist is to produce a work of art, but also 
something that is present when anyone -a baby, child, adolescent, 
adult, old man or woman - looks in a healthy way at anything or does 
anything deliberately, such as making a mess with faeces or 
prolonging the act of crying to enjoy a musical sound. It is present as 
much in the moment-by-moment living of a backward child who is 
enjoying breathing as it is in the inspiration of an architect who 
suddenly knows what it is that he -%vishes to construct, and who is 
thinking in terms of material that can actually be used so that his 
creative impulse may take form and shape, and the world may 
witness. 
(Winnicott 1971,69) 
Notice here that Winnicott perceives creativity to be a thing in itself that is present 
in all "healthy" individuals. The identification that the simple act of breathing, Nvhen 
experienced and enjoyed, can be a creative act emphasises that creativity is 
intricately and inextricably linked to our very sense of being and not only a gift 
granted to the artiSt. 49 Perception itself can be a creative act for Winnicott, "for this 
is the process by which the inner becomes actualised in external form and as such 
becomes the basis, not only of internal perception, but also of all true perception of 
environmenf'(1986,391-2). 
For Winnicott, the degree towhich creativity is present in the subject 
constitutes an integral component of what we are to regard as psychopathologic. "In 
some way our theory includes a belief that living creatively is a healthy state, and 
that compliance is a sick basis for life" (1971,65). A compliant relation to the world 
is sometimes necessary to adopt as a part of normal mental functioning. In severe 
cases of compliance, however, andwith the creation of a false-self organisation, the 
creative capacity of the subject is subverted or repressed. Winnicott's admission that 
we may not have held this view identifying subjective health with the realisation of 
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creative experience "elsewhere and in another age" (1971,65) or "a thousand years 
ago" (70) suggests that the pathology of compliant, false-self personalities observed 
by object-relations psychoanalysts may be particularly endemic in our contemporary, 
specifically Western capitalist, culture. Gabrielle Schwab goes further, speculating 
that "We may well evaluate a culture according to the extent to which it tries to gain 
access to and mold or control the transitional space - especially given our 
50 increasingly invasive media culture" (1994,36). 
For Winnicott creativity itself is to be realised in the sub ect's play. j 
Winnicott and Klein often endorse strategies employing play in their analyses of 
children (and sometimes adults), where the analyst enters into the games and the 
imagined realities of young analysands as a means of communication. Play evolves 
from an entirely subjective object-world and develops the infant's perception of its 
external environment, but the concept of play applies to adults as well, "only the 
matter is more difficult to describe when the patient's material appears mainly in 
terms of verbalisation" (Winnicott 1971,40). And, significantly, only the integrated 
psyche-soma can engage in play. "Playing involves the body: (i) because of the 
manipulation of objects; (ii) because certain types of intense interest are associated 
with certain aspects of bodily excitement" is, for me, Winnicott's obvious but 
unsatisfactory answer (1971,52). It is only the true-self that can really engage in 
play, for the objects we play with must be objects of our subject's own choosings, 
objects that can potentially carry meaning, that are found on the body and concretely 
inscribed on the psyche-soma. 
For Winnicott, play is more than merely the expression of individual 
interiority or the discursive exchange between "doctor" and "patient. " Playing is a 
creative, conununicative experience where subjects meet - it is not wholly the 
domain of either participant. Winnicott further explains that "only in playing is 
communication possible; except direct communication [e. g., acting out], which 
belongs to psychopathology or to an extreme immaturity" (1971,54). 
Psychoanalysis, Winnicott says, has developed a "highly specialised form of playing 
in the service of communicationwith oneself and others" (1971,4 1). Play, as 
communication, is primarily intersubjective, and takes place at the point of 
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paradoxical intersection between subjectivities. Through creativity, we meet what 
Jessica Benjamin calls like subjects; the recognition of the outside other as a 
separate and equivalent centre of subjectivity (Benjamin 1995,7). Play permits the 
movement of experience from the entirely subjective object-world to mutual subject 
recognition and provides a basis for our symbolic use of objects (which, in a 
Kleinian model, then forms the basis of language). 
In his theory of creativity then, Winnicott allows for and demands that the 
full weight of environmental factors be considered in the developmental aetiology of 
the subject. Winnicott finds the emphasis placed on the instincts by Freud and Klein 
and Lacan unacceptable, particularly the death drive, representing a retreat to a 
mythical narrative to explain mysterious processes. Henderson further considers: 
For the Freudian and Kleinian viewpoints hold aggression to be innate 
and (it follows from that) inevitable - the best man can hope for is to 
come to terms with his inherent badness and suppress it analogous to 
the "instinctual renunciation" idea in psychotherapy and the 
superseding of id by ego. To accept man's aggressiveness as bedrock 
is to invoke premature closure in away which is hardly scientific - if 
we accept, for example, that the apple falls because it is heavy we 
sball never discover nor feel the need for a law of gravity. To say that 
mankind's problem of original sin is really his problem of innate 
aggression is hardly an advance. 
(Henderson 1975,118) 
For this reason, some Winnicottian theory may seem hopelessly optimistic, not 
regarding the subject as inherently narcissistic (Freud and Lacan) or inherently 
violent (Klein); instead, for Winnicott, narcissism and aggression arise in response to 
environmental conditions, particularly, the frustration of infantile needs. Again, 
Henderson further explains that "In terms of theory, it is not at all aggression which 
is innate, but rather the ego weakness of an immature infant who cannot grasp that 
'mother' is an imperfect being who can never fully gratify him" (1975,118). It is 
inaccurate, of course, to portray Winnicott as such a Utopian (this is, after all, the 
analyst who openly discusses how much be bates his patients - see Winnicott 1947); 
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his rejection of the death instinct is meant to challenge what he regards as an 
unacceptable, and unscientific, retreat to a mythical explanation. And Winnicott's 
theory of creativity, like Freud's does include some notion that frustration is 
necessary to facilitate the play of the infant; a "perfect environmenf' is not "good 
enough" -a degree of gradual disillusionment is necessary. 
The history of the subject cannot bewritten therefore in terms of the subject 
alone but must also necessarily take into account the environment that responds and 
either meets the adaptive needs of the infant or fails to do so. The recognition that 
creative experience is not something that happens solely ivithin the individual, nor 
something that happens to an individual subject, but between two (or more) subjects 
is an important re-conceptualisation of the subjective and intersubjective space and 
how we conceive, both in psychoanalysis and literary criticism, of experience itself 
This theory necessitates and creates a space that is'neither the intrapsychic world 
that characterises the subjective model proposed by orthodox Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, nor is it the external, social world offered by old-fashioned Marxists 
for whom the sphere of individual interiority does not exist independently of social- 
ideological reality. 51 This leaves us then to question, if play takes place neither 
within the (subjective) individual nor in the (objective) environment, where are we 
to engage in this creative play? 
Setting the Scene: The Potential Space 
The location of creative, and, just as importantly for our analysis of language, 
cultural experience must be the potential space, or the "playground, " between two 
subjects, a third area that is both "me" nor "not-me, " that is between the internal 
phantasy world of the individual and the external world, or between the subjective 
object and the object that is objectively perceived (Winnicott 1971, especially 95- 
103). The liminal experience that is the potential space (also variously labelled "the 
transitional zone, " "the transitional space, " "the third space") is, according to 
Winnicott, first realised in the gradual separation of infant from the caregiver. 52 This 
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is the placewhere we are creative, and subsequently becomes the place of cultural 
experience, the place where we live. This is a place where we can be challenged and 
experiment, but must also (Winnicott insists) be a place of rest "for the human 
individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality 
separate yet interrelated" (Winnicott 1971,2). 
We see that in our play paradoxes must be negotiated, and in the potential 
space the subject becomes aware thatparadoxes can havepositive value. 53 This I 
will demonstrate has not only important implications for how -%ve are to conceive of 
language and literature, but this realisation can also provide new strategies for 
approaching the very problem of the subject-object paradox that has thus far in 
contemporary theory been dominated by the ancient vicissitudes of dualisms and 
dialectics. Contrary to dialectical thinking, in which opposing factions seemingly 
"come together" in synthesis, the paradoxes maintained in the third space insist that 
there be no resolution, that the contradictions and complements of subject and 
object, internal and external, separation and union, be allowed to exist 
simultaneously and unresolved. I cannot emphasise this point enough, as the full 
value of the Winnicottian potential space would be lost if one regards this paradox 
as a dialectic. A dialectical synthesis, like a war carried out upon a battlefield, is a 
failure in that something is always lost on both sides, because one side emerges 
victorious over another. And syntheses are usually less an equitable meeting than a 
triumph of an already dominant thesis. 54 The potential space, on the other hand, 
allows the ascendancy of neither extreme. There is no union - without separation. 
Nor does this space offer a metaphysical transcendence beyond polarities. When the 
potential space is polluted, that is, dominated by one side, there is no creativity, no 
play, no space for subjective ontological experience. To be effective, the potential 
space must remain unpolluted, that is, not dominated by foreign objects or ruled by 
one extreme over the other. For Flax, this space can only be enjoyed and utilised if it 
remains "neutral" (1990,120), though neutrality to me implies something passive, 
where the potential space is active and alive -%vith paradox. Carcgiver and infant, 
analyst and analysand, author and reader, reader and critic, employer and employee, 
citizen and politician enter this space together, as it is rightfully the creation of 
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neither but is shared. 
The potential space, it may not therefore come as a surprise to learn, is not 
only perceived as source of creativity for the possible realisation of subjective being, 
but, because of the difficulty inherent in the acceptance of paradox, it is also the 
source of a dreaded anxiety; but this is yet another paradox that must be negotiated. 
This anxiety stems from much the same source as that fear of ambivalence, 
identified by Klein, accompanying the impending recognition of whole-objects. 
Briefly, as the infant develops improved physiological perceptive capabilities and 
means of reality testing, the part-objects that are the source and target of the infantile 
love and hate in the paranoid-schizoid position begin to be recognised for the whole- 
objects (that is, "like subjects") that, in reality, they are. The infant, however, fears 
the confluence of love and hate directed toward the whole-object - retribution for 
past aggressive phantasies, the tainting of the ideal object - and continues to struggle 
to keep the two poles separate, using splitting, projection, intrejection and 
idealisation, to keep loving certain objects ideally and to keep hating other objects 
demonically. Just as the infant fears having to confront the ambivalence from love 
and hate, good and bad coalesced in one object, there is a similar hesitation in 
having to negotiate the paradoxes of the potential space. Visits to the potential space 
are sometimes accompanied by fears of disintegration, that is, a weakening of the 
boundary between self and other. When this fear is too great to enable the positive 
experience of paradox in the potential space, subjects are unable to act creatively 
and simply comply -with the object - or discourse - that dominates their world and 
threatens to overwhelm them. As I'will soon demonstrate, the subject therefore 
requires an object to aid in its movement to this in-bet-ween world of productive 
paradox. 
The potential space should not be thought of as an abstract, metaphysical 
space but as a material, real place. Winnicott remarks that this area is not meant to 
be thought of as part of the (body-)ego organisation, but that it is found "on body 
experiences" (1971,70). This notion of experience as inscribed on the body is 
important in this study in that it is my assertion (made with others, including M. M. 
Bakbtin and V. N. Vologinov) that language is an embodied object, arising from 
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embodied experience and taking place in an embodied space that cannot be so easily 
abstracted from the ontologically real, psyche-somatic experience of subjects. 55 
I concur with Flax's evaluation that this notion of the transitional space "is one of 
[Winnicott's] most important contributions to (possible) post-Enlightenment 
thinking He breaks decisively with Enlightenment values in identifying the 
capacities to play and to 'make use of' and 'relate to' objects, rather than reason, as 
the qualities most characteristic of human 'being"' (Flax 1990,116). Instead of 
reason as envisioned by Descartes, or the capacity to reason symbolically as 
envisioned by the Cartesian Lacan, subjectivity for Winnicott is based on the 
capacity to use objects creatively in a transitional space. Women used to be excluded 
ftom being human subjects because they were said to lack a capacity to reason. 
Lacanians exclude anyone incapable of participating in the symbolic order, anyone, 
in short, incapable of language. Winnicott's move thus explodes the field of 
subjectivity, radically rewriting the criteria by which wejudge aliveness. 
Because the potential space is a place of constant play and negotiation, it is 
the placewhere the subject can meet objects in its world. The potential space thus 
offers a way out of the narcissistic, self/other dualism common to Enlightenment 
thinking. For these reasons, Green is also full of praise for Winnicott's discovery: 
When he distinguished transitional objects, transitional phenomena 
and transitional space, Winnicott took a decisive step in the concept 
of the object in connection with inside-outside, subjective-objective, 
non-existing-existing and positive-negative relations. Instead of 
viewing the object as the stake in play between internal and external 
reality, he brought into action the notion of the boundary. By creating 
the notion of potential space existing at the point of separation 
between self and object, by making of this space of separation a space 
of reunion, by describing the creation of the transitional object within 
it, he allows us to resolve the dilemma. Psychic reality has been 
transformed. It no longer remains trapped in the unreality-reality 
opposition; it now defines itself according to the nature of the 
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potentiality which calls forth infinite transformations. 
(Green 1986,274) 
The transitional space bridges the gaps, but also helps to individuate, self and other, 
subject and object. Because of the potential space, "humans are not condemned to a 
world in which there are only gaps that can never be bridged between self and other. 
The narcissistic position inwhich there are only purely internally constructed 
&representations' or 'ideas' of objects -%vho are alive because and only so long as 
libidinal energy is invested in them is only one aspect of out experience with others" 
(Flax 1990,119). And, as Green goes on to say, "Analytic experience has convinced 
me that the only way out of the impasse of empiricism versus intellectualism, or 
4realism' versus 'abstraction', is through exploiting the technical and theoretical 
possibilities suggested by Winnicott's work" (1986,2 86). The impasses that the 
conception of the potential space may help us to overcome will also include, in Part 
11, that of "realism" and "magic. " 
Transitional Phenomena: Transitional Objects and the Role of Blusion 
Helping the subject overcome the anxiety experienced due to the liminal status and 
paradox of the potential space is the transitional object. This term Winnicott uses to 
describe any number of objects first used by the infant to decrease the anxiety of its 
"transition from a state of being merged Nvith the mother to a state of being in 
relation to the mother as something outside and separate" (Winnicott 1971,14). 
The object is a symbol of the union of baby and the mother (or 
part of the mother). This symbol can be located. It is at the place in 
space and time where and when the mother in transition from being 
(in the baby's mind) merged in with the infant and alternatively being 
experienced as an object to be perceived rather than conceived of. 
The use of an object symbolises the union of two now separate things, 
baby and mother, at the point in time and space ofthe initiation of 
their state ofseparateness. 
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(Winnicott 1971,96-7)56 
The successful use of the transitional object is necessary to achieve a balance in the 
liminal development between internal phantasy and external reality. The transitional 
object is regarded by the infant as neither internal, a mental concept, nor external, in 
that the object is not perceived to be a foreign entity, but a possession belonging to 
the infant -a subjective object. It is essential for the subjective experience of 
transitional objects to be effective in containing the anxieties of insecurity in the 
paradox of separation and union that the ontological status of the transitional object 
as either internal (subjective) or external (objective) is never challenged. 
Of the transitional object it can be said that it is a maller of 
agreement between us and the baby that we will never ask the 
question: "Didyou conceive of this or was it presented to youfroin 
without? " The important point is that no decision on thispoint is 
expected. The question is not to befOrmulated, 
(Winnicott 1971,12; italics in original) 
Entwined Nvith the notion of transitional objects is Winnicott's conception of 
illusion as a necessary first process "without which no contact is possible between 
the psyche and the environment" (Winnicott 1952b, 223). Illusion is not understood 
to be deceptive but as the first expression of the "creative potential" and is thus the 
precursor to, but is not supplanted by, the transitional object. 
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(Winnicott 1951,240) 
Phillips notes that Winnicott calls such phenomena illusions "not because they are 
false but because they combine the desired with the actual in tolerable ways" 
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(Phillips 1988,119). 
Illusion is transformed under Winnicott "from a synonym for error into a 
source of truth by making it synonymous with creativity and insight" (J. Jones 1992, 
225). Both illusions and transitional objects exist, therefore, between infant and 
mother in the intermediate third space and form the basis of intersubjective 
experience; in fact, Winnicott sometimes calls this space the "intermediate area of 
illusion" or simply illusoty experience. 
Perhaps the most significant difference we can draw between illusion and 
transitional objects is that the transitional object exists as a material, external entity, 
whereas illusion exists only as an object in the mind of the subject. Regardless, we 
are not allowed to point this distinction out to the subject as, like the transitional 
object, if illusion is to be effective, we must refrain from challenging its ontological 
status. The mother "allows the baby the illusion that what is there is the created by 
the baby; as a result there is not only the physical experience of instinctual 
satisfaction, but also an emotional union, and the beginning of a belief in reality as 
something about which one can have illusions" (Winnicott 1948,163). Like the 
transitional object, illusion is necessary for a successful adaptation of the world (see 
Milner 1952), and offers opportunities for creatively linking internal and external 
worlds. 
The subject of illusion is a very -%vide one that needs study; it 
will be found to provide the clue to a child's interest in bubbles and 
clouds and rainbows and all mysterious phenomena, and also to his 
interest in fluff, 'which is most difficult to explain in terms of instinct 
direct [sic]. Somewhere here, too, is the interest in breath, which 
never decides whether it comes primarily fromwithin or without, and 
which provides a basis for the conception of spirit, soul, anima. 
(Winnicott 1945,154) 
Notice again a link between creativity and breath, re-enforcing in the fundamental 
link between creativity and being. Like the transitional space, illusion is the shared 
system of experience between infant and mother or, later, between any 
subjectivities. Many British psychoanalysts understand the transferences to be an 
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illusion shared between analyst and analysand (see, for example, Milner's discussion 
of the "frame, " 1952 183; also Kohon 1986, Symington 1983,262). 
Rethinking Reason, Rethinking Knowledge 
That which we call defence mechanisms are also ways of thinking. 
(Green 1986,27) 
Simply being, not (self-)knowledge, is the most important and fundamental aspect of 
human experience, but something we, in our analysis of subjective experience, 
foolishly take for granted. Ontology must precede epistemology, but not ignore it. "'I 
am' must precede 'I do', otherwise 'I do' has no meaning for the individual" 
(Winnicott 1971,130). However, in emphasising here the belief in the primacy of 
subjective being, while condemning epistemological-centricism, I do not -%vish 
conversely to over-privilege the ontological at the expense of the epistemological. 
Such a move would be to act dialectically, in the thrall of binarism, rather than 
dialogically (see my discussion of Bakhtin, below). The paradox between 
epistemology and ontology is yet another that must be negotiated in subjective 
experience. I am not saying that we should scorn or ignore the subject's need for 
representation, for self-knowledge. This is certainly neither possible nor desirable. 
Rather, I hope that before we ascribe identities to ourselves, before we hang 
ourselves upon those signifiers, that there be some content, some referent, to which 
our signs refer. Ultimately, this is another dialogue I would like to introduce, playing 
with the paradoxes between being and knowing, being present and being 
represented. 
But if -%ve are to learn to address knowledge and being, we need to re- 
conceive what we mean by knoWedge itself We want to find systems of knowledges 
and strategies for obtaining knowledge that are not depersonalising, a way of 
knowing about the subject that includes the subject. We want to conceive of 
knowledge as being more than merely that which is rational, or that which is 
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available for objectification. We need to be able to tolerate uncertainty, the 
unthought knoivns (Bollas 1987) that comprise subjective experience and, as Klein 
would insist, simply not knowing. 
Implicit in Winnicott's notion of the third space, Murray Schwartz suggests, 
is a new way of conceiving of knowledge, where "subjective and objective realities 
interpenetrate" (Schwartz 1992,172). Winnicott's notion of play refuses to privilege 
a narrow, rationalist conception of knowledge, and "thus erases a sharp distinction 
between artistic and scientific modes of representation" (172). Schwartz reads 
Winnicott's notion of creativity as a "healthy" means of knowledge acquisition, 
whereas compliance leads to not only the creation of a false-self but also "the 
madness of alienating rationality" (173). James M. Jones (in the same edition of The 
Psychoanalytic Review that we find Schwartz's considerations) takes from 
Winnicott that "Knowledge arises not from the self alone nor the world alone but 
form the interaction between them" (J. Jones 1992,225). Jones suggests the term 
"interactional i st epistemology" (233) to describe an alternative to traditional 
conceptions of objectivity based on the work of Winnicott. However, I find counter- 
productive Jones' capitulation to the "linguistic inevitability" of any conception of 
epistemology; his conclusion, that "Only through cognitive, linguistic categories do 
'we understand the world of our experience" (235) seems to erase the advantages and 
advances offered by Winnicottian, and object-relations, reconceptualisation of 
knowledge as/through/of affect. 
It is with Bion that we can find a more thorough re-evaluation of knowledge 
and the processes by which one comes to know. Bion regards thinking as developed 
from projective identification, as the "successful outcome of t-wo main mental 
developments" (1961,179); simply, the development of thoughts and the 
development of processes to cope with these thoughts - thinking. Bion's formula 
seems straightforward, almost mindlessly oversimplistic, but these premises mark a 
significant shift: "It will be noted that this differs from any theory of thought as a 
product of thinking, in that thinking is a development forced on the psyche by the 
pressure of thoughts and not the other way around" (179); "thoughts" are to be 
"regarded as epistemologically prior to thinking and that thinking has to be 
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developed as a method or apparatus for dealing with 'thought"' (1962,83). For 
Freud (191 lb), thinking is a means of restraining motor discharge, and for Bion 
thinking is something forced on an apparatus, both suited for the 
purpose, by the demands of reality, and is contemporary with, as 
Freud said, the dominance of the reality principle. A modem analogy 
is provided by the fact that the demands of reality not only forced the 
discovery of psycho-analysis, but have led to the deflection of verbal 
thought from its original function of providing restraint for motor 
discharge to the tasks of self-knowledge for which it is ill-suited and 
for the purpose of which it has to undergo drastic changes 
(Bion 1962,57) 
Bion, like Fairbairn and Winnicott, is reversing our perception that thinking exists as 
a thing in its own right, independent psyche-somatic concern. These thoughts 
emerge, according to Bion, from the conjunction ofpreconceptions, a priori 
expectations - for example, of the breaSt57 - with realisation in experience - for 
example, when the infant is brought into contact, %vith the actual breast, orwhen the 
expected presentation of the breast is frustrated. The satisfaction of expectations 
leads to conceptions, the frustration of expectations Bion calls thoughts. Thus 
thoughts and concepts are initially associatedwith the emotional experience of 
environmental responses to psyche-somatic needs, and Bion's theory lights the way 
for a view of knowledge that does not force us to decide between questions of 
epistemology and those of ontology but seeks to show how these are intricately and 
inextricably related. Thus, the role of thinking, of the human capacity to reason, is 
not an end-in-itself, but to provide us a means of thinking aboutfeelings. 
For Bion, then, thinking arises in response to thoughts - not the other way 
around- that are based upon an absence (that is, of the breast), but not only 
absence; thoughts are always conjoined with conceptions, and so it would be more 
accurate to say that for Bion thinking is based on the paradoxes of absence and 
presence. For example, Bion says, "This breast that is swallowed is indistinguishable 
from a 'thought' but the 'thought' is dependent on the existence of an object that is 
actually put into the mouth" (1962,57). To focus solely on the negative term would 
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be to miss Bion's point. "A capacity for tolerating frustration thus enables the psyche 
to develop thought as a means by which the frustration that is tolerated is made more 
tolerable" (180). If there is no capacity for the development of frustration, "what 
should be thought, a product of the juxtaposition of preconception and negative 
realisation, becomes a bad object, indistinguishable form the thing-in-itself, fit only 
for evacuation" (180) through projection. Thus, Bion explains, if only absence meets 
our expectations, "all thoughts are treated as if they were indistinguishable from bad 
internal objects" (180). This leads to poor object-relations, confuses the distinction 
between self and external object, and obstructs the capacity to think. 
Bion therefore provides us with a theory of thinking that is important in 
many ways. First, it enables a new conception of reason, offering an alternative to 
Enlightenment rationality. 59 Ironically, using his own algebraic notation, Bion 
explains the objectification of knowledge and its effects on the subject. Bion 
formulates that xKy only follows xLy and xHy, where x is the subject, y is the 
object (or other subject) and the middle term defines the relation between subject 
and object -L as loving, H as hating and K knowing; in other words, before one can 
meaningfully (creatively) know an object, one must have an emotional engagement 
-with it. However, because Bion regards K to be inextricable from the subjective 
elements of both x and y, he recognises that "in proportion as inanimate machinery 
is introduced to displace the living element, L, H or K have ceased to exist" (48). 
"The techniques employed by those Nvho have a scientific outlook have achieved 
most success when y is an inanimate object. The conviction that a scientific outlook 
prevails in the relationship xKy is more easily maintained if y is inanimate and if x 
can be made to seem to approximate to the inanimate, for example uses a machine" 
(1962,47). The objectification of knowledge, the depersonalisation of x and/or y, 
destroys the capacity to relate to objects, in terms of not only love and hate but also 
in a meaningful, knowledgeable way (K). However, Bion clarifies that "If the learner 
is intolerant of the essential frustration of learning he indulges phantasies of 
omniscience and a belief in a statewhere things are known. Knowing something 
consists in 'having' some 'piece of' knowledge and not in what I have called K7 
(65). "Knowledge" in this negative sense, what Bion signifies as "-K, " is, through 
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appropriation and possession, an attempt to confirm omnipotent phantasy - Bion's K 
describes, on the other hand, a relation, a process that is active, more akin perhaps to 
learning. 59 This distinction proves useful when we are thinking about reason and 
rationalism as defences as opposed to productive processes that characterise a means 
of living in our environments. 
Bion's somewhat obscure formulation also proves useful when considering 
the difference between what has been described as our modernist and postmodern 
crises. Even the question, "How can x know anything? " which characterises the 
modernist obsession with epistemology, Bion tells us "expresses a feeling; it appears 
to be painful and to inhere in the emotional experience that I represent by xK y" 
(1962,48). But postmodemists go further, negating the affective element, and is 
better represented by the fon-nula x -K y- 
Bion posits two possible strategies - evasion and modification - through 
which a subject deals with (or "removes") the pain and frustration inherent in such 
reasoning. Emotional experience that is felt to be painful may initiate an attempt 
either to evade or to modify the pain according to the capacity of the personality to 
tolerate frustration. Modification "is attempted by using the relationship xKy so 
that it will lead to a relationship in which x is possessed of a piece of knowledge 
called y" (1962,4 8). Modification describes obsessive collection and the desire to 
master the world displayed by Enlightenment science: encyclopaedia, Orientalism, 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders. "Evasion on the other 
hand, " Bion tells us, "is attempted by substitution of the meaning 'x is possessed of a 
piece of knowledge called y' so that xKy no longer represents the painful emotional 
experience but the supposedly painless one" (48-9) - thus resembling the 
postmodem denial of meaning. And further inviting parallels with our postmodern 
environment, Bion explains that "Such a ma=uvre is intended not to affirm but to 
deny reality, not to represent an emotional experience but to mis-represent it to make 
it appear to be a fulfilment rather than a striving for fulfilment' ' (49). The subject of 
postmodernity, again, is shown to be not that different from that of the 
Enlightenment; through different means, both achieve the same ends, namely, the 
confirmation of subjective omnipotence. Both evasion and modification, as defences 
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against uncertainty that cause anxiety and frustration, also sever the link between 
emotion and knowledge, the subject and object. Modification attempts to reassert 
our omnipotence by denying that anything can escape our control, that we can 
objectify, therefore knoiv and possess, everything; evasion reasserts our omnipotence 
by denying the importance, relevance or reality of anything that threatens to escape 
our control. 
We can begin to re-conceive reason and rationality if we consider that a 
reasonable perception of world can be found not in the abstract, paranoid-schizoid 
processes of a depersonalised mind-psyche but only though the affective recognition 
of integrated whole objects in the depressive position. 
The emotions fulfil for the psyche a function similar to that of the 
senses in relation to objects in space and time: that is to say, the 
counter-part of the commonsense view in private knowledge is the 
common emotional view; a sense of truth is experienced if the view 
of an object which is hated can be conjoined to a view of the same 
object when it is loved, and the conjunction confirms that the object 
experienced by different emotions is the same object. A correlation is 
established. 
(Bion 1961,185-6) 
Thinking does not arise as a thing for itself, as it does for Descartes and the 
intellectual, and, unlike intellectual isation, thoughts arise first and should not be 
distinguished from emotional responses to the environment. This different, more 
productive conceptualisation of rationalism is also suggested by Winnicott's concept 
of the "mind in health" where "the mind does not usurp the environment's function, 
but makes possible an understanding and eventually a making use of its relative 
failure" (1949,246; see also Phillips 1988,95). 
We thus have a theory of thinking that does not naturalise a depersonalised 
conception of knowledge and shows how knowledge acquisition can - and should - 
be a creative, embodied process. Bott-Spillius argues that Bion "lessened the divide 
between emotion and cognition, for it is as much concerned with describing how 
emotions become meaningful as Nvith describing a model of how the capacity to 
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think develops" (1983,323). For Meltzer, the view that "the emotional experience 
of the intimate relationship has to be thought about and understood if the mind is to 
grow and develop" is "almost diametrically opposed to Freud's attitude towards 
emotion" (1981,182). With Bion's, Fairbairn's and Winnicott's connection of 
thinking to the earliest maternal care, reason is not dependent upon the whims and 
fancies of patriarchal authority. Flax, for one, has found such a revision of reason 
useful to her feminist project: 
Furthermore, because Winnicott locates the development of the 
capacity to reason within the unfolding relationship of mother and 
child, his account is more compatible Nvith and useful to feminist 
theorizing. Reason no longer appears as a fragile, tentative 
acquisition dependent upon the existence of patriarchal authority of 
the child's submission to the alien logic of language and the father's 
law. 
(Flax 1990,117). 
Bion and Winnicott therefore share the idea that the inability to live creatively leaves 
one to abandon the ontological concerns of subjective experience and focus solely 
upon the epistemological: 
The problem that has to be solved on this early, yet superficial, level 
must be stated in adult terms by the questions, "What is something? " 
and not the question, "Why is something? " because "why" has, 
through guilt, been split off. Problems, the solution of which depends 
upon an awareness of causation, cannot therefore be stated, let alone 
solved. 
(Bion 1959,95) 
The realisation of subjective being is thwarted by an inability to tolerate depressive 
ambivalence, by the imposition of an over-%vbelming figure or discourse, and by the 
psyche-somatic splitting that replaces environmental care Nvith intellectual 
processes. As I will argue in Part 11, trying to negotiate a form of reason that does not 
rely upon these assumptions is an important task that many contemporary British 
magic realist novelists set themselves. 
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Speaking of Transitional Objects... Language 
Languagge, in my view, is the heir to the first transitional objects. 
(Green 1986,47) 
I now wish to offer some initial investigations into how we may conceive of a 
Winnicottian and Kleinian approach to language. I believe that we need a theoretical 
strategy that will dislodge language from its privileged place as being equal to, or 
even greater than, the subject itself, while still appreciating how language serves an 
important function in the realisation of subjectivity. I find that Winnicott offers one 
such strategy that puts language in its place, simultaneously offering many new 
insights into how language can serve the subject - or fail to do so. 
It is unsurprising that object-relations theorists do not present a complete, 
pre-packaged strategy for examining language - simply, they do not privilege the 
role of language in subjective experience to the same extent as Lacan or even Freud. 
Phillips notes that "In the work of the British School linguistics Nvas never seen as a 
complementary discipline to psychoanalysis" (1988,138). The reasons for this are 
varied, historically, clinically and ideologically. Zaretsky, for example, cites 
Britain's strong empirical, meliorist and feminist traditions as central to the 
development of a specific British psychoanalysis (1998,34-8). Green finds the 
important difference between French and "Anglo-Saxon" analysts to lie the latter's 
love of empiricism and pragmatism and general distrust of intellectualism and 
abstraction, so beloved of their continental neighbours (see Green 1986,4). Again, 
the science of linguistics is not needed by British analysts who are not as desperate 
to make psychoanalysis a science, although it would be a fallacy to say that some 
British psychoanalysts did not Nvish to make some claim for psychoanalysis as a 
legitimate science. Bion, who, like Lacan, attempts to reinforce psychoanalysis's 
claim for scientific validity by drawing upon algebraic principles, shies away from 
an authoritative position, accepting that the methods he employs "are not definitive 
[ ... ]I have found myself in a similar position to the scientist Nvho continues to 
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employ a theory that he knows to be faulty because a better one has not been 
discovered to replace it" (1962, x) - significantly, this recognition appears in the 
preface to book on k7ioWedge itself Furthermore, because psychoanalysis in Britain 
historically centred on the work of pioneering analysts who focussed on infants and 
children, there was less verbal material to work with from their analysands. Analysis 
continued, therefore, not as the "talking cure" as Freud envisioned, but forcing 
analysts to examine the other processes though which relations and communication 
are conducted. The fact that many of the innovative British psychoanalysts were 
women - and thus better suited to study children, the establishment reckoned - also 
doubtlessly contributes to a shift in focus from the Oedipal relations with the father 
to the maternal care. And British analysts, despite taking a great deal of interest in 
art and literature, were concerned first and foremost only with developing strategies 
to cope with their analysands and were less concerned with constructing 
metapsychological metanarratives of human experience for the consumption of 
philosophers, artists and their critics. 
Despite this, Phillips notes that "In virtually every paper Winnicott,, vrote, he 
says something explicitly about language, though he tends to speak of 'words' rather. 
than Language as a system" (1988,138). Phillips is rightwhen he says that 
"Winnicott [ 
... 
I never makes clear how the child gets from the private experience to 
the more communal experience, from a personal teddy-bear to a pleasure in reading 
Dickens" (1988,115), but although Winnicott never makes it clear there are hints, 
leads, allusions and assumptions throughout Winnicott's work which lead us to a 
playground strewn with toys, ideas, objects that allow for almost infinite play. I will 
also briefly examine a specifically Kleinian account of symbolisation in an effort to 
present a range of psychoanalytic perspectives on the issue. This is important not so 
much to show cohesion within the British psychoanalytic movement but to add 
further distinctive strategies to our approach to language. A theory of language based 
upon object-relations, I maintain, presents us with an understanding of language as 
embodied and idiomatic to subjective experience and inscribed on the psyche-soma, 
a potential too] to be used for the realisation of subjective being and for the 
mediation of the paradoxes between union and separation, the internal and the 
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external worlds, the subject and the object. To this end, 1will also briefly examine 
the Bakhtinian circle, whose approaches to language I find share a great deal with 
object-relations, despite their disparate starting places. After these thoughts on 
language, I will conclude this theoretical exposition with some general conceptions 
of literature that may be derived from an object-relations perspective, examining the 
possibility that the text can also be a transitional phenomenon enabling creativity 
and play. 
First Thoughts: Winnicottian Considerations 
Language, as it is manifest both in our first experiences of signs and as a creative 
communicative tool utilised in adult life, can be seen to function as a transitional 
object, acting as a defence so as to reduce the anxieties of separation and union, 
anxieties that arise from the conflicts of internal and external worlds, experienced in 
the potential space between subjects. We need not regard language as an entity 
foreign to the subject, as "something alien to the individual, imposed over and 
against the inner self' (Flax 1990,119). Like the transitional object, language is not 
immediately perceived by the subject as something external to its own being - when 
used creatively, language is not something wholly external to the subject, nor 
internal, but both. Language is the toy that is shared, and as the rightful property of 
both but also the sole possession of neither, it must be located in the third space 
between subjectivities, thus enabling subjective and intersubjective play and a means 
to realise subjective being. As Winnicott describes, the symbol, like the analyst's 
attitude towards his or her analysand, "is in a gap between the subjective object and 
the object that is perceived objectively" (1960c, 161). 
Like the transitional object, language first evolves as a bridge between 
caregiver and infant, aiding in the negotiation of paradoxes of union and separation. 
Martin J. Weich speculates that "speech provides a means of retaining a connection 
to the mother as well as separating from her. Children replace sucking at the breast 
with introjection of the mother's sounds" (1978,415). Transitional objects - and 
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symbols - can also play an instrumental role in preventing the disintegration of the 
psyche-soma, fulfilling an integrative function, uniting not only infant and mother 
but also the fragmented ego, using meaning as glue (see, for example, Deutsch 
1959). But in addition to offering a means of connection and integration, the 
transitional object also permits the gradual separation of the infant as the 
disillusionment and frustration successfully enacted by the good-enough caregiver 
may be better tolerated through a "calling forth" (creative selection and use) of an 
object that ispresent, inscribed on the psyche-soma. These objects are, at first, 
equated with but later come to represent the caregiver. The transitional object thus 
enables the subject to bridge the gap between itself and the caregiver, but, Jeanette 
Winterson reminds us, "Bridges join but they also separate" (1987,61): Language 
not only connects, but it also separates, offering opportunities for individuation. 
Language thus begins with the infant's parroting of sounds such as cooing and 
babbling - thus comforting the infant in the caregiver's absence - and gradually 
develops into more complex symbolic representative speech with no sudden or 
traumatic initiation into a symbolic order. 
Bollas notes that "Language functions through illusion" (1989,30); language 
not only derives from transitional illusions but also helps to nourish these illusions 
that are necessary in intersubjective experience. 
This illusion is quietly sustained by the language we hold in common 
that cultivates an assumption that what we mean when we speak is 
what the recipient understands through our speech. If I say "Would 
you please pass me the paper clip? " and the other does so, I am 
assured that I am understood. Countless simple transactions of this 
kind sustain the powerful idea that people understand one another. In 
this belief lies a freedom to assume reception that facilitates 
communication and creativity. 
The idea that we understand one another through the different 
orders of communication is, in my view, largely illusory. 
(Bollas 1992,185-6) 
Bollas, like Winnicott, does not mean that our ability to understand one another is 
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deceptive - though he is playing on the meaning of illusion. Like any psychoanalyst, 
he recognises that we cannot ever understand each other completely. The illusion is 
an agreement between subjects that allow us to communicate by offering others the 
license to play with our objects, verbal and emotional. Illusion, rejected by 
rationalism as deceptive, is necessary to the generation of meaning. 
The suggestion that the infant first utilises language to compensate for the 
absence of the caregiver does not therefore imply that language itself is predicated 
solely upon absences in the Kantian/SaussureanALacanian sense. Rather, language is 
as much a reflection of a presence; language is derived from the objects (phantasies, 
sounds, symbols, words, thoughts, images) that have a material existence and are 
inscribed on the psyche-soma. Or, one may say that language is not predicated solely 
upon absence but upon the paradox ofabsence andpresence. If I were to speculate 
further, I would suggest that language, when used creatively, is a material presence 
in the face of a potential absence, whereas language when accepted compliantly is 
an absence with no material presence, just as thinking for the intellectual becomes a 
thing in itself with no somatic referent or content. 
This tension between absence and presence is also taken up by Green; in 
analytic communication, he says, potential meaning allows for the meeting of 
present meaning and absent meaning (1986,48). Without absence, symbolisation is 
impossible, and we find ourselves in psychotic (or "prepsychotic") structures - 
Green cites, as examples, acting out and Klein's and Segal's notion of symbolic 
equation, where there is no distinction between the symbol and the thing 
represented. However, Green also explains that absence cannot only mean loss if 
communication is to be possible. If there is to be play, this absence must also be 
transformed into a potential presence, 
For absence, paradoxically, may signify either an imaginary presence, 
or else an unimaginable non-existence. It is absence in this first sense 
which leads to the capacity to be alone (in the presence of the object) 
and to the activity of representation and of creating the imaginary: the 
transitional object, constructed within that space of illusion never 
violated by the question. Was the object created or was it found? 
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(Green 1986,293) 
I find the suggestion that we relate to the objects of language at different levels - in 
this case, of presence and absence - an important one, for while a theory explicating 
how language is used creatively examines a preferable alternative, there are 
occasions when compliance has an essential role to play in "healthy, " adaptive 
subjective functioning. Language is only one potential medium for creative 
experience, though language cannot, and should not, always be seen in these terms - 
there needs to be a balance between creativity and compliance, true and false selves, 
subjects and objects. And, as Winnicott reminds us, it is not the object itself that is 
transitional, but the use one makes of it (Winnicott 1958b, 1971). 
Milner highlights how Winnicott's and her own conceptual isation of 
language marks a shift from previous psychoanalytic thinking on the symbol. She 
finds that the orthodox position that symbolism arises as a defence in response to 
absences or prohibitions tells only part of the story. Expanding upon Ernest Jones' 
initial perception of symbolism as notiust a consequence of forbidding forces but 
also as an attempt to establish a relationship with external reality, 60 Milner finds that 
symbols also arise "due to the need to endow the external world with something of 
the self and so make it familiar and understandable" (Milner 1952,18 1), or to create 
a world filled with idiomatic nzeaning. Milner provocatively asks: 
Do we really mean that it is only the desire for ease and pleasure, and 
not necessity that drives us to identify one thing with another which is 
in fact not the same? Are we not rather driven by the internal 
necessity for inner organization, pattern, coherence, the basic need to 
discover identity in difference withoutwhich experience becomes 
chaos? 
(Milner 1952,182) 
Thus for Milner and Winnicott, symbolism and language do not merely try to patch 
up the gaps in experience, to compensate for the lost object or for the object denied 
by the internal or external father. Symbolism actively tries to make sense of those 
objects and experiences that are very much a part of the infant's (and adult's) 
internal and external worlds, constructing meaning that is not just a defence against 
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meaninglessness but as a basis for our relationships to the environment and to 
ourselves. 
A language articulated creatively, arising from the embodied experiences of 
the subject, can be said to be spoken in a specific, creative idioin. Bollas describes 
the subjective idiom as the sum of qualities specific to an individual. 61 The idiom is 
comprised of objects, drives, ideas, affective states, private experiences, phantasies, 
biological design... in short, everything that comprises and is inscribes upon the 
psyche-somatic subject. The subjective idiom is the means through which a subject 
experiences and articulates itself by the successful and creative use, selection and 
manipulation of objects that are specific to that subject. And it is therefore from and 
through the idiom that language arises and is put to creative use, and it is the means 
through which language can be put into the service and realisation of the subject's 
being. Bollas finds that if the subject is permitted to elaborate (articulate, express, 
speak) itself in its own idiom, "then life will be punctuated by inspired moments of 
self-realisation" (1992,70). Therefore, when we speak of the (re-)ontologi sing 
power of language, the "words to say it" (Cardinal 1975) must be derived from one's 
own subjective idiom, selected from the objects inscribed on the psyche-soma. 
Lying between caregiver and infant, analyst or analysand (or any two 
subjects), language is like a toy, in the true Kleinian sense, to be played with (see 
Klein 1955; Milner 1957). It is the job of the caregiver, psychoanalyst, and literary 
critic to inquire as to how that toy is being played with. Does she break it? Does he 
play with toys indiscriminately andwildly, leaving a battleground in his wake? Is she 
interested in play at all, or is he uncreative and lazy? Or - and most significantly 
with regard to the realisation of subjective being - are these toys chosen by the 
subject itself, from one's own toy-box and capable of expressing one's own desires, 
-%vishes and phantasies, or are these toys the only ones available to the subject in a 
hostile battlefield and require one to play someone else's game? 
97 
Other Winnicottian Conceptions: Transitional Language 
Although the printed -%vord and, as I argue, language itself have a material existence 
on some level, psychoanalysts most often discuss and deal -with concrele transitional 
objects - blankets, teddy bears, the body. Winnicott himself is not clear whether 
language, therefore, can serve as a transitional object. In the early 1950s, Winnicott 
defines the transitional object as a "precursor of a symbol" (1989,43) and often 
maintains the distinction between transitional object and symbol proper. However, 
Winnicott's own later illustrations detailing the progression of the infant's use of 
transitional objects (1971,34) suggest a continuity between the transitional object 
and language, and he concedes that "Whatever I say about children playing really 
applies to adults as well, only the matter is more difficult to describe when the 
patient's material appears mainly in terms of verbal communication" (1971,40). 
Transitional objects represent the infant's "first use of a symbol and first experience 
of play" (1971,96). As such, they are used as communicative tools and the infant's 
use of these objects develops from the manipulation of a blanket to mouthing, 
babbling, anal noises and the first musical notes (1971,4; see also 1960b, McDonald 
1970). The important point here is, again, that there is no clear break between the 
infantile use of its earliest ob ects and symbol-formation. For Kleinian and object- j 
relations theorists in general, the boundary between pre-symbolisation and 
symbolisation proper, like that between pre-Oedipal and Oedipal, is fluid and 
porous. Our movement from one to the other does not follow developmental, one- 
way "progress"; achieving the capacity to symbolise does not mark an irreparable 
break-, with the past - we slip in and out of both throughout our lives. With the onset 
of verbal capability and the increased capacity to use symbols in language, language 
becomes the most obvious and perhaps the common - but certainly not the only - 
transitional object in our cultural playground. Adult language never fully or even 
partially replaces these earliest objects. 
It is perhaps useful in trying to determine the status of language as a 
transitional object to consider Milner's belief for the need for a nzedium between the 
self-created and external realities (1952). Although Milner speaks of the "artist's 
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medium, " she makes clear elsewhere that such creative processes and media are not 
exclusively utilised by the artist but apply to a vast array of adult experiences. The 
media used in creative processes fulfil the same function as illusion, negotiating 
between the internal and external spheres. For Milner, the media employed in these 
negotiations are concrete, they are "pliable stuff that can be made to take the shape 
of one's phantasies, can include the 'stuff of sound and breath which becomes our 
speech" (1952,190). Like Winnicott's transitional object, this medium can be the 
toys found in the playground but also, in the case of the transference, a person may 
also become the medium through which the subject works out its relations with the 
world. 
Weich also addresses Winnicott's apparent failure to include language 
amongst the catalogue of transitional phenomena. He concludes that "One reason for 
this neglect may be that Winnicott tended to stress the physical concreteness of the 
transitional object, alongwith the sensory modalities of touch, smell, vision and 
taste, while he paid little attention to the auditory sphere" (1978,413). Weich is 
accurate in saying that Winnicott did not focus a great deal of explicit attention on 
language or the transitional nature of verbal utterance and language itself, but I Nvish 
to reconsider Weich's equation of language Nvith the non-material auditory senses. 
First, it is my belief that languages conceived and utilised as transitional objects do 
themselves possess concrete status as objects that are available for use by virtue of 
the fact that they are inscribed on the psyche-soma of subjects. Winnicott allows that 
the transitional object is not always an external object: 
Often this sYmbol precursor is in fact an object [ ... 
] Often there is no 
materialisation, however, and then certain phenomena may be found 
later to have the same significance; for instance, watching, thinking, 
distinguishing between colours, exploitation of body movements and 
sensations, etc. etc.. 
(Winnicott 1989,43) 
Language, I would respond to Weich, should not be equated with an auditory 
sensation - certainly it is only sometimes that language finds its expression in this 
medium. The concrete, material existence of language is a strength of a 
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Winnicottian conceptualisation of language as a transitional object, and something 
that such an understanding may share with Vologinov and Bakbtin. 
Weich himself focuses upon what he calls transitional language -a 
particular phase of language development experienced between sixteen and eighteen 
months andwhich lies between one and two word utterances, where transitional 
"protosymbols" exist as both symbolic equations with the object and true symbolic 
representations (see also Deri 1978). The stage of transitional language, according to 
Weich's conceptual i sation, is successfully negotiated by most subjects, with the 
notable exception of schizophrenics and autistics, and it rarely returned to, except 
perhaps in the psychoanalytic scene. Transitional language Weich places in a 
category with "language fetish" and "language constancy, " existing in a pre-Oedipal 
developmental phase before language is systernatised or phonernically structured. 
My use of Winnicott's transitional phenomena in the study of language 
differs from Weich's primarily because of our respective analytic foci and 
experience. He is an analyst, I deal with literature and culture, and I am also 
responding to a theoretical culture dominated by Lacan. So I do not mean to be 
critical of Weich, but merely to emphasise certain aspects of Winnicott's transitional 
objects that Weich does not. While Weich perceives the transitional nature of 
language to be particular to a specific stage of infantile language acquisition, I 
maintain that language never completely loses its transitional quality, so long as it is 
used creatively. The transitional status of language, for me, applies not only to early 
infantile language development, but also to the more common manifestations of 
transitional relatedness to be found in adult communication and intersubjective 
experience. This is perhaps true, Weich allows, in the analytic scene, but also I 
believe in the aesthetic experience of language to be found in literature or any 
creative use of language, where words and concepts more forcefully reflect a 
particular idiom. 
It is inevitable that the accusation will arise that by expanding these 
categories of transitional phenomena too much they lose their significance and 
effectiveness as concepts to address a specific means of experiencing the world. I 
myself wonder if my analysis does not threaten to render useless through ubiquity 
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the concept of transitional objects (like Fairbairn's schizoid), but I do not say that 
language is only a transitional object, just that symbolisation arises from transitional 
objects and always maintains some of their status as transitional phenomena. Weich 
also considers the transitional quality of language to carry on into the adult use of 
language (1978,413), although again this is limited to the analytic scene. I would 
like to expand Weich's identification that transitional language "represents the 
earliest creative use of language" (416) to include the uses of language in more 
widely conceived "creative" experience in general, creativity experiences, as 
Winnicott would say, that include any act, performed by anyone, Nvhen experienced 
and enjoyed, inextricably linked to our sense of being as subjects. 
The Vicissitudes of Symbolism: Mein 
There is, it seems, more explicit interest in language and symbol formation in the 
work of Klein and her followers than in that of Winnicott and the Independents. 
Klein's innovations are vital to our conceptualisation of language. She was the first 
to regard symbol formation more in terms of advancing the subject's emotional and 
intellectual development and relation to its environment, rather than regarding it as a 
necessary sublimation of the thwarted libidinal impulses. Before Klein, "analysts 
asked themselves: What is the content of a given symbol? To-day, " however, 
thanks to Klein, "another question is added: In what way is the content expressed by 
the symbol? This last question perhaps proves to be the more important, for the 
difference between normal and abnormal thought rests on how symbols are dealt 
witlf ' (Rodrigu6 1956,153). Although I will not explore all the existing work and 
possibilities that the Kleinian approach offers our study of language here, I would 
like to begin to set in dialogue those features that Nvill contribute to the Winnicottian 
perspective that is my focus here. 
Briefly, for Klein, language arises out of symbolisation, which itself arises 
from processes of identification - the basis of the subject's relation to the external 
world, reality and other subjects (for a concise summary of Klein's conceptualisation 
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of symbolisation, see Klein 1930; also Klein 1923). In pre-Oedipal experiences the 
infant's world comes to be dominated by sadistic phantasies directed against the 
mother, or parts of the mother and her imagined internal contents (the penis, 
excrement and children). The infant therefore experiences a severe anxiety, fearing 
retaliation from the objects against which its hatred and destructive Nvishes are 
directed. Some would further add (for example, Winnicott) that this anxiety also 
arises from the infant's fear that its sadistic phantasies may actually be successful 
and destroy the mother and/or her part-objects, thus annihilating the good object 
along NNrith the bad. These anxieties, characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position, 
are compounded through phantasy, projection and splitting, by association of the 
specific object feared with other objects. As Klein describes it: 
This anxiety contributes to make him equate the organ in question 
with other things; owing to this equation these in their turn become 
objects of anxieties, and so he is impelled constantly to make other 
and new equations, which form the basis of his interest in The new 
objects and of symbolisation. 
(Klein 1930,220) 
We see here that the process of symbolisation, for Klein, also forms the basis of 
sublimation, wherein the sub ect substitutes other objects for the real objects of its j 
desire, obtaining the real object being prohibited and thus giving rise to too great an 
anxiety, in the classical Freudian model. In this respect, I think the Kleinian 
approach has much in common with Lacan's, although Klein (as usual) identifies 
this process as beginning much earlier and at a much more primitive, fundamental 
level of experience than at the Oedipal indoctrination to le loi-du-p&re. For Klein, 
the development of our capacity for language hinges upon our relationship with the 
mother and has little to do with the Father. The significance of these ensuing 
differences should not be underestimated, for as we shall see it has far-reaching 
consequences for upsetting the Lacanian and Freudian rationalist and patriarchal bias 
in approaching language and subjectivity in general. 
Klein distinguishes between and postulates a movement in subjective 
development from symbolic equation to symbolic representation. It is Klein's belief 
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that in the paranoid-schizoid position, where splitting, persecutory anxiety, 
idealisation and demonisation are the non-n and only part-objects are recognised, the 
infantile subject has only the capacity for symbolic equation, Nvbere there is an 
equation of the symbol with the thing symbolised, or the symbol is imagined to 
actually be the thing symbolised (see Segal 1957; Hinshelwood 1991,452-6; also 
Bion 1955, Thorner 1955). Through the processes of sublimation, the subject gains 
the capacity to experience objects as symbols, or for symbolic representation, where 
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the symbol comes only to stand-for, or represent, the object of anxiety. This ability 
to recognise symbols as symbols is characteristic of the depressive phase of 
subjective development, where the subject is able to tolerate the anxiety of 
ambivalence that accompanies the recognition of whole-objects, mixing good and 
bad elements without splitting. 
There is more that could be said about the Kleinian theory of symbolisation 
as it pertains to our investigations of language and literature. However, for our 
purposes here, I believe that I have provided enough of an outline to exploit the 
similarities between Kleinian conceptualisations oflanguage and those of Winnicott. 
First, it is apparent from both the Kleinian theory of symbolisation and the 
Winnicottian theory of transitional objects that language, in part, arises as a response 
to primitive anxieties experienced early in life. 63 While for Winnicott this anxiety is 
primary the result of the liminal tensions of separation and union from the primary 
caregiver, Klein envisions language as originating from the anxieties of persecution 
that necessarily accompany the destructive phantasies of the infant. The sources of 
these anxieties are not, I contend, as different as they might seem, as I find the 
Kleinian notion of persecutory retaliation to lie at the base of the more generalised 
64 Winnicottian conceptual isation of internal and external reality. Implicit also in 
both Klein's and Winnicott's understanding of this anxiety is that a degree of anxiety 
is alivays necessary if representational language is to develop and succeed as a 
useful tool in adult life and communication. Winnicott, remember, insists that for 
transitional objects to be successfully used by the infant, they require the presence of 
an environment that is good-enough, that is not perfect, but adaptable, at times 
necessarily frustrating the infant's 'wishes. 
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For Klein and Winnicott, it is not that we always employ these defence 
mechanisms in order to rid ourselves of anxiety, but as to tolerate the inevitable, so 
to "survive our paradoxes. " Klein explains that 
the development of the ego and the relation to reality depend on the 
degree of the ego's capacity at a very early period to tolerate the 
pressure of the earliest anxiety-situations. And, as usual, it is a 
question of a certain optimum balance of the factors concerned. A 
sufficient quantity of anxiety is the necessary basis for an abundance 
of symbol-formation and phantasy; an adequate capacity on the part 
of the ego to tolerate anxiety is essential if anxiety is to be 
satisfactorily worked over, if this basic phase is to have a favourable 
issue and if the development of the ego is to be successful. 
(Klein 1930,221) 
While, therefore, language may be employed as a defensive strategy against anxiety, 
the inability to tolerate anxiety prohibits the development of the capacity to 
symbolise. Other strategies for dealing with this anxiety, utilised and arrested at a 
more primitive level of development (usually in the paranoid-schizoid position), can 
thwart the development of language capability, especially the creative use of 
language; for example, compliant acquiescence with dominant figures or discourses, 
"direct communication" or "acting out, " retreat into a wholly internal phantasy 
, world - characteristics variously attributed to schizophrenics, psychotics and 
autistics and, perhaps, postmodem subjects who are unable to use objects 
symbolically and/or creatively. 
In Klein's theory of symbolisation and Winnicott's notion of the transitional 
object there is also the shared suggestion that language first arises from the 
embodied experiences of our first objects, usually relating to the maternal caretaker. 
Specifically, according to Klein, the anxieties that give rise to language are directed 
against the internal organs and contents of the mother, and identification, the 
forerunner of symbolism, arises from the epistemophillic instinct, "the baby's 
endeavour to rediscover in every object his own organs and their functioning" (1930, 
220). 65 Language is not, therefore, an abstract entity imposed from without upon a 
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subject, but evolves as part of a process by which we creatively come to know 
ourselves and others. 
There is also this suggestion by Klein, developed most explicitly by Bion, 
that language acts as a tool of mediation between subjects. Bion describes an 
analysand whose attempts to prevent relationships -%vith other subjects - what Bion 
calls "attacks on linking" - were "expressed in a stammer which was designed to 
prevent the patient from using language as a bind between him and me' (1959,9 1; 
see also Bion 1955,223). 66 Language, for Bion as for Winnicott, is a tool through 
which intersubjective communication and subjective creativity is realised. The 
attack on the link between subjects is thus enacted because of the desire to avoid 
creative communication, due to an inability to tolerate the anxiety accompanying 
psyche-somatic integration. Bion says that 
The couple engaged in a creative act are felt to be sharing an 
enviable, emotional experience [ ... ] [his analysand] had a 
hatred of 
emotion, and therefore, by short extension, of life itself [ ... 
] the 
patient is suffering the consequences of his early attacks on the state 
of mind that forms the link between the creative pair and his 
identification with both the hateful and creative states of mind. 
(Bion 1959,93) 
We see here Bion, like Winnicott, is proposing not only that language is a means by 
which subjects interact creatively, but also that an inability to tolerate the anxieties 
of liminality inhibits the subject's capacity for creativity which may manifest itself in 
an inability to use symbols. 
Introducing Winnicott to the Bakhtinian Circle: Dialogue in the Potential Space 
Existence, like language, is a shared event. 
(Holquist 1990,28) 
Caryl Emerson correctly notes that in the polemical Freudianism: A Marxist 
Critique, Vologinov is "very selective in his reading of Freud. Nowhere does he 
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engage Freud's most provocative works, the great sociopsychological essays of the 
war years and the 1920s. In those works Bakhtin [Vologinov] would have found a 
more complex opponent and, at times, an uncomfortable ally" (Emerson 1986,26). 
It is this later Freud - the Freud that inspired object-relations - that I would like to 
draw into dialogue, %vith Bakhtin. Nevertheless, it is important that we do not elide 
the important ideological and strategic differences between Bakhtin and 
psychoanalysis. However, Bakhtin and Winnicott are, I think, coming to similar 
conceptualisations of language and intersubjective experience, despite these 
radically different backgrounds and approaches. They need each other, I think, and 
this study certainly needs both of them. In the study of language, Bakhtin offers 
Winnicott a more rigorous, more specific examination of signs and strategies for 
textual practice. Winnicott offers Bakhtin a more rigorous examination of subjective 
interiority, a realm of sub . ective experience that Bakhtin's Marxist roots make it 
hard for him to imagine, and the psychological processes involved in the shared 
space that both theorists describe. For Bakhtin, Emerson explains, the psyche is "not 
an internal but a boundary phenomenon" (1986,25), which is not inconsistent with 
Winnicott's belief that the subject comes into being through creative experiences in 
a potential space between the subject and others, but cannot accommodate the rich 
internal world -with which Winnicott endows the subject. 
There have been readings that attempt to draw together Lacan and Bakhtin 
(for example, Emerson 1986; Lowenstein 1994), but as Sue Vice warns, -%ve should 
not be too quick to equate Bakhtin and Lacan, even though some of their language, 
on the surface, seems similar; for example, "While Bakhtin's other is social, Lacan's 
is psychological" (Vice 1997,4), Lacan's is intrapsychic. Predictably, I find that 
Bakhtin's language more closely echoes Winnicott's, with explicit references to 
embodiment, play, creativity and an implicit conception of intersubjectivity. Even 
the title Holquist gives the collection of Bakhtin's essays, The Dialogic Imagination, 
suggests an intricate relationship between intersubjectivity and creativity. Perhaps a 
mediator, such as early-twentieth century Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky, would 
be useful in helping us to negotiate through the differences and similarities between 
British psychoanalysis and Russian linguistics and literary theory (see, for example, 
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Leiman 1992). Vygotsky, as I understand through my initial investigations, does not 
hold language to be a transcendental, organising principle of subjectivity but rather, 
like a transitional object, regards the sign as a mediating "tool" between embodied 
subjects. Winnicott's transitional objects and Bakhtin's and Vygotsky's concepts of 
the sign share two important features that are important to my study of language. 
These theorists all regard language as a tool in the mediation of liminal anxieties of 
union and separation, and all three posit a language as a paradoxical shai-ed 
experience, between objective world and internal reality (see Leiman 1992, 
Vygotsky 1996). 
Bakhtin notoriously avoids concise definitions (a quality he shares with 
contemporary Independent psychoanalysts), but his conception of language is 
concisely summarised by the following: 
As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as beteroglot opinion, 
language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline 
between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone 
else's. It becomes "one's own" only when the speaker populates it 
with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the 
word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior 
to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral 
and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that 
the speaker gets his words! ), but rather it exists in other people's 
mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions: 
it is from there that one must take the word, and make it one's own. 
(Bakhtin 1981,293-4) 
First, Bakhtin's concept of language is distinct from that of Saussure and 
psychostructuralism in that it is fully embodied- "For Bakhtin, words cannot be 
conceived apart from the voices who speak them" (Emerson 1986,24). Against 
structuralist approaches to language - and any approach that tries to objectify, that 
is, desubjectify, language - Bakhtin, arguably as a good Marxist, constantly insists 
that what is important in the study of language is "Who speaks and under what 
conditions be speaks: this is what determines the word's actual meanings" (198 1, 
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401). And, like the transitional object, signs are taken to be concrete, "particular, 
material things [ ... I Every phenomenon functioning as an ideological sign has some 
kind of material embodiment" (Vologinov 1973,10-11). Bakhtin constantly 
emphasises that discourses, realised dialogically and not monologically imposed, are 
"historically concrete and living things" (1981,33 1). The Bakhtinian circle does not 
therefore engage in a scientific splitting the sign from the sub ect; theirs is not a j 
rationalist, abstract conception that seeks to remove the subjective element from 
language but instead tolerates the uncertainty characteristic of the paradoxical 
location of language between subject and object, internal and external. In fact, 
Bakhtin actively endorses embodied, creative uses of language in his praise for 
Rabelais, who wants, to "return both a language and a meaning to the body" (1981, 
17 1). Another consequence of this approach is that Bakhtin shares Nvith a 
Winnicottian approach a view of language not only as an absence and meaning 
through difference but also of language as a matter of sameness (see Holquist 1990, 
3 1), of presences, and an on-going tension between these. 
Language for Bakhtin is to be found in the spaces between oneself and the 
other, at the flexible, ambiguous boundaries between speakers, or between author 
and reader. For both Winnicott and Bakhtin the space between subjectivities is 
"dialogically agitated and tension-filled" (Bakhtin 1981,276), but also for Winnicott 
and Bakhtin, it is in this place that meaning is negotiated through play: 
into this complex play of light and shadow the -word enters - it 
becomes saturated with this play, and must determine within it the 
boundaries of its own semantic and stylistic contours. The way in 
which the word conceives its object is complicated by a dialogic 
interaction within the object between various aspects of its socio- 
verbal intelligibility. 
(Bakhtin 1981,277) 
This idea of the word existing in a space between is reflected in Winnicott's 
conception of the potential space. As Green explains with regard to communication 
in analysis, "the real analytic object is neither on the patient's side nor on the 
analyst's, but in the meeting of these two communications in the potential space 
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which lies between them" (1986,48). 
And for Bakhtin, as for Winnicott, the paradoxes that generate meaning in 
language are never to be resolved - there is always a tension between union and 
separation. For Bakhtin, these are centripetal and centrifugal forces that create and 
tear down languages and meaning: 
Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point 
where centrifugal and centripetal forces are brought to bear. The 
processes of centralisation and decentralisation, of unification and 
disunification, intersect in the utterance [ ... ] Every utterance 
participates in the "unitary language" (in its centripetal forces and 
tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical 
heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces). 
(Bakhtin 1981,272) 
This is Nvhy I think it is so important Nvhen talking about the relationship between 
subjects in object-relations terms to speak of dialogues rather than the dialeclic that 
is preferred by philosophically-minded interpretations of Freud (including Lacanian). 
Between dialectic and dialogic relations there exist important differences and 
consequences for our conceptual isation of experience. Bakhtin explains: 
Dialogue and dialectics. Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the 
partitioning voices), remove the intonations (emotional and 
individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgements 
from living words and responses, cram everything into one abstract 
consciousness - and that's how you get dialectics. 
(Bakhtin 1986,147)67 
With a dialectical synthesis, the result is always more the product of the dominant 
discourse, but with a Winnicottian third space and Bakhtinian dialogue, there is no 
resolution, no synthesis, but a uncomfortable, tension-filled, but ultimately 
productive paradox. And this dialogic principle need not be limited to a 
conceptualisation of language; we can also describe the relationship of the subject to 
its environment in terms of a dialogic relationship, where meaning is constructed 
through productive paradoxical tension. Bakhtin leads us to this expanded concept 
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of the dialogue: "As long as the organism lives, it resists a fusion with the 
environment, but if it is tom out of its environment, it dies" (Bakhtin 1981,254). 
The words that a subject uses, if they are to have meaning, for Bakhtin as for 
Bollas must be within a specific subjective idiom, not imposed from without, but 
internallypet-suasive: 
many words stubbornly resist, others remain alien, sound foreign in 
the mouth of the onewho appropriated them and who now speaks 
them; they cannot be assimilated into his context and fall out of it; it 
is as if they put themselves in quotation marks against the'will of the 
speaker. 
(Bakhtin 1981,294) 
Like Bollas' idiom, these discourses are "tightly interwoven with 'one's own 
world"' (1981,345), and are suitably based in productive paradoxical relations with 
others: 
the internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone else's. 
Its creativity and productiveness consists precisely in the fact that 
such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organises 
masses of our words fromwithin, and does not remain in an isolated 
and static condition. 
(Bakhtin 1981,345) 
And, like the idiom that is elaborated in the psychoanalytic scene, the internally 
persuasive discourse "is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, 
developed, applied to new material, new conditions, it enters into interanimating 
relationships with new contexts" (1981,345-6). These discourses are not sealed 
internally, but interact dialogically, intersubjectively, to produce new meanings; it is 
"notfinite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is 
able to reveal ever newer ivays to inean" (1981,346). And as for Winnicott, such 
discourses, used creatively, offer the opportunity for a (re-) birth of the subject: 
Bakhtin shows how language of the marketplace, having lost its renewing 
(ontologising) power, is renewed by Rabelais' use of language in carnival, a theme I 
develop further in Part 11. 
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I doubt that Bakhtin's notion of creative language includes a Winnicottian 
conception of how objects can be used in the service of the recognition of subjective 
being, though it is tempting to pull some quotations out of context as Bakhtin often 
discusses the idea of "becoming. " Most often, Bakhtin discusses ideological 
becoming, by which he means the way in which our language is infused by our own 
and others' ideas and ideologies, not in the abstract but as they arise, in a true 
Marxist sense, from the concrete, material conditions of the subject. As Vologinov 
phrases it, any ideological product is both a part of reality and "reflects and refracts 
another reality outside itself" (Vologinov 1973,9). In this sense, Bakhtin's becoming 
shares with Winnicott's the idea of materiality, a being involving an integrated 
psyche-soma. Bakhtin also speaks, however, more ambiguously of a "becoming" 
realised through communication, creativity and the play of intersubjective 
boundaries that invites further parallels with Winnicott. "The very being of man 
(both external and internal) is the deepest coninuinication. To be means to 
coininunicate [ ... I To 
be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself' 
(Bakhtin, quoted and translated by Emerson). 68 Holquist also points out that Bakhtin 
defines existence as an event, conceiving of existence as "the event of being" and 
that the Russianword Bakhtin uses for "event, " sobytie, is always used in 
conjunction with the world "being, " emphasising the relationship between the two 
words and concepts (1990,25). But in the end, I think that further investigations in 
this regard should first be undertaken by someone with a better appreciation of 
Bakhtin's native language. 
Bakhtin's description of authoritative discourses also proves useful %vhen we 
consider a subject's relation to language on a compliant, rather than creative, basis. 
An authoritative discourse, Bakhtin tells us 
may organise around itself great masses of other types of discourse 
(Nvhich interpret it, praise it, apply it on various Nvays) but the 
authoritative discourse itself does not merge Nvith these [ ... ] it remains 
sharply demarcated, compact and inert: it demands, so to speak, not 
only quotation marks but a demarcation even more magisterial, a 
special script, for instance [ ... ] for it is fully complete, it has but a 
III 
single meaning [ ... 
] 
It is not a free appropriation and assimilation of the word 
itself that authoritative discourse seeks to elicit from us; rather it 
demands our unconditional allegiance. Therefore authoritative 
discourse permits no play with the context framing it, no play with its 
borders, no gradual and flexible transitions, no spontaneously creative 
stylizing variants on it. It enters our verbal consciousness as a 
compact and indivisible mass; one must either totally affirm it, or 
totally reject it. 
(Bakhtin 1981,343) 
The authoritative discourse thus negates the possibility for play and meaning by 
polluting the potential space; "it enters the artistic context as an alien body, there is 
no space around it to play in" (Bakhtin 1981,344). Authoritative discourses are the 
only kind of discourses capable of being imagined by (psycho)structuralism, as an 
entity imposed from without. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that Lacan's own 
discourse tries to be similarly authoritative, or monologic - as if it were possible to 
create a language that was not laden and impregnated Nvith the dialogic history and 
materiality of words. While one could argue with a certain degree of success that 
Lacan juggles several discourses, sometimes playfully, it seems to me that his own 
discourse is not meant to merge with these. Like Theaetetus, in a drive for exact 
definitions and for words that are frozen, free from the interfering play of meaning, 
Lacan's language appropriates others, trying to complete itself, to seal itself off with 
a single meaning that demands unconditional allegiance. Such languages are 
transmitted, not represented (1981,344), in a special script, the Lacanian algebra. 
This is also why, I think, Freud's it, I and over-I are rendered in the English 
translation into the Latinate designations we are familiar with - and not meant to re- 
interpret as freely as we do Freud's more colloquial terms 
Bakhtin and Winnicott would also agree that such authoritative discourses 
cause a psyche-somatic "rupture between language and material, and seek for 
themselves a form that will permit this rupture to be overcome by style - no matter 
how conventional and obvious that style might at first glance seem" (Bakhtin 1981, 
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380). The depersonalising language described by Bakhtin echoes the "style-over- 
substance" mantra of postmodern discourses, empbasising the "surface charms" and 
Nvith only "external meanings" that do not reflect the subjective idiom; it is a 
language that does not reflect emotions, affect, the body, and ultimately subjective 
being. 
The Unconscious is Structured Like an Affective Language?: The Possibility of 
Dialoguing with Lacanian Theory 
Language without affect is a dead language: and affect without 
language is uncommunicable. 
(Green 1986,205) 
Having been so critical of Lacanian approaches to the subject and language, it is now 
perhaps time to re-consider Lacan in a Winnicottian and Kleinian context and try to 
draw his ideas back into play. Any such attempt should not aim to show the 
analogous nature of Lacan, Winnicott and Klein, but to try to construct a mutually 
informing dialogue, rather than imposing a oppositional dialectic. While I obviously 
disagree with much of Lacan's work, this is not to say that some of his perceptions 
on the subject in late-capitalism are not useful, when historicised and re-read so as 
eliminate the assumption of the subject being narcissistic and inevitably 
depersonalised - although this would indicate such a radical shift in Lacanian 
thought that perhaps Lacan would no longer recognise himself in it. Part of the 
problem with the Lacanian language and Lacanian theory in general is its 
universality, its invariant structure that can envision only one relationship of the 
subject to language. Eventually, however, I believe that such a dialogue will be 
possible, once all psychoanalytic schools are historically contextualised and develop 
a respect for the important differences between them. Also, I would be terribly 
disappointed if issues as important and ubiquitous as language or literature could be 
so easily explained by just one perspective or theoretical strategy. 
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Klein, Winnicott and Bakhtin show us that language is not necessarily 
imposed upon the subject, that the subject does not necessarily enter an alienating 
"symbolic order, " and that the infant is not dragged, kicking and screaming, into 
language. The acquisition of language is not, as Lacanians "'vould suggest, 
"traumatic, " but rather is more often experienced by the infant as an 
accomplishment to be celebrated. However, we perhaps also need, in contemporary 
culture in particular, to negotiate a space between a "maternal" theory of language as 
creative and ontologising and a "paternal" theory of language that helps us to 
address those instances when language is imposed and demands compliance from 
the subject. Just as Winnicott does not pathologise the false-self but sees it as an 
essential part of healthy mental functioning, language demanding compliance and 
our ability to interact with this should not always be regarded in a negative light; 
however, if such a relationship is the only one a subject can establish with its world 
it, %vill inhibit the opportunities for play in the potential space. 
Where I believe the Lacanian contribution to a theory of language is perhaps 
most useful derives from the recognition that language is not always available to the 
subject as a potentially creative transitional object. The contents of the potential 
space, Winnicott tells us, must be carefully selected and vetted. The subject is 
unable to defend itself effectively against a foreign entity - such as others' language 
- that encroaches upon and threatens to overwhelm it. I am thinking here, for 
example, of the imposition of language or larger ideological discursive constructs 
upon an individual or a culture in the form of the patriarchal Law of the Father, 
positivistic scientific discourses and the imperialists' language (of economics or 
racial superiority) - Bakhtin's authoritarian discourses - where compliance is 
extracted from the oppressed subject at the expense of creativity and the realisation 
of subjective being. 69 The promise of the Lacanian theory of language, I believe, lies 
in the effective demonstration of what happens when the creative element is 
removed from subjective experience and the use of language. Here we may find 
useful a return to the paradox of presence and absence in symbolisation expressed by 
Andr6 Green. While refuting Lacan's claims that the unconscious is structured like a 
language, Green reminds us that "the Unconscious presents a double picture": it is 
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both a semantic and an affective system that reveals meaning, or how meaning 
functions (Green 1986,176). As Green more succinctly phrases it, "Language 
without affect is a dead language: and affect without language is uncommunicable" 
(205). Or, 
Without affect there is no effective language. Without language there 
is no effective affect. The unconscious is not structured like a 
language (Lacan); it is structured like an affective la\nguage, or like 
an affectivily having the properties oflanguage. 
(Green 1986,295; italics in original) 
I cannot yet say whether I wholly concur with Green's creative marriage of ideas, 
though there certainty seems to be some truth in the notion that for language to be 
effective, it must be affective, and for affect to be effective, one must be able to 
effectively communicate. Perhaps here too a dialogue can be established between 
Lacan and Winnicott's theories of compliance and the false-self. If a discourse does 
not reflect the subjective idiom, is not internally persuasive, and can instead only 
elicit a response from a disembodied false-self, the resulting depersonalisation could 
indeed be perceived to be traumatic, equally to the adult as to the newly ordained 
"Oedipal" child. 70 
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The Location of Literature 
As I Nvill demonstrate at greater length in the next section, if words are the toys, the 
transitional objects that enable subjective creativity, then our dialogues and texts are 
the playgrounds, the places where we meet other subjectivities in creative play. I 
would hesitate to identify all texts thus - there are too many other factors, other 
aspects of subjective experience, too many authoritarian discourse 
I 
s. Such a location 
of the text, as existing between writer and reader, is not a concept unique to this 
study; reader-response's horizons and re-drawn boundaries, Barthes' dead author, 
Bakhtinian dialogue and polyphony all share certain features with a Winnicottian 
approach to literature .71 As Val Richards points out, Winnicott's entire approach to 
psychoanalysis, the "shifting connotations" of terms such as "playing, " "good- 
enough mothering" and "true" and "false" selves, "depends considerably on the 
reader's own interpretations, " exemplified in Winnicott's Squiggle Game (1996,5). 
There have also been moves by some reader-response critics to dialogue with the 
American conception of object-relations - represented by the work of Heinz Kohut 
and Otto Kernberg; this approach, like those that employ British psychoanalysis, 
focuses more attention than orthodox psychoanalysis upon the transferences and the 
spaces between analyst and analysand, author and reader (see Alcom and Bracher 
1985). Furthermore, perhaps contemporary writers, themselves appreciate better than 
any theorist how texts can negotiate the innumerable paradoxes between fiction and 
reality, between stories and history, between what is probable andwhat is 
improbable. Kleinian and Winnicottian appraisals offers these conceptions of the 
text a more complex and intricate understanding of the psychological processes of 
reading, and a more complete picture of the subjects involved. 
In reading, like any experience in the potential space, there is a play between 
the subjective use of the object and the object objectively perceived. While the 
words written on the page are already inscribed with meaning, these objects are re- 
conceived subjectively by the reader in such a way that the reader experiences the 
words and stories not as foreign entities, but as subjective-objects, filled with 
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personally and culturally idiomatic significance. Thus, while the object is concrete 
and consistent in the external world, each subjective experience of that object is 
particular to the subject. Or, as Murray M. Schwartz puts it in his excellent 
Winnicottian analyses of the experience of literature, "each of us brings to the 
literary transaction a unique style of attempting to unite inner and outer realities - 
our potential spaces and transitional objects are often shared but never identical" 
(1975,61; see also Schwartz 1977,1982). Schwartz recognises the transferential 
relations that are engaged whenever we approach a text. "The critical act, " claims 
Schwartz, is always interested, "in the sense that criticism transforins or, if you 
prefer, distorts its object in the service of the interpreter's desires, which may 
include the desire for what is called 'objective' truth in other vocabularies" (1982, 
36). We should not fear our subjective responses, Schwartz suggests following 
Geoffrey Hartman, but our defensive overreaction to and fear of it, "those pseudo- 
objective criteria which imprison both the work and ourselves" (Schwartz 1982,37, 
quoting Hartman). There are, however, also limits to the extent to which one can 
impose one's own reading onto another's text, which I examine below. The goal, for 
Schwartz, is "to impart our experiences of literature without abandoning the 
possibility of formal knowledge or criticism and without relegating these things to 
the realm of 'professional' activity" (1975,52). If we consider literature to be 
"written language located in the potential space, " the critical act becomes inclusive, 
in which "both the data and ourselves are constantly interacting and recombining in 
new configurations" (1975,60-1). 
A simple example of the negotiations the reader must face when approaching 
a literary work is offered by Schwartz's Winnicottian appraisal: 
I may, for example, bring intense feelings about the images of 
sexuality to an interpretation of "Leda and the Swan. " To announce 
these without reference to the story of Troy would be to absorb the 
poem into my own subjectivity. But to speak only of Leda, Zeus, the 
story of Troy, even the arrangement of -words on the page, would be 
to deny my experience of the poem. 
(Sch-%vartz 1975,61) 
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This describes what happens, or wbat should happen, in the experience of reading, 
and the limits we may wish to suggest for the subjective interpretation of a text in 
literary scholarship. Schwartz encourages us to bring ourfeelings about a text to bear 
on our analysis - it is significant that Schwartz connects our readings of sexual 
imagery (for example) with a psyche-somatic response to the text, and not merely an 
intellectual solution or knee-jerk imposition of a critical discourse that defends one 
against such emotional responses. But one cannot make a text entirely one's own 
subjective object, that is, consume the text within one's own internal phantasy world 
and thus deny the ontological status of the external object. To claim, for example, 
that another's poem is actually a sto ry of one's own life (as in Vladimir Nabokov's 
Pale Fire) would not only be an act of hermeneutic tyranny, but is indicative of a 
paranoid or narcissistic character, unable towithstand the anxieties associated with 
the paradoxes of union and separation, phantasy and reality, self and other. Such a 
total possession is an attack on the intersubjective link elicited by the text, denying 
the meaning that would emerge from dialogic play. Just as with the transference in 
the psychoanalytic setting, "the psychoanalytic critic has a special obligation to 
differentiate his own transference responses from responses in general" (Schwartz 
1982,42). On the other hand, to speak only of the structural, stylistic or historical 
elements of a work of art, without reference to the subjective, emotional impact on 
oneself, is too greatly to objectify what should rightly be experienced subjectively by 
an integrated psyche-soma. This is the strategy favoured by structuralists and 
formalist approaches to literature, methodologies that seek to eliminate the 
subjective factor (see, for example, Reed 1982), and those forms of "linguistics that 
consider poetry as a text without reference to the subject who wrote it, " or the 
subject who reads it, "and can therefore treat it as an object"(Roustang 1998,52-3). 
Schwartz, writing on the other side of Atlantic, singles out Frye's critical 
methodology for particular scom in this case. Frye, Schwartz finds, in focussing only 
upon the structural, formal elements of the text, transforms the personal into the 
impersonal, maintaining a Cartesian "splitting of subject and object, " placing "'man' 
on one side and 'nature' and 'society' on the other" (1975,51-2). Echoing Fairbairn, 
Schwartz judges that "Frye's critical methodology operates at an intellectualised 
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remove from the affective sources of our organizing powers themselves" (1975,52). 
Both the exclusively subjective and exclusively objective strategies are products of 
the transference, where we can see that "the reader's assimilative attempt, like the 
patient's transference, is an effort to force present experience to conform to the 
(often infantile, distorted, and conflict-ridden) adaptive strategies and paradigms of 
experience that are derived from the pasf'(Alcom and Bracher 1985,346). 
By way of example, I wish to examine recent scholarship regarding Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman's "The Yellow Wallpaper. " Gilman's semi-autobiographical novella 
is written as if it were the erratic diary of a woman in late nineteenth-century New 
England, confined in her own home and denied the simple pleasures of guests, 
caring for her children and even writing. Despite Gilman's narrator's opposition, this 
c4cure" is imposed upon her by her doctor, her husband (also a doctor) and other men 
of "high standing. " Despite their prohibitions, the narrator finds relief in the creative 
act of writing and, -%vhen all else is unavailable, by tracing in her mind the cracking 
wallpaper that decorates the room in which she is imprisoned. 
Julie Bates Dock, in describing the evolution of the text and critical 
responses to it, notes that recent editions vary in wording and structure. 
Moreover, many received "facts" on which interpretations of "The 
Yellow Wallpaper" have been built - including Gilman's valiant 
struggle to get her story into print, the original audience's reading of 
it as a ghost story, and the irate reception it received from the male 
medical community - do not hold up well under scrutiny. 
(Dock 1996,53) 
It is Dock's thesis that Gilman's text and our historical understanding of Gilman 
herself have suffered as a result of the shifting interests and needs of various critical 
evaluations. She suggests, for example, that "the struggle to gain a foothold for 
women writers in literary studies and in the academy" (53) resulted in changes and 
revisions of the text itself. We may -svish to say that the text has been transformed - 
devoured and intemalised - appropriated from an idiomatic articulation of the 
author into a wholly subjective object of inquiry in another's experience. Using the 
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story as an entirely subjective object, the literary critic does not enter into a creative 
dialogue with the "like subject" that is represented in/by the text. So too, the history 
of Gilman's life has been rewritten, sometimes with little regard for historical 
accuracy or context. For example, Dock demonstrates that the story was not received 
with the degree of hostility that some scholars would have us believe. Dock notes 
that "many feminist critics of the 1970s accepted - and perhaps even required -a 
publication history that cast Gilman in the role of beleaguered heroine" (57). 
Do we wish to imply here that there has been a breach of some sort of ethical 
limit of interpretation? Although perhaps refraining from declaring these readings 
and revisions to be "unethical, " I would certainly like to suggest that these scholars 
have acted - perhaps unconsciously - as greedy children might in the playground, 
"hogging" all the toys for themselves. The critic, by thus manipulating the text and 
making it an entirely subjective object, would, in effect, be upsetting the balance, 
polluting the potential space. The text, if -tve are to regard it either as a toy in the 
potential space or as a potential space in itself, can facilitate the idiomatic 
expression of two subjectivities only if it is understood that it belongs to both author 
and critic/reader but also to neither, if it is located in a third area of cultural 
experience, if it fosters the understanding that paradox can have positive value. 
I do not here wish to single out feminist theory, or imply that feminist literary 
scholars are particularly tyrannical in their subjective appropriation of textual 
objects. On the contrary, feminist theory more often demonstrates self-awareness 
and explicitly draws attention to its own internal conflicts and potential exclusions. 
Of course some of the worst offenders, some of the most indiscriminate 
appropriations of the textual object, are performed by psychoanalysts. Because 
Freud's posthumous approval seems to be needed to offer legitimacy to any analytic 
strategy or theory that wishes to regard itself as "psychoanalytic, " and citing the 
master is the quickest route to share Freud's objective, scientific status, we find 
attributed to Freud all kinds of things that he would have been shocked to hear 
himself say. However unlikely, I find myself agreeing with Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen's 
evaluation of contemporary Freuds: 
This is how psychoanalysis "progresses, " not by openly rectifying the 
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doctrine, but by silently recuperating the criticisms directed at it and 
by having Freud endorse the most varied and contradictory theories, 
according to the fashions and necessities of the moment. "Return to 
Freud! " clamours the chorus of psychoanalysts and then see how 
Freud, before our wondering eyes, becomes successively a 
phenomenologist, an existentialist, a hermeneuticist, an experimental 
psychologist, a Marxist, a He'elian, an anti-Hegelian, a structuralist, 9 
a Derridean, a Post-Modernist, a Wittgensteinian, a feminist, a 
cognitivist, a neuro-scientist - or a Girardian. 
(Borch-Jacobsen 2000,16) 
Lacan, again displaying a remarkable lack of self-awareness, would also prohibit 
mis-readings and appropriations of Freud. 
For the analyst to point that he is a practitioner of the technique does 
not give him sufficient authority, from the fact that he does not 
understand a Freud 111, to challenge the latter in the name of a Freud 
II whom he thinks he understands. And his very ignorance of Freud I 
is no excuse for considering the five great psychoanalyses as a series 
of case studies as badly chosen as they are badly expressed, however 
marvellous he thinks it that the grain of truth hidden within them ever 
managed to survive. 
(Lacan 1953,30) 
From my glass house, I would not wish to prohibit rereadings of Freud, although this 
is further evidence demonstrating the desperate need for an historical consciousness 
when using psychoanalytic theory. There have been important historical studies of 
psychoanalysis to be sure, but when we read and reinterpret psychoanalysis, we too 
often tend to find in Freud what ive want. We do abuse Freud with such subjective 
readings, and "the productive tension between the antimonies within Freud's work 
tend to be lostwithin subsequent psychoanalytic theories" (Flax 1990,90). 1 am not 
arguing for the sanctity of Freudian theory (as if I am in any position to do so here), 
but our readings of Freud tell us less about what he says and more about what we 
need him to say; perhaps we need to learn to tolerate Freud's ambiguity, the 
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irresolvable paradoxes, and to see Freud as a whole object, a confluence of good and 
bad objects, sometimes the source of great insight and sometimes just wrong. 72 
1 would also like to consider an ethics of interpretation in literary criticism to 
counter the claims made by those critics who more greedily, and for more despicable 
political-ideological purposes, appropriate for themselves the objects that are 
rightfully our shared cultural objects. For a particularly poignant example, Harold 
Bloom, in "Feminism as the Love of Reading" (1994), casts himself in the role of 
Nabokov's Dr. Charles Kinbote, and attempts to create a Virginia Woolf that is his 
own entirely subjective object, who writes only in the interest of literary aesthetics, 
that is, who confirms his narcissistic phantasy of what "writing" should be about. 
Woolf and her texts become part-objects that are manipulated in Bloom's phantasy. 
While Woolf herself problematises the notion of what it means to write "as a 
woman, " Bloom would have us all believe that it is possible to write with-out the 
body, with-out a space or place in time. 73 Such beliefs are entirely without 
justification or insight; they serve ideologies that seek to undermine the claims of 
those subjects who cannot, will not, should not live without their bodies or the 
ability to articulate their own subjective idiom. Such depersonali sing, rationalist 
claims actively undermine the possibility for recognition of the integrated psyche- 
soma, and denies that language and experience are inscribed upon the body. It is 
these claims made by patriarchs, literary critics and sometimes psychoanalysts to 
which the authors in my next section so often object. 
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Endnotes 
1. For example, the postmodernism of Jameson, Lyotard or Flax or Linda Hutcheon's (1988) 
and Brian McHale's (19 87) studies of postmodern literature, with whom I concur to varying 
degrees. I find myself apparently arguing against Lyotard and Flax, who regard 
postmodernism. as a productive set of discursive practices that dissolve metanarratives; 
however, I find Flax's reading of psychoanalysis and Enlightenment so compelling I cannot 
really say that I entirely disagree with her conception of postmodernism, but my own focus is 
different from hers. With Eagleton, I would like to think that "Unlike most postmodernists, I 
myself am a pluralist about postmodernism, believing in postmodern fashion that there are 
different narratives to be told of postmodernism, too, some of them considerably less positive 
than others" (1996,26). 
2. There have, however, been attempts to re-read some of these traditional psychoanalytic 
diagnostic categories in a more contemporary context. See, for example, Bollas' Hysteria 
(2000); there have also been books from analysts who are not of the object-relations school, 
including Elaine Showalter (Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture, 199 8) and 
Juliet Mitchell (Mad Men and Medusas: Reclaiming Hysteria and the Effects ofSibling 
Relations on the Human Condition, 2001). 
In opposition to this, Andr6 Green finds rather that the fundamental change in 
psychoanalysis lies not in changes in analysands themselves but in "what the analyst hears - 
and perhaps cannot help but hear -which has until now been inaudible" (1986,33-4). 
3. When I identify such diagnostic categories as being increasingly common in contemporary 
times, I do not want to go as far as some in proclaiming their ubiquity. The DSMcriteria for 
identifying Borderline Personality Disorder is so broad that it could apply to anyone. In the 
words of Robert Young, "It is a list calculated to make most people I know pretty 
uncomfortable" (I 994b) - conveniently so, perhaps, for the pbarmaceutical-psychiatric 
industry. There is also some resistance to such diagnostic categories in psychoanalysis itself, 
Harold Searles, for example, says "I became convinced, long ago, that borderline phenomena 
will be encountered in any deep-reaching course of psychoanalysis or intensive 
psychoanalytic therapy, for these phenomena are part of the general human condition" (qtd. 
in Young 1994b). 
4. By epistenze -a term and concept I use in various contexts throughout this work -I am 
referring to Foucault's belief that there are "epistemological fields" that can be historically 
grounded and in which knowledge is ordered (see Foucault 1966, xv-xxiv). 
5. Stewart cites a study finding depersonalisation to be the third most common symptom seen 
in mental institutions, behind only anxiety and depression (1964,171). 
6. For Kleinians, depersonalisation similarly involves a lost sense of being, brought about by 
excessive projective identifications and the inability to maintain good (and bad) internal 
objects. This might also be regarded as similar to Winnicott's concept of disintegration as the 
subject experiences an internal vacuum and the environment, or others in the environment, 
are felt to hold all the parts of the self (see Thorner 1955; Hinshelwood 1991,271). 
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7. These terms are sometimes used contrarily to my uses here: "Derealisation" is also a term 
used by Fairbairn, distinct from but related to depersonalisation (Fairbaim 1940,5). For 
Stewart (1964), the "derealisation" is interchangeable with "depersonalisation, " although he 
seems to accept the distinction that the former "involves an estrangement from the identity of 
the self "while the latter "involves an estrangement from the identity of afamiliar objeel" 
(173). For Thomer, "In 'derealization' the patient has a feeling that the world has changed, 
has become unreal; while in 'depersonalization' he feels that he himself, That is his ego, has 
changed" (1955,291). Thorner further clarifies that "a feeling of unreality develops when 
two conditions are fulfilled: when (i) a strong sense of inner persecution by bad objects is 
combined with (ii) splitting processes within the ego" (1955,306). 
1 do not disagree with these, and other, conceptualisations; my uses of these terms 
are, for now, not excessively prescriptive. 
8. Interestingly, I have been unable to find such normotic or normopath subjects in literary 
texts. When I discussed these concepts in seminars on object-relations, many undergraduates 
taking the course expressed frustration at not being to locate any such characters in literature 
as many of them were interested in exploring this concept in their papers. When we discussed 
why no such characters seemed to exist in literature - we all agreed that similar if not quite 
so severe characters were everywhere to be found in our culture - we thought that it must 
have something to do with the fact that even the most ambitiously postmodem of novels still 
deals with human experience, when the point of normotic and the normopath is that there is 
no possibility for experience at all, which would make, some suggested, inconceivably dull 
novels. In addition, the very existence of the text, the very attempt to articulate experience in 
a subjective idiom, is evidence of a resistance to such a depersonalised state. Even Bollas' 
exemplary case study of the normotic, Tom, cuts himself to enjoy some sort of experience 
(see my forthcoming essay on Sylvia Plath and Bollas). Bollas declares, "It is my view that 
Tom's breakdown constitutes a mute refusal to live within normotic culture, even though at 
the point of his suicide attempt he had not discovered other avenues for the expression of his 
feelings" (1989,151). 
9. For example, Nike does not actually make any shoes, they just put their Swoosh on 
merchandise that is produced by others, usually in the developing world (there is, therefore, 
no direct relation between the sign and its mode of production). The identification of a 
movement from commodities to the image does not come from Naomi Klein herself but from 
Graham H. Phillips, the U. S. chair of Ogilvy and Mather. (See N. Klein 2000,14). 
10. Hardt and Negri admit that this is an oversimplification, but there is some truth in it. 
Postmodernism, for example, flourishes in the prosperous Western academe, while 
fundamentalism is taken up by the impoverished, for example in Afghanistan and the US. 
They point out how the poor and the postmodernists are strangely excluded from each others' 
discourses: 
The poor is destitute, excluded, repressed, exploited - and yet living! It is the 
common denominator of life, the foundation of the multitude. it is strange, but 
also illuminating, that postmodernist authors seldom adopt this figure in their 
theorizing. It is strange because the poor is in a certain respect an eternal 
postmodem figure: the figure of a transversal, omnipresent, different, mobile 
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subject; the testament to the irrepressible aleatory character of existence [] 
They [postmodernists] tell us that a regime of transversal linguistic relations 
of production had entered into the unified and abstract universe of value. But 
Nvho is the subject that produces "transversally, " Nvho gives a creative meaning 
to language - Nvho if not the poor, Nvho are subjugated and desiring, 
impoverished and powerful, always more powerfid? 
(Hardt and Negri 2000,157-8) 
11. Naomi Klein does not talk much about academia explicitly, but her judgement on the 
lack of response in academia to the increasing corporate control of universities is scathing: 
more than a few of those tenured radicals Nvho were supposed to be corrupting 
young minds with socialist ideas were preoccupied with their own 
postmodernist realisation that truth is itself a construct. This realisation made 
it intellectually untenable for many academics to even participate in a political 
argument that would have "privilegedý' any one model of leaming (public) 
over another (corporate). And since truth is relative, who is to say that Plato's 
dialogues are any more of an "authority" than Fox's Anastasia? 
This academic trend only accounts for a few of the missing-in-actions, 
however. Many other campus radicals -%vere still up for a good old political 
fight, but during the key years of the corporate campus invasion they were tied 
up in a different battle: all consuming gender and race debates of the so-called 
political correctness wars [ ... I It wasn't until the politics of personal 
representation were themselves co-opted by branding that students and 
professors alike began to turn away from their quarrels with each other, 
realising they bad a more powerful foe. 
(N. Klein 2000,104) 
Klein's picture may be over-simplistic and specific exceptions could be found to disprove the 
rule, but Eagleton would concur, more specifically levelling his criticism at American liberal 
pseudo-leftists, so perhaps Klein's picture better resembles North American institutions, 
Klein's first concern. There have been some significant movements resisting the branding in 
universities in recent years; for example, the University of Sheffield's ethical trade policy 
and the banning of Bacardi and Nestl6, although these movements have been entirely 
initiated, led and agreed upon by students. 
12. See, for example, Paul Foot's review of Klein's book, which concludes, "The indignation 
which these books ignite needs more food for its flames than vague appeals to citizenship" 
(Foot 2001,29). 
13. Also quoted by Phillips (1988,120); Phillips points out that Winnicott wrote this in 
response to the increasing dogmatism of the Kleinian group, though I appropriate it now to 
Criticise not only the dogmatism of the Lacanian school but also Lacan's attempt to guarantee 
his vision of psychoanalysis by freezing and sterilising it through his "psychoanalytic 
algebra. " 
14. Flax argues that "Winnicott and Lacan share one crucial assumptions: that the subject 
125 
comes to be(ing) in the field of the Other" (1990,126); however I think that these others are 
so radically different that it makes any comparison nearly impossible. For one, Winnicott 
would not make a distinction between an "other" and the "Othef" (nor have I seen Winnicott 
ever capitalise the word, except at the beginning of a sentence), and Lacan's other necessarily 
leads to alienation, while for Winnicott such an alienation from the other and self is, to 
varying degrees, pathological. 
15. Also quoted in Flax 1990,90-1. While Freud here accuses philosophy of being stuck in an 
animistic mode of thinking, earlier in this essay ("A Question of Wellanschauting") he has 
already separated philosophy and science, psychoanalysis of course being the domain of the 
latter. 
16. Young quotes some observations of A. N. Whitehead (Science and the Modern World) 
that accurately sum up my own feelings towards this scientific methodology. 
In the first place, we must note its astounding efficiency as a system of 
concepts for the organisation of scientific research. In this respect, it is fully 
worthy of the genius of the century which produced it. It has held its own as 
the guiding principle of scientific studies ever since. It is still reigning. Every 
university in the world orgapises itself in accordance with it. No alternative 
system of organising the pursuit of scientific truth has been suggested. It is not 
only reigning, but it is without rival. 
And yet - it is quite unbelievable. This conception of the universe is surely 
framed in terms of high abstractions, and the paradox only arises because we 
have mistaken our abstraction for concrete realities. 
(A. N. Whitehead, quoted by Young 1990) 
17. Lloyd describes that "the mathematical excursus in the Theaetelus authorises us to 
attribute a concern for the careful definition of mathematical terms to Theaetetus" (1979, 
111). 
18. Sullivan claims - without irony, I take it: 
I would go so far as to say that he [Lacan] stands as founding theoretician of a 
post-Modem Age, much as Augustine laid out the City of God blueprint for 
the Middle Ages, or as Descartes mapped out the preoccupations of the 
Modem Age. The intractable problem of writing about human culture in a 
prehistoric era (, %vhich left no written record) may yield little, I submit, by 
being examined in the light of a Lacanian episteme. 
(Sullivan 1991,36) 
19. Not fluent in German myself, I can only accept others' word for this. Meira Likierman 
(1990) discussing many specific issues arising from the translation of Freud's works, finds 
that 
In the original Freud's terminology is open ended and allusive, his text full of 
rich ambiguities and his tone personal and conversational. In the translation 
such qualities are played down for the sake of an abstract "scientific 
language" [ ... ] Indeed 
drawing on the vocabulary of dead languages to 
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construct the meaning of our most intensely lived, immediate experiences is 
questionable. It is also somewhat misleading. These terms have the Nvhiff of 
medical textbooks, and appear to pinpoint interior organs Nvbich are concrete 
and real, unlike our very elusive psychical processes. 
(Likierman 1990,115) 
it will be interesting to see whether a planned French Standard Edition (according to 
Likierman, under the supervision of the orthodox Jean Laplanche) and new British English 
translations (under the editorship of Adam Phillips, a Winnicottian) -%vill create a more 
globally "standard" Freud or even more polarised, nationalist Freuds. 
20. Also quoted in Emerson 1986,23. In an address at the Bakhtin Centre at the University of 
Sheffield (2000), Mikael Leiman was also critical of Saussure's Cartesianism, which Leiman 
saw manifested in Saussure's methodology - his transformation of language into an object 
suitable for study by a "social science" such as linguistics - and his mind-body dualism in the 
splitting of the material sound from the idea. 
21. With regard to the debate on the appropriate term for the first infantile caregiver: While I 
am sensitive to the use of the term of "mother" as an essentialised and essentialising 
category, I must admit a certain reluctance to abandon its usage. Winnicott tells us that the 
mother need not necessarily be the infant's own mother, and also that it need not be a female. 
"Mother" is used here, Nvhen I am quoting others, and because it is understood that in most 
cases, the infant's first experiences are in relation to its female parent. Although the 
functions served by the ("good-enouglf ' and/or "not good-enough") mother may also be 
performed by the father or another male, the infant does not recognise this figure as "male" 
or "female"; what is important to the infant in this stage of development are only those 
fiinctions that relate to feeding, nurturing, holding, etc.. 
While it is true that the uncritical and unexamined use of the term "mother" will 
essentialise the functions of "mothering, " and it is clear that another term is preferable to 
avoid calling to the negative (ideological) implications of gendering the caregiver, I find 
myself in a difficult position as I do not wish to disembody the functions of mothering (as I 
find "caregiver" might serve to do) or dehistoricise the fact that these caregivers have 
generally been women, within the episteme frornwhich this theory emerged. For now, 
however, I will avoid the term "mother" where possible. 
22. In Freud, the relationship to the father retrospectively determines the 
relationship with the pre-Oedipal mother; in Melanie Klein, however, the 
relationship with the mother determines the relationship with the father 
following a linear cause-and-effect movement. For, the position of the subject 
in relation to the castration complex determines his relationship to the first 
object. For Melanie Klein, the experience of separation from the first object, 
the breast, determines all later experiences 
(Kohon 1986,43) 
23. In the 1950s, Lacan seems to be obsessed with the lunacy of British psychoanalytic 
culture. Lacan critiques Klein and Balint extensively in his first seminar (1953-54), and 
Fairbaim in the second (1954-5 5). Each of Lacan's critiques completely ignore how these 
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analysts differ from him theoretically, as he constantly belittles the British conceptualisation 
of and focus upon affect. Lacan only engages with them on his terms, finding comfort on his 
familiar turf of the imaginary, real and symbolic. "Melanie Klein, " Lacan tells us, "has 
neither a theory of the imaginary nor a theory of the ego" (1953-54,82) - the latter claim 
being simply wrong, and as for the former, he does not see that Klein's theory does not 
i-equire a concept of the imaginary, or consider why that may be. Although Lacan could be 
said to be correct in his appraisal of Klein's treatment of Dick (see 1953-54,62-88), which 
even most Kleinians would grant is a rather harsh imposition of interpretation, Lacan's 
treatment of Balint is scandalous, though not unique in its generally condescending, 
patronising attitude towards British analysts, none of whom, it seems, are capable of 
constructing a coherent theory of their practice. Fortunately, however, Lacan recognises his 
duty: "It is up to us, " he says, "to introduce these notions" (1953-54,82). 
24. Roustang also says: 
This is certainly a strange form of reasoning; after acknowledging that this 
"element of immediacy" is ceaselessly encountered in the analytic experience, 
Lacan then jettisons it because it is unknowable [ ... I by virtue of the confusion 
posited at the outset between the statement that speech is the means of 
analysis, and the claim that speech alone comes into play in analysis. This 
confusion traverses Lacan's entire oeuvre, but was only necessary because he 
so badly wanted to found a psychoanalytic science. 
(Roustang 1998,39) 
1 
25. Lacan finds the accusation that he neglects affect to be so completely insubstantial, such 
a "faint gesture, " that he explains at the end of this seminar, "Your inclusion of the drives 
among the confusion of gestures used in defense against my discourse lets me off so easily as 
to preclude my feeling grateful" (Lacan 1974,24). Green also points out the sarcasm and 
scorn with which Lacan greeted thosewho had the misfortune to remind him of his gradually 
acquired aversion for affect (Green 1973,100). 
26. To the objection that the body is involved in the identification of the mirror phase, I 
would point out that it is only the "imago ofone ý own bodjý'(Lacan 1966,3) that is involved 
in this operation. 
27. For a change lavishing praise on Balint, Lacan points out that he "does not fall into the 
counter-transference - that is to say, in plain language, he is not an idiot - in the coded language we wallow in, we call the fact of hating someone ambivalence, and the fact of 
being an idiot counter-transference" (1953-54,227-8). 
2 8.1 am aware that there are those Lacanians who now focus more attention on the real (for 
example, Mek), and I welcome their efforts, but it does not change the fundamental 
distinction set up by Lacan between that which is knowable through language and that which 
is not - as I suggest in Part 11, it would be better to reject the boundary altogether. 
29. This is not withstanding Lacan's attempt to (mis)appropriate Independent psychoanalyst 
Michael Balint and his "two-body psychology" in the late pages of The Language of the Seýf 
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(see Lacan 1953,68-9). 
30. Eagleton, who too often accepts Lacanian theory unproblematically for my liking, does 
muster enough scepticism to question the nature of postmodem "Otherness": 
What homogenizes these avatars of Otherness is just the fact that none of 
them is me, or us, which implies quite as self-centred a perspective as the 
most discreditable "humanist" subject. If the "other" is reduced to whatever 
disrupts my identity, is this a humbly decentring move, or a self-regarding 
one? And if the world is hollowed out along with me, as a fractured subject 
confronts a fictional reality, is that subject really as humble as it seems if it 
has made sure that there is no longer any obdurate reality out there to resist it? 
(Eagleton 1996,88) 
The answer I would give Eagleton is that of course such a view of the other is incredibly 
narcissistic, though it is a particular kind of empty self-love. Postmodemism sees itself as 
replacing the modem subject as omnipotent, narcissistic and complete with a view of the 
subject as fragmented and illusory, but maintains its narcissistic character. The postmodern 
subject is not "humble, " but it can find little in itself to love, so, in an attackworthy of a 
Kleinian anally-sadistic infant, it seeks to destroy and/or control the outside world. This has 
had the effect, Eagleton says, of deflating those bourgeois subjects thatwere too full of 
themselves, but they can find compensation in the effect this has had on the political left 
Nvho, instead of merely acting, must now remain fixed while they "problematize the nature of 
the agent" (1996,89). 
3 1. In his last essays, Freud seems to begin to realise the importance of these earliest 
matemal experience, very grudgingly leaning towards the Kleinians and away from his own 
daughter and orthodox followers (Klein and Anna Freud would soon after Freud's death of 
course be locked in a bitter struggle for the place as the favourite daughter, the rightful heir 
to psychoanalysis). See, for example, "An Outline of Psychoanalysis" (1940) where, with 
Klein and contra Lacan (though of course with reference to neither), Freud discusses the 
inaternal origin of the super-ego (424). 
32. Again, Winnicott initially meant this as a criticism of Klein and Freud for maintaining a 
belief in the instincts, trying to explain the history of the individual in terms of the baby alone 
without reference to the environmental provision (see Winnicott 1971,70-1). 
33. "Ideas and Definitions, " probably from the early 1950s (Winnicott 1986,43-4). 
34. Lowenstein, through an over-inflated sense of Lacan's originality and a too-common 
misreading of Winnicott, finds Winnicott's conception of the self "as an immanent and 
positive essence" (1994,716), In the letters page of London Revieiv ofBooks, Kirsty Hall 
demonstrates the most ridiculous ignorance common to Lacanian (and "Post-Modem 
theory") self-importance, asking "How many psychoanalysts are aware that Winnicott's 
formulation of the true and false self is highly problematic? To put the argument at its 
Simplest [most laughable]: how can either the analyst or the analysand distinguish between 
what is true andwhat is false? " (Hall 2001,4). Lacan himself attacks all such notions to be 
found in Britain, pejoratively referring to "all the Manchbausens of psycboanalytical 
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normalisation to pull themselves up by the hair in the hope of attaining the paradise of the 
full realisation. of the genital object, indeed of the object, period" (Lacan 1968,25). These are 
but a few published examples - many more have come from conferences and informal 
discussions. 
35. Jones also examines rationalisations meant for public consumption. With regard to 
everyone's need to have "what might be called a theory of life, and particularly a theory of 
himself, " Jones explains: 
Every one feels that, as a rational creature, he must be able to give a 
connected, logical, and continuous account of himself, his conduct, and 
opinions, and all his mental processes are unconsciously manipulated and 
revised to that end. No one will admit that he ever deliberately performed an 
irrational act, and any act that might appear so is immediately justified by 
distorting the mental processes concerned and providing a false explanation 
that has a plausible ring of rationality. 
(Jones 1908,12-13) 
36. Fairbaim's description of the intellectual is ironically similar to Freud's description of 
his "savages" in Totem and Taboo, whose belief in magic demonstrates that 
A general overvaluation has thus come about of all mental processes - an 
attitude towards the world, that is, which in view of our knowledge of the 
relation between reality and thought, cannot fail to strike us as an - 
overvaluation of the latter. Things become less important than ideas of things 
[ ... ] Relations which bold between the 
ideas of things are assumed to hold 
equally between the things themselves. 
(Freud 1913,142). 
The savage and the "highly intelligent man who suffered from obsessional ideas" thus both 
maintain a belief in the "omnipotence of thoughf'(143). Freud over-optimistically finds that 
"At the animistic stage men ascribe omnipotence to themselves. At the religious stage they 
transfer it to the gods but do not seriously abandon it for themselves [ ... 
] The scientific view 
of the universe no longer affords any room for human omnipotence, " though Freud does 
have the insight to conclude that "None the less some of the primitive belief in omnipotence 
still survives in men's faith in the power of the human mind, which grapples with the laws of 
reality" (146). 
37. This is my own term for the schizoid individual characterised by the processes Fairbaim 
describes, although Fairbairn does say that such schizoid characteristics, "usually in a less 
pronounced form, are also common among members of the intelligentsia" (Fairbaim 1940, 
6). Phillips also uses this tenn, stating that "the Intellectual" was a figure with which 
Winnicott was preoccupied (1988,95), though Phillips does not cite Winnicott's usage, nor 
can I find where in Winnicott's workwhere he actually uses this terin. 
I should also perhaps clarifý, that to suggest that one utilises a schizoid defence does 
not, for Fairbaim, imply that the subject suffers from a severe psychopathology. Fairbairn 
finds that most sub ects employ a variety of schizoid defence mechanisms and, as for j 
Winnicott, these are often part of normal mental functioning. 
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38. Miller preposterously does on to defend this contention thus: 
You might think it is a very far-fetched idea, but it is an idea necessitated by 
the notion that speech in analysis and interpretation can change the subject. If 
-%ve take as our point of departure the idea that speech and interpretation can 
change a subject, the simple way to formalize this is to say: The subject is 
nothing more than the effect of the combination of signifiers. 
(Miller 1991,33) 
Never having done a course in formal philosophical logic, the professional ten-n for an 
argument thus misguided eludes me, but I think more commonly we can say that this not only 
puts the cart before the horse (language before the subject) but is also a case of cutting a 
square to fit a circle. I 
39. Also discussed by Alford 1999,13 1. 
40. Andr6 Green would seem to concur: "But the more progress I made in understanding 
Freud's works, the more I became aware that the 'return to Freud', as I understood it, did not 
accordwith the interpretation provided by the spokesman of the 'French Freud"' (Green 
1986,8). 
4 1. Although I do not really take it into consideration here (partly because I am not sure I 
agree and partly because it is not necessary that I engage with this argument now), Green 
tries to further define epistemophilia by setting it beside scopophilia. 
Epistemopbilia is more akin to the search for an explanatory 'theory', as 
exemplified by the sexual theories put together by children to explain how 
babies come into this world. Scopophilia is a drive towards a much less 
inhibited, displaced, or desexualised pleasure. It involves the affect more than 
the intellect. 
(Green 1986,343) 
42. Klein also provocatively suggests that the inhibition of the epistemological impulses may 
contribute to xenophobia, "for instance, the incapacity to learn foreign languages, and, 
further, hatred for those who speak a different tongue" (Klein 1928,188). 
43. Thomas is playing with Freud's own love of Charcot's quotation. See Freud 1905b, 156. 
44. One of these is, as Flax points out, a tendency shared Nvith Lacan to focus only on certain 
aspects of Freud's thought. Although my bias would say that those aspects are the better, 
more accurate ones (and of course Freud Nvas not always right), there is a case to be made 
that object-relations theorists are somewhat neglectful of certain areas (for example, 
sexuality). 
Many deficiencies of object-relations that Lacanians find - that they cannot recognise 
a signifier, that it is based on nawe conceptions of the subject that do not address economic 
relations, poNver structures and patriarchal gender relations - are a combination of truth and 
idealisations of Lacanian thought. There have been other, more informed criticisms of the 
deficiencies in object-relations thought, from the slightly amending (Flax) to the outright 
damning (Doane and Hodges 1992 - more hostile to Winnicott than Klein). I could stand up 
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and defend object-relations from these criticisms, some of which are not without foundation, 
but this is not the place for such engagements. Also, in the spirit of Independent 
psychoanalysis, it is better that we not accept any theory set in stone but accept such 
criticisms and rereadings so as to best allow the theory to respond to its own environments. 
45. Bollas here usesjouissance to describe the joy that "reflects the inner sense of the self's 
release to its being" (1992,51), which is "the subject's inalienable right to ecstasy" (1989, 
19). This use of Lacanian terminology shows how Bollas draws voices together in the 
dialogic production of meaning - though we should not be tempted to readjouissance in the 
Lacanian sense that is limited to a transgression; I think that the experience Bollas wishes to 
describe in his idiomatic appropriation of this term goes well beyond Lacan's conception. 
46. In this analysis, too, it is important not to succumb to temptation and try to elide the 
fundamental differences between Lacan and Winnicott's theory on the illusion of shared 
language, as Cameron (1996) and Schwab (1994) seem to (and I myself almost did when I 
was first presented with these ideas). 
47. Lacan states that this identification can be made with the infant's own reflection or the 
image of another child. Initially, Iwould say that there is a radical difference between these 
two positions and that Lacan can not have it both Nvays, until I remember that Lacan's other is 
only a projection of the image/imagination anyway. It is not a real other that is important 
here, but only identification with an image That is mis-recognised as the self. 
48. Lacan's conceptualisation of creativity is hardly worth mention in this context: creativity 
is a function of the symbolic order, it renews "the never-exbausted power of symbols in the 
human exchange that brings them to the light of day" (Lacan 1953,46). 
49. Milner approaches a similar conceptualisation, finding that "some form of artistic ecstasy 
may be an essential phase in adaptation to reality, since it may mark the creative moment in 
which new and vital identifications are established" (1952,182); although she does not 
explicitly link creativity to being as Winnicott does, for Milner it is through successful 
adaptation to reality and identifications that the external and internal worlds come to have 
meaning to the subject. 
Fairbaim (1938) adding to the Kleinian conception of art-as-reparation, also believes 
that "Artistic activity consists simply in making somethingforfim" and therefore 
44 anything that is madeforfun may be regarded as a work of art" (384; italics original). 
Fairbairn also perceives the ubiquity of creativity, finding it to be as present in the first 
manipulations of a pencil by a three-year old as it is the work of Michelangelo, though he 
seems - at this early stage, anyway - to underestimate how important such fun and play can 
be. 
50.1 also concur with Schwab, as would Winnicott, I believe, when she states that "Just as 
we find changing historical forms of subjectivity, so too do we find historical changes in the 
transitional space" (1994,35). 
1 have persisted in using Winnicott's terms of "health" and "normal" with regard to 
mental functioning and psychopathology. It perhaps should not be necessary to clarify this, 
but of course Winnicott does not mean either of these to impose normative categories, b la 
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the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental 
Disorders (1980). Rather, Winnicott's conceptions of normal, healthy mental functioning are 
specific to each subject. To me, Winnicott needs to ask only one question in determining 
"healthy" or "unhealthy" (a term he never uses): does the subject negotiate for themselves a 
space between paradoxes that enables that individual meaningful object relations as an active 
agent in its environment? 
5 1. See, for example, Vologinov 1973. 
52.1 primarily use the phrase "potential space" to describe this phenomenon. There is no 
significant reason for this; simply that I like the word-play upon "potential" and the constant 
reminder that this space is flexible and impermanent, a reminder that this space never exists 
a priori, nor, I think-, would we wish it to. 
53. Most Lacanians would argue that Lacan similarly deals with paradoxes, but Roustang 
points out that this is "paradox" "in the etymological sense of the -word, that is, whatever 
goes against commonly accepted opinion or runs counter to good sense" - Lacan's thought, 
Roustang claims is "unilateral" in the sense that doesn't demonstrate the links between 
opposites but isolates one side in order to hurl the other into oblivion (Roustang 1998,116). 
54. And hence the "politics of the third way, " so cherished by (once left or left-centre) 
Western democratic leaders such as Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Jean Chretien, has nothing 
in common with the Winnicottian third space. These political ideologies, under the guise of 
anti-ideologies or "ideologically-free" discourses, are a true dialectical synthesis, and I leave 
it for the reader to deterinine -which side of the political spectrum exerted the most pull to 
drag the synthesis to its side. Nor, it should go without saying, does Starbucks' promotional 
phrase, "A Comforting Third Space, " constitute a Winnicottian third space, although they 
would likely wish to appropriate Winnicott's conceptual isation and recast it as a place of 
c4coffee... community... camaraderie... connection" (N. Klein 2000,135); these spaces cannot 
be creative because they are always already polluted by the corporate agenda, forcing us to 
play by capitalism's rules. 
The first to discover the need to paradoxically maintain tension was, who else? Freud. 
In the Introduawy Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-17), for example, he explains to what 
one expects would have been a very uncomfortable audience that it is not desirable to replace 
sexual repression with libidinal gratification, or vice versa. "This conflict would not be 
solved by our helping one of these trends to victory over its opponent [ ... ] Neither of these two alternative decisions could end the internal conflict; in either case one party to it would 
remain unsatisfied" (Freud 1916-17,484). 
55.1 find Freud's metaphor of the Mystic Writing Pad (1925) to be useful in examining how 
experience is inscribed on the subject, although I do not employ the metaphor in quite the 
same manner as Freud. Briefly, the three layers of the Mystic Writing Pad represent the 
subject: The bottom layer, the wax slab, contains a permanent record of every experience, or 
inscription, that has been made on the Pad. This we may also liken to the unconscious, as the 
Permanent inscriptions on the wax slab are not immediately visible, unless, Freud tells us, the 
slab is viewed "in a suitable light. " (Also, the writing tool used to make the inscriptions often 
falls into the grooves previously encoded on the slab, thus reinforcing certain experiences - 
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repetition compulsion? ) The middle layer both receives external stimuli and presents a 
surface representation of that which has been inscribed; we may therefore liken this layer to 
what we regard as the self, as the markings visible on this layer are only a small selection of 
the inscriptions that exist upon the underlying wax slab, and can be erased (repressed) from 
this surface layer. Finally, the top layer is a protective sheath, a sort of defence mechanism to 
lessen the impact of the harsh inscriptions of experience upon the pad, mediating between the 
other two layers and the external world. 
56. Winnicott's belief in an initial state of union with the mother could be read as an 
endorsement of primary narcissism, which I said earlier was an orthodox Freudian idea 
(largely) rejected by object-relations theorists. With primary narcissism the baby perceives 
the mother as an extension of itself - and, therefore, all its libidinal energies directed upon its 
own ego, but Winnicott's union between baby and environment is not based in narcissistic 
phantasy but an intersubjective dependence. 
57. The social-constructivist me that was first attracted to Lacan still shudders when being 
asked to believe in a pilori expectations or knowledge, though I think that Bion is winning 
me over. Bion - like Bollas, with his concept of the idiom - is vague as to what this does and 
does not include, but Bion further offers "that an infant has an inborn pre-conception that a 
breast that satisfies its own incomplete nature exists. The realisation of the breast provides an 
emotional experience. This experience corresponds to Kant's secondary and primary 
qualities of a phenomenon. " (1962,69). Green attempts to clarify this further: "By 
preconception, -we must understand not preconceived judgement, but a matrix of conception, 
an innate unconscious disposition, based on waiting for and expecting a fulfilment involving 
the participation of an object" (1973,93). 
58. Of course, all psychoanalysis - Freudian, Lacanian, Kleinian and Independent - has its 
roots in Enlightenment rationalism. For example, Klein's earliest notions of pedagogy in her 
first essays are explicit evidence of her belief in the power of "Enlightenment, " the power of 
making conscious what was once unconscious, of liberating that which is repressed on the 
basis of some antiquated sense of propriety. Furthermore, Zaretsky points out ho%v Klein and 
British obj ect-relations analysts assumed what he calls "the. threefold promise of modernity, 
three interrelated aspirations first articulated in the Enlightenment: personal autonomy, 
genderjustice and reconciliation, and the democratization of authority" (Zaretsky 1998,34). 
59. Bion, leading the way, claims that "The writing of this book [Learningfroln Experience] 
is a realisation of K7 (1962,66). 
60. In personal letter to Winnicott, Lacan announces his decision to speak on Jones' theory of 
symbolism 
1. because I consider thoroughly well-founded in principle his effort to 
situate in relation to metaphor, that is, to a figure of speech, the effects of so- 
called symbolism in analysis (regretting that that effort should have remained 
'without sequel, before me) 
2. because his failure is instructive [ ... ] 3. because I find in it a confirmation of my thesis considering the 
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privileged function of the phallus. 
(Lacan 1974,76) 
61. Bollas first introduces the notion of the idiom in his book Forces ofDestiny (1989), 
however, I find that the identification provided in this earlier work insists too much upon a 
heredity or genetic basis. I do not wish to deny the importance of innate factors in human 
experience, but I believe that Bollas better balances the nature-nurture paradox (so crucial to 
the concept of idiom) in his later work, and my preference is reflected in my own use of the 
term. 
To go back even further, in The Shadoiv of the Object (1989) Bollas' precursor to the 
idiom seems to be what he calls the subjective elenient - another term I employ at times. The 
subjective element is the "internal play of affects and ideas that generates and authorises our 
private imaginations, creatively informs our work and gives continuing resource to our 
interpersonal relations [ ... 
]a particular kind of internal space that facilitates the reception of 
unconscious affects, memories and perceptions" (1987,137). 
62. The Kleinian conception, shared with Ferenczi, that this forrii. of symbolisation has its 
basis in the primary identifications of infantile experience (that is, "arising out of the baby's 
endeavour to rediscover in every object his own organs and their functioning" - Klein 1930, 
220) may also be viewed with Bollas' idea of the transformational object (1987), as an 
object-relations alternative to Lacanian theories of identification with the signifier or le 
object petit a that attempts to understand, for example, the function of the commodity in 
consumer culture. 
63. Milner also sees anxiety as a necessary component of symbolism (1952,183). 
64. It is, however, Winnicott's unwillingness to conceive of a Kleinian "death instinct" that is 
perhaps the most significant difference between the two theorists. Interestingly, Nancy 
Chodorow suggests that myths and legends that feature goddesses, sirens, whirlpools, 
Immaculate Virgins are often attempts to cope with a "dread of women" that is an anxiety 
originally arising form the vicissitudes of union and separation with and fears of retaliatory 
attacks from the mother (1989,35). 
65. As Freud says, "The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not tofind an 
object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, 
to convince oneself that it is still there" (Freud 1925a, 440) or, more simply, "The finding of 
an object is in fact a refinding of if' (Freud 1905,145). 
66. This invites immediate parallels with Pat Barker's Regeneration (1991), a novel that 
similarly addresses break-downs of communication and the psycbe-somatic bases of language. 
67. In Being a Character, Bollas speaks of an "evolutionary dialectic [ ... ] enabling the reader to participate in that unconscious movement that contributes to a psychoanalyst's clinical 
practice and informs his creation of psychoanalytic theory" (Bollas 1992,6). 1 do not wish to 
say that Bollas here means dialoguewhen he uses the expression "evolutionary dialectic" - however, I think the former better describes the relations that Bollas is describing. 
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68. Emerson, however, falls victim to eliding the important differences between Lacan and 
Bakhtin as she introduces this statement of Bakhtin's as evidence of their correspondence. It 
undoubtedly sounds like Lacan in places, but this reflection is only on the surface - the ideas 
behind their language are so radically different so as to make comparison futile. 
69. Finlay-de Monchy suggests that it is at this point, when an inviting potential space is 
unavailable, that the body may become a transitional object: "an echoing of surfaces" where 
symbolic language usage is blocked and replaced with regressive acting out, where the body 
becomes the only medium of direct communication (1995,59). 
70. There are other connections to be made between Kleinian, and Winnicottian theories of 
language and those of Lacan that I wish to explore, but which are only tangentially related to 
my discussion here. Specifically, I would like to explore further the possibility that the laws 
of language themselves could/should be treated as transitional objects, and how a Kleinian 
perspective on the development and nature of identification and symbolisation may dialogue 
with a Lacanian-influenced perceptive of the "I" (je) and the "me" (nzoi), especially as it 
pertains to the analysis of popular and commodity culture, where the product promises to 
"stand-in" or represent the identity of the subject. Klein believes that identification precedes 
symbolisation and is characteristic of infantile omnipotence that denies the external, separate 
existence of the subject (Hinshelwood 1991,453). Thus, '%ve may speculate that the paranoid- 
schizoid identification with the commodity denies its separate existence, and that the product 
may come not to represent, but be equated with the subject itself (for example, the ubiquity 
of Nike or the Molson Canadian beer commercial that promises I am. ") 
Perhaps Lacan does allow for some degree of subjective creativity in language: 
This is not to say, however, that our culture pursues its course in the shadowy 
regions beyond creative subjectivity. On the contrary, creative subjectivity has 
not ceased in its struggle to renew the never-exhausted power of symbols in 
the human exchange that brings them to the light of day. 
(Lacan 1966,71) 
However, although Lacan may here speak of "creative subjectivity, " we know that his 
subject, and likely his notion of creativity, are very different from Winnicott's. 
71. Consider, for example, Wolfgang Iser's belief that "The convergence of texts and reader 
brings the literary work into existence, and this convergence can never be precisely 
pinpointed, but necessarily always remain virtual, as it is not to be identified either with the 
reality of the text or with the individual disposition of the reader" (1974,275) and that 
"without the elements of indeterminacy, the gaps in the text, we should not be able to use our 
imagination" (1974,283; see especially 274-94). 
Green similarly identifies that "The work is in this no-man's-land, this potential, 
transitional space, this site of a trans-narcissistic communication where the author's and 
reader's doubles - ghosts which never reveal themselves - communicate through the writing" (1986,322). 
Gabrielle Schwab's "transitional texts" are also located in Winnicott's potential 
space, and work continually to transgress and therefore reshape the boundaries of language 
and subjectivity. There is much I admire in Schwab's analysis - her insistence on the subject, her willingness to embark- upon a dialogue with other discourses, including poststructuralist 
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and Lacanian-inspired philosophies largely overlooked here -though her insistence upon a 
Lacanian conceptualisation of Winnicott I also find a limitation of her approach. She insists, 
for example, on showing how Winnicott alters our conceptions of the imaginary and 
symbolic orders, while I maintain that such orders cannot be maintained at all in a 
Winnicottian epistemology. Furthermore, "The creative potential of the transitional space, " 
she says, "is always relative in respect to the symbolic order" (Schwab 1994,4 1). 
Mary Jacobus' conception of the "scene of reading" also seems to share many 
qualities with a Winnicottian potential space, where the reader engages in play and boundary 
testing, though I believe that Jacobus' conceptualisation, coming from a more Kleinian 
perspective, is more concerned with an internal "landscape" of phantasy, (see Jacobus 1999, 
especially 17-83). 
72. Another worrying trend is the appropriation of Klein's or Winnicott's work by Lacanian 
psychoanalysts and critics. For example, in Elizabeth Wright's introduction to psychoanalytic 
criticism (1984), we find a Winnicott -%vhose potential space relates only to the parent's 
language and a Klein for whorn entry into the symbolic order is paramount for movement 
from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive positions. To an extent, this is true also of 
Schwab (see endnote above), for whom the transitional space exists in relation to Lacan's 
symbolic. 
7j. Bloom seems to have a buddy-in-backlash in Lowenstein, who finds that Dora has been 
unfortunately mis-appropriated by feminism. 
If yesterday she was forced into the PrOcrustean bed of patriarchy, today she 
seems to be stuffed into the lean mold of feminism. Eager to uncover Freud's 
blind spots and to expose his masculine fallibility, recent critics, construing 
Dora alternately as victim or as heroine , have failed to recognize that Dora's 
case history offers us a far more innovative, complex, and subversive model of 
subjectivity. 
(Lowenstein 1994,718-9) 
True, Dora can provide a new way of looking at subjectivity, just as Woolf must have loved 
reading, but Lowenstein, like Bloom, seems to Nvish to deny the specific, embodied 
resistances that Dora and Woolf offer. 
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- PART II - 
The Potential Spaces of/in Contemporary British Magic Realist Literature 
In the last section, I explored how object-relations psychoanalysis can be used to 
reconceptualise language and literature and redress the contemporary crises of 
subjectivity exacerbated by postmodern culture and discursive strategies. Here I wish 
to demonstrate how I see contemporary fiction responding to these crises of 
subjectivity. I find that many contemporary writers use their texts to create potential 
spaces, inviting readers to share in the creative production of meaning. This is most 
evident, I think, in contemporary magic realist fiction, where readers, writers and 
characters visit these spaces in real and metaphorical terms. In this chapter, therefore, 
I will look at what insights an object-relations psychoanalytic approach can offer 
what has been labelled inagic realist orfantastic literature, and how this literature 
interacts with the socio-political and cultural sphere that produces it andwhich it 
enters. I examine the strategies at work in these texts and how these texts may 
intervene politically in the development and experience of subjects. More 
specifically, I wish to demonstrate how these texts may be utilised in the creative play 
of subjects and how many of these texts point the way out of the vicissitudes of love 
and hate, reason and unreason, and show us how to survive our paradoxes. 
I will begin with a brief exploration of the historical development and characteristics 
of magic realism since the Western Euro-American Enlightenment. I have tried to 
situate the discussion with regard to existing perspectives on magic realism, 
focussing especially on the historical understanding of Jos6 B. Monle6n and the 
structuralist and psychostructuralist approaches of Tzvetan Todorov and Rosemary 
Jackson. I then turn to the texts themselves, using an object-relations perspective to 
re-examine the narrative strategies and conceptualisations of time that are employed 
in magic realist fiction. I then examine at length how contemporary British magic 
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realism differs from earlier representations of the fantastic in its attempt to open 
potential spaces. On the one hand I examine the spaces of reason and rationality to 
see how these authors regard the efforts and constructs of the capitalist culture, and 
the spaces of unreason and irrationality to see how they perceive the previous 
transgressions in literature and theory as ineffective in trying to imagine real social 
change. These instances of transgressive unreason are usually conceived as the limit 
of magic realism's challenges to the established order, but contemporary magic 
realist authors, I find, reject the very dualism upon which reason and rationality are 
predicated. Finally, I examine the third spaces created by contemporary magic 
realism, and how transitional objects and illusion are employed within the text to 
guide characters and readers through the uncertainty of liminality. 
139 
Magic Realism: A Theoretical Review 
Just as at the beginning of this thesis I felt it necessary to defend my decision to offer 
yet another psychoanalytic conception of language and literature, I feel as though 
here I must present some idea as to why I feel it necessary to offer yet another 
psychoanalytic reading of magic realist literature. Others that have already provided 
readings of magic realism that are painstaking and seemingly comprehensive (for 
example, the structuralist evaluations of Tzvetan Todorov) and somewhat 
psychoanalytic (for example, the re-evaluations of Rosemary Jackson). What follows 
is a brief explanation of what it is I borrow and reject from others' conceptualisations 
of magic realism, and my initial investigations into what unique contributions I think 
object-relations can make to our understanding of this literature. 
Before continuing, however, I need to make a quick clarification regarding 
terminology. I do not perceive any serious difference between Todorov's (and 
Monle6n's) use of the terinfantastic and my own preference for the term inagic 
realism and so I use the words interchangeably. Todorov uses "the fantastic" (as do 
Monle6n and Jackson), and it often seems to be applied to Euro-American traditions 
- primarily, the Gothic, from Otranto to Poe - between the seventeenth and early 
twentieth centuries, while "magic realism" seems to be term more often applied to 
the fiction that has emerged from Latin America (and India) since Word War 11.1 
elide the difference in this case - something I am usually loath to do - because at 
least within the context of contemporary British fiction, I am trying to suggest that 
there is a correspondence between these traditions. Although Jackson's use of 
"fantastic" is supposedly derived from Todorov, it seems at times to include texts that 
he would deem "marvellous. " However, I do not perceive a significant difference in 
the general conceptualisations of magic realism and the fantastic, both of which seem 
to refer to genre that lies in the same liminal space between the real/uncanny and 
magic/marvellous. I usually use the term "magic realism" here because, first, it 
starkly and directly calls to the paradox inherent in this form of literature and, more 
pragmatically, I do not wish to complicate further the issue of fantasy/phantasy. 
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And Yet .... : The Origins of Magic Realism and the Contemporary Tradition 
In his intriguing Foucaultian sociohistorical approach to the fantastic, Jos6 B. 
Monle6n posits that the fantastic was born at the dawn of the Enlightenment, "by the 
constant shifting of the diffuse boundaries between reason and unreason" (1990,6). 
This would seem to contradict the identification made by Zamora and Farris of a 
relatively unbroken tradition dating back to the Greek epics and I would be 
uncomfortable claiming that the fantastic, or a literature that served a similar purpose 
to it in challenging governing epistemologies and opening potential spaces, did not 
exist prior to the Enlightenment. However, I believe that this tradition can vary so 
dramatically from one era to another that there is a need to follow Monle6n and 
examine the post-Enlightenment development of the fantastic in its specificity. 
Monle6n also makes the point that there was almost certainly some pre- 
Enlightenment conceptualisation of "the fantastic" in literature, for "If the fantastic, 
as I argue, depends deeply on a specific concept of reality, of what is true and natural, 
then surely there must be a literature, prior to The Castle of Otranto, that deals with 
this issue, even if the referential premises rest on different values" (Monle6n 1990, 
7). Angela Carter also implies such a link between the Enlightenment and a shift in 
representation of the fantastic when, in the introduction to her collection of fairy 
tales, she notes that 
one of the first self-conscious collections of European fairy tales [,. vasj 
assembled by Charles Perrault and published in Paris in 1697 under 
the title Histoires ou contes A tempspassi, translated into English in 
1729 as Histories or Tales ofPast Times. (Even in those days there 
Nvas already a sense among the educated classes that popular culture 
belonged to the past - even, perhaps, that it ought to belong to the 
past, where it posed no threat ... ). 
(Carter 1990, x-xi) 
Carter thus identifies the genesis of the Enlightenment production of the fantastic, 
albeit fifty to sixty years earlier than Monle6n- This orientalism, this making other of 
folklore, served to distinguish the magical stories and epistemologies from the 
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emergent Enlightenment rationalism. 1 
. The emergence of the fantastic or magic realist literature is therefore bound to 
a specific epistemic shift. As Monle6n points out, in an epistemological universe in 
which 
Miracula might exist, the supernatural might be recognised it is 
impossible to talk about the fantastic, since this implies the 
recognition of the supernatural not on moral [for example, religious] 
grounds but, paradoxically, on rational premises. Not until nature 
becomes objectified, and not until the supernatural Nvas equatedwith 
the unnatural, could fantastic literature emerge [ ... ] For this fracture to 
take place, an exclusive Nvorldview - one that recognises the existence 
of nature as ruled by independent laws that cannot be transgressed - 
needs to first dominate in society. 
(Monle6n 1990,8-9) 
Thus, Monle6n can claim, with some authority, that the "fantastic is, at heart, 
an epistemological questiorf ' (9). Certainly Todorov, Jackson, Monle6n, Armitt and 
others offer us enough evidence from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to 
demonstrate that, indeed, epistemological concerns are often at the forefront of 
fantastic literature, from Walpole to Poe. However, just because the fantastic 
emerged as a result of or in response to a certain change in the dominant episteme, it 
does not therefore mean that it only responds to epistemological issues. I would 
suggest that the fantastic explores not only epistemological questions but also 
addresses the increasingly prevalent ontological crises of subjectivity that are also 
exacerbated by the discourses that have proliferated since the Enlightenment. These 
ontological concerns of the fantastic have, I think-, become much more evident in the 
second half of the twentieth century, and this shift in focus could be perceived, as it 
often is, as another seismic epistemological shift. It is perhaps significant that 
Monle6n's study leaves off where I pick up, in about the mid-twentieth century. For 
Monle6n, the fantastic is a genre that exists in the past tense: 
The artistic explosion that occurred at the turn of the twentieth century 
may be seen as inaugurating a different epoch in social and cultural 
142 
development, although such an assertion would likewise require 
historical perspective in order to fully assess its significance. But such 
a time was also the culmination of a period: the seeds of the new 
economic and social organisation that we are now experiencing (from 
corporativism to informatization, from irrationalism to pragmatism) 
could probably be traced to the events immediately preceding World 
War 11 [ ... ] In this sense the history of the fantastic must be seen as 
covering the periods between the 1760s and the 1930s, and must be 
included within the history of irrationalism As social production, 
the fantastic articulated apprehensions that were deeply attached to the 
specific characteristics of capitalist society. The perception of 
monstrosity had significant correlations with the way in which 
dominant culture defined and redefined its political and economic 
supremacy, and depended upon the concrete forms of class struggle. 
(Monle6n 1990,138-9) 
Of course there has been a social and artistic shift since World War 11. And as 
Monle6n suggests, perhaps this new epoch in social and cultural development 
requires a new historical - and psychological - perspective in order to understand its 
significance: 
After World War 11, the international panorama changed drastically. 
New relations of power, the creation of a hierarchy of first, second and 
third worlds, the supremacy of corporations, the existence of a nuclear 
threat - all would be elements that would contribute to a different 
social order. The rich production of the fantastic that invades our most 
recent past thus requires the tracing of another history. 
(Monle6n 1990,13940) 
It is unfortunate, therefore, that Monle6n's study ends with the literature of 
the early twentieth century and with a belief that the fantastic ceases when there is no 
longer a need to articulate the irrational. What is odd is that Monle6n seems to 
proclaim that the Enlightenment is over, the powers of irrationalism having 
persevered over the bourgeois, capitalist order of reason. Monle6n clearly states that 
143 
our most recent past is dominated by global capitalism and corporativism, but does 
not seem to appreciate how these that are the inevitable and (largely) unbroken 
consequences of eighteenth-century bourgeois reason, not an opposition to it. In fact, 
these contemporary systems and institutions are even more reliant upon the strategies 
of capitalist rationality for their maintenance and security. Monle6n asserts that at the 
turn of the twentieth century, "Reason suddenly became an antiquated and powerless 
instrument, and the old mechanisms of order, its social and legal institutions, became 
totally inefficient' ' (95); "the discourse of reason that had served to promote and 
justify the ascent of the bourgeois world now articulated its own negation" (98); 
"From 1816 on, the conc7ept that 'revolutions constitute necessary, organic 
components of evolution' became an intrinsic part of the dominant ideology"' and that 
unreason is the "defining epistemology"(137); and that "In the span of approximately 
thirty years [1900-1930], the scientific, moral, political, and economic universe of the 
bourgeoisie seemed to have fallen into chaos. The forces of unreason appeared to 
have taken over the universe of order" (81) and so on. Andyet, I continually found 
myself objecting, and yet we live today in a world in which capitalism is even further 
entrenched, in which the institutions established at the beginning of the 
Enlightenment are now even stronger, and bourgeois rationalism is the dominant 
epistemic strategy across almost the entire world (see, for example, N. Klein 2000, 
Hardt and Negri 2000). 2 And as Eagleton points out, "the bourgeois humanist subject 
is not in fact simply part of a clapped-out history we can all agreeably or reluctantly 
leave behind" (1985,71). Similarly, I am not so sure that the break between pre- and 
post-World War 11 magic realism is as neat and clean as Monle6n pretends. Even if 
there has been a fundamental shift in the fantastic from the epistemological to 
ontological, I argue in Part I of this study that the ontological crises that we can now 
observe have been precipitated by the epistemological obsession and bourgeois 
capitalism that is the Enlightenment's continued legacy. 
For example, I think that Muriel Spark's The Comforters, -written in 1957, 
could be deemed an early example of the fantastic beyond Monle6n's scope. There 
are certainly questions raised in this novel that we regard as epistemological: when 
asked about the progress of her survey of the twentieth century novel, Caroline, the 
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central character, responds "I'm having difficulty Nvith the chapter on realism" (Spark 
57); and, with a character writing a book on the twentieth-century novel while being 
aware of being a character in a twentieth-century novel, Spark demonstrates a self- 
reflexivity commonly associated by literary theorists as an epistemological 
postmodemity. She asks if the voices and typewriter sounds she bears are 
"objectively real" or "imaginary" (44). These questions can, however, also be 
regarded as addressing ontological concerns: who am I? am I only the sum total of 
representations of me, or do I have an existence independent of representation? It 
shows further, I think, that epistemological and ontological questions are intimately 
and intricately related, so that although there may be a shift in focus from the early to 
the second-balf of the twentieth century fantastic, both sets of issues are at play in all 
magic realist texts. Caroline argues with Laurence, her ultra-rationalist sometime- 
boyfriend, 
"If the sound has objective existence it will be recorded. " 
[Laurence] 
"This sound might have another sort of existence and still be 
real. " [Caroline]. 
"Well, let's first exhaust the possibilities of the natural order" 
"But we don't know all the possibilities of the natural order. " 
"If the sound doesn't record, we can take it for granted that it 
either doesn't exist, or it exists in some supernatural order, " he 
explained. 
She insisted, "It does exist. I think it's a natural sound. I don't 
think that machine will record it. " 
I ... I 
"Well, in that case, I think you should try to understand the 
experience in a symbolic light. " [Laurence] 
"But the voices are voices. Of course they are symbols. But 
they are also voices. There's the typewriter too - that's a symbol, but 
it is a real typewriter. I hear it. " 
(Spark 1957,64 and 68) 
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Echoing concerns of otherwriters of the time (for example, Beckett, Pirandello), in 
The Comforters Nve see characters disappearwhen they are not being looked at, or not 
being represented in the narrative. One can see how the ontological and 
epistemological concerns of subjectivity cannot be easily separated into discrete 
categories, butwe do injustice to the text and the subject if we limit our analysis to 
purely epistemological concerns. Caroline here is articulating the cry of a subject 
who feels that her entire ontological existence is dependent upon knowing, upon 
representation, and resists Laurence's attempts to rationalise her experience into a 
neat objective certainty. He simply refuses to listen to what she is saying, placing his 
own defensive need to reconcile and explain her experience in terms that are 
comfortable for him, that do not challenge his rational conception of the world. It is 
"as if her body, at such times, were only awaiting her word" (Spark 1957,66), 
identifying the inversion of contemporary philosophy and culture that places 
representation before being, epistemology before ontology. As I quoted in Part 1, 
Beckett's deteriorating narrator in Texisfor Nothing similarly asserts the need to tend 
to ontological over the epistemological, being before doing, albeit too late. 
There's my life, why not, it is one, if you like, if you must, I don't say 
no, this evening. There has to be one, it seems, once there is speech, 
no need of a story, a story is not compulsory, just a life, that's the 
mistake I made, one of the mistakes, to have Nvanted a story for 
myself, whereas life alone is enough. 
(Beckett 1967,93) 
The Structuralist Approaeh: For and Against Todorov 
In Tzvetan Todorov's super-scientific structuralist study, thefantastic is a genre that 
lies between the antithetical genres of realism, wherein supernatural events can be 
rationally explicated in terms of the uncanny, 3 and the marvellous, dominated by the 
unambiguous presence of supernatural events or elements. There are for Todorov 
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three conditions that must be met for a work to be categorised as "fantastic": 
1) the text must oblige the reader to hesitate between the natural and the 
supernatural 
2) this hesitation must be experienced by a character, Nvith Nvhom, on some 
level, the reader identifies 
3) the reader must reject both poetical and allegorical interpretations 
These criteria are plausible enough and form the contemporary standard from which 
all critical analyses of the fantastic begins, and I would like to retain, to a certain 
degree but Nvith notable exceptions, all three in my own analysis. 
Todorov's conceptualisation of the fantastic offers some obvious parallels 
with Winnicott's conception of the third area of experience. Like the potential space, 
Todorov defines magic realism as a careful negotiation between opposites: "either the 
reader admits that these apparently supernatural events are susceptible of a rational 
explanation, and we then shift from the fantastic to the uncanny; or else he admits 
their existence as such, and we find ourselves within the marvellous" (58). The 
fantastic, he says, "lasts only as long as a certain hesitation" (41); -Ivhen a decision is 
made, the work becomes not fantastic but something else. "The fantastic therefore, " 
like the potential space, "leads a life full of dangers, and may evaporate at any 
momenf'(41). Todorov also insists that the fantastic must not challenge the 
ontological status of the experience. He says that "when a book begins with a 
sentence like 'John was in the room, lying on his bed, ' %ve are not entitled to ask 
ourselves if this is true or false. Such a question has no meaning, for literary language 
is a conventional language in which the test of truth is impossible" (82). Ultimately 
for Todorov, and I think that this may also be true for everyone, "all literature 
escapes the category of the true and the false" (83). As James Henderson reminds us, 
Coleridge also spoke of thewilling suspension of disbelief exercised by readers of 
poetry. "Surely, " Henderson suggests, "we are all quite capable of exercising such a 
faculty in the face of ourwish to do so, bolstered by an awareness of the limitation 
and fallibility of our rational processes" (1975,114). 4 This call for uncertainty 
echoes, of course, Winnicott's assertions regarding the transitional object that we will 
never ask the question ... Did you conceive of this or was it presented to you from 
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without' [ ... ] The question 
is not to be formulated" (1971,12) and that the potential 
space must maintain - without resolution - the paradoxes that exist in the potential 
space (cf. Winnicott 197 1). 5 When the question is asked, Nvben the paradox is 
resolved, Nve are no longer enjoying the experience in the fantastic Nvorld of the 
potential space. 
Todorov's first condition is often explicitly addressed in magic realist fiction. 
In Angela Carter's Nights at the Circus, Fevvers, for example, constantly challenges 
us by asking "Is she fact or is she fiction" - but she knows that no one, other than the 
rationalist Walser, really wants to know. As a condition of the "game" that is played 
in Fowles' The Magus, Maurice Conchis insists that Nicholas not attempt to resolve 
the paradoxes and illusions he finds on Bourani. Conchis tells Nicholas, "I do not ask 
you to believe. All I ask you is to pretend to believe" (Fowles 1977,137), because to 
challenge the ontological status of the object, to know with any certainty whether it is 
real or not, spoils the point of the game. Nicholas, like Walser, eventually realises 
this: 
At last it began to seem plain. All that happened at Bourani 
was in the nature of a private masque; and no doubt the passage was a 
hint to me that I should, both out of politeness and for my own 
pleasure, not poke my nose behind the scenes. 
(Fowles 1977,165) 
For Conchis, "the unknown" is "the great motivating factor in all human existence" 
(288) as liminal experience is necessary for creative subjective being. He further 
states that "The solution of the physical problems that face man - that is a matter of 
technology. But I am talking about the general psychological health of the species, 
man. He needs the existence of mysteries. Not their solutiolf ' (235). George Singer, 
in John Murray's John Dory, explains the condition of uncertainty thus: "The crucial 
encounter with the second [talking] fish and my subsequent entanglement with 
Wright are only credible if we accept one basic assumption, viz. that I am not a 
certifiable lunatic subject to florid hallucinations" (Murray 2001,88). Singer, without 
wishing to "prove" to the reader that his experiences undoubtedly happened, realises 
that if we think him mad, that if we take his smiling fish as a hallucination, we have 
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identified his text as a work of uncanny, as Todorov would say. This rationalisation 
of his story would cause his narrative to lose all of its power. And although I 
appreciate that Toni Morrison would not want herwork classed as "magic realist" - 
for the historical and cultural implications this Euro-American term evokes -I also 
would point out that at the carnival in Beloved, Sethe, Paul D and Denver watch the 
magicians and clowns, "and the fact that none of it was true did not extinguish their 
appetite a bit" (Morrison 1987,48), which could be easily said of the reader of 
fantastic fiction. 
Todorov's concept of uncertainty as a requisite component of the fantastic 
invokes Klein's concept of epistemophilia. 6 In Klein's first essay, "T he Development 
of a Child" (192 1), Klein refers to a positive intellectual development as 
c" enlightenment"' (in inverted commas) or "natural enlightenment. " Klein's use of 
this term is paradoxical and I think can be seen to mark a significant shift: On the one 
hand, her notion of "enlightenmenf 'can be seen to correspond to Freud's wish for 
pedagogic enlightenment whereby children's incorrect knowledge of sexuality is 
replaced by accurate, objective understanding. However, unlike Enlightenment 
rationality, in which the demarcation between fact and fiction is predetermined by 
acknowledged authorities, Klein argues for a relaxation of the (perceived) authority 
of the parents in order to facilitate the (creative) intellectual development of the 
child. Klein's practical solution is to answer children's questions "absolutely 
truthfully and, when necessary, on a scientific basis suited to his understanding, but 
as briefly as possible" (1921,3). Klein sometimes seems harsh, for example when 
telling a four-and-a-half year-old that there is no Easter bunny or Santa Claus, but she 
does also allow the children to retain a degree of their own explanation - "stories" - 
rather than insisting that the scientific explanations be immediately and wholly 
adopted. 
Perhaps this goes some way to explain the ubiquity of orphans in magic realist 
literature and in children's literature more generally - the protagonists, and the 
children who are invited to identify with them, are free to indulge their imaginations 
and explore the Nvorld on their own terms, liberated from the authoritarianism of 
parental omnipotence. When, for example, Harry Potter is living Nvith the Dursleys, 
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his Muggle Aunt and Uncle, he is forbidden to explore his magic powers. "Don't ask 
questions - that was the first rule for a quiet life with the Dursleys" (Rowling 1997, 
20). Significantly, when Barry is permitted to explore his magical side, it is not in an 
environment in which he can wholly indulge his omnipotent phantasy, but in the 
more controlled "third space" of Hogwart's, where there are still some rules 
governing behaviour. Klein argues that by thus allowing a degree of uncertainty, the 
epistemophillic instinct of the child - from which I think Winnicott developed his 
notion of creativity - is allowed to operate and more securely establish a relation to 
the "reality-principle": 
It seems to me as though in this case the child's urge to 
knowledge, being earlier and more strongly developed, had stimulated 
his feebler reality-sense and compelled him by overcoming his 
tendency to repression to make sure of the acquisition wbich was so 
new and so important to him. This acquisition, and especially the 
impairment of authority which wentwith it, will have renewed and so 
strengthened the reality-principle for him as to enable him to carry on 
successfully the progress in his thinking and knowing that began 
simultaneously with the influencing and overcoming of the 
omnipotence-feeling. This decline of the omnipotence feeling that is 
brought about by the impulse to diminish parental perfection (which 
certainly assists in establishing the limits of his own as well as of their 
power) in turn influence the impairment of authority, so that an 
interaction, a reciprocal support would exist between the impairment 
of authority and the weakening of the omnipotence-feeling. 
(Klein 1921,16-7) 
This passage also demonstrates to me how, for Klein, a balance between reality and 
fantasy, and never the total ascendancy of either, is the most productive force for 
change, a theme that I return to below. Thus, in insisting upon the maintenance of 
paradox, hesitation and uncertainty, the fantastic resists the (rationalist, 
Enlightenment) impulse to impose knowledge and kill the "natural curiosity" and 
"impulse to inquire. " Klein in fact explicitly endorses the use of such stories to 
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stimulate the child's intellectual development; referring to Grimm's tales, she says "I 
am of the opinion [ ... I that with the assistance of analysis there 
is no need to avoid 
these tales but that they can be -used directly as a standard and an expedient" (192 1, 
52). 
While I do agree therefore Nvith much of Todorov's conceptualisation of the 
fantastic, there are many typically structuralist deficiencies in it that need to be 
redressed. First and foremost, we need to deny Todorov's wish that we exclude from 
our analyses such silly irrelevancies as psychology, politics and the subject. As I 
stated with regard to Lacan in Part 1, just as Saussure insisted upon a synchronic 
analysis that eliminates the psychological, anthropological, historical, physical and 
physiological, Todorov too wishes to isolate the object of his study, desubjectifying it 
in order to create a knowable science. Todorov, following Frye, insists that "Literary 
studies are to be undertaken with the same seriousness, the same rigor evinced by the 
other sciences A consequence of this first postulate is the necessity of removing 
from literary study any valuejudgement concerning the works in questiorf' (Todorov 
1973,9). And, reflecting a Lacanian privileging of the signifier, Todorov conflates 
the importance of language in subjective experience: "For language is, in fact, the 
form par excellence, and the structuring agent, of man's relation with other men. Or, 
as Henry James says in 'The Question of Our Speech': All life therefore comes back 
to the question of our speech, the medium through whichwe communicate with each 
other, for all life comes back to the question of our relations with one another" 
(Todorov 139). 
Todorov considers three functions of the fantastic: First, that it "produces a 
particular effect on the reader; " second, that the fantastic "serves the narration, " for 
example, by maintaining suspense; and finally, that the fantastic has a "tautological 
function: it permits the description of a fantastic universe, one that has no reality 
outside language" (92). Todorov then notes how these functions of the fantastic 
parallel three functions of the sign as conceived by structuralism: the pragmatic, the 
relation of the sign to its user; the syntactical, dealing with signs' relations to each 
other; and the semantic, dealing with the sign's relation to the referent. The core of 
my objections to Todorov lies in his explicit denial of this first, and I think most vital, 
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function of the fantastic and of the sign. Todorov declares, "We shall not concern 
ourselves here with the first function of the fantastic, for it derives from a psychology 
of reading quite alien to the strictly literary analysis we are undertaking" (92). This is 
fair enough, I suppose, in that we all have the right to limit our terms of study 
according to our historically and culturally determined interests. However, Todorov, 
by ignoring the reader, eliminates the subjective element and thus depersonalises the 
experience of reading, therefore mis-understanding the experience. Like Lacan and 
Saussure, Todorov accepts the primacy of subjectivity and subJective perception in 
the object of his analysis, but then proceeds to show us how we can eradicate this 
infinite variable so as to placate our insecurities and defend ourselves from the 
uncertainty that subjectivity invokes. 
Todorov therefore echoes Lacan in his attempt to scientise subjective 
experience. Quoting Frye, he says 
"The poet, like the pure mathematician, depends not on descriptive 
truth, but on conformity to his hypothetical postulates... Literature, 
like mathematics, is a language, and a language in itself represents no 
truth, though it may provide the means for expressing any number of 
them. " Thus the literary text participates in tautology: it signifies itself 
[ 
... ] Literature 
is created from literature, not from reality, Nvhetber that 
reality is material or psychic. 
(Todorov 1973,10) 
When Todorov claims that "literature does not refer to anything outside itself' (59) 
he is negating the potentiality that literature offers readers: not that, of course, 
literature inust refer to a recognisable world, but literature is always derived from and 
has consequences for the subject that lies outside the text. 
But Todorov does acknowledge, again like Lacan, grudgingly, that the subject 
does have a role to play in the construction of meaning, "for the fantastic requires, it 
will be recalled, a reaction to events as they occur" (60) and this reaction is 
necessarily subjective. His own first criterion of the fantastic, that it provoke 
"hesitation in the reader, " means the fantastic itself is a "kind of reading" (32) that 
ultimately makes the categorisation of the fantastic dependent not upon formal 
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elements of the text but on the reader's response. A ghost haunts Todorov's 
laboratory, as subjectivity always seems to have a inevitable and niggling tendency to 
upset a purely scientific, objective approach. So Todorov, like structuralist-inspired 
postmodernism, can only define this kind of reading negatively - it "must be neither 
cpoetic' nor 'allegorical"' (62) - because without the subject, having rejected the 
reaction of the reader, he has nothing upon which to erect his foundations. 
As a result of this attempt to reify his object of study, Todorov falls victim to 
dualist thinking, splitting subject and object, mind and matter, psyche and body. We 
know via Winnicott and Fairbaim that the creation of such sharp distinctions is a 
defence mechanism and, although at times necessary in the day-to-day functioning of 
the subject, is not conducive to play, where these artificial dichotomies must be 
abandoned. Todorov is correct when he says that the fantastic is about challenging 
boundaries, but as he relies on a structuralist dualism he is only capable of conceiving 
of his challenge in narrow sense, as mere "transgressions. " For Todorov, in the 
fantastic 
Nve are working Nvith an adult simulacrum of infancy. But this is in fact 
what happens in the literature of the fantastic: the limit between matter 
and mind is not unknown here, as it is in mythical thought, for 
instance; it remains present, in order to furnish the pretext for 
incessant transgressions [ ... ] 
Another consequence of the same principle has still greater 
extension: this is the effacement of the limits between subject and 
object. The rational schema represents the human being as a subject 
entering into relations Nvith other persons or things that remain 
external to him, and which have the status of objects. The literature of 
the fantastic disturbs this abrupt separation. 
(Todorov 1973,116) 
There is some truth in this, although the extent to which Todorov and I are talking 
about the same thing is limited due to our different understandings and 
conceptual i sations of how the subject and object relate to each other. The literature 
of the fantastic does disturb the abrupt separation of subject and object, but this is 
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ironically a separation perpetuated by the likes of Todorov himself, adhering to "the 
rational schema. " Todorov also foreshadows Jackson's more explicitly Lacanian- 
influenced analysis by only recognising the dissolution of boundaries that are enacted 
in fantastic literature -a tendency derived from a belief in primary narcissism. 
Todorov - though as much influenced by Piaget as Lacan and orthodox 
psychoanalysis - believes that "in early mental development, there exists no precise 
differentiation between the self and the external world" (118), a state of infantile 
fusion with the mother, wherein the infant imagines the mother merely to be an 
extension of his own nascent self (an idea, as I explained in Part I and will address 
again below, largely rejected by object-relations psychoanalysts). Todorov also seems 
to maintain other Lacanian fallacies, such as the belief that the key and climactic 
moment in the infant's development is the subject's "accession to language, " and the 
privileging of language all out of proportion. 
In examiningwhere Todorov's analyses, and those of formalists and like- 
minded psychostructuralists, fall short, I believe that it makes it more obvious what 
an object-relations perspective can bring to our critical culture. Todorov's analyses of 
magic realism commit some of the very same "crimes" that I believe literature in 
general, and certain critical evaluations, must seek to avoid: namely, the 
objectification and erasure of the subjective element. 
The Psychostructuralist Approach: For and Against Jackson and the Limits of 
"Transgression" 
The task of redressing Todorov's apolitical and decidedly a-subjective understanding 
of the fantastic is taken up most notably by Rosemary Jackson in her 1981 study, 
Fantasy: The Literature qfSubversion. I wholeheartedly agree with her overall 
assessment of Todorov: "One of the major shortcomings of Todorov's book on the 
fantastic is its reluctance to engage with psychoanalytic theory and, related to this, a 
relative lack of attention to the broader ideological implications of fantastic 
literature" (Jackson 1981,61). Jackson goes some way in answering Todorov's 
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apolitical conceptualisation of the fantastic by demonstrating an awareness that the 
political and the unconscious influences and effects of the fantastic are intricately 
related. While I am wholly in agreement with Jackson's general conceptualisation of 
the fantastic as a mode capable of deep political and psychological consequences for 
its readers and its cultures, it is perhaps equally obvious -where my objections lie: 
predictably, my problems with Jackson's analysis are a consequence of her 
understanding of psychic processes being derived solely from the Lacanian 
psychostructuralist model of subjectivity. In using only a Lacanian approach to 
redress Todorov, she falls victim to Lacan's, and ironically Todorov's, structuralist 
limitations. Jackson finds herself in the unenviable position of trying to resurrect the 
subjective element in a theory of the fantastic using a methodology that is itself 
purged of the subjective element, a task rather like trying to fill an aquarium while 
standing in the middle of a desert with a punctured hose. 
For Jackson, the political power of the fantastic lies in its ability to transgress 
the established order and to represent subjective desire, based on the telling and 
expelling formula of orthodox psychoanalysis. While Jackson's inclusion of 
psychological considerations is a marked improvement on Todorov, we must 
examine the nature of the transgression and desire in which she places so much 
investment. Exactlywhat is being "subverted, " what is being "transgressed"? What, 
for that matter, is meant by "desire"? Jackson's emphasis on transgression is similarly 
derived from Lacan and his specific conceptualisations of psychoanalysis and the 
subject. This transgression is "certainly not the same as the one the patient commits 
with the expectation of being punished or punishing himself' (Lacan 1959-60,2) but 
a reference to the morbid enjoyment of the sexual object denied to the subject by the 
law of the father. Lacan derives his notion of transgression from both Freud's ideas 
on the Oedipal prohibition, the killing of the father: "the great myth that he places at 
the origin of the development of civilization" (Jackson 1981,2), and on the death 
instinct, which seeks to go "beyond the pleasure principle. " What the subject 
transgresses is the law that places limits upon pleasure, which means for Lacan a 
transgression against the symbolic order. 
Jackson's psychoanalytic approach is also a Lacanian inheritance derived 
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from Freud's early theories of repression and the oversimplistic belief that the 
conscious acknowledgement of all unconscious thoughts and feelings is the only 
means through which psychoanalysts can treat their analysands. Freud's first 
conception of psychoanalysis as a "talking-cure" rested upon the epistemologically- 
centric assumption that his analysands could be cured simply by "replacing what is 
unconscious by what is conscious" (see, for example, 1916-17,486), by putting the 
ego, %vhere the id was (Wo es ivar, soll kh iverden), by making conscious unconscious 
desires. This limited conception of psychoanalysis has been expanded upon by 
Kleinian and Independent British psychoanalysts - and to a lesser degree Freud 
himself - who recognised and emphasised the importance of other aspects of 
analysis, such as the transferences, containing, holding. And just as simply replacing 
idwith ego is a very limited conception of what psychoanalysis can offer subjects and 
culture as a whole, so too simply articulating desire, "making visible the un-seen, of 
articulating the un-said" (Jackson 1981,48), is a limited conception of the 
possibilities offered by fantastic literature. 
As Lacan in large part derives his notion of transgression from Freud's Totein 
and Taboo, which traces the origins of the incest taboo, and for Freud, civilisation 
itseý(, to the initial act of transgression against the Father, Lacan glowingly regards 
transgression as "something worthy of our praise, felix culpa, since it is at the origin 
of a higher complexity, something to which the realm of civilization owes its 
development' ' (1959-60,6). Although Lacan does say that it would be a fallacy to 
assume he wishes to embrace Sade's extremism or that Sade is the progenitor of 
psychoanalysis (1959-60,191), he - and subsequently Jackson - radically 
overestimates the potential that such empty transgressions have for the subject. It is 
difficult to tell to what degree Lacan is being ironic or genuine when he muses: 
One can acknowledge that in no other literature, at no other time, has 
there been such a scandalous body of work. No one else has done such 
deep injury to the feelings and thoughts of mankind. At a time when 
Henry Miller's stories make us tremble, who would dare rival the 
licentiousness of Sade? One might indeed claim that, %ve have there the 
most scandalous body of work ever written. 
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(Lacan 1959-60,200) 
Lacan then identifies Sade's work as "experimental literature" that seeks to cut the 
subject "loose from his psychosocial moorings - or to be more precise, from all 
psychosocial appreciation of the sublimation involved" (201) as if this were a 
desirable goal towards which to work. Jackson follows Lacan by claiming that 
"Sade's fantasies are the most extreme articulations of a desire for transgression in 
our cultural history" (1981,74). Jouissance, experienced only through transgression, 
is thus elevated by Lacan and his followers (including not only his explicit followers 
like Jackson but a whole cultural spirit that is associated with the French academy in 
1968) to a first commandment, a moral imperative: There can be no duty more noble, 
no philosophy more profound, than that which transgresses the imposition of the 
symbolic order, or anything "Other" that stands in the way of realising narcissistic 
desire by forcing repression of libidinal impulses. 
I would likewise suggest that Jackson's contention that magic realism serves 
its readers psychically by offering an opportunity to regress to a infantile psychic 
state considers only a limited conception of the possibilities offered by 
psychoanalysis and magic realism: 
The fantastic can be seen as corresponding to the first stage in Freud's 
evolutionary model, the stage of a magical and animistic thought 
mode when primitive man and the young child have no sense of 
difference between self and other, subject and object worlds. Fantasy, 
with its tendency to dissolve structures, moves towards an ideal of 
undifferentiation, and this is one of its defining characteristics. It 
refuses difference, distinction, homogeneity, reduction, discrete fonns. 
(Jackson 1981,72) 
I would not deny that for some people the appeal of an artistic work may lie in the 
potential for regression that it offers. However, I reject the equation of the fantastic 
with this "first stage in Freud's evolutionary model" - if Jackson shares Todorov's 
meaning of the term (although it sounds more here as if she means the "marvellous"). 
I assume that Jackson is referring to the stage of primary narcissism, of phantasied 
undifferentiated fusion with the mother, and so it was therefore unlikely that I would 
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agree with this assertion of Jackson's either. However, more substantially, while I 
think that magic realist literature does offer occasions to challenge and dissolve 
boundaries between subject and object, self and other, I think Jackson goes too far in 
saying that it "refuses difference" and "distinction. " She does not at all seem to 
appreciate how the fantastic, like the potential space, can also offer moments of self- 
distinction. It can eradicate boundaries but it can also provide us with limits - limits 
to our being, spaces for idiomatic articulation, moments of ontological realisation. As 
a potential space, magic realism offers opportunities to negotiate, which must allow 
for movement in (at least) two directions. 
Carter's Sadeian Experiment 
Vengeance. Transgression. Glory! Eug6nie de Mistival offers her 
arse to her mother and invites her to kiss it. 
(Carter 1979b, 124) 
I cannot offer such a critique of those overly-enamoured of transgression without 
addressing Angela Carter's "exercise in cultural history, " The Sadeian Women. It 
might seem odd that I am so scathing -, vith regard to Sadeian transgression when, to 
many, Carter shows a similar devotion to the "man of pleasure's" sexual libertine 
principles. There has been a great deal of controversy surrounding Carter's Sadeian 
Women. Loma Sage remarks that this work "got her into great trouble in 1979 and for 
years afterwards, though radical feminist attacks on her for bad faith carry less 
conviction these days in the face of the range and carnival good humour of the later 
work" (1994,16-7). For many, however, the perception that Carter tried to construct 
here - and in some of her early fiction -a Sadeian feminism is unforgivable. I could 
understand how for some Carter is uncomfortably ambivalent in her at times 
sympathetic readings of Sade. For example, in the "Polemical Preface, " Carter speaks 
of the 
terrorist of the imagination, a sexual guerrilla whose purpose is to 
overturn our most basic notions of [sexual] relations, to reinstate 
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sexuality as a primary mode of being rather than a specialised area of 
vacation from being and to show that the everyday meetings in the 
marriage bed are parodies of their own pretension [ ... ] 
The pornographer as terrorist may not think of himself as a 
friend of women; that may be the last thing on his mind. But he will 
always be our unconscious ally because he begins to approach some 
kind of emblematic truth 
(Carter 1979b, 21-2) 
Carter has a "conviction that the pornographer Sade can be made over into an ally in 
the task demystification" (16). But I think that Carter is both accurate and sufficiently 
restrained in her limited praise of Sade. She is, in some way, coming from a mid- 
twentieth-century cultural milieu that produces Lacan's own conceptualisation and 
glorification ofJouissance, although Carter does not take long to recognise the 
limitations of such an approach. Linden Peach suggests that two of Carter's early 
novels, The Magic Toyshop (1967) and Heroes and Villains (1969), both tell the story 
of "an adolescent girl who has lost one or both of her parents after an act of 
transgression on her parf' (1998,72). These early examples illustrate the Lacanian 
belief in the guilt that is inherent in an experience ofjouissance, but they also 
demonstrate the ultimate futility of transgression. One can detect a significant shift in 
Carter's thought after - sometimes I think even during - The Sadeian Women. For 
example, although Carter in 1979 identified Blake and de Sade as like-minded "great 
guerrillas of the Age of Enlightenment" (Sage 1994,12), in the 1990 introduction to 
The Virago Book ofFaity Tales she can look back: "When I was a girl, I thought that 
everything Blake said was holy, but now I am older have seen more of life, I treat his 
aphorisms with the affectionate scepticism appropriate to the exhortations of a man 
who claimed to have seen a fairy's funeral" (Carter 1990, x). 
Sade is unique and useful for Carter only in that he rejects the conception of 
women as walking incubators and the idea that sex is only for procreation. With 
Sade's help, Carter can declare the death of the goddess, the ideal mother: 
To deny the bankrupt enchantments of the Nvomb is to pare a 
good deal of the fraudulent magic from the idea of women, to reveal 
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us as we are, simple creatures of flesh and blood whose expectations 
deviate from biological necessity sufficiently to force us to abandon, 
perhaps regretfully, perhaps with relief, the deluded priesthood of a 
holy reproductive function. This demystification extends to the 
biological iconography of women. 
(Carter-1979b, 109-10) 
Carter recognises, however, that this transgression still supports the dominance of 
bourgeois rationalism and a thoroughly patriarchal conception of women; Sade's 
phallic mother is still defined by the penis and can acquire just temporary advantage 
by wielding only a phallic weapon. Juliette can cast off the shackles of oppressed 
sexuality only by turning herself into the "profane whore, " governed by control and 
rational systems and by dressing as a man. She is "an advertisement of the advantages 
of free enterprise" and the "benefits of a free market economy" (I 979b, 10 1). So 
Sade, the enfant terrible, actually supports a dominant order, re-enforcing the 
capitalist order and the socio-sexual marketplace, idealising a conception of Woman. 
As James Henderson observes with regard to thMogy, "Just as the mediaeval 
Christian needs Satan to allow him to keep hold of his concept of a loving God, so 
the toddler wants a quality of menace in his father to maintain the longed-for image 
of his mother as good, warm, and gratifying" (1975,112). Sade's transgressions of 
the conventional woman do little but affirm such an idealised, paranoid-schizoid 
invention. 
Carter notes that Sade's conception of transgression, which "was essential to 
his idea of pleasure [ ... ] 
is always intellectual, never sensual" (28), and any glimpse 
of Carter's work reveals that she always values the sensual above the intellectual. 
Carter recognises that "transgression initially disrupts but finally restores the status 
quo [ ... I For Eug6nie's. transgression 
is authorised" (130-1). Transgression does not 
merely give way to the status quo but actively restores it. And of course Eug6nie's 
transgression is authorised: All transgression is authorised, because as Klein (and 
Foucault) also realised, it is necessary for an authority to define what it is that is 
transgressive, a concept that I think is also implicit in Lacan's conceptual isations. 7 
Carter further demonstrates that the Enlightenment's reason and Sade's unreason do 
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not stand in opposition but side-by-side. She points out that the political pamphlet 
included in Sade's Philosophy in the Boudoir, "Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, ifyou 
Would Become Republican" Nvas "extracted from its pornographic context and 
republished by the followers of the Utopian, Saint-Simon" during the revolution of 
1848 (119). Aidan Day observes: 
What Sade's work reveals, for Carter, is the dead-end of a concept of 
reason that is founded on the egocentricity of the Cartesian paradigm 
of personal identity [ ... ] Sade draws this egocentric 
individualism time 
and again in a pornography which, as Carter says, allegories the 
Enlightenment's assumption of a Cartesian dualism of self and other 
[ ... ] The self and the other in Sade are, for Carter, mutually confirming 
opposites. Both sides, licked into a framework of rigid dualisms - 
reason and unreason, aggressor and victim, annihilator and annihilated 
- confirm egoism and a lack of humanity and communality. 
(Day 1998,97-8) 
Reason and unreason both serve the master of bourgeois individualism. The libertine 
maxim that one should "Have no other curb than your tastes, no other laws than those 
of your own desires, no more morality than that of Nature herself '(Carter 1979b, 
119) is certainly not antithetical to eighteenth-century bourgeois ideology, nor would 
it be out of place in a twenty-first-century advert. Carter most succinctly puts it when 
she says that Sade, "Instead of constructing a machine for liberation [ ... ] substitutes 
instead a masturbatory device" (132). Her final word on Sade is that he is "still in 
complicity with the authority which he hates" (136). 
Carter also recognises that Sade is of very limited use to her feminist cause. 
Justine and Juliette represent one of the oldest and most obviously artificial 
dichotomies, one the "holy virgin" and the other a "profane whore" (101). Thus 
partaking in Enlightenment values of reason, Sade is also (rather more obviously) still 
an ally of bourgeois patriarchy. Justine, for example, "is the object of a thousand 
different passions, some of them very strange, but she is the subject of not a single 
one" (49). 8 Through the reason of the bourgeois market or Sade's sexual unreason, 
Justine is still a commodity in the sexual capitalist world. "Her final humiliation is to 
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realise that her value has never resided in herself but in the values of the open 
markef' (74). And, finally, I find that in the larger context of Carter's work, there is 
less room for ambiguity as her most evil characters, the Supreme-Beings-in-Evil -Dr. 
Hoffman and the Count of The Infernal Desire Machines and Rosencreutz and the 
Duke of Nights at the Circus - are all Sadeian in sexual, misogynist and bourgeois 
philosophical tendencies. 
Klein and Foucault on Transgression's Dependence, Transgression's Dependents 
But what does it mean to kill God if he does not exist, to kill God 
who has never existed? 
(Foucault 1963,32) 
Melanie Klein similarly recognises that transgressions demonstrate not a rebellion 
against and break with authority but, on the contrary, demonstrate an on-going 
dependence upon the authorities which the transgression pretends to oppose. This 
conception is central to her notion of depressive ambivalence, and develops directly 
from Freud's own musings on the subject. Freud explains that "The hostile feelings 
are as much an indication of an emotional tie as the affectionate ones, in the same 
way as defiance signifies dependence as much as obedience does, though with a 
'minus' instead of a 'plus' sign before if' (Freud 1916-7,495) In her very first essay, 
Klein observes 
We are apt to lay stress on the 'courage' of the thinker Nvho, in 
opposition to usage and authority, succeeds in carrying out entirely 
original researches. It would not require so much 'courage' if it were 
not that children would need a quite peculiar spirit to think out for 
themselves, in opposition to the highest authorities, the ticklish 
subjects which are in part denied, in part forbidden. Although it is 
frequently observed that opposition develops the powers roused to 
overcome it, this certainly does not hold for the mental and intellectual 
development of children. To develop in opposition to any one does not 
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signify any less dependence than submitting unconditionally to their 
authority; real intellectual independence develops between the two 
extremes. 
(Klein 1921,22) 
Transgression alone can shock, destabilise, teniporarily decentre and expose, but 
transgression alone is merely a token gesture against authority which does not enact 
or force any significant change unless it becomes part of a larger, more significant 
movement. Irrational transgressions of reason or semiotic transgressions of the 
symbolic order do not constitute alternatives to reason or the symbolic. 9 In fact, Klein 
says, transgression actually serves to support the dominant order. Lyotard's game 
theory also brings him to this conclusion: "everyone knows that a countermove that is 
merely reactional. is not a 'good' move. Reactional countermoves are no more than 
programmed effect in the opponent's strategy; they play into his hands and thus have 
no effect on the balance of power" (1979,16). Even Lacan seems to recognise this, 
despite usually glorifying the power of transgression and breeding in some of his 
followers a unfounded optimism in the political power ofjouissance. As I quoted in 
Part 1, "It is the irony of revolutions that they engender a power all the more absolute 
in its action, not because it is more anonymous, as people say, but because it is more 
reduced to the words which signify it" (Lacan 1953,46), which indicates that 
transgression cannot undo the symbolic - though for Lacan, nothing can. 
Monle6n, following Foucault, would concur -with my Kleinian criticisms of 
Jackson's conceptualisation of the fantastic: 
the exposition of the repressed is not necessarily a subversive act, if by 
subversion is meant a challenge to the causes of repression, a defiance 
of order, an assault upon the dominant ideology. If anything, it served 
precisely to help modify hegemonic discourse in order to justify the 
survival of bourgeois society, a fact that also explains why the 
fantastic only appeared after the bourgeoisie had consolidated its 
power. The questioning of order is not necessarily a subversive act. 
The perspective from which that questioning is undertaken as well as 
the implicit or explicit alternatives derived from such an action must 
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also be taken into account. 
(Monle6n 1990,14) 
He says further: 
For Rosemary Jackson, the fantastic is by definition a subversive genre 
because it questions the dominant parameters for the definition of 
reality and because it voices what society has suppressed. This 
affirmation needs to be qualified: the questioning of dominant 
principles does not necessarily imply a "progressive subversion. " As 
modernism showed, the end of the realistic contract also opened the 
way for very reactionary interrogations of bourgeois society. 
(Monle6n 1990,150) 
Monle6n's objections to transgression are thus fundamentally the same as my own. 
First, he realises that merely voicing repression, putting ego where id was, does not 
make the fantastic subversive. Further, he recognises, with Klein, that merely 
questioning dominant parameters, that is, transgression, does not guarantee a 
"progressive" or lasting change. Jackson is more correct when she realises that "the 
most subversive fantasies are those which attempt to transform the relations of the 
imaginary and the symbolic" (91), butwhat she does not see is how the very 
structures of the imaginary, symbolic and real are constructed through the rational, 
bourgeois conception of experience that she wishes to undermine. This 
transformation, therefore, is mistaken as a reversal or rupture of "the process of ego 
formation which took place during the mirror stage" (90). 
The oscillation between opposites, such as reason and unreason, is part of a 
manic defence to protect the subject against an unbearable dread. Although manic 
defences are also sometimes a normal part of human functioning, their use prevents 
movement into the depressive position - that is, they do not let us see the world in 
whole objects - but are still Schizoid means of dealing with and reinforcing the 
established order. Jackson herself does acknowledge certain limitations of this 
transgressive function. "Fantasies, " she notes, 
are not [ ... ] counter-cultural merely through this thematic 
transgression. On the contrary, they frequently serve (as does Gothic 
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fiction) to re-confirm institutional order by supplying a vicarious 
fulfilment of desire and neutralising an urge towards transgression. A 
more subtle and subversive use of the fantastic appears with works 
which threaten to disrupt or eat aNvay at the 'syntax' or structure by 
which order is made. 
(Jackson 1981,72) 
Yet, despite this awareness, Jackson insists subsequently and throughout her book 
upon privileging this notion of transgression alone as some potent force for change. 
Transgression, as I perceive it, is not an end in itself, but only one potential 
means through which real, significant change, such as (re-)ontologisation, can be 
realised. Jackson comes closest to appreciating this when she examines Foucault: 
"Fantastic narrative is preoccupied with finfits, and Michel Foucault's writings enable 
us to place this concern historically [ ... ] Foucault compares the 
kind of transgressive 
literature found in secularised fantasy to religion in previous ages. He claims for them 
both the same ontological function: an exploration of the limits of being" (Jackson 
1981,78-9). This "being, " as understood by Jackson, however, is not ontological but 
entirely discursive. But Foucault is exposing the limits of discursive transgression 
upon subjective being - and transgression, he suggests, is always discursive. 
In that zone which our culture affords for our gestures and speech, 
transgression prescribes not only the sole manner of discovering the 
sacred in its unmediated substance, but also a way of recomposing its 
empty fonn, its absence, through which it becomes all the more 
scintillating From the moment that Sade delivered its first words 
and marked out, in a single discourse, the boundaries of what suddenly 
became its kingdom, the language of sexuality has lifted us into the 
night where God is absent, and where all of our actions are addressed 
to this absence in a profanation which at once identifies it, dissipates 
it, exhausts itself in it, and restores it to the empty purity of its 
transgression. 
(Foucault 1963,30-1) 
It is Nvhen sexuality is constructed as a discourse, "cast into an empty zone where it 
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achieves whatever meagre form is bestowed upon it by the establishment of its 
limits" (29-30), that an authority is posited, limits set, and transgression possible. 
Although at times I find it hard to decipher, Foucault's conceptualisation of 
transgression (perhaps a response to Lacanlo) does support Klein's. Essentially, 
Foucault does not see transgression as offering any real resistance to the authority it 
pretends to oppose, but as dependent on that authority for its very possibility. 
Transgression, then, is not related to the limit as black is to white, the 
prohibited to the lawful, the outside to the inside, or as the open area 
of a building to its enclosed spaces. Rather, their relationship takes the 
form of a spiral which no simple infraction can exhaust. Perhaps it is 
like a flash of lightning in the night which, from the beginning of time, 
gives a dense and black intensity to the night it denies, which lights up 
the night from the inside, from top to bottom, and yet owes to the dark 
the stark clarity of its manifestation, its harrowing and poised 
singularity; the flash loses itself in this space it marks with its 
sovereignty and becomes silent now that it has given a name to 
obscurity [... ] 
Transgression does not seek to oppose one thing to another, 
nor does it achieve its purpose through mockery or by upsetting the 
solidity of foundations; it does not transform the other side of the 
mirror, beyond an invisible and uncrossable line, into a glittering 
expanse. 
(Foucault 1963,35) 
But surely then magic realist fiction can and must offer something more than 
transgression if it is to be of any political use or if it is to serve the subject in the 
recognition of its being. 
I realise that I am being harsh and dismissive, perhaps excessively so, towards this 
"transgression theory. " But this spirit of transgression involved other such 
Enlightened practices as the circulation of a petition demanding the decriminalisation 
of sex with children, signed by Sartre, de Beauvoir, Barthes, Foucault, Derrida and 
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others (Henley 2001). 1 mention this not to demonise these men and women or their 
struggles for political reformation but to further insist upon a hisforicisalion of their 
ideas which are presently too often regarded as sacrosanct. Contemporary critical 
theory seems to have the greatest investment in transgression largely in the run-up to 
and during the 1960s movements against authority and authoritarianism (social, 
sexual, political), aggrandised in the quasi-mythical Paris uprisings of 1968. 
Roustang points out that 
Lacanwas not the only one in France, in the 1960s, who dreamed of 
inventing a new form of rationality by giving ample space to madness, 
supposedly the only phenomenon able to reveal man in his essence. 
These people wanted to go much further than German Romanticism, 
'which always maintained a certain distance between the relation to the 
world of dreams and fantasy as the necessary condition for creation, 
and the actual production of a work, which is subject to rules and 
assumes an order [ ... 
] Reason was seen as suffering from all kinds of 
ailments, and the repression it initiated had been done away with, so 
that the great revelation might take place. This was a kind of hyper- 
romanticism, which could well be another name for surrealism, for it 
was a question of paralysing the rational as irrational, and thus 
allowing an unprecedented form of rationality to appear on the 
horizon. 
(Roustang 1998,119) 
But post-1968, while not without its own repressive practices, must be ready to fight 
these battles but also move beyond this narrow view. Ricarda Schmidt sees Carter's 
Dr. Hoffman as representing the 11magination aupouvoir of the 1968 students' revolt 
- but although Dr. Hoffman offers hope to the city under control of the tyrannically 
rationalist Minister, he is, rather unambiguously by the end, the villain of the novel. 
David Punter reads Hoffman "as a series of figures for the defeat of the political 
aspirations of the 1960s, and in particular of the father-figures of liberation, Reich 
and Marcuse" (1985,3 1; see also Schmidt 1989,60-1). To this list we could add 
Barthes and Lacan. But critics like Punter seem to think that Hoffman is the bero of 
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the novel, a crusading manipulator of the "Real" (see Punter 1985,33). Schmidt 
claims that such critics mistakenly believe that Desiderio kills Hoffman "because he 
is unable to recognise the liberating effects of the Doctor's plans" (1989,6 1). 
It is therefore my Nvish to demonstrate that fantastic, magic realist, literature 
can do much more than merely fell or expel desire, as per Jackson's orthodox 
psychoanalytic belief that simply rationalising the unconscious (Freud) or naming 
desire (Lacan) constitutes a "cure. " There may be some texts in which the simple 
articulation of desire or transgression of authority is the be-all and end-all, but I find 
that the texts that make this their focus conspicuously belong to another age and are 
simply not as complex or interesting as much magic realist fiction today. 
Contemporary magic realism moves beyond transgression, and I want to shift the 
measure of the fantastic's political impact from the pseudo-subversion of 
transgression to the degree to which it can create potential spaces and enact 
significant change, both psychic and cultural. 
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Magic Realism as Potential Space: Uncertainty, Narrative Strategies and Time 
There are many ways in which magic realism can be read in terms of potential spaces 
and transitional phenomena. In the follow section, I will explore a variety of these, 
focussing especially on narrative strategies and conceptualisations of time in magic 
realist novels. 
Dialogic Narrative and Liminality 
I'm telling you stories. Trust me. 
Don't believe that one. 
(Winterson 1987,5,13,69, etc. ) 
(Winterson 1987,23) 
"What happened to the omniscient author? " 
"Gone interactive. " 
(Winterson 2000,27) 
First and perhaps most importantly, magic realist texts have the ability to open 
potential spaces by employing narrative strategies that themselves exhibit and invite 
playfulness and creative participation. Many of these qualities are commonly found 
among contemporary texts (which sometimes leads to uneasy distinctions between 
magic realism and postmodem literature), but can be found, I think-, in a magnified 
form in the texts that I have analysed here. Jackson, Armitt and hosts of others focus 
on the transgressive qualities of language and the narrative structures, and while these 
are sometimes illuminating in their own way, I -%vish to shift the focus onto the 
narrative strategies that show evidence of the dialogism and play that I discussed in 
Part 1, where the narrative voice invites creative participation of other subjects by 
opening potential spaces, gaps in both wholly objective (realist) and wholly fantastic 
(marvellous) discourses. 
A dialogic narrative demonstrates that language is always shared, and that 
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meaning is generated in the creative, constructive play between subjects using 
language as the shared transitional object, and often in magic realist texts, explicit 
attention is drawn to these qualities of language. The dialogic narrative opens 
potential spaces for the generation of meaning by negotiating the paradoxes between 
self and other, subject and object, phantasy and reality. In such texts, the author, the 
readers and the characters participate in this play, and the text is presented as safe 
space in which this creativity will be facilitated, not squashed by the authority of one 
who insists upon compliance with a discourse that he or she aspires to exclaim 
monologically. 
First person narration, so often to be found in the magic realist novels I have 
looked at, creates narratives that are explicitly and radically dialogic. Being personal, 
unreliable, delusional, drugged, obsessional or otherwise "fla-%ved, " the first-person 
narrative is porous and subjective, punching holes in the very notion of a perfect, 
smooth objective discourse that seeks to seal the spaces for uncertainty and play. 
Loma Sage, writing on Angela Carter's fiction, observes the paradox of the "archaic 
powers of the narrator whose authority rests precisely on disclaiming individual 
authority" (Sage 1994,2). As Todorov says, the 
represented ("dramatised") narrator is therefore quite suitable to the 
fantastic. He [sic] is preferable to the simple character, who can easily 
lie [ ... ] But 
he is also preferable to the non-represented narrator, and 
this is for two reasons. First, if a supernatural event ivere reported to 
us by such a narrator, we should immediately be in the marvellous; 
there would be no occasion, in fact, to doubt his words. But the 
fantastic, as we know, requires doubt [ ... 
] Secondly, and this is related 
to the very definition of the fantastic, the first-person narrator most 
readily permits the reader to identify with the character, since as we 
know the pronoun "I" belongs to everyone. 
(Todorov 1973,83-4) 
Whether the "I" is explicitly spoken by the narrator, or we are given a limited third- 
person narrator that focuses upon a single character, the invitation extended to the 
reader to identify with a character is an important aspect of the fantastic. Often this 
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character is the seemingly "average man" Todorov identifies, to whom magical 
things happen -even Harry Potter lived as an ordinary Muggle before learning of his 
identity as a famouswizard. This invitation is also extended in countless other texts, 
as Walser in Nights at the Circus, our "rational reader-in-the-texf' (Williams 1995, 
94), and Nicholas in The Magus are also quintessential rationalists whose scepticism 
must be overcome before they can engage creatively with their worlds. Todorov saw 
this "integration of the reader into the world of characters" as the (first) prerequisite 
of all fantastic literature, and the first or limited third person narration heightens the 
uncertainty of the (implied) reader through identification. 
Winterson alsowarns against the tyranny of an authoritative voice and "the 
danger of automatic writing. The danger of writing yourself towards an ending that 
need never be told" (2000,53). Stories that are concluded are closed, monolithic in 
structure and meaning. Winterson wams against the seductive satisfaction such 
writing strategies entice us towards. 
At a certain point the story gathers momentum. It convinces itself, and 
does its best to convince you, that the end in sight is the only possible 
outcome. There is a fatefulness and a loss of control that are somehow 
comforting. This was your script, but now it'writes itself. 
Stop. 
(Winterson 2000,53) 
The omniscient author, Winterson feels, must "go interactive, " leaving spaces in 
stories and narrative structures for the readers Nvho are, ideally, networked co- 
conspirators in writing the maps that detail real and imagined adventures (see below). 
A story is thus "a tightrope between two worlds" - "always you, ahvays me, always 
this story" (2000,119). Her prescription is to "Break the narrative. Refuse all stories 
that have been told so far (because that is what the momentum really is), and try to 
tell the story differently - in a different style, with different weights - and allow some 
air to those elements choked -%vith centuries of use, and give some substance to the 
floating world" (2000,53). Leave gaps, uncertainties, spaces in the narratives into 
which others can plug themselves and their own experience. These are the 
characteristics of the narratives demanded by Bakhtin's dialogism and the 
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irresolvable paradoxes of magical realism. 11 
A first-person narration expands the possibilities for uncertainty in a magic 
realist text. When Nicholas Urfe begins The Magus unremarkably relaying the fact 
that "I was born in 1927, the only child of middle-class parents, both English [ ... ]" 
(Fowles 1977,15), we do not doubt later that Nicholas is telling us, as accurately as 
he can, of deceptions that he suffered under Maurice Conchis. The juxtaposition of 
"magical" events emerging from this realist narrative therefore challenges our 
rationalist expectations to an even greater extent, and we are left with the uncertainty 
that either these supernatural beliefs are to be taken literally as truth, which we'will 
always doubt, or that our narrator is in fact unreliable, despite having previously 
convinced us otherwise. When in the opening pages of David Mitchell's Ghostivrillen 
(1999) the narrator boasts of telepathic powers, we assume we are listening to a 
narrator suffering from fanatical religious delusions or misinterpretations of the 
uncanny, though over time we come to doubt our own certainty. Upon first relating to 
the reader that a turbot in an aquarium smiled at him, George Singer, the narrator of 
John Murray's John Dory, breaks off his narrative temporarily: 
At this point let's just pause and pose the obvious questions. 
Let's marshall the proper forensic detail. Had I been drinking? Was I 
hallucinating? Was I without my prescription spectacles? Had Ia long 
history of mental instability? Was it a whimsical trick of the light or a 
crassly poetic example of emotion projection? 
No, emphatically, is the answer to all of those 
(Murray 2001,22) 
Interestingly, the narrator's daughter -a "young psychologist of twenty-eight who has 
already published weighty books on child development and Melanie Klein" - greets 
her father's revelation not with rational disbelief but "playful scepticism" (2001,23). 
Joanne Harris shows that alcohol-induced uncertainty is not necessarily a sign of 
degradation or delusion. In Blackberry Wine, Harris shows us wine itself talks. 
It ventriloquizes. It has a million voices. It unleashes the tongue, 
teasing out secrets you never meant to tell, secrets you never even 
knew. It shouts, rants, whispers. It speaks of great things, splendid 
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plans, tragic loves and terrible betrayals. It screams with laughter. It 
chuckles softly to itself It weeps in front of its own reflection. 
(Harris 2000,9) 
While in this novel wine really does talk, a bottle of blackberry wine assuming the 
burden of first-person narration, this is of course a metaphor for the magic that can be 
inspired by the potions and alchemy of everyday magic -a topic to which I will 
return later. 
A powerful example of first person narration heightening the uncertainty of a 
magic realist work can be seen in Patrick McGrath's gothic-revival novel Martha 
Peake (2000). In this novel, a polyphony of first-person voices weaves loose narrative 
threads and ideas, as much if not more often based on the imagination of our 
narrators as on fact. In the very first sentences of the novel, we are told that the 
writing of a history is a "black art, " resurrecting the dead and reanimating their bones 
(McGrath 2000,3). Our narrator, Ambrose Tree, competes with his uncle William to 
tell a story that each sees in his own way, that each need-v to see in a particular way. 
We cannot trust the uncle, who, despite having first-hand knowledge of events, we 
suspect of insincerity, he is dying, his memory failing, his intake of drink and opium 
increasing and his moral and ideological outrage at the liberal revolution in the 
American colonies clashes with the new generation, represented by his nephew, who 
shares the idealisation of the romantic tide sweeping Europe. Ambrose, beginning the 
narrative with some tendencies towards eighteenth-century rationalism like his 
scientific uncle, reviews the facts, and begins to doubt his uncle's story: 
His story, it is true, had held together well enough, given the generous 
assistance of a sympathetic imagination like my own; but I had 
detected certain omissions, certain small inconsistencies, and 
anomalies, and all at once the old man's cavalier references to the 
vagaries of a failing memory seemed suspect. 
(McGrath 2000,56) 
Ambrose also begins to suspect that his uncle is withholding information in order to 
cover up his own complicity in a ghastly, grotesque tragedy. We soon also begin to 
suspect Ambrose's reliability as a reader/listener as he falls ill and is dragged under 
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the spell of narcotics,. His uncle's narrative only comes to us from the pages of 
Ambrose's notebook - "A few fevered jottings, clawed from the chaos that illness 
wreaks in the mind, and frornwhich a full rich body of memory springs forth, at 
leisure; " it is only long after he had recovered that he subjects these reports to "the 
rigours both of reason and of the sympathetic passions, and thus rendered coherent" 
(130). 
When his uncle is unable to relay Martha's experiences in America, having no 
first hand knowledge of these events or, more accurately, being unwilling to tell the 
story in a manner satisfying to Ambrose, the generous assistance of Ambrose's 
imagination multiplies and Ambrose takes it upon himself to tell the story he Nvishes 
to hear from the tantalising fragments available to him. 
I began to feel that all was not lost; thatwith the aid of these 
cn. unbling scraps, and the exercise of my own sympathetic passions, 
there might yet be a way of coming at the knowledge of what Martha 
Peake did in America, and what was done to her; and I came at last to 
the decision that, like Martha, I would go on alone. I wouldwrite her 
story myself. Armed with these fragments I would trust my own 
intuitive grasp of the drift and meaning of her experiences in America, 
and give them life with my pen. 
(McGrath 2000,147) 
Although Ambrose more-or-less accepts that this story is complete patchwork of 
guesses and conjecture, he is nevertheless surprised and dismissive when his uncle 
criticises or contradicts his account. But the once rationalist, fact-driven Ambrose 
accepts a degree of uncertainty in the more noble endeavour of telling, or imagining, 
the story: 
All this I discussed with my uncle, and he supposed, he said, that this 
was how it might have happened, there was little here he could take 
exception to. It was plausible, he allowed, his tone suggesting that 
plausibility was but a poor cousin to 1ruth. But truth being a prize 
beyond our grasp - as I then said to him - then plausibility, surely, was 
as good as we could hope for? 
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(McGrath 2000,167) 
The two narratives are thus set into competition. As Uncle William "rambled, often 
erratically, over the matter at hand, with many digressions and, as always, a frequent 
application to the Hollands-and-water, " Ambrose, later in his room, "gave literary 
flesh to what I had heard, bringing to bear upon his few sticks of ill-remembered fact 
the full powers of imagination - intuition - sympathy - and art Thus did his 
sticks come to life; thus did they flower" (18 1). As the novel progresses, Ambrose 
more frequently interrupts his uncle's narratives with his own digressions and vice 
versa. They become increasingly hostile to one another and one another's stories. 
Thus we have two narrators, neither of whom we can trust and outside of whose 
stories we have no external, objective confirmation of facts. And we therefore have 
two narratives, and nowhere can the reader locate the "trutlf"with any certainty. 
Finally, most contemporary authors that we might identify as magic realist 
demonstrate a keen awareness of postmodernism, psychoanalysis, structuralism and 
other critical and philosophical discourses that we normally take to be the preserve of 
literary critics, and seek to create texts that resist our often cant-laden readings and 
restrictive strategies. For example, Nights at the Circus resists a purely Bakhtinian 
reading of the circus as carnivalesque; The Magus resists a purely Jungian reading of 
subjectivity and analysis; Tipping the Velvet flirts with and frustrates queer theory at 
every turn. This drags the literary critic from the comfort of ajargon-induced stupor 
into a creative, although perhaps anxiety-ridden, paradox-filled play. As both 
Todorov's definition of fantastic literature and Winnicott's conception of the 
potential space indicate, paradox must be allowed to exist without closure, without 
resolution, and this includes not only the reader's uncertainty as to the ontological 
status of events that they read about, but should also include an uncertainty on the 
part of the literary critic as to how they may "brand" what it is they are reading. 
Again, while this may be somethingwe can say of a great deal of contemporary 
literature, it is perhaps exemplified in magic realism; the mode itself resists 
classification, as either a realist or marvellous, and sometimes even as a strictly 
defined "magic realisf 'work. 
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Time in Magic Realist Narratives 
Some sort of temporal uncertainty or displacement, for either characters or readers, is 
present in almost all the novels I consider here, and this too can open potential 
spaces. Todorov equates the fantasticwith the present, in that the present is a "pure 
limit between the past and the future" (1973,42). The fantastic is like the present in 
that it must negotiate an ambiguous space between the marvellous, which is like the 
future in that it involves unknown phenomena not yet seen or still to come, and the 
uncanny, the past that can explained by known fact. 12 But also for Todorov, "time 
seems to be suspended, it extends beyond -what one imagines to be possible" (118). 
Todorov's position here sits very well with the orthodox psychoanalytic approach to 
the fantastic, which regards these temporal eruptions in much the same way they 
regard the transgressions against the established symbolic order. Jackson theorises 
that "Chronological time is [ ... ] exploded, -%vith time past, present and 
future losing 
their historical sequence and tending towards a suspension, an eternal presenf' (1991, 
47). Fantastic narratives are thus often regarded via structuralism and orthodox 
psychoanalysis to be ahistoric and/or atemporal (see also Armitt 1996). But this is 
only true in that aparticular conceptualisation of time is suspended, those 
constructions typical of the patriarchal, bourgeois Enlightenment. 
Freud's conceptualisations of the past's bearing upon the present began a 
radical shift in our conceptions of time and linearity. However, orthodox 
psychoanalytic theory implicitly complies with notions of time that can firmly be 
situated within the Enlightenment notion ofprogress, a myth that was central to the 
bourgeois conception of the world. Monle6n shows how the Enlightenment ushered 
in a new era that 
departed significantly from the medieval idea of a single divine 
creation to outline a world of progress, change and constant 
transformation. These efforts at establishing history fell, on the one 
hand, within the broader trend consolidating bourgeois culture as the 
ultimate expression of civilization. But it also opened the way for the 
possibility of envisaging history as a process, aj ourney within 
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different and contradictory stages, a procession whose characteristics 
are in constant transformation. The seeds that allowed bourgeois 
society to conceive of itself as another link in the chain of time Nvere 
thus sown. 
(Monle6n 1990,44) 
We can see glimpses in the early post-Enlightenment fantastic narratives and gotbic 
literature of this myth coming under assault by the forces of irrationality. The myth of 
progress being as unstable as the bourgeois order that it propped up, there was a 
constant, underlying fear that the processes of evolution would eventually find a 
replacement for bourgeois hegemony. Darwin, Marx and Freud, world wars and other 
catastrophes force us to accept the possibility that the march of progress has not 
gloriously culminated in the bourgeois civilisation but that this form of social 
organisation was itself transitory, a stage in the process and not the telos. Marx, 
adopting himself the bourgeois voice of reason and turning it against itself, 
articulated this fear with the theory of the dialectic movement of history, similarly 
based upon the myth of progress and positing instead the rise of the proletariat as the 
end of history. And perhaps the insecurity of the myth explains the nineteenth century 
obsessive fear of criminals, savages (for example, "lower" races) and human 
animalisation (for example, masturbation, transgressing the incest taboo) stemming 
from the possibility that the evolution of the human species might also not inevitably 
progress forward, but backward, the human race "devolving" into a pre-civilised 
form, to medieval epistemologies or oral/anal/genital fixations. 13 Freud's own 
obsessions are indicative of this, and the contemporary cry to "Objectify your desire! " 
suggests that we other Victorians are perhaps not as different as we would like to 
believe. "No order is permanent; the new reign of the monstrous is perfectly 
plausible; bourgeois civilisation is not the culmination of historical development but 
just another link in the chain of evolution" (Monle6n 1990,93). 
For Freud, Lacan and classical psychoanalysis in general, although one can 
become fixated upon a particular stage of development, a lack of progress is always 
pathologised and there is always the attempt to draw the subject into compliance with 
the inevitable march of subjective evolution (development). In Freud's conception of 
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the oral, anal, genital model of infantile development, the subject follows a linear, 
predestined pattern through various stages, and any return to or fixation upon any one 
stage is regarded as a pathological "fetish" or "regression. " The initiation into the 
Oedipal stage, especially as it is misconceived by Lacan in the bar between the 
symbolic and the imaginary, is also indicative of this belief in progress. Just as the 
bourgeois order posits capitalism as the felos of history, and Marxism (the rational 
voice of socialism) posits the rule of the proletariat, 14 so too Freud and Lacan imagine 
the phallic stage and symbolic order as the end-point in subjective development. Of 
course, for both there is the threat of regression, and this is appropriately 
pathologised. 
Some psychoanalytic theorists have attempted to subvert these categories by 
highlighting the niggling threat to this patriarchal system posed by the influence of 
the irrational leftover: the pre-Oedipal experience, the real. However, and perhaps 
this is obvious at this point, the rigid demarcation between pre-Oedipal and post- 
Oedipal stages is dependant upon the theoretical structures of the Oedipal myth for 
legitimacy, as the real is entirely constructed from the leftover of the symbolic (and is 
hence deemed "impossible"). How significantly can "pre-Oedipal" experience 
challenge the Oedipal norm when the very categorisation of experience as pre- 
Oedipal accepts and supports the normalisation of the Oedipal? 
Like Lacan's real, time and history in the fantastic are too often regarded as 
the impossible, the ahistorical, the Nebulous Time of the subject who exists only for 
himself without relation to the outside world - usually conceived in terms of a 
primary narcissistic fusion with the mother (for example, Jackson and Armitt). And 
of course, it would be nalive of me to ignore the existence of texts that do seek this 
"realm of pleasure. " However, these texts share with the idea of primary narcissism a 
belief in such a non-existent atemporal space of pre-Oedipal bliss, as if transgression 
or subversion of the patriarchal order of time and progress was itself enough to undo 
it. Most of the contemporary texts I examined for this study, however, acknowledge 
that such a subversion is futile and ultimately unproductive, for example, Carter's 
Nebulous Time in Infernal Desire Machines, or Nan's period as a kept mistress of a 
rich Sapphist in Tipping the Velvet. Ironically, the "seasonless routines of Felicity 
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Place" (Waters 1998,298) are induced by Diana (the Roman goddess of seasons'), 
and it Diana's gift of a wrist watch that forces Nancy to negotiate the paradoxes of 
time. While at first she does not wind this watch, seeing it as merely a piece of 
jewellery and useless in the eternal pleasures of Felicity Place, she later discovers the 
importance of both forms of time - the "old order of things" and the "thneless quality 
of [her] new life" (282-3). 
Rather than looking at these texts simply in terms of the historical versus the 
ahistorical, temporal versus the atemporal, therefore, I wish to examine these 
fantastic narratives in light of the need to find a balance between these two 
conceptual isations of time. In the Kleinian narrative of infantile development and 
adult experience, Klein maintains Freud's developmental stages, and some sort of 
evolutionary development is pan of human experience. However, Klein posits in 
addition to this progression a model in which we can observe a constant vacillation 
between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Again, while temporal 
suspension may represent a transgression of the laws of time, I find that it shows a 
deep-seated dependence upon - and hence support for - the patriarchal, bourgeois 
conceptualisation of progress. Klein's conceptualisation, on the other hand, 
represents a real re-evaluation. Rather than following the direct linearity and 
evolutionary progress of phallic logic as suggested by Freud and Lacan, a Kleinian 
approach emphasises the necessity of an ongoing negotiation between positions. Jo 
Nash succinctly explains that 
Mein and Bion both argued that there is no natural linear 
temporal path of development where there is always a straightforward 
transition, as maturity increases, from the paranoid-schizoid position 
to the depressive position. Rather, all intersubjectivp relations oscillate 
between these two positions all our adult lives. They both argued that 
it is not possible to achieve permanent depressive position relations 
between adults [ ... I Linear concepts of time as a "climactic" yardstick 
of developmental progress are elided by oscillations between the 
paranoid-schizoid and depressive position. Instead psychodynamic 
developmental time is cyclical, involving a continuous dynamic 
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process of regressive recovering and renewal, driven by the 
recognition of inevitable loss, the depressive "mourning, " that 
underpins all creative psychological change. 
(Nash 1999,172) 16 
The undoing of the "phallocentric psychic economy driven by the dominant phantasy 
of the omnipotent powers of the penis-phallus" (Nash 1999,172) likewise for Nash 
serves to undermine the phallic rationality that is supported by this fundamental 
developmental schema (see Nash 1999 and Part I of this study). Klein also 
significantly re-cast Freud's developmental stages in terms of positions. A position, 
Juliet Mitchell says, "is an always available state" (1986,116), or as Villanelle 
explains in Winterson's The Passion, "The future is foretold from the past and the 
future is only possible because of the past. Without past and future, the present is 
partial. All time is eternally present and so all time is ours" (Winterson 1987,62). 
Notice she says that all time is "eternally present, " not just the pre-Oedipal, pre- 
symbolic experience. 
Although Klein initially maintained the classical orthodox position with 
regard to the Oedipal complex, she significantly modified this in her later work in 
some ways which are important here. Klein shows that the Oedipal complex, or 
constellation, and subsequently the genesis of the super-ego, begins much earlier that 
Freud has initially envisioned. (The preference expressed by many contemporary 
object-relations theorists for the term and conceptual isation of the Oedipal 
constellation over that of the Oedipal complex itself a revision of rigid, linear 
categories in this regard. ) Whereas Freud posited that the super-ego arose in response 
to the internalisation. of the threat posed by the father in the genital phase, Klein sees 
the genesis of the Oedipal phase in the pre-genital (oral and anal) stages of 
development and the super-ego, therefore, to originate from earlier, maternal, 
persecution. This view is sternly resisted by orthodox psychoanalysis, not only as a 
contradiction of Freudian theory, but more significantly, I suspect, as it significantly 
diminishes the importance of the Father and the penis in the psychic development of 
the infant and the singular, phallic logic of reason. The Freudian and Lacanian 
fulcrums of the Father's law, castration anxiety and penis envy all therefore assume a 
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secondary importance as a consequence of this Kleinian revision, which upsets the 
patriarchal psychoanalytic tenets of linear evolution and the possibility of fatherly, 
objective language (as opposed to maternal care) as a basis for conducting 
psychoanalysis. 17 Klein's reconceptualisation of the Oedipal complex and the super- 
ego, setting it so early and as a gradual process where no severe breaks or end-point 
are clearly discernible, has also had the effect of drastically eroding the convenient 
boundary between the pre-Oedipal and the Oedipal to the point where, I think, the 
distinction (like Winnicott's conceptualisation of the psyche-soma) is "not to be 
distinguished except according the direction from which one is looking" (Winnicott 
1949,244). 
It is important to note that Kleinian theory is not positing a simple ahistorical 
transgression of the Enlightenment conceptualisation of time. Juliet Mitchell, in her 
introduction to a collection of Melanie Klein's essays, falls into this trap, making the 
mistake of failing to see how Klein's theory marks a substantial shift in this regard. 
Klein is not offering us a conceptualisation of "pre-Oedipal" time as ahistoric. 
Mitchell's belief, that "infancy is a perpetual present" (1986,26), which I think she 
derives Lacan, ignores Klein's important contribution that more accurately reflects 
infantile experience and negotiating these notions of time. Mitchell's reading of 
Klein maintains the very patriarchal constructions of history that I have described 
Klein as working against. Mitchell thinks that'Tsycbically speaking, there is no past 
until after the repression of Oedipal wishes by the castration complex" (1986,26), 
which reaffirms the penis as the centre of human psychic life that Klein sought to 
displace. For Mitchell, "The castration complex destroys the phantasy of an eternally 
satisfying relationship with the mother, " which Kleinians and obj ect-relations 
theorists know does not exist: Castration "introduces the command, " issued by the 
father, "that the Oedipus complex be over and done with because of the Oedipus 
and castration complexes, only humans have yesterdays" (Mitchell 1986,26) -a 
patriarchal fallacy that Klein works to undermine. Mitchell therefore reads Klein 
wholly within the orthodox psychoanalytic position. Her belief in the supreme 
tragedy of the castration complex, the primacy of the father in the Oedipal 
prohibitions and the implicit over-importance placed upon language all undermine 
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Klein's significant deviations from Freud and his orthodox followers. 
The solution to the oppressive rationalist, patriarchal progression of time lies, 
I think, in another negotiation in a potential space, between the extremes of historical 
progress and ahistorical infinitude. "Naming the new woman's history 'herstory"', 
Linda Gordon correctly realises, "does us no favours" (Gordon 1986,20). Wanting to 
negotiate a space between patriarchal history and a conception of women's narratives 
as ahistoric, Gordon represents what Kristeva describes as a "third generation" of the 
feminist movement, who "do not exclude - quite to the contrary - the parallel 
existence of all three in the same historical time, or even that they be interwoven one 
with the other" (Kristeva 1979,209). 18 Echoing Angela Carter's re-examination of 
fairy tales, Gordon recognises that "most historiographical progress - perhaps most 
intellectual progress - proceeds by rearranging relationships within old stories, not by 
writing new stories. The old stories have been ours, too" (Gordon 1986,20-1). And 
uncannily echoing Winnicott, Gordon says 
I would like to find a method in between. This in-between would not 
imply resolution, careful balance of fact and myth, or synthesis of fact 
and interpretation. My sense of a liminal method is rather a condition 
of being constantly pulled, usually off balance, sometimes teetering 
wildly, almost always tense. The tension cannot be released. Indeed, 
the very desire to find a way to relax the tension is a temptation that 
must be avoided. Neither goal can be surrendered. It is, %vrong to 
conclude, as some have, that because there may be no objective truth 
possible, there are not objective lies. There may be no objective canon 
of historiography, but there are degrees of accuracy; there are better 
and worse pieces of history. The challenge is precisely to maintain this 
tension between accuracy and mythic power. 
(Gordon 1986,22) 
Most importantly, Gordon shares the recognition Nvith Winnicott that the negotiation 
of paradox must give rise to anxiety, and that this anxiety is not to be relieved. The 
desire to find a -%vay to relax that tension is a defence mechanism employed by 
worshippers"of reason and unreason alike. 
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Object-relations theory can, I argue along with Nash, work to enact and 
support this significant and necessary epistemological shift in how we perceive time 
and history, and this shift is mirrored, I think, in most of the literature I examine here. 
The f/phantasy of an imaginary union is shared by orthodox psychoanalysis and texts 
that do not seek anything other than to indulge the phantastic desires of the subject - 
we can call this the "fantasy of phantasy. " Contemporary magic realist fiction, like 
Kleinian psychoanalysis, erodes the artificially defended boundaries of time, 
highlighting the paradox of subjective experience. 
Fevvers, Carter's winged(? ) protagonist in Nights at the Circus, tells us that I 
never docked via what you might call the nonnal channels, sir, oh, dear me, no; but, 
just like Helen of Troy, was hatchect' (Carter 1984,7): 
Hatched; by whom I don't know. Who laid me is as much a mystery to 
me, sir, as the nature of my conception, my father and my mother both 
utterly unknown to me, and, some would say, unknown to nature, 
what's more. 
(Carter 1984,21) 
By "hatching" Fevvers, Carter is offering a view of a character who lies outside the 
patriarchal pattern of history as it is conceived by the Oedipal constellation, but 
without offering instead a simple transgression of Oedipal relations. She is raised by 
half-a-dozen mothers, but avoids the explicit censure of the father, represented only 
by Ma Nelson's sometimes-working clock, toy sword, and Lizzie's rationalist 
Marxism. Similarly, we eventually witness Walser's transformation, or rebirth, by his 
own "hatching" at the novel's conclusion, quite literally, under Fevvers. Fevvers says: 
Let him hand himself over into my safekeeping, and I will transform 
him. You said yourself he was unhatched, Lizzie; very well - I'll sit on 
him, I'll hatch him out, I'll make a new man of him. I'll make him 
into the New Man, in fact, fitting mate for the New Woman. 
(Carter 1984,281) 
Thus, when Fevvers and Lizzie, whether by pure magic or by invention, arrest the 
march of the phallic Big Ben while they relate their narrative to a still sceptical 
Walser, they are not simply adding yet another spectacular dimension to their 
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narrative and Fevvers' credibility as a "legitimate" wonder. They serve notice that 
their narrative is not one to be driven by the singular logic of Walser's much-loved 
rationality, a phallic conception that attempts to exclude the possibility of play by 
casting its monolithic shadow of the father upon the city for which it is the centre, 
driving force of progress. (The extent to which the city of London is itself a space 
where reason or potential play reigns I address below. ) Carter, like Klein, thus cracks 
the rock upon which the Western philosophical tradition of rationalism is constructed 
by working outside a particular conceptualisation of linear development and the myth 
of "progress" - but not simply transgressing it. In this way, Carter recasts the mythiC 
phallic thrust of history and offers in addition an alternative history of cyclicity and 
progress. 
The Chance sisters are another example of a negotiation of Oedipal dictates: 
They are the "wise children" that know their father, challenging patriarchal and 
bourgeois lineage. Dora Chance announces early in her narrative that the grandfather 
clock dominating her front hall is "the only castrato grandfather clock in London" 
(Carter 1991,4), and similarly does not feel the need to "legitimise" her self or her 
story by reference to rationalist time. They are the illegitimate daughters of the 
legitimate stage, but they do not literally contravene the incest taboo. Dora makes do 
with her Uncle Perry, her other father. 19 Nan in Waters' Tipping the Velvet relates a 
similar story, with a significant difference: 
Although I didn't long believe the story told to me by my Mother - 
that they had found me as a baby in an oyster-shell, and a greedy 
customer had almost eaten me for lunch - for eighteen years I never 
doubted my own oysterish sympathies, never looked far beyond my 
father's kitchen for occupation, or for love. 
(Waters 1998,4) 
Although Nan may be situated outside the traditional Oedipal conflict, it is seemingly 
not necessary, as her father does not appear as the phallic father who needs to be 
evaded (for example, herfather ý kitchen). Kitty Butler, Nan's lover, also evades the 
Freudian Oedipal triangle: "She had been born, she said, in Rochester, to a family of 
entertainers. Her mother (she did not mention a father) had died while she Nvas still 
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quite a baby, and she had been raised by her grandmother" (39). This invites further 
parallels with Carter's Wise Children, especially when Nan and Kitty take up 
residence in Brixton, also the home of Nora and Dom Chance. Waters is trying to 
subvert Freudian theories of homosexuality as a mis-take in Oedipal identification, 
and perhaps she is also paying tribute to Carter. 
The failure to recognise this alternate view of history, and positing a 
"perpetual present" is instead characteristic of a space, a void, where creativity is 
negated - for Carter in Infernal Desire Machines, this is "Nebulous Time, " or in 
Nights at the Circus, this is Siberia, where none of the natives "knew in what way 
their past differed from their present" (Carter 1984,258); "rather, they inhabited a 
temporal dimension which did not take history into account. They were a-historic. 
Time means nothing to them" (265). And the "perpetual presenf 'for the pre-Oedipal 
infant in narcissistic fusion with the mother recalls - and as I will argue later is 
criticised by Carter - the city under the influence of Dr. Hoffman's desiring 
machines. In this "kingdom of the instantaneous" there is always and only the 
promise of the realisation of one's narcissistic desire (Carter 1972,18). Dr. Hoffman 
only transgresses phallic time, betraying a dependence on the existing order; he does 
not offer an alternative to it, as Klein and Carter do. 
"Jeanette, "20 the protagonist of Winterson's Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, 
was also a "foundling, " adopted by her mother (see Winterson 1985,3-4; 98). 
Jeanette similarly avoids the Oedipal triangle, as her father does not really figure in 
this early life-history, and Jeanette's relationship to her mother provides ample 
evidence to support Klein's (and Freud's very late) assertion that the mother is not 
only the first but also the most harsh prohibiter. Jeanette's knowledge of her adoption 
was key, she explains, in that it represented the first time in her life she experienced 
any sort of "uncertainty. " "Uncertainty to me was like Aardvark to other people. A 
curious thing I had no notion of, but recognised through second hand illustratiolf' 
(1985,98). Her strict religious upbringing teaches Jeanette that "Uncertainty was 
what the Heathen felt, and I was chosen by God" (98). As with the uncertainty 
regarding her sexuality, the uncertainty inflicted upon Jeanette by this "Awful 
Occasion" is at first rejected and despised; it is however, her status as an adopted 
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child - and later her sexuality - that provides an opportunity to crack the smooth 
surface of her mother's authoritarian, religious discourse. 
There are other temporal events and situations in magic realist fiction that 
create potential gaps in the monolithic march of patriarchal, rationalist time, and I 
can only begin to point to some here. The very years in which Nights at the Circus 
and Tipping the Velvet are set, that is, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, are 
meant to pl ace the characters, along with the reader, in an uneasy time of anxious 
uncertainty (without wishing to concede anything to the popular and politically nayve 
pseudo-theory that our age is characterised by "millennial anxiety"). Fowles' The 
Magus also revisits the borders of history, as all periods and historical eras are to be 
found on Bourani, visited by the ghosts of Victorian girls and Nazi soldiers. 
A solar eclipse inspires many mythologies, and features in many magic realist 
texts. It represents a suspension of time, a moment when other versions and visions of 
history can be explored in a space that is not dominated by the usual march of the sun 
across the sky. The birth of Villanelle, the web-footed daughter of a Venetian 
gondolier in Jeanette Winterson's The Passion (1987), coincided with the eclipse of 
the sun. In Pauline Melville's The Ventriloquist's Tale (1997), it is during a solar 
eclipse that a brother and sister escape to the jungle and indulge their incestuous 
desire. In Nights at the Circus, the narrator describes how "EveMvhere [Fewers] 
went, rivers parted for her, wars were threatened, suns eclipsed [ ... I" (Carter 1984, 
11). However, as these examples demonstrate, solar eclipses are temporary 
transgressions against time. It also demonstrates that such transgressions cannot be 
permanent - as the cessation of the earth's rotation would imply. 
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The Setting of Magic Realist Novels: Reason, Unreason and Between 
Magic realist literature explicitly and forcibly draws attention to the epistemological 
and ontological limits of experience, to the vicissitudes of nze and not-ine, subjective 
and objective - but this literature, especially in its most contemporary manifestations, 
also negotiates between the generic categories of "magic" and "realism. " Often these 
novels are set in a location that further explores or represents this necessary paradox. 
In the following section, I want to look at some of the spaces that are offered in 
magic realist novels and the attempt to negotiate between the vicissitudes of 
bourgeois, patriarchal, capitalist reason and simple transgressive unreason. Iwill first 
examine how rationality and irrationality are represented and can be located in magic 
realist texts, but I wish to demonstrate how a third, potential space is employed in 
contemporary magic realist narratives as a third, meaningful alternative to the 
established order. 
The Spaces of Reason 
I was a young girl, a virgin, and therefore men denied me rationality 
just as they denied it to all those who were not exactly like 
themselves, in all their unreason. 
(Carter 1979,165) 
In many early gothic and fantastic narratives, critics have pointed out how the worlds 
of reason and unreason can be clearly located in the text, usually in clearly 
demarcated spaces that can often be recognised from one text to another. For 
example, although Monle6n points out that the symbols of the bourgeois world are 
absent in the earliest post-Enlightenment fantastic narratives, the city increasingly 
becomes the focus of rationality in magic realist fiction from the gothic onwards, a 
reflection of the increasing purge of unreason and the metamorphoses of cities into 
sanctuaries of rational, correct thinking. Again following Foucault, Monle6n points 
out how cities were structurally and architecturally transformed through the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to become such spaces. Since the eighteenth 
century the city has become the spiritual home of rationality, an island of reason, 
encircled by unreason in the urban periphery and backward, rural life. Even as 
unreason invades and infects the alleys and sewers and trade unions of the cities in 
the nineteenth century, the city remains the ideal and idealised space of reason, the 
irrational kept largely in ... the unknown country' of the bas-fonds" (Monle6n 1990, 
63). 21 Although I find Monle6n overestimates the success of this challenge to the 
bourgeois order, he recognises that "Urban life was, without any doubt, a standard for 
civilisation, at least Nvhen applied to certain quarters; but urban life also means 
enduring the pestilence of concentration, or the possibility of catching Va maladie 
anglais"' (67). 
This location of reason is still found in contemporary magic realist texts from 
around the world. The city in many texts is the cultural home of the rationalist and/or 
imperial oppressor and, as such, negates the internal cultural objects. Melville's The 
Ventriloquist's Tale, set in South America, explains how the city was built so as to 
control the irrational natives found there. Joanne Harris depicts Lansquenet-sous- 
Tannes as a construct of the French Enlightenment reason: "the town planners had a 
fierce republican streaW'(1999,39). Vianne tells us as we imagine a town, like Paris, 
planned in minute detail to conform to the highest logic. "Knowledge is currency 
here" (1999,14), Vianne realises immediately. Most overtly, in Carter's Infernal 
Desire Machines, the unnamed city is the target for the Dr. Hoffman's assault 
because it is the home of disembodied rationalism, and hence, Carter, via her narrator 
Desiderio, explicitly links this form of disembodied rationalism with patriarchy, 
capitalism and desubj ectifi cation. 
It was a solid, drab, yet not unfriendly city. It throve on 
business. It was prosperous. It was thickly, obtusely masculine. Some 
cities are women and must be loved; others men and can only be 
admired or bargained with and my city settled serge-clad buttocks at 
vulgar case as if in a leather armchair. His pockets were stuffed with 
money and his belly with rich food. Historically, he had taken a 
circuitous path to arrive at such smug, impenetrable, bourgeois 
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affluence; he started life a slaver, a pimp, a gun-runner, a murderer 
and a pirate, a rakish villain, the exiled scum of Europe - and look at 
him lording it! The city was built on a tidal river and the slums and the 
area around the docks still pullulated with blacks, browns and 
Orientals who lived in picturesque squalor the city fathers in their 
veranda'd suburbs contrived to ignore. Yet the city, now, was rich, 
even if it was ugly; but it -%vas just a little nervous, all the same. 
(Carter 1972,16) 
The city is shown as a product of bourgeois capitalism and is identified as male - the 
son of patriarchal rationality. Like the subject, the city that marginalises and represses 
the unwanted, threatening objects - the blacks and browns and Orientals - fears these 
objects' return. Hoffman's Ambassador describes this return of the repressed thus: 
"And if you disintegrate the images with your lasers and your infra, red rays, they only 
revert to their constituent parts and soon come together again in another form which 
you yourself have rendered even more arbitrary by your interference" (Carter 1972, 
37). The city, although hyperbolised throughout the novel, accurately reflects so 
many in Western Europe and the Americas. 
The radically rationalist city and the social institutions which support it are 
thus established as a manic defence against the hostile or indifferent world. As 
Winnicott insists, however, this does not mean that they cannot also provide a 
facilitating space for an experience of subjectivity. As Desiderio explains, some cities 
are women, facilitating, while others are men, oppressive and demanding. Some 
cities, like mothers, are capable of facilitating and holding and offering space for 
creative experience - for example, representations of St Petersburg, Venice or turn- 
of-the-century London - these I examine in the following sections. The Nfinister's 
city is the latter, a patriarchal offering certainty and a defence against the hostile 
world beyond reason and the city limits. 
The world, that is, of earthquake and cataclysm, cyclone and 
devastation; the violent matrix, the real world of unmastered, 
unmasterable physical stress that is entirely inimical to man because 
of its indifference. Ocean, forest, mountain, weather - these are the 
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inflexible institutions of that world of unquestionable reality which is 
so far removed from the social institutions which make up our own 
world that we men must always, whatever our difference, conspire to 
ignore them. For otherwise we would be forced to acknowledge our 
incomparable insignificance and the insignificance of those desires 
that might be the pyrotechnic tigers of our world and yet, under the 
cold moon and the frigid round dance of the unspeakably alien planets, 
are nothing by toy animals cut from coloured paper. 
(Carter 1972,161-2) 
In the sternly patriarchal city there can be no "love, " as such a father and his laNv 
governs only false selves. Again with echoes of Winnicott's seed metaphor, 
Desiderio asks us to "Consider the nature of a city": 
It is a vast repository of time, the discarded times of all the men and 
women Nvho have lived, worked dreamed and died in the streets which 
grow like a wilfully organic thing, unfurl like the petals of a mired 
rose and yet lack evanescence so entirely that they preserve the past in 
haphazard layers, so this alley is old, %vhile the avenue that runs beside 
it is newly built but nevertheless has been built over the deep-down, 
dead-in-the-ground relics of the older, perhaps the original, huddle of 
alleys which germinated the entire quarter. 
(Carter 1972,17) 
Like the disembodied ideas and defences of rationality, these new avenues of thought 
bury the pathways that are the original foundations of the organic development of the 
city. The alleys, these original paths, are pushed to the side and neglected, repressed. 
What Hoffman's machine threatens to do, which is so unfathomable to Desiderio and 
Minister, is to crack the smooth surfaces of the avenues and piazzas that guide the 
disembodied rationalist through the safe, ahistorical city. Once Dr. Hoffman's assault 
upon the city has begun, "Those bluff, complaisant avenues and piazzas were 
suddenly fertile in metamorphoses as a magic forest" (17). 
Within a city, therefore, there exist simultaneously facilitating spaces and 
houses of rationalist horror. Fevvers' relations and experience of Mother Nelson's 
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Academy are immediately contrasted with the brothel run by Our Lady of Terror, 
Madame Schreck. Whereas Mother Nelson both fosters Fevvers' engagement with 
the potential space and offers others a place of whole-object integration, Madame 
Schreck represents the unmediated indulgence of narcissistic phantasy and offers 
only part-object relations. Or perhaps those that come to Schreck are rationalists Nvbo 
are cut off from reality, bringing their "phantasy-lives to a standstill by taking refuge 
in the phantasies of the dark, empty mother's body" (Klein 1930,227). Fevvers 
explains that Schreck "had some quality of the uncanny about her, over and above the 
illusion" (Carter 1984,58): 
You must understand this: Nelson's Academy accommodated those 
who were perturbed in their bodies and w-ished to verify that, however 
equivocal, however much they cost, the pleasures of the flesh were, at 
bottom, splendid. But, as for Madame Schreck, she catered for those 
who were troubled in their... souls. 
(Carter 1984,57; ellipsis in text) 
For my purposes, this suggests that, despite the commodification at work in the 
social-sexual transaction of prostitution, Nelson's had at least the aim of providing a 
temporary re-ontologisation, an experience of psyche-somatic integration, Whereas 
Madame Schreck's fosters "unhealthy" schizoid relations with oneself and others. It 
is a site of paranoid splitting and regressive phantasies, although Fevvers asserts that 
"there was no terror in the house our customers did not bring with them" (62), for 
example, Christian Rosencreutz, who buys Fevvers from Madame Schreck. The 
opportunity Madame Schreck offers for the indulgence of schizoid living is evident in 
the qualities attributed to the "freaks" that Madame Schreck hires to populate her 
house: a woman with eyes where nipples should be; a toy-like diminutive woman; a 
Sleeping Beauty. 
Madame Schreck strikes me as a dead mother, who Andrd Green describes as 
incapable of fostering the creativity of the children in her care. Because she is so 
narcissistically obsessed Nvith her own mourning of the lost object, she cannot receive 
their projections and her children are unable to construct meaning. The dead mother 
sounds like an ideal mate for Sade himself- Green lists amongst the characteristics of 
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the dead mother complex "the releasing of secondary hatred, which [ ... 
I brings into 
play regressive wishes of incorporation, but also anal features which are coloured 
with manic sadism where it is a matter of dominating, soiling, taking vengeance upon 
22 the object, etc. " (Green 1986,152). The dead mother's children are also 
characterised by auto-erotic excitation, the "search for pure sensual pleasure at the 
limit, without tenderness, ruthless [ ... ] There 
is a precocious dissociation between the 
body and the psyche, as between sensuality and tenderness, and a blocking of love" 
(152), which acutely describes the men who frequent Madame Schreck's 
establishment. Further, this psyche-somatic splitting and quest for lost meaning 
creates a "compulsion to think, " an "overcathected intellectual capacity" (152) that, 
like Fairbaim's concept of intellectualisation, are characteristic of Enlightenment 
subjects from Sade's manor to postmodern living rooms. 
Like Justine and Juliette, Madame Schreck serves her rationalist Sadeian 
master. Rosencreutz is the sadistic libertinewho "goes to the orgy to enhance his 
notion of his unique and supreme self' (1979b, 146). He wears a medallion engraved 
with the symbol of a phallus with "little wings attached to the ballocks thereof [ ... 
] 
Around the shaft of this virile member twined the stem of a rose whose bloom nestled 
somewhat coyly at the place where the foreskin folded back. Whether the thing was 
ancient or I could not tell, but it represented a heavy investment" (70). Of course, 
Rosencreutz's symbol(ic) is both ancient and modem, as it is the universal icon of the 
patriarchal wish - the single, monolithic penis soaring to all heights of privilege 
above the (non-represented) female. Ironically, Rosencreutz longs for his penis to 
have the powers of flight and life already possessed by Fevvers, and it is these powers 
that he must steal from her of in order to acquire them for himself. 23 
Rosencreutz, we learn, suffers from outrageous paranoid-schizoid phantasies, 
which manifest in not only paranoid delusions of a conspiracy of women against men 
(a remnant, perhaps, of maternal persecutory fears), but also psyche-somatic splitting 
and phantasies of omnipotence (these all, of course, are intricately related). 
Rosencreutz may seem to be the evil anti-thesis of Walser's rationality, yet both 
employ the same psychic defence mechanisms - splitting, projection - to deal with 
the anxieties that present themselves and threaten to overwhelm them. He is another 
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disciple of Sadeian libertinism, and thus still a product of reason that he pretends to 
oppose. Rosencreutz is a Kleinian nightmare come to life in late nineteenth-century 
London. He believes in the perfect, unattainable mother's body, yet also fears the 
aggressive retaliatory attacks that the mother will inflict upon him. There is a fear of 
the nameless dread and frustration at the limitations (for example, eventual 
degradation and death) of the body. Rosencreutz practises the black magical arts as 
opposed, I suppose, to the magic that is helpful and in fact necessary in the 
construction of subjectivity. He believes that he can and must suck "efflorescence" 
from the bodies of young women (phantasies of introjection). Rosencreutz perceives 
Fevvers to be "Azrael, Azrail, Ashriel, Azriel, Azaril, Gabriel" (75), the Angel of 
Death or the persecutory object whom he must incorporate in order to control and 
subsequently destroy in order to guarantee the survival of his good objects, 
omnipotence and immortality. 
Paradoxically, it seeins that it is Fevvers' status as an object of liminal 
complexity that makes her the object of Rosencreutz's obsessions and makes him 
believe that she can save him from his nameless fears. It is Rosencreutz who hails 
Fevvers as the "Queen of ambiguities, goddess of in-between states, being on the 
borderline of species, manifestation of Arioriph, Venus, Achamatoth, Sophia" (81). 
He sees her as a 
creature half of earth and half of air, virgin and whore, reconciler of 
fundament and firmament, reconciler of opposing states through the 
mediation of your ambivalent body, reconciler of the grand opposites 
of death and life, you who come to me neither naked not clothed, wait 
Nvith me for the hour when it is neither dark nor light, that of dawn 
before daybreak, when you shall give yourself to me but I shall not 
possess you. 
(Carter 1984,81) 
But Rosencreutz does not see Fewers as fostering these paradoxes but as a 
reconciler. In wishing to possess Fewers and obliterate these paradoxes he 
demonstrates that reconciliation is appropriation. In order to deal Nvith the paradoxes 
before him, Rosencreutz must reconcile, appropriate and destroy - thus guaranteeing 
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the ascendancy of immortality over materialism, life over death, and his phantasy 
over reality. He, %vishes to destroy, to devour Fevvers, the Angel of Death, in order to 
protect his own omnipotent phantasy, and he seeks to destroy and devour women in 
general in order to guarantee that it is only his phallus that has the power to rise 
above the thorns that threaten to drag him down. Perhaps Winnicott's concept of 
annihilation best describes this omnipotent impulse, when the destruction is carried 
out not in th e hope that the object will survive - and therefore be loved - but with the 
express intent of confirming omnipotent phantasy; "annihilation, " Winnicott tells us, 
means "no hope" (see 1971,93). 
Similarly, the Grand Duke from whose clutches Fevvers must escape as the 
circus prepares to leave St. Petersburg some hundred pages later wishes to possess 
Fevvers not as a transitional object but as his own entirely subjective object. "You 
must know, " the Grand Duke informs Fevvers, "I am a collector of all kinds of objets 
d'art and marvels. Of all things, I love best toys - marvellous and unnatural artefacts" 
(187). The Duke's identification of Fewers as "marvellous" and "unnatural" recalls 
to the reader Walser's recognition that Fewers needs to be not regarded as such. 
Fevvers must sustain her liminal status if she is to retain her powers (as a confidence 
artist) and her subjectivity. By identifying her as "marvellous, " the Duke reveals that 
he does not regard Fevvers as a like-sub ect, nor as a transitional object available for j 
use, 24 but as a magical object, a product of his omnipotent phantasy which he wishes 
to possess entirely and to which he wishes not to grant any degree of autonomy. He 
wishes to possess Fevvers as he possesses the "hollow woman, " part of his 
"clockwork orchestra"; mechanical objects that he employs as an (musical) 
instrument and was obtained by his ancestors. This orchestra "had the authentically 
priceless glamour of objects intended only for pleasure, the impure allure of the 
absolutely functionless" (188). As intended only for pleasure, these objects can serve 
no function as transitional objects aiding the negotiation between pleasure and reality, 
but only serve the omnipotent, narcissistic pursuit of pleasure. 
Multitudes of characters -svho embody the ideals - and failures - of 
Enlightenment rationalism can be found in the texts I examine: Father Reynaud in 
Harr-is' Chocolat, Napoleon in Winterson's The Passion, Ambrose Tree's Uncle 
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William and his employer Lord Drogo in Martha Peake, the Dursleys, Harry Potter's 
oppressive aunt and uncle, being other striking examples. 25 They all, in some way, 
belong to a Society of Reason, the organisation constructed by the youthful (and self- 
admittedly misguided) Maurice Conchis in Fowles The Magus. Their manifesto is a 
rallying-cry for these figures: 
THE SOCIETY FOR REASON 
We, doctors and students of the faculties of medicine of the 
universities of France, declare that we believe: 
1. Man can progress only by using his reason. 
2. The first duty of science is to eradicate unreason, in wbatever form, 
from public and international affairs. 
3. Adherence to reason is more important than adherence to any other 
ethos wbatever, whether it be of family, caste, country, race, or 
religion. 
4. The only frontier of reason is the human frontier; all other frontiers 
are signs of unreason. 
5. The world can never be better than the countries that constitute it, 
and the countries can never be better than the individuals that 
constitute them. 
6. It is the duty of all who agree with these statements to join the 
Society of Reason. 
(Fowles 1977,189) 
Let me respond point-by-point: 1) This demonstrates the patriarchal exclusivity of the 
Enlightenment: "Man" is the first word of the first law. It is also the bases of 
"'progress, " the patriarchal, Enlightenment mark of time. 2) The first duty of reason is 
to eradicate unreason: indeed, "reason" only comes into being when it defines and 
expels that which is "unreasonable" and vice versa. The decision to eradicate 
unreason from public and international affairs creates a private maternal sphere of 
unreason. 3) Adherence to reason must come first and foremost, infiltrating all other 
discourses: that is why Marxist socialism, reasonably articulated and maintaining 
some form of power, is more acceptable to bourgeois values than "libertarian- 
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socialism" (anarchy) and why, as I explain below, Desiderio is so shocked and 
disappointed when he meets Dr. Hoffman. The only truly acceptable politics is a 
politics of reason. 4) The frontier is created by the construction of reason itself (refer 
to point 2). 5) A typical bourgeois privilege of the individual, eradicating the 
foundations of collectivity. 6) This last point underscores the necessity of 
universalising and normalising Reason, since it only works when its illusory 
transcendency is presumed by all. 
Perhaps "the most rational man in theworld" (Carter 1972,24), the most 
extreme proponent of pathological rationalism is to be found in 111fernal Desire 
Machines, the Minister of Determination, who embodies institutional manipulation 
and patriarchal reason, and who we are meant, initially, to regard as the anti-thesis of 
Dr. Hoffinan. In the Minister, we glimpse a relic of the early, pre-twentieth-century 
Enlightenment. The Minister "believed in the existence of objective reality and that 
this reality could be directly accessed. It wasn't a matter of human beings 
representing this reality in their minds: they could access it pure. Reality for the 
Minister was finite and quantifiable [ ... ]" (Day 1998,66-7). 
The Minister had never in all his life felt the slightest quiver of 
empirical uncertainty. He was the hardest thing that ever existed and 
never the flicker of a mirage distorted for so much as a fleeting second 
the austere and intransigent objectivity of his face even though, as I 
saw it, his consisted essentially in setting limit to though, for Dr. 
Hoffman appeared to me to be proliferating his weaponry of images 
along the obscure and controversial borderline between the thinkable 
and the unthinkable. 
(Carter 1972,22) 
The Minister's entire being is subsumed into maintaining the city's rationalist 
surface, a project made especially difficult due to Dr. Hoffinan's machines attacking 
the city. By commanding his Ministry and the Determination Police, he maintains the 
rigid literal "defences" of the city, building walls of intellectual i sation and reason, 
barbed, wire and an arsenal of projecting weaponry in order to keep at bay any 
element that threatens the rationalist, affect-less stability of the city. His phallic 
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singularity is the "Key to the City, " explained in one of the "Seven Wonders of the 
World" exhibits that Desiderio visits outside the city: 
Exhibit Six: THE KEY TO THE CITY 
A candle in the shape of a penis of excessive size, with scrotum 
attached, in a state of pronounced tumescence. The wrinkled foreskin 
was drawn far enough back to uncover in its importunate entirety the 
grossly swollen, sunset-coloured tip as far as a portion of the shaft 
itself and, at the minute cranny in the centre, -where a wick must have 
been lodged, burned a small, pure flame. As the viewer watched, the 
candle tipped forward on its balls and pointed to one accusingly. 
I was struck with the notion that this was supposed to represent 
the Minister's penis. 
(Carter 1972,46) 
The Minister's politics, his so-called "theory of names and functions, " are 
constructed to prevent any "disturbances and no usurpation of names or ranks or roles 
whatsoever" (24). The Minister sees it as his mission to stop the spread of "infection" 
- for the city's threat, like the threat to reason itself, does not come from an external 
source, but is internal - "if the city Nvas in a state of siege, the enemy Nvas inside the 
barricades, and lived in the minds of each of us" (12). His apparent nemesis Hoffman 
also recognises the unstable nature of these defences: "I used the capital city of this 
country as the testing ground for my first experiments because the unstable existential 
structure of its institutions could not suppress the latent consciousness as effectively 
as a structure with a firmer societal organisatiorf ' (211; note too that Dr. Hoffman 
himself is a product of the Cit Y). 26 The Minister embodies disembodiment, he is "not 
a man but a theorem, clear, hard, unified and harmonious" (13). Or, as Hoffman's 
Ambassador recognises, 
You [the Minister] are in the process of tabulating every thing you can 
lay your hands on. In the sacred name of symmetry, you slide them 
into a series of straightjackets and label them with, oh, my God, what 
inexpressibly boring labels! Your mechanical prostitutes welcome 
their customers in an alien gibber wholly denied to the human tongue 
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while you, you madame, work as an abortionist on the side. You 
murder imagination in the, %vomb, Minister. 
(Carter 1972,37) 
Like a dystopian morality-tale, Carter portrays the Minister as a figure enforcing 
institutional compliance through means that are easily perceived as allegories for 
existing structures and practices. In the city's defence, the Minister employs the 
Determination Police, Reality Testing Laboratories and a highly structured set of 
practices and codified laws that further entrench his rationalist defences. For 
example, "the Determination Regulations Page Four, paragraph I c, " under which 
Desiderio is charged, states that "Any thing or person seen to diverge significantly 
from it or his own known identity is committing an offence and may be apprehended 
and tested" (62) and invites comparison's Nvith Bentham's - and Foucault's - 
panopticonism. 
Postmodern Rationality: Mistrusting the Ambiguity of Mirrors 
If prohibition has a meaning, it is that images are deceitful. 
(Lacan 1959-60,196) 
"Silly old Bataille, " she said. 
To mistake fantasy for reality, she meant. 
Lucky you, my good woman, I thought, who can so 
thoroughly distinguish between them. 
(Ward Jouve 1994,138) 
The Minister orders the destruction of all mirrors, "because of the lawless images 
they were disseminating. Since mirrors offer alternatives, the mirrors had all turned 
into fissures or crannies in the hitherto hard-edged world of here and now and 
through these fissures came slithering sideways all manner of amorphous spooks" 
(Carter 1972,12). Todorov points out that the "mirror is present in [E. T. A. ] 
Hoffman's tale whenever the characters must make a decisive step toward the 
supernatural, and this relation is attested to in almost all fantastic texts" (Todorov 
1973,121). Jackson rc-iterates, "Many Victorian fantasies employ the device of a 
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lens or mirror to introduce an indeterminate area where distortions and deformations 
or 'normal' perception become the norm. Lexvis Carroll's Alice moves through the 
looking glass into the paraxial realm,, %vhere anything can happen" (Jackson 1981, 
44). It is this step towards the super-natural that the Ministerwishes to prevent his 
citizens from making. Mirrors offer a chance to reflect upon one's self, to see one's 
self as awhole-object, containing an innerworld, that the Minister needs to deny to 
the inhabitants of the city he defends: 
"Reason, " which rejects the marvellous, knows this very well, for it 
also renounces the mirror [ ... ] "Reason" 
declares itself against the 
mirror which offers not the -world but an image of the world, matter 
dematerialised, in short, a contradiction of the law of non- 
contradiction [ ... 
] Vision pure and simple reveals an ordinary world, 
without mysteries. Indirect vision is the only road to the marvellous 
[ ... I Eyeglasses and mirrors 
become the image of a vision that is no 
longer the simple means of connecting the eye to a point in space, 
which is no longer purely functional, transparent, transitive [ ... I 
Moreover we find the same fruitful ambiguity in the word "visionary; " 
which designates a personwho both sees and does not see, and thus 
implies at once the higher degree and the negation of vision. 
(Todorov 1973,122-3) 
However, the mirror is also where the narcissist becomes fixed upon his image. 
Citing E. T. A. Hoffman, a distant relative of Carter's doctor, Todorov maintains that 
"Real wealth, true happiness (and these are found in the world of the marvellous) are 
accessible only to those who manage to see themselves in the mirror" (Todorov 121). 
The mirror is also the medium through which Lacan's infant enters towards the realm 
of the imaginary. For Lacan (1966), the satisfaction derived from the coherent, whole 
image in the mirror is a mere illusion and initiates subjective alienation and splitting. 
As Desiderio proves, the satisfaction in the mirror is merely an illusion, but a 
necessary ilhision to achieve balance and subjective ambivalence through creativity 
and the realisation of subjective ontology. 
There is another reading we may take from the mirrors as they are employed 
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by Lacan and the Minister in Infernal Desire Machines, readings that make the 
connection between Enlightenment rationality and contemporary postmodern 
endeavours. Dylan Evans, in situating Lacan within the Western philosophical 
tradition, invites an intriguing parallel with Carter's radically rationalist Minister: 
"Lacan has a Cartesian mistrust of the imagination as a cognitive tool. He insists, like 
Descartes, on the supremacy of pure intellection, without dependence on images, as 
the only way of arriving at certain knowledge" (Evans 1996,83). Thus despite his 
protestations to the contrary, as I stated in Part 1, Lacan can be seen neatly donning a 
mode of thought entirely characteristic of the bourgeois Enlightenment. Like the 
27 
Minister, he wants to break all the mirrors, to murder imagination in the woMb . 
Contemporary critics often show how the mirror in fantastic narratives functions like 
Lacan's imaginary. But what they overlook is the mistrust Lacan himself had for 
mirrors, and thus how the concept of the imaginary is to be disregarded as a place 
potentially productive for the subject in evading or repairing the damage done by the 
symbolic. Those critics who have tried to redeem the imaginary sphere as an implicit 
subversion of the symbolic do not seem to appreciate that the construction of the 
imaginary itself is a product of privileged symbolic reason. But mirrors, although 
often a place of narcissistic self-indulgence, are also "ambiguous things" (Car-ter 
1974,70). Carter's narrator in "Flesh and the Mirror" observes: "The mirror 
annihilated time, place and person; at the consecration of this house, the mirror had 
been dedicated to the reflection of chance embraces. Therefore it treated flesh in an 
exemplary fashion, with charity and indifference" (Carter 1974,70). 
As I stated in Part 1, for most British psychoanalysts, the notion of a "pure 
intellection" is a defence (Winnicott's false-mind psyche, 1949; Fairbaim, 1940) that 
is a severe detriment to the analytic work; for Lacan (and other orthodox schools), the 
use of disengaged, disembodied rationality is a necessary precondition to their 
scientific endeavours in analysis. It is tempting to believe that Carter is addressing 
Lacan, and post-structuralist and psychostructuralist theory in general. Carter Nvas 
certainly familiar with a great deal of literary theory. The Sadeian Wonzen cites 
Adorno and Horkbeimer, Barthes, Bataille, de Beauvoir, Breton, Bettelheim, Norman 
Brown, Fanon, Foucault, and, significantly Freud, Lacan and Klein. Loma Sage 
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(1994) points out how Barthes and Foucault were, at various stages, key influences on 
Carter. But Sage also says that Carter "distrusted cultural traditions - 1950s New 
Critical and 1970s poststructuralists alike" -which suggests that she did not much 
approve of the scientisation of literary analysis. Ward Jouve also relates an anecdote 
that suggests Carter had no love of French post-structuralism: 
My feeling is that both The Passion offeiv Eve and The Sadeian 
Woman lend themselves so readily to being read as counter-tracts to 
French theory of the seventies - Lacan, Cixous in particular - that it is 
almost certain she knew exactly what she was doing. I once introduced 
Angela Carter to H616ne Cixous in London - they were doing a mano 
a mano - and Carter professed terror at the encounter. I now wonder 
whether her terror had something to do with coming face to face with 
what she had attacked. 
(Ward Jouve 1994,163) 
For example, in 1nfernal Desire Machines, in response to a propaganda broadcast by 
the Minister, when he praises "inflexible rationalism" as the city's best defence, 
Hoffman points out that "Reason cannot produce the poetry disorder does [ ... ] And 
he 
thinks I only operate in the gaps between things and definitions! What scant respect 
he shows for me! " (206). Perhaps Carter is suggesting that as the Minister 
underestimates Hoffinan, relegating him to the gaps, Lacan underestimates everything 
subjective that lies outside language by relegating it to the real. For Lacan, that -which 
"impels us to seek the reality of the subject beyond the Language barrier" is an 
"illusion" (1953,72) - which for Lacan, unlike Winnicott, is always negative, an 
obstacle (like the transference) to successful analysis. Like Pinel, like Lacan, the 
Ministerwishes to confine and exclude thatwhich he cannot rationally contain. 
Carter offers further critique of the general scientific endeavours to rationalise 
subjectivity. The war eventually turns in the Minister's favour when Hoffman loses 
his samples, the means through which he controls the desires of Nebulous Time, and 
the Minister completes his computer bank and institutes a programme he calls the 
"Rectification of Names" (193): A "philosophic" and "ideological" weapon, he 
attempts to control what is real by naming the objects with a scientific, and 
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sterilising, precision, "So, you understand, that no shadow would fall between the 
word and the thing described" (194). By thus killing the potentiality of meaning to 
emerge through play, the Minister insists that citizens whom he defends comply with 
the language he imposes upon them, as if creating an algebra of experience. 
Albertina explains further: 
He set up a new slogan, "If the name is right, you see the 
light. " He is a man of great intellect but limited imagination. Which is 
why he can hold out against my father [Hoffman], of course. Once the 
names were right, he thought perfect order and hence perfect 
government on his own Confucian terms would follow automatically. 
So be dismissed all his physicists and brought in a team of logical 
positivists from the School of Philosophy in the National University 
and set them to the task of fixing all the phenomena compiled by his 
computers in the solid concrete of a set of names that absolutely 
agreed with them. Ironically enough, their task was made all the easier 
because of the flexibility of identity produced in the state of nebulous 
time. 
(Carter 1972,194) 
Under this system, as under radical postmodemity as envisioned by post-structuralist 
theory, reality becomes the sign. As Albertina points out to Desiderio, the Minister 
"has not got enough imagination to realise that the most monstrous aberrations are 
bound to flourish in soil once it has been disinfected of the imagination" (Carter 
1972,194). Reason produces irrational monsters, grateful to and dependent upon 
their rationalist fathers for their existence. 
When Dr. Hoffman creates a new molecular structure to counter the 
Minister's new counter-weapon, the city's chief physicist, Dr. Drosselmeier, who had 
a "three-star reality rating" discovers that the modified unreality atom is "the sphere 
of looking glass, like a reflective teat" (Carter 1972,23). In response, the Minister 
conceives of a new means of reality testing, one which best suits his paranoid- 
rationalist needs, "an immense computer centre which would formulate a systematic 
procedure for calculating the verifiable self-consistency of any given object. He 
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believed the criterion of reality was that a thing Nvas determinate and the identity of a 
thing lay only in the extent to which it resembled itself"(23). Perhaps Carter is again 
playing Nvith Lacan, who similarly identified the origins of the unreal imagination in 
the mirror and attempted to construct an algebraic, mathernatic system for conceiving 
of subjectivity. 
These characters are enacting a defence and trying to establish certainties. 
They are unable to tolerate paradox and need reconciliation. In order to achieve this, 
both Rosencreutz and the Duke must objectify Fevvers, turn her into an object within 
their own fantasies. As Nvith their forefather Sade, they construct a phantasy in which 
"the subject itself becomes an objet de IzLxe in these elaborately choreographed 
masques of abstraction, of alienation" (Carter 1979b, 146). Carter's reading of Sade 
and his representatives in novels recalls my criticism of Lacan from Part 1: like 
Rosencreutz, the Duke and the Count, Lacan seems unable to deal Nvith the paradox 
that is subjectivity, and creates instead an objet de Iwe through an elaborately 
choreographed masque of abstraction and alienation. 
The Spaces of Unreason: The Inadequacy of Transgression 
Rather, since Sade and the death of God, the universe of language 
has absorbed our sexuality, denatured it, placed it in a void where it 
establishes its sovereignty and where it incessantly sets up as the 
Law the limits its transgresses. 
(Foucault 1963,50) 
There is always a city. There is always a civMsation. There is 
always a barbarian with a pickaxe. Sometimes you are the city, 
sometimes you are the civilisation, but to become that city, that 
civilisation, you once took a pickaxe and destroyed what you hated, 
and what you hated was wbat you did not understand. 
(Winterson 2000,17) 
The apparent "other" side of the magic realist narrative are the spaces of pure 
unreason. However, as I have already stated, I think many authors and theorists over- 
rate the subversive potential of unreason and irrationality as it is entirely dependent 
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upon the discourses of reason and can only provide a token transgression. Zipes 
points out that initially there was resistance to fairy tales by the rationalist bourgeois 
for its 
implicit and explicit critique of utilitarianism. The emphasis on play, 
alternative forms of living, pursuing dreams and daydreams, 
experimentation, striving for the golden age - this stuff of which fairy 
tales were (and are) made challenged the rationalistic purpose and 
regimentation of life to produce for profit and expansion of capitalist 
industry. Therefore, the bourgeois establishment had to make it seem 
that the fairy tales were immoral, trivial, useless and harmful if an 
affirmative culture of commodity values supportive of dlite interests 
were to take root in the public sphere. 
(Zipes 1979,14)28 
Other epistemologies, other -ways of regarding the world thus need to be conflized and 
suppressed (not necessarily repressed) by the bourgeois order, and it is this 
demarcation and confinement of unreason that, for many, gives rise to the 
contemporary fantastic. For Monle6n, "The basic setting [ ... ] the central spatial 
metaphor that sustains gothic literature is confinement: dark rooms, labyrinthine 
halls, and secret passages populate its pages" (33). 29 For example, 
In Otranto, as in Gothic literature in general, unreason materializes (or 
threatens to do so) within the walls of its own epistemological frames: 
castles, monasteries, old abbeys, dungeons. It is not the lighted street, 
nor in the vastness of nature, neither in the city nor in the country, 
where reason is challenged: it is, rather, within the symbols of 
feudalism that the representation of unreason emerges. 
(Monle6n 1990,32) 
Unreason remains confined to designated spaces, safely hidden away and negated as 
a threat to the rational order, and the sphere of reason becomes the public sphere. 
(See also Foucault 1965,1975). The ubiquitous castle hides the evidence of ancient 
epistemologies and links with the past, "weapons, the ancestral portrait gallery, the 
family archives and in particular human relationships involving dynastic primacy and 
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the transfer of heredity rights. And finally legends and traditions animate every comer 
of the castle and its environs through their constant reminders of past events" 
(Bakhtin 1981,246). 
The ruins of gothic castles also demonstrate the inevitable march of time, 
reinforcing the bourgeois structures of progress, demonstrating that time can erode all 
foundations, even those of the bourgeois Enlightenment. The horrors in the 
nineteenth-century fantastic, once the gothic monsters of medieval epistemology, are 
transforined into the enemy from within, the "projection of progress, " the rise of 
those inevitable elements that are residual to reason. Instead of dragons and ghosts, it 
is the working classes and poor of the cities that are the spectre haunting Europe. 
Consequently, but also paradoxically, by the nineteenth century, the discourses of 
reason themselves are also increasingly identified as a threat to the very order that it 
supports. Frankenstein creates his monster not by manipulating the ancient dark-arts 
but by employing the most sophisticated science and reason. Marx's later Nvork does 
not use the rhetoric of passion and revolution so much as he employs cold, 
calculating science. Freud, too, articulates the chaos of the unconscious, always 
appealing to the scientific grounding of his research. 30 
The point 1, %vish to make here, and that I find constantly made by 
contemporary magic realist texts, is that unreason does not, in itself, produce as 
effective a resistance to or transformation of the rationalist social order as some 
would hope. As I stated with regard to transgression earlier, unreason is most often, 
as Klein would say, a schizoid response that further reinforces the dominant order 
rather than a significant challenge to it. As many critics suggest, the carnival is 
celebrated so as to better extract the continued compliance the next working morning. 
(However, I suggest below other ways we may read Bakhtin's carnival. ) Carter, 
following Zipes, interestingly points out how the Brothers Grimm sought to collect 
fairy tales not to upset the bourgeois social order but to actually help create it. 
Their [the Grimms] work in collecting fairy tales was part of the 
nineteenth-century struggle for German unification, which didn't 
happen until 1871. Their project [ ... ] envisaged popular culture as an 
untapped source of imaginative energy for the bourgeoisie; "they 
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wanted the rich cultural tradition of the common people to be used 
and accepted by the rising middle class, " says Jack Zipes. 
(Carter 1990, xvi) 
So, what becomes of unreason in contemporary magic realist literature? The 
nature of unreason has alivays been the internal threat posed to reason. In the early 
Enlightenment, this may have been the unacknowledged residual epistemologies of 
the medieval era; in the nineteenth century, it was the downtrodden workers of the 
cities and the poorer classes that were left out of the new industrial economy and 
emergent rational discourses of unreason. Contemporary magic realism represents 
unreason as coming from all directions: from the ancient or barbaric epistemologies 
(Chocolat, Beloved, Affinity, Harry Potter), from the proletariat (Nights at the 
Circus, Peifinne), from reason itself (Infernal Desire Machines, The Magus). The 
threat of unreason also comes from further within human consciousness: it has moved 
from existing in the past, to living in the alleys of our cities, to being embedded in 
our o, %vn, rational minds, in the form, for example, of the unconscious. Jackson makes 
a similar argument on "the internal origin of the other" (54). Through her Lacanian 
lens, the other is always regarded as, for example, "otherworldly", "evil", "Satan, the 
devil, the demon... etc. " (53). These beings are also increasingly oriented within: 
"The demonic is not supernatural, but is an aspect of personal and interpersonal life, 
a manifestation of unconscious desire" (55); "the 'other' is no longer designated as 
supernatural, but is an externalisation. of part of the self" (55); "Danger is seen to 
originate from the subject, through excessive knowledge, or rationality, or the mis- 
application of the human will" (58). 1 suspect that the correspondence between 
Jackson's Lacanian theory and my object-relations approach here is due to the 
general psychoanalytic project that - regardless of doctrinal orientation - looks first 
and foremost at the processes of the internal world (for example, repression, 
splitting). However, unlike Jackson's Lacanianism, object-relations refuses always to 
see the "other" as either solely a projection of one's imagination or as an always 
hostile, evil Being. 
And, perhaps the more fashionable identification as our culture fetishes 
language, unreason today is identified as being "beyond" language, or pre-linguistic - 
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but we should be careful with such conceptions. Just as we recognise that competing 
epistemologies and the urban proletariat are themselves purposefully constructed as 
irrational by rationalist discourses to serve bourgeois hegemony, we should likewise 
regard the demarcation of the "linguistic" as re-enforcing a rationalist hegemony. The 
separation of language from that which is "beyond language, " and the latter's 
confinement to the maternal, to the real, and its exclusion as "unscientific, " serves 
the same master as the division between reason and unreason. And the appearance of 
unreason and the extra-linguistic in the fantastic is a containment that may subvert, 
but also serves, reason/unreason, linguistic/extra-linguistic, object/subject, 
mind/affect dichotomies. 
Monle6n states that "The formulation of unreason, a search for a language 
that could express it, would becomes the new paradox of the fantastic" (102). But 
rather than trying to find a language of unreason to challenge the discourses of 
rationality, however, should we not reject the Enlightenment's very distinction as 
ideologically self-serving? Merely finding a transgressive language for unreason will 
only further serve to entrench the bourgeois order and the distinctions that serve it. 
Contra Monle6n, I see the new fantastic as not so preoccupied with epistemological 
concerns, instead recognising that it is the Enlightenment obsession with 
epistemology and reason itself that has precipitated current crises of subjectivity. An 
investigation of the spaces of irrationality and unreason depicted by many 
contemporary magic realist authors I think will demonstrate how simple transgression 
of the present order is deemed insufficient. 
So unreason is often to be found, from the nineteenth century, right in the very 
heart of the rationalist order - the city. Q mean the "heart" only metaphorically, 
because obviously disembodied minds do not possess hearts. ) And into eighteenth 
century Paris - the crown jewel of rationalism! - was born Jean-Baptiste Grenouille, 
the unscented future murderer of Perfume with the most fantastic powers of smell. In 
Carter's Nights at the Circus and Waters' Tipping the Velvet, London at the turn of 
the twentieth century houses a plethora of brothels, a subculture of licentiousness, 
lesbian tea-ladies, socialists and, in Waters' Affilnity, a network of dubious 
spiritualists and genuine fraudsters. In a hidden alley in Muggle London, accessed 
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only through a secret passage in the Leaky Cauldron pub, lies Diagon Alley, the 
centre of commerce for wizards across England. 
In stark contrast to these enclosed, suffocating cities, many contemporary 
magic realist texts set the forces of unreason in vast, empty landscapes where 
phantasy thrives. Such spaces are found in abundance in Nebulous Time in Carter's 
Infernal Desire Machines, where desire and phantasies rule unchecked and all- 
polverful, where all linear time is dissolved and all time instantaneous. In these 
spaces, omnipotent phantasy is unhindered by any external control or reality. The 
"acrobats of desire" realise the rationalist dream as their minds' desire completely 
overcomes their restraining bodies; they are beings with no respect for the somatic. A 
magical, literal example of splitting, of the triumph of the mind-psyche, Desiderio 
describes how 
four times a day they transcended their own bodies and made of 
themselves plastic anagrams [ ... ] Their figures flowed into one another 
so choreographically it was impossible to see how they extricated or 
complicated themselves. They did not give out any odour of sweat 
And then Mohammed, the leader, took his head from his neck and 
they began to juggle with that until, one by one, all their heads came 
off and went into play [ ... ] After that, limb 
by limb, they dismembered 
themselves. Hands, feet, forearms, thighs and ultimately torsos went 
into a diagrammatic multi-man whose constituents were those of them 
all [ ... ] And then, the piýce 
de risistance, they began to juggle with 
their own eyes. 
(Carter 1972,113-4) 
Thus, although the wholly irrational Nebulous Time looks radically different from the 
Minister's ultra-rationalist city, the effects upon subjectivity are the same: splitting, 
disintegration, desubjectification, depersonalisation and the privileging of the mind- 
psyche and its products - reason, language, desire. This should not come as a surprise 
because, as I stated earlier, we are only meant initially to regard the Minister as the 
antithesis of Hoffman. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the Doctor and 
the Minister are cut from the same Enlightened cloth. Hoffman's tools are also those 
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of Minister - defensive splitting and an unshakable faith in rationalism - and 
therefore both the city and Nebulous Time are products of Reason. Just as Foucault 
describes the relation of transgression to the limit as "a spiral which no simple 
infraction can exhaust" (1963,3 1), Desiderio describes how in the city under 
Hoffman, "It seemed each one of us was trapped in some downward-drooping 
convoluted spiral of unreality from which we could never escape" (Carter 1972,20). 
Carter transforms E. T. A. Hoffman from the writer whose brand of fairy tales 
Todorov sees as exemplary of the fantastic to the Doctor, the "powerhouse of the 
marvellous" (201), unable to tolerate any uncertainty and as positivistic (in his own 
way) as his nemesis, the Minister. 
Just as postmodem culture privileges the signifier, has created ideas, subjects 
and pseudo-symbols that lack depth and meaning, Hoffman's Nebulous Time is 
depicted as "a period of absolute mutability when only reflected rays and broken 
trajectories of an entirely hypothetical source of light fitfully reveal a continually 
shifting surface, like the surface of water, yet a water which is only a reflective skin 
and has neither depth nor volume" (99). Peach also notices how Hoffman produces 
"meaningless plurality, " a "postmodern, consumer-oriented world dominated by 
media images" (1998,101). Hoffman's transmitters have been bombarding the city 
with "sufficient radiation to intensify a symbol until it becomes an object according 
to the law of effective evolving, or, if you prefer a rather more explicit terrn, complex 
becoming" (Carter 1972,208) - echoing Robert Young's suggestion that in the 
postmodern, the subject has been de-ontologised at the expense of the ontologisation 
of the signifier. Hoffman's philosophy is, in this respect, "not so much transcendental 
as incidental. It utilises all the incidents that ripple the depthless surfaces of the 
sensual world. When the sensual world unconditionally surrenders to the 
intermittency of mutability, man will be freed in perpetuity form the tyranny of a 
single present" (99-100). Day also sees parallels between Nebulous Time and 
postmodem theory, suggesting that as the proprietor describes Nebulous Time to 
Desiderio, he "sounds like a postmodemist theorist going on about the depthlessness 
of the signs, the depthlessness of the representations that constitute the world and 
which make untenable any idea of autonomous, objective reality" (Day 1998,78). If 
209 
the Minister is a caricature of our modernist rationalist predecessors, Hoffman is the 
demonic embodiment of our postmodern theory, exposing how postmodernity itself is 
successor to and complicit with Enlightenment rationality. Unlike the Minister, 
Hoffman does not maintain an idle belief in the absolute knowability of external 
reality or in metadiscourses; however, Hoffinan does show an unwavering faith in the 
discourses of science. 
Hoffman seems to make the sterilised city fertile, and in some respects opens 
spaces in the city in which the citizens can play - an acceptance of the limited role 
that mere transgression can enact. But instead of moving the city from one oppressive 
extreme into a mediating potential space, he goes too far in the opposite direction, 
creating his own form of enslavement. Upon finally gaining entrance into Hoffman's 
stronghold, Desiderio realises that in fact, "the magician's castle was not the home of 
unreason at all but a school for some kind of to me incomprehensible logic" (204). 
Just as the Minister's rationality sterilises the city by negating the potential for 
creative play, Desiderio in the end finds Hoffman's castle similarly "sterile" (210). 
Here is another illustration as towhy the model of the dialectic does not work as a 
model to explain Winnicott's conceptual isation of the third space. The "synthesis" of 
competing thesis (in this case, rationality and compliance with external reality) and 
antithesis (retreat into a wholly phantastic, internal universe) does not become a 
creative, ontologising third space. Instead, we are faced with the Minister's 
oppressive vision or that of Hoffinan. Hoffinan's old physics professor, of all people, 
is humiliated at the lengths to which Hoffman has tried to take his war. It would seem 
that the similarity between the Minister and Hoffman is not lost on the Minister 
himself as he offers the following parable: 
"A man made a pact Nvith the Devil. The condition Nvas this: the man 
delivered up his soul as soon as Satan had assassinated God. 'Nothing 
simpler, ' said Satan and put a revolver to his own temple. " 
"Do you cast Dr. Hoffman as God or Satan? " 
The Minister smiled. 
"As my parable suggests, the roles are interchangeable, " he 
replied. 
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(Carter 1972,38-9) 
Hoffman's castle, like the city, is a haven of rationalist certainty, safely hiding 
Desiderio away from the threats of uncertainty and liminality that exist between the 
castle's defences and those of the city. Desiderio declares, "Here, everything was 
safe. Everything was ordered. Everything was secure" (197). 
The city under Hoffman's control becomes entirely abstracted from external 
reality and creates a world that corresponds only with individual phantasy. 
Apparitions of the dead, lost objects, return as if they exist in reality; the city 
becomes a "kingdom of the instantaneous" where desires are immediately gratified; 
"it had become the arbitrary realm of the dream" (18). In such a world dominated by 
narcissistic internal phantasy, transitional objects become ineffective and 
unnecessary. Desiderio announces the arrival of mendicants who sell charms and 
talismans to protect the citizens of the city from the hallucinations inspired by Dr. 
Hoffman, but these objects, potentially for use in the transitional space, remain 
wholly magical. These beggars and theirwares "possessed only the most dubious 
reality status [ ... 
] Sometimes the talismans they sold vanished with them even though 
they had already been stowed away in the household shrines of their purchasers; and 
sometimes nof '(18). The transitional object, Winnicott tells us, must exist at least to 
some extent in the external world. Without the soothing presence of the transitional 
object, anxiety experienced in the city is increased, an anxiety intensified by the 
presence of other unwelcome, entirely foreign objects. 
The most obvious flaw of Hoffman's thinking, and any theory that similarly 
over-inflates the importance of desire, is to confuse phantasy and desire Nvith the 
sub ect itself. Hoffman is right to a degi-ee, of course, that the desires and phantasies 
manufactured by his machines are necessary for being, but this desire is not the 
"essence of being" (210), unless you assume (as some psychoanalysts and 
psychoanalytic critics do) that all subjects are driven solely by narcissistic drives. 
Hoffman echoes some orthodox psychoanalysts and postmodern theorists: 
"Inside the reality modifying machines, in the medium of essential 
undiffei-entiation [ ... ] Eventually a multi-dimensional body is brought 
into being which operates only upon an uncertainty principle [ ... ] Once 
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these undifferentiated yet apprehendable ideas of objectified desire 
reach a reciprocating object, the appearance is organically restructured 
by the desires subsisting in latency in the object itself These desires 
must, of course, subsist, since to desire is to be. " 
(Carter 1972,211). 
It is this explanation of his theory that forces Desiderio to recognise the true nature of 
Hoffman's theory: "So tharwas the Doctor's version of the cogito! I DESIRE 
THEREFORE I EXIST. Yet he seemed to me a man without desires" (211). This 
conceptualisation of being - "I desire therefore I am" - is shown by Carter to be not 
dissimilar from the "I think therefore I am" that is the condition of Enlightenment, 
bourgeois subjectivity. In this sense, we may see yet another parallel between 
Hoffman and the Minister, in that each, although pretending to save or liberate 
subjective experience, actually depersonalises and desubjectifies the subject. It is at 
this point that Desiderio recognises that Hoffman "had examined the world by the 
light of the intellect alone and had seen a totally different construction from that 
which the senses see by the light of reason [that is, the Minister]" (212-3). 
Hoffman proclaims himself to be a liberator, but he does not try to liberate 
desire. He tries to quantify it, to objectify it, study it, to create a mathematical 
formula through which he can understand it, control it. "He penned desire in a cage 
and said: 'Look! I have liberated desire! ' He was a hypocrite" (208). 3 1 Desiderio 
admits that be too is a hypocrite, and perhaps we must ask if postmodern and 
psychostructuralist theory is similarly hypocritical, albeit "on a less dramatic scale" 
(208). Carter demonstrates that Hoffman, like the postmodern "liberators" of the 
subject, or more accurately, subjective desire, pretends to perform a radical reversal 
of the Cartesian cogito while in reality only re-articulating a conceptualisation of 
subjective experience that similarly depersonalises and negates the possibility of 
creative, ontologising experience by flipping from one (paranoid-scbizoid) extreme to 
another. While both the Minister and Hoffman - and, for example, Descartes and 
Lacan - regard theworld through seemingly opposite lenses, the starting place and 
effect are shared: The Minister and Descartes through the reason of cogito ergo sum 
and Hoffman through the transgressions of agilanins ergo suinus. Perhaps Carter has 
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some contemporary theory in mind when Desiderio says, "Indeed, I knew from my 
own experience that, once liberated, those desires it seemed to me he cheapened as 
he talked of them were far greater than their liberator and could shine more brightly 
than a thousand suns and yet I did not think he knew what desire was" (Carter 1972, 
213). 
Like Hoffman, one might initially regard Father Reynard, the spiritual leader 
of Lansquenet, as a Father of unreason, as religion usually represents the irrationality 
of faith and ancient epistemologies. However, again we see that the apparent border 
between reason and unreason is itself a convenient Myth. Father Reynard devoutly 
obeys the law of his father - both his God and the mon pýre that he speaks to 
throughout the text. This also invites comparisons with Lacan, who not only deffies 
Freud but le loi-de-pýre. Reynard is guided by his "armoured certainty" (53). He 
complains that Vianne's treachery - making and selling chocolates - will undermine 
the values and system he relies upon. 32 "SooW' he worries, "they will be [ ... ] 
celebrating the inner seýf ' (162); another interesting comment in light of the Lacanian 
denial of the sphere of interiority as at least partly constitutive of subjectivity. 
Interestingly, Vianne remarks how the rationalists in the village remind her of "those 
small flat pralines shaped to look like tightly closed oysters" (54). Of course Nan, in 
Tipping the Velvet, takes great pride in her ability to prise open oysters. 
In Nebulous Time, Desiderio meets a Count, a Sadeian "erotic traveller, " 
describing himself as "a connoisseur of catastrophe, "' Nvho travels the world so as to 
witness disasters of human suffering and death: the eruption of Vesuvius, the 
bombing of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden (122). In this figure, like her analyses 
of Sade himself, Carter demonstrates the futility of transgression as an effective 
response to reason. Desiderio finds this traveller's "quality of being" and self-centred 
determination like that of Minister - that is, rationalist; Desiderio "can hardly 
describe to you the man's appalling, cerebral lucidity" (126). Albertina later 
reconfirms this view, claiming that 
the Count's rapacity was its purely cerebral quality. He was the most 
metaphysical of libertines. If he had passions, they were as lucid and 
intellectual as those of a geometrician. He approached the flesh in the 
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manner of one about to give proof to the theorem and, however, 
exiguous those passions seemed to him, they were never 
unpremeditated [ ... ] His desire 
became authentic because it was so 
absolutely synthetic. 
(Carter 1972,167-8) 
In fact, while Desiderio suspects that the Count is really Hoffman in disguise, 
Albertina, who is herself disguised as the Count's servant Lafleur, once thought that 
the Count was really the Minister in disguise. This demonstrates again how the 
monsters of reason and unreason are not to be distinguished from one another except 
according to the direction from which one is looking. In an interesting twist on 
Goya's capricho "The sleep of reason produces monsters, " Car-ter shows how the 
opposite may hold true, emphasising the co-dependency of reason and unreason. 
Lafleur/Albertina reminds him that "Master and slave exist in the necessary tension 
of a twinned actuality" (147), before challenging him "You'%vere a man in a cage 
-%vith a monster. And you did not know if the monster was in your dream or you were 
the dream of the monster" (148). 
When the Count makes the declaration, "I am entirely alone. I and my shadow 
fill the universe"' (148) he seeks to negate the existence of the other, which has real, 
ontological consequences for Desiderio and Lafleur. 
Lafleur gasped at that and so did I for I felt myself instantly 
negated. To my horror, I discovered I immediately grew thinner and 
less solid. I felt - how can I describe it? - that the darkness which 
surrounded us was creeping in at every pore to obliterate me. I saw the 
white glimmer of Lafleur's face and held out my hands to him 
imploringly, beseeching him to go with me together into the oblivion 
to which the Count had consigned us, so that I should have some 
company there, in that cold night of non-being. 
(Carter 1972,148) 
The ideal narcissist, the Count cannot see or interact -%vith a world outside himself, 
but this is also the bourgeois, isolated individual. Day describes this Count as "a kind 
of reductio ad absurdian of the Cartesian model of personal identity - the solus ipse, 
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'himself alone' paradigm - with its emphasis on individual, subjective transcendence. 
In his 'infernal egoism' the Count seeks to expand his subjectivity to fill the 
universe" (1998,94). Carter shows how this subject, the product of Enlightenment 
reason, is also the subject as conceived by Lacan and by much postmodem theory. 
The Count is shown as being under constant threat from a figure that relentlessly 
hunts him, a monstrous "black pimp. " Day notes, 
The problem is the shadow. Caught in the subject-object paradigm of 
identity the Count defines himself in relations to and in contrast with 
an "other", an object which, in order that he may define his 
subjectivity to himself, he views as devoid of subjectivity, lifeless. 
This is how he views the human objects of his sexual lusts. They are 
not subjects: merely meat upon which his subjectivity operates. In 
order fully to realise his egoistic subjectivity, in order to become an 
absolute self, he must suspend the subject-object dualism and unite 
'with the other. But the other - that different thing, that thing against 
which he defines his imperious subjectivity - is lifeless. So to join 
with the other is to find annihilation. 
(Day 1998,94-5) 
As Monle6n and Jackson suggest, the Count's nemesis - his other - demonstrates 
how the monstrous threat in the fantastic has moved increasingly inward, from 
ancient epistemologies to internal, unconscious processes. The monstrous, 
threatening "other" for the Count is the radical other of Lacanian and postmodem 
theory with whom there can be no intersubjectivity. But - and this point must be 
clear - in depicting such a relationship between the Count and his nemesis, Carter is 
not confirming the normalising, universalising relationship between self and other as 
conceived by Lacanian and postmodem theory. On the contrary, with her illustration 
of the Count, she pathologises the narcissistic subject and theory that give rise to such 
a conceptualisation. Jackson, for example, thinks that 
In a general shift from a supernatural to a natural economy of images, 
the demonic pact comes to be synonymous with an impossible desire 
to break human limits, it becomes a negative version of desire for the 
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infinite. In the modem fantastic, this desire expresses itself as a violent 
transgression of all human limitations and social taboos prohibiting 
the realisation of desire. 
(JacksOll 1981,57) 
This certainly may be said of the Count - however, it fails to highlight that, %vhich 
Carter seeks to demonstrate in the Count: the futility of such transgression of 
human 
limits, how such transgression actually perpetuates the rationalist order (,, social 
taboos") and alienate the psyche-soma ("human limitations") and the futility of a 
"modem fantastic" and theory of a modem fantastic that conceives of the subject 
for 
whom transgression is the ultimate and greatest good. 
For Lacan, the inaccessibility to the Other is the lack that drives subjectivity. 
We become "subjects" when, entering the symbolic, we abandon all hope of union 
, with the Other, although the subject must always deny that it is dependarit "Pon the 
Other for its identity. For the Count, too, the Other is -%vhat drives him or', what 
defines him, although to maintain his subjectivity he constantly flees from this Other. 
Albertina explains that, 
When he reached a final reconciliationwith the projective other who 
was his self, that icon of his own destructive potential, the abominable 
black, he had merely perfected that self-regarding diabolism -Vvhich 
crushed and flattened the world as he passed through it [... ] But his 
insistence on the authority of his autonomy made him at once the 
tyrant and the victim of matter, for he was dependent on the notion 
that matter was submissive to him. 
(Carter 1972,168) 
For Jackson, "One of the central thrusts of the fantastic is an attempt to erase this 
distinction itself [between the T and the 'not-I'], to resist separation and difference, 
to re-discover a unity of self and other" (52). While this may be true to Varying 
degrees (and perhaps more true of the pre-World War H literature that is Jackson's 
focus), in this instance Carter is using the notion of such a union to critiLille the 
orthodox psychoanalytic conceptualisation of the subject itself 
This description of the Count also invites a Kleinian reading by , vhich we 
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might see that the Count actually fears the split-off, projected and persecutory portion 
of himself which constantly threatens to return by forcing him to see himself as a 
whole object. In the Lacanian reading above, the Count is seen suffering from an 
epistemological crisis of self-identity - am I the omnipotent being I know myself to 
be? A Kleinian perspective, however, would de-naturalise this sort of crisis, and also 
permit us to see that the anxiety the Count feels toward this hunter is precipitating an 
ontological crisis that challenges his subjective existence. Lafleur explains: 
A sage of ancient China, the learned Chuang Tzu, dreamed he -was a 
butterfly. When he woke up, he was hard put to it to tell whether a 
man had dreamed he was a butterfly or a butterfly still dreaming he 
was a man. If you looked at the situation objectively for a moment, my 
dear Count, you might find that the principal cause of your present 
discomfort is a version of Chuang Tzu's dilemma. 
(Carter 1972,147-8)33 
I suspect here that Carter is playing with the perception of the postmodem critic, the 
victim of an ideology of narcissistic individualism who constructs theories of 
subjectivity based on negativity only, on absence. The Count holds "the passionate 
conviction he was the only significant personage in the world. He -was the emperor of 
inverted megalomaniacs but he had subjected his personality to the most rigorous 
discipline ofstylisation [ ... ] He could say nothing that was not grandiose. He claimed 
he loved only to negate the world' (123; emphasis mine). The emphasis on 
stylisation suggests a privileging of signifiers and presentation over substance and 
materialism. The Count says, "'I have devoted my life to the humiliation and 
exaltation of the flesh. I am an artist; my material is the flesh; my medium is 
destruction; and my inspiration is nature" (126). The "flesh" is to be regarded as a 
part-object, split off from the psyche-soma. The traveller is interested only in the 
subject as an object, capable of suffering - and its potentiality to satisfy his sadistic 
desire. The problem for this traveller is the same as so many of those who wish so 
desperately only to "transgress" authorities that theoretically, by their own negation, 
can no longer exist: "I should like to speak an ultimate blasphemy and then bask in 
the security of eternal damnation but, since there is no God, well, there is no 
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damnation, either, unfortunately. And hence, alas, no final negation" (123-4). 34 
The whore-house to which the erotic traveller takes Desiderio is very similar 
to Madame Schreck's, in ternis of physical space (see 130) and in that it reduces the 
human body and sexuality to its part-object constituents. The Madame in Infernal 
Desire Machines says, "My house is a refuge for those who canfind no equilibrium 
between inside and outside, between mind and body or body and soul, vice versa, 
etcetera, etcetera, etcetera7' (131-2). The Madame dresses the traveller and Desiderio 
in tights that, when put on, leave their genitals exposed. Desiderio observes that "the 
garb grossly emphasised our manhoods while utterly denying our humanity" (130). 
The exposed phalli representing these two men is particularly appropriate here, as 
Carter is certainly drawing parallels between individualist narcissism, disembodied 
rationalism and patriarchy. As the men are reduced to part-objects, so too, predictably 
and necessarily, are the women Nvho work the house: 
There ivere, perhaps, a dozen girls in the cages in the reception room 
[ 
... 
I Each was as circumscribed as a figure in rhetoric and you could 
not image they had names, for they had been reduced by the rigorous 
discipline of their vocation to the undifferentiated essence of the idea 
of the female. This ideational femaleness took amazingly different 
shapes though its nature was not that of Woman; Nvhen I examined 
them more closely, I saNv that none of them were any longer, or might 
never have been, woman. All, without exception, passed beyond or did 
not enter the realm of simple humanity. They were sinister, 
abominable, inverted mutations, part clockwork, part vegetable and 
part brute. 
(Carter 1972,132) 
As "figures in rhetoric, " "undifferentiated, " and "ideational, " these women represent 
the paranoid-schizoid (omnipotent, disembodied) phantasies of the men who visit the 
house. They are "Women" constructed only through patriarchal discourse. Like 
Rosencreutz, who buys Fevvers from Madame Schreck, the Count needs to destroy 
women in order than he may live, that is, in order that he can maintain his omnipotent 
phantasy. 
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He took on a ponderous and ecclesiastical gait, as if it were a kind of 
mitre that he wore - he, the Pope of the profane, officiating at an 
ultimate sacrament, the self-ordained, omnipotent, consecrated man- 
phallus itself, and when he snatched a candle from a monkey's paw 
and used it to ignite the rosy plumage of winged girl, I knew he was 
about to preach a sermon and she was to be his text. 
(Carter 1972,133) 
In losing their humanity, many of these women's bodies are toppedwith the heads of 
beasts (zebras, giraffe, stags). "One leafy girl was grown all over with mistletoe but, 
where the bark was stripped away from her ribcage, you could see how the internal 
wheels articulating her went round" (133). A "fusion of dream-states, " "meat, " 
"beasts" are all tenns used literally to describe these freakish women. 
In Nebulous Time on the way to the coast of Africa, the Count, Desiderio and 
Lafleur are captured by pirates, and later a tribe of centaurs, yet more figures who 
embody paranoid-schizoid depersonalisation: The centaurs split-off and project their 
bad selves, their human halves, denying human reason and preferring to live as 
35 beasts. There is a ritualisation of guilt and reparation, mimicking similar practices 
in human religion. The pirates' beings are entirely subsumed by that of their leader as 
they constantly use splitting, idealisation and, projective identifi cation. And, like the 
Count, both groups are brutally misogynist: the pirates wield swords as phallic- 
substitutes, part-objects through which they experience the world. 
Though their use required great skill, it needed no finesse for the most 
telling stroke was a murderous, chopping blow that easily split a man 
in haý( It was impossible to fence [that is, play] -%vith such a sword. It 
was equally impossible to defend oneself except by attackingfirst. 
They -%vere weapons which deniedforethought, impulses ofdostruction 
made of steel. And the pirates themselves, so slight, so silent, so cruel, 
so tivo-dimensional, seemed to have subsinned their beings to their 
sivords, as if the weapons were their souls or as Y"they had made a 
pact ivith their sivords to express their spiritfor them, for the Dash of 
the sword seemed by far a more expressive language than the staccato 
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monosyllables that came so grudgingly to their lips. 
(Carter 1972,150-1; emphases mine) 
These phallic swords can be contrasted with Ma Nelson's sword that Fevvers wields 
in Nights at the Circits. Still a symbol of Ma Nelson's power and order - the 
connections between Britannia, Nelson and Empire also being drawn into the image - 
this is a maternal phallus, not a conquering symbol of male potency but a friendlier 
transitional object, still offering protection. Unlike the pirates, Fevvers can "fence" 
with her sword. Ma Nelson's "plaything" (83) is only a "toy" (18 1), but it saves 
Fevvers from Rosencreutz, although the Duke that Fevvers faces in St. Petersburg 
breaks it, leaving her "defenceless" (19 1). Without any phallic symbol, they are lost 
in the void of Siberia (a world like Nebulous Time of complete phantasy). Fevvers 
"knew she had mislaid some vital something of herself [ ... 
] When she lost her 
weapon to the Grand Duke in his frozen palace, she had lost some of the sense of her 
own magnificence which had previously sustained her trajectory" (Carter 1984,273). 
The violently and oppressive patriarchy of Nebulous Time radically 
metamorphoses and distorts the concept of the "mother" from the nurturing, 
facilitating sort that helps create potential spaces. In fact, this distinction, between 
facilitating, playing and threatening, persecuting and devouring mothers typical of 
schizoid phantasy may be the sign-post one can use to discriminate between potential 
and, wholly phantastic spaces. The leader of an army of women Desiderio and the 
Count encounter on the African Coast explains this metamorphoses in language that 
illustrates a transformation from a Winnicottian playing mother into a Kleinian 
mother of paranoid-schizoid pbantasies. 
"Why, you may ask, have I built my army out of women [... ]? 
Gentlemen, if you rid your hearts of prejudice and examine the bases 
of the traditional notions of the figure of the female, you -%vill find you 
have founded them all on the remote figure you thought you glimpsed, 
once, in your earliest childhood, bending over you with an offering of 
warin, sugared milk, crooning a soft lullaby while, by her haloed 
presence, she kept away the snakes that writhed beneath the bed. Tear 
this notion of the mother from your hearts. Vengeful as nature herself, 
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she loves her children only in order to devour them better and if she 
herself rips her own veils of self-deceit, Mother perceives in herself 
untold abysses of cruelty as subtle as it is refined. " 
(Carter 1972,160) 
Carter makes the further suggestion here that it is these persecution phantasies that 
men carry with them from their infancy that lead to their fear and subsequent 
oppression of women - which further emphasises, through the Count, Hoffman (and 
the Duke and Rosencreutz from Nights) the link between patriarchal polver and 
rationalist psyche-somatic splitting. This representation of "mothers" is also evident 
in the time Desiderio spends with the River People. Although one of Desiderio's 
"mothers" is found on the river - more often representing a transitional space - his 
time with the River People should be regarded as part of Nebulous Time: it seems to 
exist in a continuous present, dominated by the inability to symbolise, and the 
actualisation of paranoid-schizoid phantasies and sexual desire, including the 
realisation of Oedipal wishes. 36 Women on the river suffer from the patriarchal 
forces of unreason just as the women of the city suffer from the patriarchal forces of 
reason: all the women of the tribe moved in a detached manner, "like benign 
automata" so "it was quite possible to feel they were not fully human" (73); Mama's 
gestures are found by Desiderio to be performed in "stiff, exact gestures, as if these 
gestures were the only possible physical expressions of hospitality, solicitude or 
motherly care" (73). Desiderio is given a doll to play with, but this object cannot 
function transitionally; the doll, and his 9 year-old bride to be, are woman of his 
fantasy, not real subjects in their own right. Desiderio explains that all river people 
were 
somehow frozen in themselves. Even the method of pouring a drink 
was hallowed by tradition and never altered [ ... I And 
in this lack of 
self, I began to sense a singular incapacity for being, that sad, self- 
imposed limitation of experience I recognised in myself and must also, 
like my cheekbones, be my inheritance from the Indians. 
(Carter 1972,87) 
The language of this tribe, and also that of the tribe of centaurs, is particularly 
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revealing. Desiderio informs us that in these languages "words depended not so much 
on pronunciation as intonatiorf ' (70). The centaurs' language has neither grammar or 
vocabulary, but is just the play of sounds. For the river people, 
the problem of the particular versus the universal did not exist and the 
word "man" stood for "all man". This had a profound effect their 
societization. Neither was there a precise equivalent for the verb "to 
be", so the kernel was struck straight out of the Cartesian nut and one 
was left only with the naked, unarguable fact of existence, for a state 
of being was indicated by a verbal tag which could roughly be 
translated as "one finds oneself in the situation or performance of such 
and such a thing or action" [ ... ] The tenses divided time 
into two great 
chunks, a simple past and a continuous present [ ... ] There was also a 
marked absence of abstract nouns, since they had very little use for 
them. They livedwith a complex, hesitant but absolute immediacy. 
(Carter 1972,71) 
My ear again picks up language that echoes Winnicott's seed metaphor. I take this to 
mean that the defences that are the seed's shell are removed, leaving only the 
exposed kernel that would wither without at least some forin of protection. This 
seems to be a reverse of the "normotic" or postmodern subject, who focusses upon 
the shell to the point where the kernel withers in impenetrable outer coating. The 
river people, it would seem, live a psychotic existence of continuous present (or 
44simple past"), immediate sexual and phantastical gratification. 
The river people could be said to be transgressive of the order dominating the 
city but again this reinforces that the understanding that their irrationality offers no 
solution to the rational city. The river people cannot learn the language and ways of 
the imperialists that Desiderio tries to convey to him, and they have a fundamentally 
differentway of conceiving of the world. Desiderio says of Nao-Kurai, "he could not 
think in straight lines; he thought in subtle and intricate interlocking circles" (79). 
And ultimately, Desiderio must leave the river people as they intend to cat him, 
literally, in order to gain his magical powers, the ability to read and write showing 
how the rationalist discourses of the imperialist are introjected by native populations. 
222 
But again these inhabitants of Nebulous Time resemble our postmodem subjects. 
Nao-Kurai is also enamoured of the "very shapes of the letters [ ... ] He fell to musing 
on the angularities and traced and retraced them, chuckling to himself with pleasure, 
until they became cursive abstracts, beautiful in themselves but utterly lacking in 
signification" (Carter 1972,79). 
In Nebulous Time, a zone of the unlimited actualisation of phantasy, 
Albertina shows herself to be her father's daughter by acting as the consummate 
scientific rationalist. Desiderio explains that Albertina 
had become engrossed in the problem of the reality status of the 
centaurs and the more she talked of it, the more I admired her ruthless 
empiricism for she was convinced that even though every male in the 
village had obtained carnal knowledge of her, the beasts were still 
only emanations of her own desires, dredged up and objectively reified 
from the dark abysses of the unconscious. 
(Carter 1972,186) 
This again demonstrates the similarity between radical defences, from extreme 
dependence on rationalism to the extreme regression into internal phantasy. Albertina 
here also reflects the postmodem subject (perhaps the product of her father, the 
postmodern theorist) who confuses the "reality" of the external -world and the 
"reality" of the internal world. This trend to objectify the subjective, to reify human 
consciousness, in many ways perfected by certain forms of psychoanalysis, is 
characteristic of our cultural experience and our treatment, in both theory and 
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practice, of the subject. Regressing into a world of phantasy, such as Nebulous 
Time, provides the same defence, that of certainty, rather than liminal uncertainty. 
Albertina ultimately draws Desiderio too far into the world of omnipotent phantasy. 
She gives Desiderio a scrap of paper with the following quotation from de Sade, "My 
passions, concentrated on a single point, resemble the rays of a sun assembled by a 
magnifying glass; they immediately set fire to whatever object they find in their way" 
(Carter 1972,97). 
In Nights at the Circus, the third section of the novel finds Fewers, Walser 
and the rest of the Imperial Circus in a hostile, uncontained void of Siberia that is 
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largely devoid of objects. As Fevvers; herself takes over more of the narrative voice in 
this section, she asks: 
How do they live, here? How do they cope with it? Or aren't I the right 
one to pop the question, I'm basically out of sympathy,, vith the 
landscape, I get the shivers on Hampstead bloody Heath. As soon as 
I'm out of sigbt of the abodes of humanity, my heart gives way 
beneath me like rotten floorboards, my courage fails. Now parks, I 
love, and gardens. And small fields with hedges and ditches round 'em 
and useful cows in 'em. But if you niust have a wild hillside, let there 
be a least a sheep or two posed picturesquely on an outcrop of rock, 
ready to have its wool wounded off, something like that [ ... ]I hate to 
be where the hand of Man has badlywrought and, here, we are on that 
broad forehead of the world that had the mark of Cain branded on it 
when the world began, just as the old man at the station Nvho come 
selling us the bears he'd carved bad 'convict' branded on his cheek. 
(Carter 1984,197) 
As the transitional object facilitating potential spaces, Fevvers recognises that this is 
not her space, that she is "basically out of sympathywith the landscape. " The abodes 
of humanity arcwhere subjects live and play and work; in small spaces of peace and 
tranquillity, such as parks and gardens, she can still feel comfort, but the vast 
emptiness of Siberia is foreign space and goes against Fevvers' being - it is a place 
where there is no play, no opportunity for uncertainty and the spectacle upon which 
she thrives . 
38 Here, Fewers begins to lose her phenomenal shine, her capacity as a 
privileged, special object aiding the negotiation of space. Her wing is broken; she is 
unable to fly; her hair loses its blonde lustre; she begins, in short, to look less 
"fantastic. " Reflecting on her close escape from the Grand Duke at the end of her 
time in St. Petersburg, Fevvers reflects: ... Nowhere', one of those words, like 
'nothing', that opens itself inside you like a void. Andwere we not progressing 
though the vastness of nothing to the extremities of nowbere? " (198). Fevvers further 
comments that "As soon aswe turned our backs on the train, " the last symbol of the 
"real" world of objects, "it ceased to exist; we were translated into another world, 
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thrust into the hearts of limbo to which we had no map" (225). 
The answer to Fevvers' question, "How do they live, here? How do they cope 
with it" is answered by Walser's fate and the characters that populate the Siberian 
void. First, we see in Walser a sort of rebirth, and, I think, a parody of the 
psychoanalytic theories of infantile development. In an inversion of both Klein and 
Lacan, Walser utters his firstword, "Mama, " in response to his mother's presence 
before he experiences the anxiety of absence. Once he has uttered his first word, "he 
discovers in himself sensation. He rubbed his hand on his belly in a circular motion 
and searched the absence that had been his memory but he could find nothing there to 
tell him what to say. So he kept rubbing" (222-3). This also closely resembles an 
inversion of the Kleinian theory of the infant's first objects, where the first sensation 
experienced as a bad object by the infant is hunger, a sensation that is countered by 
the feeding presence of the mother, experienced as a good object. Language then 
comes to be used by the infant in response to this presence and absence of the 
mother/caretaker/breast. This re-birth, literally expressed here as a new beginning to 
the cycle of absence and presence, renews within Walser the anxieties of infancy. 
After one feeding, Walser's "mother" (the escaped convict Olga) disappears forever, 
and Walser must, like the infant, adopt defences appropriate to counter this lost 
object. 
Fevvers informs us that "the night around us contained nothing to assuage the 
infinite melancholy of these empty spaces" (228). Because there are so few objects 
within this void that make themselves available for play, Walser, together with his 
adopted tribe, and the Shaman, his "father" and spiritual guru, are constantly creating 
their own through vivid hallucinations. This is a world dictated and dominated by the 
products of phantasy. Their indifference to the world, Fevvers tells us, is masking a 
fear - "a spiritual infection of discontent, contracted from exposure to the unfamiliar, 
whose symptoms were questions" (254) or doubt, uncertainty. This situation is a 
defence organised by the tribespeople against the impending arrival of the railroad 
and the threat it poses to their way of life. The tribespeople thus retreat into phantasy 
as a defence against a world devoid of meaningful objects and away from the foreign 
world of Western civilisation that is encroaching upon their land. Carter also 
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suggests, however that through some accident the railroad might bring a useful 
degree of rationalism to awake the Siberian inhabitants from their phantastic 
slumber. 
Upon first meeting the Shaman, "Walser entered an immediate fugue of 
hallucinations, in which birds, witches, mothers and elephants mixed up with sights 
and smells of Fisherman's Wharf, the Alhambra Theatre, London, the Imperial 
Circus, Petersburg, and many other places. All his past life coursed through his head 
in concrete but discretefragnients and he could not make head nor tail of any of it" 
(23 8; emphases mine). Walser's mind is filled with spaces and objects of his past but 
they are not connected, consistent with internal phantasy in paranoid-schizoid 
thinking, only fragmented part-objects not symbolically representative but thought to 
be concrete, real objects themselves . 
39 And thus psychically positioned, Walser has 
lost all powers of self-reflection. After Walser's rebirth, he is lost, both literally and 
metaphorically cut off from the rich spaces and play offered by St. Petersburg and 
London. The "snowy wastes" are described as "The empty centre of an empty 
horizon" (236). Walser "is a sentient being, still, but no longer a rational one; indeed, 
now he is all sensibility without a grain of sense, and sense impressions alone have 
the power to shock and ravish him" (236). Walser, under the guidance of the tribe's 
Shaman 
acquired an 'inner life', a realm of speculation and surmise within 
himself that was entirely his oxvn. If, before he set out with the circus 
in pursuit of the bird-woman, he had been like a house to let, 
fumished, now he was tenanted at last, even if that interior tenant was 
insubstantial as a phantom and sometimes disappeared for days at a 
time. 
(Carter 1972,261) 
In this void, objectless world, phantasy is the only mode of perception - there is no 
connection with an external, real world. Walser's adopted tribe does not even believe 
him to be real, but merely a hallucination, 
since, traditionally, the natives of those remote parts of Siberia 
regarded hallucination as ajob of, %vork- [ ... ] you might 
have said the 
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Shaman "lived in a dream". But so did they all. They shared a 
common dream, which was their world, and it should rather be called 
an "idea" than a "dream", since it constituted their entire sense of 
lived reality, which impinged on real reality only inadvertently. 
(Carter 1972,253) 
This world of dreams that constitutes reality for the isolated tribe, then, is not 
corporeal, not material. By calling it an "idea" I think Carter invites a Marxist 
analysis of the idealists privileging their disembodied sense of reality over the 
material conditions of lived bodily experience, a reading emphasised by the increased 
ferocity Nvith which Lizzie defends her Marxist, historical materialist position in 
Siberia. Because in this Nvorld there is no sense of illusion, no play, only 
hallucinations, magic never tempered by realism, there is no creative use of objects. 
Objects exist only as an extension of phantasy; the Shaman's art of confidence 
trickery, like that of the capitalist Colonel and Herr M., cannot function transitionally 
as Fevvers' does. The Shaman's objects are not transitional but "fetishes"' (238), 
again like the capitalists and the patriarchs. 'o 
As the Shaman's mysticism demonstrates, there is a certainty that exists in 
accepting one's phantasies for reality. The retreat into a phantastic world is, after all, 
a defence against the uncertainty and paradox of the potential space and the 
recognition of the whole object. But this certainty is acquired at the expense of 
creative play. "They knew the space they saw. They believed in a space they 
apprehended. Between knowledge and belief, there was no room for surmise or 
doubt. They were, at the same time, pragmatic as hell and, intellectually speaking, 
permanently three sheets in the wind" (253). We also learn that the tribe does not 
encounter foreigners, that is, there is no foreign element from external reality which 
enters into their world and demands that they alter their hallucinations as a good- 
enough mother would. A foreigner that did once stray into their camp could not be 
incorporated into their world and was expelled; having no understanding of anything 
outside themselves, they demonise this alien entity, identifying him, and any others 
who threaten their pure, untainted phantasy, as the "devil" - like the rationalist 
Enlightenment, this "irrational" tribe develops a system of demonisation, expulsion 
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and confinement against that which threatens their social order. Also, like much of 
our contemporary theory, the "other" is always a demon, an extension of our phantasy 
but also a threat to it - hell, after all, is the other. This tribe, then, exists in a 
permanent paranoid-schizoid position in that they only experience part object 
relations, do not recognise objects for what they are and are incapable of creative 
play. They cannot use objects but only possess them. 
Postmodern (i-r-)Rationality: The Prestidigitation of Psychoanalysis 
Carter also shows how the Shaman is worthy of membership in the Society of 
Reason, although she admits that of the "mad scientist" figures in Nights at the 
Circus, he is the most sympathetic (Haffenden 1985,88). Again Car-ter uses this 
figure to demonstrate how reason and unreason are employed as a defence, and is of 
particular interest to me here as one may regard it to be addressing psychoanalysis 
itself. The Shaman 
listened attentively to what Walser said after a dream because it 
dissolved the slender margin the Shaman apprehended between real 
and unreal, although the Shaman himself would not have put it that 
way since he noticed only the margin, shallow as a step, between one 
level of reality and another. He made no categorical distinction 
between seeing and believing. It could be said that, for all the peoples 
of this region, there existed no difference between fact and fiction; 
instead, a sort of magic realism. Strange fate for ajournalist, to find 
himself in a place with where no fact, as such, existed! Not that 
Walser would have known what a journalist was, any more his 
memories were incomprehensible to him until the Shaman interpreted 
them. 
(Carter 1984,260) 
This provocative passage can surely be read in many different ways, but it suggests to 
me a relationship between Walser and the Shaman similar to that of the analysand 
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and the analyst. Perhaps Ave are to regard this psychoanalytic relationship as a 
potential space opening within the void of Siberia: and psychoanalysis itself is a sort 
of magic realism, capable of opening potential spaces of communication, caught 
between fact and fiction, frustratingly so where facts, as such, are elusive. However, 
there exists the frequently made accusation that psychoanalysis can become a 
controlling discourse that is overly scientific, creating a specialist discourse (as per 
Foucault, Bourdieu) th at alienates subjects from their own experience. Carter's 
representation of psychoanalysis here I find to be typically ambivalent. On the one 
hand, she says that the 
Shaman most certainly was nol a humbug. He was the supreme form 
of the confidence trick - others had confidence in him because of his 
own utter confidence in his own integrity. He was the doctor and the 
midwife of the village,. the dream-reader and the fortune-teller, the 
intellectual and the philosopher, to boot. 
(Carter 1984,263) 
On the other hand, however, the Shaman is a rationalist like the rest: "He made no 
categorical distinction between seeing and believing [ ... ] there existed no 
difference 
between fact and fiction" and he insists upon speakingfor Walser, whose "memories 
were incomprehensible to him until the Shaman interpreted them" (263). 
In many ways, with this representation Carter is critiquing psychoanalysis as a 
rationalist, epistemological-centric science that concerns itself onlY with language. 
Narrating, Fevvers describes: 
The Shaman was the pedant of pedants. There was nothing vague 
about his system of belief. His type of mystification necessitated hard, 
if illusory, fact, and his mindwas stocked with concrete specifics. 
With what passionate academicism he devoted himself to assigning 
phenomena their rightful places in his subtle and intricate theology! If 
he was always in demand for exorcisms and prophecies, and often 
asked to use his necromantic powers to hunt out minor domestic items 
which had been mislaid, these were frivolous distractions from the 
main, pressing, urgent, arduous task in hand, which was the 
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interpretation of the visible world about him via the information he 
acquired through dreaming. When he slept, which he did much of the 
time, he would, could he have written it, have put a sign on his door: 
'Man at work'. 
(Carter 1984,252) 
We again see here all of the trappings of the rationalist - pedantic, certain, factual, 
academic, patriarchal,. theologic. It is this perceived necessity of objective, hard facts 
that lead to the importance of Walser's lessons in "the power of looking 
preternaturally solemn, as if he were the possessor of knowledge hidden from 
ordinary mortals, " because this look is "a prerequisite for the whole performance; 
who would believe a giggling Shaman' ' (264). This myth of objectivity is perpetuated 
by the Shaman/psychoanalyst by mystifying the process like a religion - an 
observation often made of psychoanalysis in fiction (for example, D. M. Thomas' 
The Ofite Hotel, Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar, Salman Rushdie's Grinnis, Ntozake 
Shange's Liliana, Marie Cardinal's The Words to Say It, Joanne Greenberg's I Never 
Promised You a Rose Garden). Like psychoanalysis, the Shaman's main task is the 
"interpretation of the visible world via the information he acquired through 
dreaming. " For the Shaman, as for Freud, the dreamwork is the royal road to the 
unconscious and the means by which to construct knowledge about the analysand's 
world. The Shaman and the members of his tribe, we are told, have a fantastic ability 
to scrutinise the landscape and to read the inscriptions thereupon, that is, the tracks of 
the few animals with whom they share their environment and upon whorn they 
depend for their survival. Similarly, for Freud, psychoanalysis is the "suitable lighf, 
through which one could trace the inscriptions upon the mystic writing pad (Freud 
1925a), tracking the marks left by the objects that he hunts - the histories, neuroses, 
traumas and fears of his analysands. 
Carter is perhaps more scathing in her illustration of psychoanalysis when she 
sets out to explain what Walser must do in order to learn the Shaman's profession. 
Fewers tells us that Walser's lessons comprised three components: 
a) prestidigitation, or sleight of hand - the ability to conceal pebbles, 
sticks, spiders and, if any -%vere obtainable, baby mice about his person 
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and produce them in the course of a diagnosis or an operation; 
b) ventriloquism - the assumption of a high, squeaky voice of the 
special kind associated with the voices of spirits [or hysterics], and to 
'throw' it, so it might seem as if it came from within the patient 
himself [ ... I 
c) last but not least - the power of looking preternaturally solemn, as if 
he were the possessor of knowledge hidden from ordinary mortals 
(Carter 1984,263) 
The implication is that not only is the Shaman/psychoanalyst a rationalist, but also a 
sort confidence artist of a dubious sort, like the Colonel or Herr M.. The tricks let the 
Shaman pull a diagnosis out of a hat, so to speak-, a mystification that increases his 
power. Similarly, psychoanalysts are accused of practising ventriloquism, forcing 
their own discourses into the voices of their patients (again, see The White Hotel, Tile 
Words to Say It). And the solemnity of their look is to maintain the illusion of 
objectivity, an art still practised by those psycboanalysts, %vho would prefer to deny or 
play down the importance of the countertransference, still clutching the antiquated 
idea(l) of objectivity and the myth of the analyst as a blank slate. 
However, I find that Carter's critique of psychoanalysis is aimed even more 
specifically. Fevvers also describes: 
The world, dream, dreamed idea or settled conviction extended 
upwards, to the heavens, and downwards, into the bowels of the earth 
and the depths of the lakes and rivers with all whose tenants they lived 
on intimate terms. But it did not extend laterally. It did not, could not, 
take into account any other interpretation of the world, or dream, 
whichwas not their own one. Their dream was foolproof An engine 
tuned fabrication. A closed system. Foolproofbecause it was a closed 
system. The Shaman's cosmogony, for all its complexity of forms, 
impulses and states of being perpetually in flux, was finite just 
because it was a human invention and possessed none of the 
implausibility of authentic history. And "history" was a concept with 
which they were perfectly unfamiliar, as, indeed, they were with any 
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kind of geography except the mystically four-dimensional one they 
invented for themselves. 
(Carter 1984,253; emphases mine) 
Here again there are the criticisms of rationalist certainty, but I cannot but help 
perceiving an implicit critique of the structuralist and post-structuralist language that 
tells us how language exists laterally in a closed system, that is, synchronically, 
concerned with the disembodied langue, irrespective of history and individual 
utterances. Saussure's presuppositions and exclusions were, I grant, necessary in the 
construction of a science of language, but also just as this tribe becomes confused as 
towhat is real and what is phantasy, I believe that we have similarly lost touch with 
the reality of the subject when subjects are thus reduced by an "engine-turned 
fabrication. " Furthermore, the Shaman owns a bag of objects (like a magician's bag 
of tricks), the most important of which is an amulet. Like Lacan's phallus, this amulet 
assumes a place of central, if not exclusive, importance in the Shaman's power. 
Again, one cannot help but think that Carter is at play, explicitly ridiculing and 
parodying the assumptions of Lacanian psychoanalysis: "In his amulet resided the 
whole source of his extraordinary powers. His father, from whorn he had inherited it, 
assured him he must never, ever reveal the contents. He was so secretive about the 
contents of his amulet-bag it might as well have contained nothing at all" (257). 
As if to emphasise the central importance of countertransference, the Shaman 
interprets the world and the images that present themselves to him according only to 
his own hallucinations and the dictates of his own phantasy. For example, upon 
hearing Walser sing a European song he learned from the Circus, the Shaman, "sure 
he interpreted the sounds correctly" while not understanding any of the words, kills a 
reindeer and stretches his skin between two poles in a sort of ritual sacrifice. Also, 
the Shaman operates entirely in his own language, and it is this that Walser must 
learn in order to communicate his dreams to his new spiritual guru. However, 
Walser's 
gradual acquisition of the Shaman's language set up a conflict within 
him, for his memories, or his dreamings, or whatever they were, were 
dramatised in quite another language. When he spoke out loud in that 
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language, the Shaman paid him far more attention than he did when he 
asked for another glass of tea in proto-Finno-Ugric, because the 
Shaman assumed Walser's remembered English was the astral 
discourse that must be interpreted according to his own grand 
hypothesis, a set of conundrums that became perfectly scrutable with 
the aid of mediation and that distillate withwhich he continued to 
dose Walser. 
(Carter 1984,260) 
Walser's adoption of the Shaman's language renders him unable to (re-)experience 
his dreams (and unconscious phantasies in general) in an idiom that "Vould have 
personal meaning. The Shaman "was accustomed to seeing, or seering, and then 
persuading others that they say the same thing as he" (269). And the Shaman is 
incapable of understanding any experience that lies beyond his grand hYPothOsis- For 
example, there can be no interpretation of Walser's remembrances of the sea, as it is 
a concept entirely out of the Shaman's realm of experience: "he could not interpret 
this vision; he could not decide what the sea meant - although, as his grasp of the 
Shaman's language grew, he was able to make a few stabs at interpreting the dream 
material as he went along" (261), just as many ontological crises are incapable of 
being read by psychoanalysts whose language - or excessive privileging of 
language 
- does not include words or concepts for these malaises. It is when Walser and the 
Shaman begin to share a language and Walser begins to retrieve more of his own 
memory that the potential space begins to open and dialogue becomes possible. 
However, the Shaman maintains the privileged place of his own discourse and 
interpretations over those of his analysand. "Walser had learned to speak in images in 
order to recount his visions W that the Shaman would understand them but the 
Shaman understood them in his own way" (262). 
Aspects of Carter's rational/irrational psychoanalysts are also embodied in 
other figures. Early in the Nvar to defend his city, the Minister decides that Hoffil an M 
"has invented a virus which causes a cancer of the mind, so that the cells of the 
imagination run Nvild. And Nve must - Nve will! - discover the antidote" (Carter 
1972, 
22). Therefore, the Minister perceived the hallucinations that plague his city to be an 
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illness that must be cin-ed- more specifically, an illness of the mind, whereby the 
mind is pulled away from rationality and the real world, and it is the Minister's self- 
appointed task to use the powers of rationality to draw the citizens back to reason. 
Unsure as to how Dr. Hoffman is taking control of his city, the Minister "was forced 
to become an exorcist and although he bad a battery of technological devices to 
help him, in the last resort he was reduced to the methods of the medieval witch- 
hunter" (22). Again, in this description of the Minister, we hear the echoes of many 
clich6s regarding psychoanalysis: paradoxically incorporating religion, superstition, 
exorcism, scientific objectivity and technology. 
As each of these authors demons trate, therefore, merely representing unreason does 
not effect a significant challenge to the established order. We therefore repeatedly 
find in contemporary magic realist texts a third space of play that attempts to 
negotiate these perilous extremes and to achieve, through the creative play of 
subjective being, a real challenge to the established social, political, economic (and 
literary) orders. 
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The Potential Spaces of Contemporary Magic Realism 
"The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters" 
Imagination abandoned by reason produces impossible monsters; 
united with her, she is the mother of the arts and the source of their 
wonders. 
(Goya, Los Caprichos, 1799)41 
There is a radical difference between trying to define the limits 
reason runs up against, and wanting to base reason in inviolable 
limits. In the first case, reason has its own domain, based on the 
principle of identity and the search for univocity; it recognises that 
this domain has frontiers, even if it strives to push them back. 
Reason is thus bordered by an exterior. In the second case, reason 
is no longer anything but an illusory superstructure, having no other 
justification than that of a system of defences prejudicial to the 
emergence of truth. Since these limits are foundational, and are 
intrinsically necessary to the field they define, the field truly no 
longer has any limits; it is bounded by nothing except itself, is 
subject to no determination, and, aforliori, no rules. 
A further step is taken in this direction once the theory 
claims to base itself, not even on limits, but on impasses - that is, 
on taking wrong roads [ ... I Establishing these impasses as foundational means condemning the entire field to sterility, and 
enclosing it - that is, if it were to accept any limits at all - in a sort 
of triumphant deadlock. 
(Roustang 1998,119-20) 
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A magic realism that seeks to create potential spaces does not simply transgress or 
subvert reason and does not therefore perpetuate the hegemony of the order that 
produces both reason and unreason, the thesis and its antithesis, but can (playfully) 
explore genuine alternatives. Monle6n, for example, suggests at times that even the 
setting of the early gothic novel was neither that of exclusive reason or unreason, 
"Neither the city nor the country, but rather that no-man's-land in which the rural and 
the urbanworld met; neither the image of an agricultural society nor the locus of 
mercantilism, but rather that belt on which a new economic order was basing its 
resources and to which it was relegating its residues" (334). This space for Monle6n 
in the gothic is typified by ruins, "neither the projection of an Arcadian countryside 
nor the emblem of civilisation. They stood in a no-man's-landwhere the ivy 
romanced the stone, where two worlds intersected" (35). Day notes how Carter's 
feminism "is notjust an inversion, as if the feminism of this novel were inscribed 
within what Carter termed a 'female supremacist' mode" (Day 192). Just as Klein 
does not merely "invert"the Freudian model but reconstructs it, so too many 
contemporary magic realist authors realise that a simple inversion would be both 
futile and counter-productive. Walpole's gothic castle of Otranto is situated firmly in 
the irrational past; Carter's bloody chamber is located in a castle "at home neither on 
the land nor the water, a mysterious, amphibious place, contravening the materiality 
42 of both earth and waves" (1979,117). The panopticons of Nights at the Circus and 
Waters' Affinity begin as places for the confinement and surveillance of women 
prisoners, but are transforined when love blossoms between the prisoners and the 
guards in Carter's novel and a prisoner and a lady visitor in Waters'. As we have seen 
with regard to time, for example, it should not be a question of history versus 
herstory, evolution versus cycles, Freud versus Klein. In Siberia, Fevvers laments the 
loss of both Ma Nelson's clock-, which can be stopped and reset by Fevvers and Lizzie 
as they require, and Father Time, "who was once on our side" (Car-ter 1984,226, 
234). It is to insist, in Winnicottian fashion, not upon the rigid, defensive and 
artificial segregation of categories and perceptions, but upon a careful and ongoing 
negotiation between these. We do not want to imagine a situation imposed by 
Hoffman, who "set the timepieces free so that now they are authentically pieces of 
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time and can tell everybody whatever time they like" (1972,33). 
As with time, there is a recognition in contemporary magic realist fiction that 
all such defensive binaries need to be (re)negotiated. This can be seen most often as a 
negotiation between the artificial and defensive posturings of reason and unreason. 
Too often tales of magic realism or fantasy are seen as (and sometimes are) mere 
escapism, as with the carnival, regarded as only opium for the masses that actually 
pen-nits further exploitation by the dominant order. In rejecting unreason as a solution 
to the tyranny of reason many contemporary magic realist authors are similarly 
dismissed as advocating the status quo, participating in a cultural industry that seeks 
to maintain the bourgeois order (see Zipes 1979). Many magic realist authors find 
themselves in a paradoxical position of writing stories that invite readers to indulge 
their imaginations, to at least admit the possibility of magical worlds, while at the 
same time decrying the rule of what are usually taken to be unreasonable forces in 
society. Rushdie, for example, in an open letter to the six billionth person bom 
(1999), argues against belief in religious stories as the origin and meaning of life, 
paradoxically echoing the pleas of rationalist Enlightenment scientists for an 
abandonment of such antiquated, dangerous beliefs. "As human knowledge has 
grown, it has also become plain that every religious story ever told about how we got 
here is quite simplywrong. This, finally, is what all religions have in common" 
(Rushdie 1999). Expelling the uncertainty that appears so often in his fiction, 
Rushdie repeatedly dismisses these "sacred tales" as simply "wrong. " While 
Rushdie's magic realist fiction could certainly be said to draNv upon the 
epistemologies of the past, Rushdie here advocates a rejection of these in favour of 
what seems like a thoroughly modem, scientific approach to knowledge. "The 
ancient wisdoms are modem nonsenses. Live in your own time, use what we know, 
and as you grow up, perhaps the human race will finally grow up with you, and put 
aside childish things" (1999). 
As I have suggested throughout this chapter, Car-ter also must confront this 
paradox - the "magic" in her fiction often sitting uncomfortably with her principles. 
"It's an odd paradox, I know" she admits to Haffenden (92); "I'm a socialist damn 
it! " she insisted on another occasion. "What do I care about fairieS? "43 Carter wrote 
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that the early Enlightenment collections of Histories or Tales ofPast Times placed 
the folkloric traditions in the past because of a sense that they ought to belong to the 
past, "where it posed no threat" and she describes herself as "saddened to discover 
that I subscribe to this feeling, too" (Carter 1990, xi). She told Haffenden: 
Obviously the idea that my stories are all dreams or hallucinations out 
of Jung-land, or the notion that the world would be altogether a better 
place if we threw away our rationality and went laughing down the 
street, or even the one that schizophrenia is an enriching experience, 
that's all nonsense. I can see how it must look to some readers, but the 
point is that if dreams are real as dreams, then there is a materiality to 
symbols; there's a materiality to imaginative life and imaginative 
experience which should be taken quite seriously. 
(Haffenden 1985,85) 
She then admits: "My villains are usually mad scientists, but I really don't know why, 
since I've got nothing against science as such. The toy-maker, the puppet master, is 
the ideal villain" (95). And yet she uses magic, the mystical, in order to materialise, 
de-mystify. 
Jeanette Winterson implicitly addresses this when examining the furore over 
naked pictures of children in a recent (2001) Saatchi exhibit. She realises, first, rather 
obviously, that "human nature is full of such contradictions" but that "The regular 
reformers, whether spiritual or social, teetotallers or icon-smashers, pressure groups 
or policy-makers, always want things in black and white. This or that is not who we 
are" (Winterson 200 1). 44 Negotiating these paradoxes, providing constructive 
uncertainties, for Winterson, is the function of art: "Art works with contradictions, 
which is why zealous regimes such as Stalinism, fascism and puritanism hate it. The 
Neivs ofthe World doesn't seem too keen on it either" (2001). 
There is the implication in these comments that there is a kind of "reason7' 
that offers hope to the rational senselessness that too often dominates national and 
international politics and economics, but also a recognition that "reason, " and the 
Enlightenment project in general, has not panned out the Nvay it was supposed to. Or, 
as Eagleton suggests, perhaps the project of modernity never really got off the ground 
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(1996,63). This leads to another paradox: Many of these authors simultaneously 
-%vrite - in both their novels and critical writings - against the postmodern 
depersonalised, disembodied surface, a consequence of the Enlightenment's 
epistemological-centricism, but they also wish to reclaim something of the 
Enlightenment ideal of reason. These authors seem to appreciate, with Eagleton, that 
"If we can and must be severe critics of Enlightenment, it is Enlightenment which has 
empowered us to be so" (1990,8). Instead of a Reason that is divorced from affect, 
an epistemology that does not account for ontology, there is something to be gained 
from Bion's work that seeks to re-unite this artificial dichotomy, to use reason as a 
means of thinking aboutfeelings. 
Aidan Day, in The Rational Glass (1998), empbasises Carter's "materialist 
metaphysics" and provides a convincing wealth of evidence to show how in Carter's 
works "reason" and "rationality" are qualities that are, for the most part, privileged - 
but not without important exceptions. Dr. Hoffman is, by the novel's conclusion, 
clearly the enenzy, regardless of how much Sadeian sympathy we might extend to him 
along theway as waging war upon the oppressed inhabitants of the city; Lizzie 
always wisely tries to get Fevvers to see reason, of the old-school Marxist variety; as 
stiflingly dull life with the Professors seems to Marianne, the chaotic Barbarians are 
more brutal and horrific. However, far from accepting an Enlightenment vision, 
Carter is playing with the very concept of reason and rationality, seeking alternative 
conceptualisations of reason that are not defined by bourgeois enlightenment. Day's 
evaluation of Carter shares much with my object-relations psychoanalytic approach; 
he too finds that 
Carter wants a reason defined outside the binary antagonisms of 
masculine and feminine, reason and unreason, thought and feeling. 
She Nvants a model inwhich reason and thought are not defined 
against unreason and feeling. She Nvants a model for the relationship 
between people that is based on the principle of reciprocity rather than 
self-definition by exclusion. 
(Day 1998,13 1) 
Rather than psychoanalysis, Day examines Carter's play of reason in terms of 
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Haberrnas' philosophical re-evaluations of the Enlightenment and postmodernity - an 
approach that is not without merit, but one that I approach suspiciously. 45 
As I explored in Part 1, my psychoanalytic bases produce a different approach 
to re-evaluating reason. First, the concepts of "rationality" and "reason" can be read 
in two ways. On the one hand, there is the (paranoid-)schizoid rationality that is the 
favoured crutch of the depersonalised subject who, splitting the object and the self, 
its mind from its body, and wishing to keep separate the subject and object, relies 
upon reason as a (pathological) defence mechanism in order to sustain its false-self in 
the face of uncertainty, a hostile, harsh environment demanding compliance. On the 
other hand, rationalism might also be the "mind in health, " the domain of the 
psychically mature, integrated subject in the depressive position that recognises 
whole objects and can more accurately respond to the world. Whereas the 
Enlightenment conception of Reason is based upon objectivity and disinterest, a 
healthy conception of reason engages the subject and the subjective element and is 
able to tolerate the uncertainty that this implies. At its best, reason, Eagleton reckons, 
"is related to generosity, to being able to acknowledge the truth orjustice of another's 
claim even when it cuts against the grain of one's own interests and desires. To be 
reasonable in this sense involves not some desiccated calculation but courage, 
realism, justice, humility and largess of spirit; there is certainly nothing clinically 
disinterested about it" (1996,123). 
Day is correct when he states that Carter has a "passion for" and 
"commitment to reason" (12), although Day and Ricarda Schmidt, drawing upon 
classical psychoanalysis, regard "reason" as a negotiation between the super-ego and 
the id (Schmidt 1990; Day 1998,83), and the belief that Carter is devoted to liberal- 
feminism is questionable. ("I'm a socialist damn it! " might have been her restrained 
response. ) Carter's apparent desire for a world ruled by reason does not, for example, 
extend to the patriarchal, controlling and depersonalising city in Infernal Desire 
Machines - as I state above, this is a damning polemic against the Enlightenment 
manifestation of reason in defence of capitalism and patriarchy. Carter, in both her 
fiction and criticalwriting, explicitly examines these two conceptions of rationality 
as a depersonalising defence mechanism of the split subject and of rationality as a 
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sober recognition of the whole object. Of course, these two visions of reason and 
rationality are, I think, intricately related in such a way that it is sometimes very 
difficult to distinguish between the two, and this too Carter seizes upon. Carter uses 
the terms reason and rationality to mean both a positive state of depressive 
ambivalence andjudgement and also as a term indicating a depersonal i sing, 
desubjectifying defence mechanism employed by a non-integrated, paranoid-schizoid 
subject. It is placing their faith in reason, "however incoherently, " that protects 
Fevvers, Lizzie and others from the Circus from the Siberian stonn (1984,243), 
which suggests not a intellectual faith in the power of the mind to overcome the 
environment but an emotional engagement, a faith in the environment to perform a 
holding, containing function. As Carter states in The Sadeian Woman, contra 
Voltaire, reason cannot serve as one's only guiding light, as "rationality without 
humanism founders on itself' (1 979b, 35). Fevvers' rationality is not the product of 
the patriarchal Enlightenment but, Carter suggests, is the result of good object 
relations and confidence bred from the safe and secure good internal object. Fewers 
explains, 
NoNv,, %vhen I call Lizzie a "NvitcW', you must take it Nvith a 
pinch of salt because I am a rational being and, what's more, took in 
my rationality Nvith her milk, and you could say it's too much 
rationality as procured her not altogether undeserved reputation, for 
-vvhen she puts two and two together sometimes she comes up with 
five, because she thinks quicker than most. 
(Carter 1984,225) 
Fewers' rationality stems from the introjection and maintenance of the good object 
(milk) which develops into a recognition of whole objects: Lizzie is a Nvitch, but she 
is also a rationalist - perhaps too much so, as her type of rationalism (ironically 
expressed through Lizzie's adherence to Marxist theory) leads to simple mistakes and 
misrecognition of the world. 
Elaine Jordan sees Carter as "rethinking the fables of Enlightened modernity" 
(Jordan 1994,196). Day focusses on Carter's deconstruction of the "Enlightenment's 
grand narrative or metanarrative of reason" (68), assuming "Reason" to be a 
241 
monolithic structuring principle of the subjectivity of modernism tbatpost- 
modernism has arrived to eradicate. Day, focussing on the perceived dissolution of 
the metanarrative and the proliferation of competing discourses, sees this "liberating" 
project as generally "postmodern. " However, I think that postmodernism's success in 
overturning Enlightenment hegemony has been extremely limited. Postmodernism 
itself is still largely enamoured of and falls victim to the epistemologies and love of 
epistemology that dominate the Enlightenment. While the academic postmodem tries 
to undo the theoretical possibility of metanarratives, many of these narrative are as 
strong - if not stronger, further entrenched - in the world as a whole. By continuing 
to privilege the ontological status of the signifier above that of the subject, the 
postmodern subject has no recourse but to complywith this Enlightenment 
epistemology. 
Although I usually avoid broadly mapping theories of individual development 
onto socio-cultural historical movements, I am tempted to do so here, mapping the 
development of the fantastic narrative since the Enlightenment onto the Kleinian 
development of the infant. Monle6n traces the movement of the fantastic to a 
narrative mode that could be more accurately described as magic realist, noting that 
"The old polarization between good and evil that bad been effective in the gothic 
tales disappeared with the progressive internalization of the demonic. As a result of 
this process, an epistemological uncertainty arose in bourgeois thought, a crisis that 
was articulated through and tamed by the fantastic" (Monle6n 1998,72). As Klein 
and Bion and Winnicott show, however, this uncertainty is not limited to 
epistemology, but goes to the very heart of our being as subjects. Whereas first, as in 
the eighteenth century, the bad object of unreason was projected, located outside the 
infant, by the nineteenth century there is an inevitable internalisation as the 
increasingly "rational" infant recognises that the bad object comes from inside. When 
faced with the whole object, the infant experiences ambivalence and uncertainty, and 
this ambivalence and uncertainty are also at the heart of magic realist narratives. 
Eventually, as the infant matures, the child learns to accept and tolerate the 
ambivalence and uncertainty of the whole object, thus moving beyond the schizoid 
position and embarking upon a better, more accurate relationwith the world. This 
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movement is recognised and articulated by magic realist writers, if not by 
contemporary literary critics. It is perhaps also significant that wben I wished to 
examine the vicissitudes of reason and unreason in the previous sections, Carter's 
Infernal Desire Machines offered the most obvious examples of the limitations of 
both extreme positions, and now that I wish to examine potential spaces that can 
negotiate between the polar opposites, it is Carter's later, and I think much more 
camature" work, Nights at the Circus (1984) to Nvbich I turn most of my attention. In 
this section, I will examine some of these settings of magic realist novels that 
maintain those potential spaces that do not support the dominant (rationalist, 
bourgeois) order either by confirming the hegemony of reason or by pretending to 
offer a naive transgressive solution of unreason, but by denying the rationalist 
categories themselves and maintaining uncertainties and paradoxes. 
Re-acquainting Winnicott and Bakhtin 1: Carnival as Liminal Space 
In this investigation it is perhaps inevitable, though also very productive, again to 
draw Bakhtin into dialogue with Winnicott - specifically, how Bakhtin's conception 
of the carnival shares many qualities with a Winnicottian conception of magic realist 
literature as potential space. Many - including Carter herself - have criticised 
Bakhtin's conception of carnival along much the same lines as I have criticised that 
notion of transgression, that is, as a temporary subversion of authority, a safety-valve 
that only provides a fleeting illusion of change while in fact propping up the 
hegemonic order it appears to subvert. To some, carnival is only a temporary 
subversion of authorities, a transgression that does not really threaten the established 
order because of the accepted provision that at the carnival's conclusion, the normal 
social order will be re-established. There is some truth to such a reading, I think, but I 
also feel that in reading carnival through object-relations psychoanalysis and 
contemporary magic realism, we might gain another perspective, a more meaningful 
and lasting role for carnival as liminal space in which subjects can evade the 
demands of compliance, comforted by the knowledge that if the anxiety of creative 
243 
living becomes too great, they can always retreat to a world more familiar. 
Briefly, for Bakhtin, the carnival, such as Mardi Gras, Hallowe'en or May 
Day celebrations, is a cultural event, often found thematically in literature, that 
promotes an inversion and parodies of the normal order, societal hierarchies. Bakhtin 
empbasises that the carnival is a folk ritual, not for the purposes of an individual or a 
social elite but for all classes. In carnival, there are "no footlights" - there is no 
distinction between actors and spectators, and everyone participates on equal footing. 
This can be read psychoanalytically as encouraging the play - dissolution and 
confirmation - of boundaries between subject and object and the intersubjectivity 
that characterises the paradox of experience in the third space. In psychoanalytic 
terms, carnival makes no room for the narcissistic indulgence (it is a carnival, not an 
orgy); instead, carnival seeks to improve the relationswithin society, to improve 
object-relations, and strengthen the ego, we might say. The ritualistic aspect of 
carnival can also aid in reducing the anxiety of liminality and creative living by 
offering a structure to the seemingly chaotic paradoxes and choices available in the 
third space. 
Carnival also functions dialogically. Bakhtin historically links carnival to 
feasts, points out that cultural feasts are "linked to moments of crisis, of breaking 
points in the cycle of nature or in the life of society and man" (1984,9). Thus it is 
such breaks, gaps in the otherwise smooth, impenetrable power of social (or psychic) 
authorities that opportunities for carnival, for participatory creativity, are enabled. 
Also, as I suggested with regard to the dialogic nature of magic realist narrative, there 
are similar gaps in discourse that make the monologic, smooth discourses porous - 
and it is in these gaps that the potential for creativity exists . 
46 The temporary 
suspension of social laws during carnival leads Bakhtin to theorise the possibility of a 
special type of communication impossible in everyday life [ ... I special 
forrns of marketplace speech and gesture, frank and free, permitting 
no distance between those who came in contact with each other and 
liberating normal forms of etiquette and decency imposed at other 
times. A special carnivalesque, marketplace style of expression was 
formed which we find abundantly represented in Rabelais' novels. 
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(Bakhtin 1984,10) 
This is also to be found, I argue, in most magic realist novels under consideration 
here. A Lacanian reading of this might regard carnival as a suspension of le loi-dil- 
pýre - the threat of castration that enables language by forcing subjects into the 
symbolic order - and a repetition of the (primary) narcissistic fusion between the 
infant and the mother that the father forever abolished. While some texts explicitly 
invite this reading, I would read Bakhtin here as describing the special 
communication, the play enabled by subjects participating in the potential space, 
where meaning is generated by dialogic, mutual construction and not dictated by 
social authorities or the dictates of rationalist discourses. 
Re-acquainting Winnicott and Bakhtin H: The Grotesque Psyche-Soma 
Finally, Bakhtin's theory of carnival shares with Winnicott's potential space the full 
and active participation of the body, or more accurately, the psyche-soma. For 
Bakhtin, the carnival is characterised by grotesque realisin, an assertion of the base 
materiality of the body and its functions, especially those functions typically 
suppressed by the bourgeois order: shitting, fucking, farting, pissing, sweating, 
cumming... 
In grotesque realism [ ... ] the bodily element is deeply positive. It 
is 
presented not in a private, egotistic form, severed from the other 
spheres of life, but as something universal, representing all people. As 
such it is opposed to severance from the material and bodily roots of 
the world; it makes no pretense to renunciation of the earthy, or 
independence of the earth and the body [ ... I The material bodily 
principle is contained not in the biological individual, not in the 
bourgeois ego, but in the people, a people who are continually 
growing and renewed. This is why all that is bodily becomes 
grandiose, exaggerated, immeasurable. 
(Bakhtin 1984,19) 
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The grotesque body seeks to "'embody' the world, to materialize it, to tie everything 
in to spatial and temporal series, to measure everything on the scale of the human 
body" (1981,177). Bakhtin's Marxism (or perhaps more accurately, Stalin's 
Marxism) prevents him from imaging a bodily-ego of the sort conceives by 
Winnicott, and this immediately thwarts my attempt simply to draNv him into a 
simple psychoanalytic dialogue. However, while remembering to allow for 
differences, Bakhtin's language with regard to the body echoes Winnicott's seed 
metaphor: he says that the classical body has ... neither core nor shell, ' neither an 
inner nor an outer, " while the contemporary body is "A core and a shell, an inner and 
outer, separatedwithin if' (Bak-htin 1981,135-6). Bakhtin states that "The essential 
principle of grotesque realism is degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is high, 
spiritual, ideal, abstract" (19). As I have argued here, bourgeois individualism and 
Enlightenment rationalism have established a tradition of amplifying the dissociating 
and depersonalising defence mechanisms of the subject, pretending that lve have no 
bodies and concluding that our whole essence or nature consists in thinking 
(Descartes 1637,54). 
Despite their initial ideological differences, the grotesque body nevertheless 
has much in common with wbat Winnicott calls the integrated psycbe-soma. The 
grotesque body stands against the classical body, "the finished, complete man, 
cleansed, as it were, of all the scoriae of birth and development" (Bakhtin 1984,25). 
The classical body, like the postmodern body, is nothing more than a smooth, 
impregnable, unadulterated surface. This is the body as envisioned by the split-off 
mind-psyche, the body as desired by the omnipotent narcissist or rationalist that 
phantasies an existence severed from the "material body and roots of the world. " 
Such a body is emptied of any subjective elements (Winnicott 1949,1952; Bollas 
1987,1989; McDougall 1989). Bakhtin describes the classical body, like the 
depersonalised subject who seeks such a shell, as "isolated, alone, fenced off from all 
other bodies" with sharply defined, impenetrable defensive boundaries (1984,29). 
And the classical body is the body of the authority that would present us with a 
smooth, unadulterated discourse. The grotesque body, on the other hand, like the 
dialogic porous narrative of magic realism, "is not a closed, completed unit; it is 
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unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits" (1984,26). The grotesque 
body invites interaction by exposing its own openings, potential spaces for psyche- 
somatically integrated, creative living. 
The stress is laid on those parts of the body that are open to the outside 
world, that is, the parts through which the world enters the body or 
emerges from it, or through which the body itself goes out to meet the 
world. This means that the emphasis is on the apertures or the 
convexities... the open mouth, the genital organs, the breasts, the 
phallus, the potbelly, the nose This is the ever unfinished, ever 
creating body. 
(Bakhtin 1984,26) 
Bakhtin, like Klein and British psychoanalysis in general, does not privilege the 
phallus as the most important sexual organ - it assumes it rightful place as one organ 
among many. For Bakhtin as for Klein and Winnicott, it is thiswhole, integrated 
body that forms the basis for the creative use of language. Bakhtin's understanding of 
the language related to the grotesque body is limited to abuses, oaths and curses - this 
includes not only language that transgresses the law of the social order (fuck, 
tabernac), but also folk uses of language that are robbed of their meaning Nvhen 
authorised by the social elite. Bakhtin's theory can thus complement both Klein's 
belief that the aggressive phantasies of the infant initiate the use of symbols and 
Winnicott's conceptualisation that the creative use of language must necessarily 
involve the integrated psyche-soma. 
Although one must be careful in assuming a one-to-one correspondence here, 
grotesque realism is associated with ambivalence - life and death, good and bad, not 
merely the exultation of life over death, good over bad. As Sue Vice emphasises, 
"Bakhtin argues that dual images, combining praise and abuse, are characteristic of 
Rabelais, and of the ambivalence of grotesque realism, which may also blend comedy 
and tragedy [.. ] Praise and abuse here [ ... 
] are 'the two sides of the same coin', as 
Rabelais' image of the token suggests" (Vice 1997,158). As'with the whole-object, 
there is an uncomfortable meeting of opposites, opposites that are non-nally kept apart 
by defence mechanisms that most often support the established order, but this re- 
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unification is ultimately integrating, renewing. 
An interesting example of this opposition can be found in the 1988 Terry 
Gilliam film, TheMventures ofBaron Munchausen, where Ave meet the King and 
Queen of the Moon, who have the ability to separate their heads from their bodies. 
The King's bead -a mind-psyche - narcissistically boasts that when free of the 
distractions of the body, he is an omnipotent, all-knowing being, pondering the 
meaning and nature7 of the universe. Exemplifying the Enlightenment split, his mind- 
psyche is the ideal sought by bourgeois reason. His body, on the other hand, is always 
running around in a Bakhtinian grotesque fashion, lustily groping the Queen, 
ravenously devouring food and giddily expelling the results of his excesses. While the 
mind-psyche is content to exist in its own right and is always avoiding the body, the 
body jumps at every opportunity to seize the head, place it back upon its shoulders 
and thus integrate the psyche-soma. The head is terrified of such a possibility: 
"Flatulence and orgasms! I hate those faces you make me make! " Hence Bakhtin says 
that grotesque realism is degrading, "concerning oneself with the lower stratum of 
the body" (Bakhtin 1984,24), "'the lower part is the genital organs, the belly and the 
buttocks'. 'Upward' is heaven; 'the upper part' of the body 'is the face or the head"' 
(Vice 1997,155; see Bakhtin 1984,21). Interestingly, however, in TheMventures of 
Baron Munchausen the Queen's independent head and body are not similarly split as 
to their functions. Her head is still capable of lust - after our mini-hero Munchausen 
- and her body can still be cunning and thoughtful in avoiding the King's advances. 
This may be a re-articulation of a gender stereotype, but it also highlights the 
distinctively patriarchal nature of bourgeois rationaliSM. 47 
Fevvers' is often described as bawdy, farting and burping throughout the first 
chapters. She does not feel ashamed of discussing sex, enjoying the blushes of 
Walser's discreet rationalism. It is the "dirty language" Fevvers disapproves of, 
Tecognising, like Bakhtin, that there is nothing indecent about in the body and 
processes, but only in the discursive constructs that we build up around them. She 
observes that "There is no element of the metaphysical about pissing, not at least, in 
our culture" (Carter 1984,52). In addition, just when we and Walser are meant to be 
holding Fevvers in the greatest awe, marvelling at her magical splendour, a raunchy 
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fart usually brings us crashing back down to a harder realism. These bodily functions 
punctuate and penetrate the classical body and discourse, opening Fevvers' story up 
to the dialogic participation of others (Lizzie, Walser), preventing one from taking 
her story as complete, authoritative, smooth, whole, unassailable, and closed to 
others. 
Bringing the high low, inverting an established hierarchy, features in many 
magic realist texts. In Murray's John Dory, for example, our narrator George Singer's 
best friend, Squinty Bar Radish - perhaps one of the greatest names ever to grace the 
pages of an English novel - is described as a "Rabelaisian incarnation as a student of 
cacation" (2001,5 1). George and Squinty Bar must endure endless exceedingly 
tedious lessons in which their teacher, Miss Blood, makes her students recite from 
memory the proper way to address a titled clergyman who is the son of a duke or a 
marquess, a clergyman who is a baron, a clergyman Nvho is the son of either an earl or 
a viscount or a baron and so on and so on. ("Reverend Lord, " "Reverend the 
Honourable" and "Reverend Sir, " respectively, in case you are interested. ) In a 
wonderfully grotesque parody of this ritual recital that passed for learning in the 
1940s, Squinty Bar turns his bare buttocks to George and manipulates the two cheeks 
with his index fingers to make the orifice act as the mouth of his teacher: 
"Singer! " the twin cheeks demanded in a winsome falsetto. 
"Tell me how you would address a duke's arse? A duke's son's arse? 
A duke daughter's arse? How would you address a clergyman's 
daughter's arse assuming she was a peer of the realm? " 
"Please Miss, " I snickered, "that's a most imaginative play on 
words. I believe the proper form when you address a clergyman's 
daughter's arse is 'Miss Right Reverend Dirty Back Passage. "' 
"Mmm, " Radish's buttocks minced. "And how would you 
address her if she was titled? " 
"That's easy, Miss. 'Milady Right Reverend Bare Arse the 
Bandit Bart. " 
(Murray 2001,7 1) 
The scene continues in this vein, but I think this is sufficient to make my point. What 
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a Winnicottian analysis could add to this classical Bakhtinian grotesque scene is the 
element of imaginative play, particularly in the face of the compliance demanded 
from the stem system represented by Miss Blood. There is also the suggestion here 
that such a creative interruption of the established order can be more than a mere 
transgression, highlighting the ridiculous futility of that which the hierarchy takes so 
seriously. The laughter generated by the grotesque body not only subverts the 
student/teacher hierarchy, but also opens Miss Blood's authoritative discourse to the 
imaginative, dialogic play of George and Squinty Bar, letting them inject something 
of themselves into the world. 
This is equivalent to what Bollas refers to in the analytic scene as "cracking 
up" (1995), those comical moments when the analysand's speech undermines the 
authority of the analyst. As if personally acquainted with Miss Blood, Bollas explains 
that the "The self that wants to master its narration is continuously slipping up in its 
intentions" (224). Humour that cracks up discourse is dangerous, Bollas says, because 
it threatens authority: 
"Clowns, like minstrels and 'comics, ' always deal with the same 
problem, " writes Dario Fo, "be it hunger for food, for sex, or even for 
dignity, for identity, for power. The problem they invariably pose is - 
who's in command, who's the boss? " 
(Bollas 1995,240) 
It is not necessarily that comedy threatens to seize power, or itself constitutes a 
revolution, but such a cracking up exposes the gaps, the orifices, in a discourse that 
pretends it never farts or is unsusceptible towhat comes flying out of others' arses. 
Bollas claims that mothers can use cracking up to "neutralize a power conflict" (240), 
thus enacting Klein's suggested lessening of the perceived omnipotence of the 
parents so as to foster the epistemophillic instincts of the infant. 
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The Carnivals, Circuses and Casinos of Magic Realism 
"We came on the wind of the carnival" Vianne Rocher announces on the first page of 
Harris' Chocolal (1999,11). To the xenophobic villagers of Lansquenet, "we are a 
curiosity to them, a part of the carnival" (13). And, like so many of these narratives, it 
is a carnival - literal or metaphoric - that sets in motion the action, the first steps 
toward the potential space. As many criticise, the carnival in Lansquenet is only 
temporary and life soon seems to return to the status quo; all too soon 
The carnival is gone. Once a year the village flares into transient 
brightness but even now the warmth has faded, the crowd dispersed. 
The vendors pack up their hotplates and awnings, the children discard 
their costumes and party-favours. A slight air of embarrassment 
prevails, of abashment at this excess of noise and colour. Like rain in 
midsummer it evaporates, runs into the cracked earth and through the 
parched stones, leaving barely a trace. Two hours later Lansquenet- 
sous-Tannes is invisible once more, like an enchanted village which 
appears only once every year. But for the carnival we should have 
missed it altogether. 
(Harris 1999,15) 
The carnival comes and goes with little trace, but - if I can indulge myself with the 
metaphor - the water that seeps through the parched cracks can, under the right 
conditions, germinate the seeds. Carnival, as merely a transgression of authority, 
cannot itself enact change, but it can spark the creative element. I think that Zipes is 
correct when he observes with regard to the fairy or folk tale - and we may add 
literary carnival or even contemporary magic realist fiction - that "The end result is 
not an explosion or revolution. Literature and art have never been capable of doing 
this and never will be. But they can harbour and cultivate the germs of subversion and 
offer people hope in their resistance to all forms of oppression and in their pursuit of 
more meaningful modes of life and communication" (1979,18). Vianne decides to 
stay in Lansquenet, a facilitating mother to bring some magic to the town, "if ever a 
place were in need of a little magic [ ... I And besides, the wind, the carnival wind was 
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still blowing" (19). She is "like a remaining slice of the carnival" (26) feared by 
Father Reynard and the authorities that sanction the carnival as temporary relief 
Carter's Nights at the Circus offers one vision of a carnival, butwhile it may 
seem at times to be the most obvious example, Carter's typical play frustrates any 
simple reading. Carter herself read Bakhtin's work on carnival, but only afterwriting 
Nights at the Circus. In "In Pantoland" (1993) Carterjoins a chorus of voices who 
criticise the temporality of carnival. 
As Umberto Eco once said, "An everlasting carnival does not work. " 
You can't keep it up, you know; nobody ever could. The essence of 
the carnival, the festival, the Feast of Fools, is transience. It is here 
today and gone tomorrow, a release of tension not a reconstruction of 
order, a refreshment ... after which everything can go on again exactly 
as if nothing had happened. 
Things don't change because a girl puts on trousers or a chap 
slips on a frock, you know. Masters were masters again the day after 
Saturnalia ended; after the holiday from gender, it Nvas back to the old 
grind... 
(Carter 1993,389; ellipsis in original)"' 
And Carter explicitly says of Bakhtin's theory itself- 
It's interesting that Bakhtin became fashionable in the 1980s, during 
the demise of the particular kind of theory that would have pout all 
kinds of question marks around the whole idea of the camivalesque. 
I'm thinking of Marcuse and repressive desublimation, which tells you 
exactly what carnivals are for. The carnival has to stop. The whole 
point about the feast of fools is that things went on as they did before, 
after it stopped. 
(Carter, quoted in Warner 1994,254) 
Notice that Carter recognises the futility of simple transgression: it is only "a release 
of tension not a reconstruction of order. " While her criticism of Bakhtin is legitimate, 
I want to demonstrate that her work reveals another aspect of carnival, one that 
demonstrates how carnival goes beyond simple transgression and can be employed to 
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effect lasting, meaningful change. 
The circus perhaps involves more of a definite boundary between performer 
and spectator than an ideal Bakhtinian carnival, but the audience of the circus is 
invited to participate in the magic that the performers exhibit. Walser is transformed 
from mere observer to reporter and participant as a clown. As readers, '%ve are invited 
to identify Nvith Walser, who blurs that boundary between sceptical audience and 
participant when he himself runs off to join the circus. As Vice reminds us, "The 
whole point of carnival, and equally the dialogic novel, is that 'the vieNver [is] also a 
participant"' (Vice 1997,187). Even as Todorov acknowledges, the reader's 
participation, in the form of hesitation, is the first condition of the fantastic. It is not 
enough for Walser - for the (re-)ontologisation that he undergoes in the course of the 
novel - or for the reader to be a mere spectator: "Carnival is not a spectacle to be 
seen by the people; they live in if' (Bakhtin 1984,7). 
Walser becomes a clown, a figure that Bakhtin and Carter regard xvith 
ambivalence. On the one hand, Bakhtin sees the clown as the very embodiment of the 
transitional object, "representatives of the carnival spirit in everyday life out of 
carnival season. " Clowns "represented a certain form of life, which was real and 
ideal at the same time. They stood on the borderline between life and art, in a 
peculiar mid-zone as it were; they were neither eccentrics nor dolts, neither were they 
comic actors" (Bakhtin 1984,8). But clowns are also "life's maskers; their being 
coincides with their role, and outside this role they simply do not exist' ' (1981,159). 
This is true of Buffo: 
am I this Buffo whom I have created? Or did 1, when I made up my 
face to look like Buffo's, create, ex nihilo, another self Nvho is not me? 
And what am I without my Buffo's face? Why nobody at all. Take 
away my make-up and underneath is merely not-Buffo. An absence. A 
vacancy. 
(Car-ter 1984,122) 
The clown is in a unique position, like Walser, in that although clowns wear a mask, 
a false-self, "they see the underside and the falseness of every situation" (Bakhtin 
1981,159) - presumably an advantage that a more playful Walser wants to exploit in 
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his examination of Fewers. The clown is, paradoxically then, a form "to portray the 
mode of existence of a man who is in life, but not of it, life's perpetual spy and 
reflector" (16 1). Simultaneously exposing falsity and lies they also "grant the right 
not to understand, the right to confuse, to tease, to hyperbolise life; the right to 
parody others while talking, the right not be taken literally, not 'to be oneself"' (163). 
Walser the clown can foster the paradox that gives life to the "internal man" that 
"could be laid bare only with the help of the clown" (164). 49 
Walser-the-rationalist becomes a clown in order to fully experience the play 
offered by the liminality of the circus/carnival - clowns are both the life of the party 
and weary (postmodern) performers. The laughter of the carnival that the clowns 
generate is, Bakhtin says, universal in its scope; it is directed at everyone, including 
the carnival's participants (Bakhtin 1984,11) - perhaps especially the carnival's 
participants and, as Carter shows, the clowns themselves (see Carter 1984,116-25). 
This laughter is "uninfected by lies" (Bakhtin 1981,236) and is "ambivalent: it is 
gay, triumphant, and at the same time mocking, deriding. It asserts and denies, it 
buries and revives. Such is the laughter of carnival" (Bakhtin 1984,11-12). 50 This 
conceptualisation mirrors both the maintenance of productive paradox that 
characterises the third space and the psychic maturity of Klein's depressive position 
that is capable of successfully accommodating opposing emotions. 
Carter's circus is "constructed to house pen-nanent displays of the triumphs of 
man's will over gravity and rationality" (1984,105). It is a location of creative play 
where paradox is allowed to flourish against the tyranny of Enlightenment reason. 
But in the absence of clearly demarcated boundaries, it is not home to mere 
transgressive unreason. As the underlying location of the novel as a whole, the circus 
is the place we are invited to gape with awe and wonder at the normal made fabulous 
and the illusion of magical beings and events, but also where one can experience the 
"titillating contradiction between the soft, white shoulders of the lovely ladies [ ... I 
and the hairy pelts of the beasts in the ring" (1984,105). It is a location wherein the 
Colonel, the capitalist who runs the circus, takes advice from an intelligent pig and 
can honestly lament not being able to reason with his simian employees, "Darned 
apes won't listen to reason" (1984 183), while the apes constantly show themselves 
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to be more intelligent than their human oppressors - belying, therefore, the equation 
of reason -with an achievement of an evolved, Superior Man. 
The circus is a fertile repository of characters Nvho, like Fewers, challenge 
audiences' and readers' certainties. But more than merely challenging these 
certainties, the characters that populate Carter's circus encourage uncertainty and 
"hesitation" on the part of Walser and the reader Nvith iffesolvable paradoxes; if these 
characters are to be enjoyed and understood, the very foundations of bourgeois 
epistemology must be abandoned .51 The "inhabitant[s] of the magic circle of 
difference, " are "unreachable... not knowable" (1984,108). Fevvers, the marquee star 
of the show, asks her audiences the question "Is she fact or is she fiction, " but, as 
Winnicott insists -%vith regard to the transitional object, no decision on this point is 
ever expected. The Princess of Abyssinia, the tiger-enchantress, "looked like a child 
[ ... ] but, close to, her face, though neither 
lined nor wrinkled, was ancient as granite" 
(106). Lamarck's Educated Apes turn Darwinian theory up-side-down, making 
scientific study of humans, "producing afresh in Walser that dizzy uncertainty about 
what was human andwhat was nof' (110). Also, in Carter's Infernal Desire 
Machines, Desiderio first begins to learn of Dr. Hoffman's history and the theory 
behind his actions in a decrepit circus run by Hoffman's now-blind former physics 
professor. The circus/carnival offers a uncomfortable space in which we are invited 
to not just transgress, but to cast aside the boundaries, defences and hierarchies 
themselves. 
Other contemporary novels similarly suggest the carnival as a potential space 
of liminality. In Morrison's Beloved, the (re-)emergence of Beloved from the river, 
and the (re-)ontologising experiences that are made possible as a result, occur while 
Sethe, Paul D and Denver are attending a carnival. It is here that Sethe first sees the 
possibilities offered to her: "A life. Could be" (Morrison 1987,47). Through the 
facilitating presence of Paul D, who persuades Sethe to go to the carnival and, 
subsequently, to negotiate between her past and its reconstruction, Seth re-integrates 
her psyche-soma - feeling the chokecherry tree on her back - enabling her to recover 
her history. Paul D makes possible the visit to the carnival, inviting Sethe to make 
space for him but not, he points out, exclusively for him. "That's the point. The 
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whole point. I'm not asking you to choose. Nobody would. " (45). In Beloved, the 
carnival and the river frornwhich Beloved emerges are seen as liminal spaces, where 
the normal (racist, patriarchal) rules that govern society are suspended and from 
which life emerges: in the river, Denver is born and Beloved re-born; in the carnival, 
Sethe. 52 
In Jeanette Winterson's The Passion, the images of the carnival and the river 
again come together in Venice,, %vhich seems to be less a city and more an 
uninterrupted carnival, filled with games and gambling. Here, the waterways offer the 
chance to build bridges. Villanelle explains: 
We didn't build our bridges simply to avoid walking on water. 
Nothing so obvious. A bridge is a meeting place. A neutral place. A 
casual place. Enemies will choose to meet on a bridge and end their 
quarrel in that void. One will cross to the other side. The other will not 
return. For lovers, a bridge is a possibility, a metaphor of their 
chances. And for the traffic in whispered goods, where else but a 
bridge in the night? 
(Winterson 1987,57) 
Bridges in Winterson's Venice are thus spaces that not just connect two opposing 
sides (dialectical), but actually and actively create third spaces that negotiate between 
the two. However, again like potential spaces, "Bridges join but they also separate" 
(6 1); these spaces offer not only the chance to draw subjects together in potentially 
undifferentiated play, but the re-ontologisation offered by such creativity can also 
provide, through differentiation, a unique sense of self and a clear articulation of 
one's own boundaries. And like Winnicott, Winterson explicitly recognises the 
potential productivity of such paradoxes. Predicting that one day the Rialto bridge 
that prevents the two factions of the city warring will be forever "scaled, " Villanelle 
realises that it "will be the doom of paradox" (1987,6 1). 53 And although Capri, 
geographically speaking, is a genuine island, in Winterson's The PolverBook it 
becomes a liminal space, its mythical status creating an "idea of itself - an imaginary 
island and a real one - real and imaginary reflecting together in the mirror of the 
water" (2000,87). Like Venice, Winterson sees the secret of Capri's success to be 
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"found in maintaining these tensions" of land and sea, height and depth, innocence 
and knowingness, poverty and riches "that have always lived on either side of the 
olive tree" (91). 
As the circus lies at the heart of St. Petersburg in Carter's Nights, it is the 
Casino that is the focal point of magical, creative experience in Venice. The casino is 
one of the few places in which our female heroine can find ajob; she dresses as a 
boy, not to gain acceptance, but because it "was part of the game, trying to decide 
which sex was hidden behind tight breeches and extravagant face-paste [ ... I" 
(Winterson 1987,54). (It could be said that the same game is being played in Waters' 
Tripping the Velvet and, in a more "metatextual" fashion, in Winterson's JVritten on 
the Body. ) Villanelle recites the casino's mantra throughout the book: "You play, you 
win. You play, you lose. You play" (Winterson 1987,66). Winterson highlights the 
paradox and uncertainty of the potential space through gambling, suggesting perhaps 
that it does not matter so much -whether you win or lose but merely that you've 
played the game, a clich6d truism that can also be said with regard to love: 
Hopeless heart that thrives on paradox: that longs for the 
beloved and is secretly relieved when the beloved is not there. That 
gnaivs away at the night-time hours desperate for a sign and appears at 
breakfast so self-composed. That longs for certainty, fidelity, 
compassion, and plays roulette Nvith anything precious. 
Gambling is not a vice, it is an expression of our humanness. 
We gamble. Some do it at the gambling table, some do not. 
You play, you, %vin, you play, you lose. You play. 
(Winterson 1987,73)54 
Winterson's novels seem to abound with such anonymous spaces, and we can 
often draw parallels between anonymity and potentiality, although these are by no 
means equated. Sage notices in Car-ter's fiction, and perhaps contemporary magic 
realist fiction in general, a "nostalgia for anonymity" (1994,2) that undermines the 
authority and certainty of the narrator. Wrillen on the Body, for example, is one such 
space as the anonymous, androgynous - or, rather, bisexual, perhaps even poly-sexual 
- narrator allows Winterson and the reader to construct a cornucopia of potential 
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beings, sexualities, subjectivities and performance. Winterson's most recent novel, 
The PowerBook (2000), presents the characters revelling in the radical anonymity of 
sexuality and identity offered in cyber-space. Sexuality in Written on the Body and 
The PoiverBook is both richly sensual and disembodied: the polymorphous sexuality 
invites a celebration of bodily pleasure that is not constrained by gender politics, 
identities or even biological specificity but invites readers to "Take off your clothes. 
Take off your body. Hang them up behind the door. Tonight we can go deeper than 
disguise" (2000,4). More than merely being homosexual in a heterosexual world- 
or being heterosexual when the expectation is homosexual - these narrators deny all 
categorisation demanded by the Enlightenment binarism, of sexuality. Talking about 
The PoiverBook (2000b), Winterson openly spoke of admiring and desiring the 
anonymity offered by cyber-space and the plurality of subjectivities one can assume 
there. Her description of cyber-space in this respect immediately struck me as very 
similar to Villanelle's descriptions of Venice and the Casino. 
Stories in The City as Potential Space 
It should be possible to link the lessening of ornnipotent 
manipulation and of control and of devaluation to normality, and to 
a degree of manic defence that is employed by all in everyday life. 
For instance, one is at a music-hall and on to the stage come 
dancers, trained to liveliness. One can say that here is the primal 
scene, here is exbibitionisn-4 here is anal control, here is masochistic 
submission to discipline, here is a defiance of the super-ego. Sooner 
or later one adds: here is LIFE. 
(Winnicott 1935,131) 
As I argued above, the city is most often the location of unwavering rationality and 
the logical home of compliance and the IaNv of the father. However, cities generally 
receive an ambivalent treatment from contemporary magic realist writers, and thus 
the city sometimes becomes an important site of potentially creative experience. This 
is true of a vast range of city-scapes: from early nineteenth-century Venice to late 
nineteenth-century St. Petersburg to early twentieth-century Toronto to late-t'wentieth 
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century "Gothic north' 'Yorkshire 55 to early twenty-first century Tokyo. Carter cites 
cities as important spaces in the development of story-telling and creativity, pointing 
out that "Village girls took stories to the city, to swap during endless kitchen chores 
or to entertain other people's childreW' (Carter 1990, xv). This is perhaps especially 
true of societal re-organisation taking place during the Industrial Revolutions, which 
would consistently show how the creation of cities, dictated and necessitated by the 
bourgeois mode of production, were also - again, necessarily - the sites of resistance 
(both significant and token) to the bourgeois order. 56 
London is a site of such negotiation for Carter's Nights at the Circus, Wise 
Children and Waters' Tipping the Velvet, all of which illustrate the lives of music- 
hall stage performers in late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century London. 
Peach points out that the "theatre in the seventeenth centurywas a much more 
camivalesque institution than it is today. It was much more a free place for meeting 
and drinking with people and performances were characterised by more interaction 
between the actors and the audiences and within the audiences itself' (1998,148). 
Although set two hundred years later, Carter and Waters capitalise on this more 
camivalesque expression of the stage in their depictions of the music-hall which 
retains the more public and participatory aspects of theatre (in Wise Children, 
retaining the pre-Enlightenment theatrical traditions by reverting back to 
Shakespeare). As Winnicott chooses his example by fortunate coincidence in the 
epigraph above, we may say -%vith regard to the music-hall performers that they are 
enacting a primal scene, that they are indulging in exhibitionism, in anal control, that 
they are submitting to masochistic discipline or that they are deficient in their super- 
ego - and each of these readings may be applied, to various degrees, to these novels. 
"Sooner or later, " Winnicott concludes, however, "one adds: here is LIFE. Might it 
not be that the main point of the performance is a denial of deadness, a defence 
against depressive 'death inside' ideas, the sexualisation being secondary. " The 
special place for subjective being offered by the stage is emphasised most 
emphatically in Wise Children Nvhen Dora and Nora go to Hollywood to star with 
their father in A Midsummer Nights Dream. Hollywood is for Dora a space of 
unrelenting (ir)rationalism, a fully magical "Land of Make Believe" (Carter 1991, 
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120) 
What I missed most was illusion. That wood near Athens was too, too 
solid for me. Peregrine, who specialised in magic tricks, loved it just 
because it was so concrete. "You always pull a live rabbit out of a 
hat, " he said. But there wasn't the merest whiff about the kind of 
magic that comes Nvhen the theatre darkens, the bottom of the curtain 
glows, the punters settle down, you take a deep breath [ ... ] none of the 
person-to-person magic we put together with spit and willpower. This 
wood, this entire dream, in fact, was custom-made and hand-built, it 
left nothing to the imagination. 
(Carter 1991,125) 
Dora's preference for the stage over film is a preference for relations with other 
people over a narcissistic, self-gazing relation to the camera, and a preference for the 
reality of London, with its Brixton as well as its West End (with a river in between! ) 
over the single-minded, self-indulgent phantasising of Hollywood. Carter writes of 
another such space in "The Erl-King" (1979). Here, in the woods, "there is a haunting 
sense of the imminent cessation of being [ ... IA young girl would go into the wood as 
trustingly as Red Riding Hood to her granny's house but this light admits no 
ambiguities and, here, she will be trapped in her own illusion because everything in 
the wood is exactly as it seemsý' (186). Like Hollywood, it is too literal - there is no 
paradox, no illusion through which to generate meaning. And it is "This lack of 
imagination [that] gives his heroism to the hero" (1979,205). 
Hollywood is a magical space, but it is (Winnicottian) illusion, not pure 
magic, that Dora (and Car-ter) seeks. It is the intermingling, the paradoxes that are 
found in London. In paradox, symbols and meaning can flourish - Hollywood for 
Dora "was all too literal" (125). Again fortuitously choosing his examples, Winnicott 
asks, 
What about such things as the wireless that is left on interminably? 
What about living in a town like London Nvith its noise that never 
ceases, and lights that are never extinguished? Each illustrates the 
reassurance through reality against death inside, and a use of manic 
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defence that can be normal. 
(Winnicott 1935,13 1) 
The bustle, the noise, the lights of the city are highlighted by both Carter and Waters, 
suggesting that London offers a denial of deadness, a manic defence against anxiety 
and therefore, a sensation of "life. " Fevvers exclaims, "Oh, my lovely London 
The shining city! The new Jerusalem! " (Carter 1984,89). Ambrose Tree, in 
McGrath's Martha Peake, ambivalently introduces us to "London! Or rather - 
Londorf ' (2000,24). In these texts, London is the potential space, resounding in 
paradox, play and ambiguities; Hollywood is more akin to the phantastic void of 
Siberia. As the centres of reason and of unreason London is a third space that is both 
and neither. It is a mythical, magical place inspiring awe and wonder, but it can, and 
should, also arouse anxiety - it is a place "vaster and smokier and more alarming 
than I could have thought possible" (Waters 1998,64). 
Fevvers' negotiation in London and creative fight against patriarchal, 
rationalist society is illustrated through the story of Fevvers' early history at Ma 
Nelson's whorehouse (where both Lizzie and Fevvers worked, albeit not as 
prostitutes but as a house-cleaner and a sort of "lucky mascot"). Fevvers relates: 
It was one of those old, square, red-brick houses with a plain, 
sober fagade and a graceful, scallop-shaped fanlight over the front 
door that you may still find in those parts of London so far from the 
tide of fashion that they were never swept away. You could not look at 
Mother Nelson's house without the thought, how the Age of Reason 
built it; and then you almost cried, to think the Age of Reason was 
over before it properly begun, and this harmonious relic tucked away 
behind the howling of the Ratcliffe Highway, like the germ of sense 
left in a drunkard's mind. 
(Carter 1984,25-6) 
To me, Fevvers here laments how that the Age of Reason was, in its genesis, perhaps 
a noble undertaking that was not allowed to achieve its wwn goals before being 
corrupted. This Age of Reason was responsible for the lofty designs of building itself, 
with its "plain, sober fiagade, " but it also gave rise to the game that enshrined itself 
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'within the walls, "in which those who visited might extend the boundaries of their 
experience" and -%vhere "rational desires might be rationally gratified" (26). 
"Rational" desires here are those desires experienced by any whole, psyche- 
somatically integrated object. It is both the fagade of the house and the institution 
within that survive the end of the Age of Reason, surviving as the "genn of sense' 
that infects the mind of the drunkard, surviving the dizzying and incoherent 
rationalism and industrialisation that is also the product of bourgeois reason. 
The representation of Venice in The Passion also gives us a vision of a 
landscape that is urban and yet does not maintain the Enlightenment dichotomy of 
reason and unreason, instead serving as a potential space for the play of paradox and 
the realisation of subjective being. Villanelle's Venice is the "city of uncertainty" 
(58). It is neither part of the mainland, that is, undifferentiated and inseparable from 
the world that surrounds it, nor an island, like the isolated prisons of San Servelo or 
Corsica to which Henri and Napoleon are banished. Venice is a city of mazes, where 
the usual (rationalist, patriarchal) temporal divisions and conceptions are challenged. 
"In Venice, a long time ago, when we had our own calendar and stayed aloof from 
the world, we began days at night" (1987,56). It is the "city of disguises", but do not 
imagine that everyone wades about pathologically hiding from the world behind their 
false-selves. Rather, as Villanelle explains, "What you are one day will not constrain 
you on the next. You may explore yourself freely" (Winterson 1987,150). Venice is 
the "enchanted city" where "all things seem possible. Time stops. Hearts beat. The 
laws of the real world are suspendeT'(1987,76). It is capable of generating illusion, 
the apparent movement of the buildings a trick of the early morning light reflecting 
off the domes. 
Venice functions for Villanelle and Winterson as a potential space of 
specifically sexual play. Villanelle, like Winterson's unnamed and unsexed narrator 
in Wriften on the Body, Nan in Waters' Tipping the Velvet and Carter's pantomime 
characters in "In Pantoland", are all free to explore their gender and sexual 
orientation in a space in which they are free to chose to be men or women or neither 
or to negotiate their own way through these paradoxes. Again, there is a love in 
Winterson, Carter and Waters of the burlesque, where "transvestism and female 
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impersonation are staple disguises" (Warner 1994,247). Villanelle androgynously 
shifts throughout between identities as a woman and a boy and seems comfortable in 
an ambiguous bi-sexuality. Many of the voices in The PoiverBook are poly-sexual, 
living in disguise as whatever gender suits their desires. Nan, to examine an extreme 
example, starts as a woman Nvho dresses on stage as a man and falls in love with a 
woman who also dresses as a man, then walks the street dressed as a "rent-boy" 
offering blow-jobs to men before strapping on a dildo and dressing full-time as the 
man-servant of a rich Sapphist and, finally, dresses as a woman who falls in love with 
a woman. Nan observes that 
It might seem a curious kind of leap to make, from music-hall masher 
to renter. In fact, the world of actors and artistes, and the gay world in 
which I now found myself working, are not so very different. Both 
have London as their proper country, the West End as their capital. 
Both are a curious mix of magic and necessity, glamour and sweat. 
(Waters 1998,203) 
Sexuality and gender thus also exist in a space in between. When she sees a sign 
seeking a "Fe-Male Lodget"' she finds that "there was something very appealing 
about that Fe-Male. I saw myself in it - in the hyphen" (Waters 1998,211). 
Venice, Henri feels, is one place that could resist the compulsive and 
extremely tyrannical rationalisations of Napoleon. 
Where Bonaparte goes, straight roads follow, buildings are 
rationalised, street signs may change to celebrate a battle but they are 
always clearly marked. Here, if they bother -%vith street signs at all, 
they are happy to use the same ones over again. Not even Bonaparte 
could rationalise Venice. 
(Winterson 1987,112) 
Henri is, at least at first, unable to deal with the uncertainty and chaos that for him 
Venice represents. Henri is more accustomed to the creations of French town- 
planners that designed Lansquenet and Paris, but Villanelle's mother spits on Paris, 
here as in the real world the quintessential rationalist city. Henri wants a map to help 
find his way through Venice, an objective representation and guide to the space. 
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Villanelle responds, "It won't help. This is a living city. Things change, " explaining 
that "The cities of the interior do not lie on any map" (Winterson 1987,113-4). But 
the potential space is not something that can be objectively represented and 
cognitively understood - it must be experienced. 
"You are an absolutist then. " 
"What's one of those? " 
"All of nothing. " 
"What else is there? " 
"The middle ground. Even been there? " 
"I've seen it on the map. " 
"You should take a trip. " 
(Winterson 2000,40) 
For Winterson, stories themselves are maps. Some of these maps are like the 
conventional narratives produced by automatic writing, where "Some of the territory 
has become as familiar as a seaside resort. When we go there we know we will build 
sandcastles and get sunburnt and that the caf6 menu never changes" (2000,54). 
However, "Some of the territory is -wilder and reports do not tally. The guides are 
only good for so much. In these wild places I become part of the map, part of the 
story, adding my version to the versions there" (54). These are the spaces of 
uncertainty and dialogism, where the reader is not led by an authoritative voice but 
actively recreates the territories through which he or she passes and rewrites the maps 
that chart that space, putting something of themselves both in the environment and its 
representation. 
In Nights at the Circus, we leave quasi-rationalist London, governed by the 
patriarchal tyranny of Big Ben, moving East to the quasi-mystic "Petersburg7where 
Walser begins to partake in the play made available through the circus. It is the 
combination of the city and the circus that fosters the suspension of disbelief and the 
acceptance of paradox that permit Walser's creative play. The liminal location of St. 
Petersburg magnifies the effects of the circus. Walser himself recognises this quality 
of St. Petersburg as a city of in-betweens, of hybridity and paradox. 
St. Petersburg, a beautiful city that doesn't exist any more. 
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Today, another beautiful city of a different name bestrides the mighty 
Neva; on its site, St. Petersburg once stood. 
Russia is a sphinx. You grand inintobility, antique, hieratic, 
one haunch squatting on Asia, the other on Europe, what exeniplary 
destiny are you knitting out of the blood and sinew of history in your 
sleeping womb? 
She does not answer. Riddles bounce offher sides, as gaily 
Pai nted as those of apeasant troika. 
(Carter 1984,96; emphasis original) 
St. Petersburg stands between West and East and, standing on the precipice of the 
twentieth-century and the changes that await it, is between tradition and revolution, 
between names, soon to be at once present and absent, a "city that is on the point of 
becoming legend but not yet" (97). It is a "Sleeping Beauty of a city, " and like the 
Sleeping Beauty imprisoned by Madame Schreck, it is between life and death, 
"longing yet fearing the rough and bloody kiss that will awaken her. " in St. 
Petersburg, Walser's journalistic prose is transformed into a grandiose, adjective-rich 
tour of magical excess verbiage, as exemplified above. "Walser reread his copy. This 
city precipitated him towards hyperbole; never before has he bandied about so many 
adjectives. Walser-the-clown, it seemed, could juggle , vith the dictionary with a zest 
that would have abashed Walser-the-foreign-correspondent" (98). As a clown, we can 
infer from Bakhtin, Walser has the "right to speak in otherwise unacceptable 
languages and the right to maliciously distort languages that are acceptable" (Bakhtin 
1991,405), "acceptable" in this context I take to mean officially sanctioned, 
rationalist discourses worthy of the sceptical journalist. 
In Carter's Infernal Desire Machines, for example, finding this space is much 
more problematic than in Nights at the Circus, where the physical re-location of the 
characters provides an ahnost straight fonvard representation of the psychic location 
of the characters. In Infen2al Desire Machines, as in Nights, while the city is most 
certainly the home of rationalist thought, the space outside the city does not neatly 
divide itself into a potential space or an object-less sphere wholly dominated by 
internal phantasies. It is to Carter's and others' credit that they so explicitly make the 
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point that for subjects accustomed to the protection offered by a rationalistic defence, 
the movement from depersonalising rationality to a potential space is by no means 
assured and is a cause for anxiety. The "lesson" to be taken from the manipulation of 
these environments is to show how desperately one needs these defences once they 
come to dominate our experience, and how easily complete disintegration threatens 
to ensue after the loss of the first line of defence. (The seed whose kernel is damaged 
may not be able to germinate Nvhen exposed to a harsh environment. ) Also, the 
inability to draw clear, defining lines around such spaces again presents the 
welcomed inability to impose simple categories and over-simplistic one-to-one 
correspondences, showing that it is not necessarily the space itself but the quality of 
experience that is transitional and the source of productive paradox. 
Tokyo, as represented by Carter in "Flesh and the Mirror" (1974) and in 
David Mitchell's Ghostwritten (1999), is another example of an ambivalent 
conception of the city. It is still a living place that offers potential liminality, but also 
at times threatens to overwhelm the subject. The use of Tokyo also highlights for me 
that the cities that offer the potentiality for experience can be situated in relation to 
Western rationalism: They are either shown as existing outside the tyranny of 
rationalism (as Venice is immune to Napoleon's tyranny), at the supposed height of 
the irrational challenge to bourgeois hegemony (nineteenth-century London, for 
example), or, finally, it seems, in cities that can be imagined to lie beyond the grasp 
and design of Western rationality (the orientalism of Tokyo, although ironically, 
Tokyo was recently held up in the "West" as a shining example of capitalist 
organisation). In each case, it is shown that the city intrinsically defies its assumed 
place as the sanctuary of Cartesian logic. Like Winterson's Venice, Tokyo, as 
potential space, cannot be rationalised, scientifically mapped-out. "It's so big that 
nobody really knows where it stops [ ... ] The city never stops rewriting itself In the 
time one street guide is produced, it's already become out of date' (Mitchell 1999, 
37). Carter's narrator in "Flesh and the Mirror" realises the folly of trying to contain 
the city and make it a part of her own phantasy: 
I think I know, now, what I was trying to do. I was trying to subdue the 
city by turning it into a projection of my own growing pains. What 
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solipsistic arrogance! The city, the largest city in the world, the city 
designed to suit not one of my European expectations, this city 
presents the foreignerwith a mode of life that seems to him to have 
the enigmatic transparency, the indecipherable clarity, of dream. And 
it is a dream he could, himself, never have dreamed. The stranger, the 
foreigner, thinks he is control; but he has been precipitated into 
somebody else's dream. 
You never knowwhatwill happen in Tokyo. Anything can 
happen. 
(Carter 1974,69) 
Car-ter's narrator finds that Tokyo's vibrancy offers a means of experience. Living 
elsewhere, "It was as if I never experienced experience as experience It was as if 
there were glass between me and the world" (69). 
But Mitchell's representation also draws attention to the deficiencies that 
such space offers. Unlike Venice in The Passion, this space cannot be exploited by 
the individual physically for an experience of potentiality. "You don't have the space 
[... ] You're pressed against people body to body in the trains, several hundred bands 
gripping each strap on the metro trains. Apartmentwindows have no view but other 
apartment windows" (37). As from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth the 
irrational moved from an external threat to become internal, the spaces cities offer for 
creative experience seem to move from external, psychical spaces to those that are 
internal, psychical. "No, in Tokyo you have to make your place inside your head" 
(37; italics in original). These spaces are found by Tokyo's citizens through "Sweat, 
exercise and pain" in gyms and swimming pools, in television, Internet, Hollywood, 
doomsday cults (38) - which demonstrates, for me, ambivalence not only towards 
(post)modern technologies but also towards the quality of experience in the 
(potential) spaces of contemporary society. 
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Potential Cyber-Spaces 
Mitchell's Ghostivritten also asks us to question the potential spaces to be found in 
cyber-space, the interweaving w9rld of the Internet. Dissolving boundaries form the 
structural basis of his novel; many of the characters are trying to live beyond their 
somatic limits, therefore indulging in a schizoid omnipotent phantasy. Our first 
narrator has joined a religious sect which he believes has granted him extra-sensory 
power and released him from the "prison of materialism, " from all human ties with 
his "skin family" - that "unclean, biological family" into which he was born (1999, 
9). Mitchell often exploits cyber-space as an exemplary site for such disintegration. 
So I do not want to over-aggrandise the brave new world of the Internet - for 
fear of my analysis crashing down like dot. com stock or one day seeming as dated as 
a 1950s sci-fi matinee. I do not want to endorse Nvbole-beartedly cyber-space as the 
great new potential space lying-in-wait. Here too I think we need to inject a note a 
cautious ambivalence. First, cyber-space is a disembodied universe. We do not take 
our bodies into the Internet. This can, as I have suggested, have its advantages, but 
instead of a potential space, it can also be a place where we indulge omnipotent 
phantasies. Instead of productive play, we often use the anonymous space offered by 
the Internet to indulge in regressive primitive processes, free of the inhibitions that 
necessarily confuse our material relations with others, the materiality that prevents us 
from regarding the other only as objects of our phantasy. In cyber-space we can split 
ourselves, and others, pander to our own illusions of grandiosity, collapse or blow-up 
the frames and boundaries that define ourselves and our relations with others - which 
also of course means that we are subject to feelings of emptiness, anxiety and 
disintegration, and more often relate to others in terms of part-, rather than whole- 
objects (see Young 1996,1996b). Computers and the Internet also offer, in theory, 
places where one can escape the sloppy, unpredictable world of subjective emotions 
and human relations in favour of supposedly cool, binary, logical dispassion. We are 
invited in cyber-sex not only to "Take off your clothes" but also to "Take off your 
body" (Winterson 2000,4). We should also perhaps be wary of the increasing 
corporate control of the Internet, whereby cyber-space is becoming less the utopian 
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deinos it was once hoped it would develop into and instead merely provides more 
room for advertisers' logos - though I suppose that this is true of so many spaces that 
it would be unfair to single out the Internet for specific ridicule in this sense (I hear 
that Pepsi wants to project its logo onto the moon ... 
). 
But there is also evidence to suggest that cyber-space may provide at least an 
adequate surrogate or substitute for embodied experience in the potential space. As I 
have already discussed, Winterson's characters utilise the anonymity, the disguises, 
that cyber-experience can offer. Like the living city that cannot be quantified or 
contained on a map, the Internet is beyond definitive representation, moving and 
shifting according to the play of those that enter the space. "This is a world. This is a 
world inventing itself. Daily, new landmasses form and then submerge" (Winterson 
2000,63). 57 The Internet is a potential place where subjects can meet, intermingle an 
impact upon one another. As Winterson's narrator says: "It used to be that the real 
and the invented were parallel lines that never met. Then we discovered that space is 
curved, and in curved space parallel lines always meet" (2000,94). This cyber-space, 
though, must also be shared. Just as in a potential (meat)space no one element can 
dominate, there can be no authority, the Internet is governed only by a democratic 
principle that everyone can use this space. "What happened to the omniscient 
author? " one character in The Poiver. Book asks another. "Gone interactive" is the 
straight-forward reply (27). Winterson, perhaps nalvely equating experiences of 
material sex and cyber-space, insists upon these dialogic, non-authoritarian relations 
In this space which is inside you and inside me I ask for no rights or 
territories. There are no frontiers or controls. The usual channels do 
not exist. This is the orderly anarchic space that no one can dictate, 
though everyone tries. This is a country without a ruler. I am free to 
come and go as I please. 
(Winterson 2000,175) 
And so we must remember that the Internet, like bridges, can separate as well as 
unite. The Windows interface that I am using as I write these words allows me to 
divide my project and my worlds into discrete units. Winterson's narrator explains: "I 
was typing on my laptop, trying to move this story on, trying to avoid endings, trying 
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to collide the real and the imaginary worlds, trying to be sure which is which" (2000, 
93). This highlights, for me, the appeal of cyber-spaces where, like magic realist 
fiction, there are uncertainties that must be negotiated. "When I sit at my computer, I 
accept that the virtual worlds I find there parallel my own. I talk to people whose 
identity-I cannot prove. I disappear into a web of co-ordinates that we say will change 
the world. What world? Which world? " (2000,94). 
"Queen of Ambiguities": illusion and The Transitional Object 
A Mellanschauung erected upon science has, apart from its 
emphasis on the real external world, mainly negative traits, such as 
submission to the truth and rejection of illusions. 
(Freud 1933,219) 
For Winnicott, it is through illusion that we come into being as subjects. Illusion is 
necessary for creative experience and enables the use of transitional objects that aid 
the infant in its movement from a purely magical, omnipotent worldview, thus also 
establishing the basis of intersubjective experience. It seems to me that in 
contemporary magic realist fiction we see many such transitional objects embodied 
as central characters, objects helping to guide the narrators, characters and readers in 
negotiating the paradoxes between magic and reality. Again, Carter's Nights at the 
Circus offers an exemplary case study, though many other texts have similar figures, 
sometimes more subtly to be found in small objects, talismans, or even memories and 
language, objects that are also available to subjects in the exploration of the potential 
space and the articulation of their idiom. 
Fewers is heralded as the "Queen of ambiguities, goddess of in-between 
states" (81), and this status as a paradox within the potential spaces of Nights of the 
Circus both troubles and excites readers and characters alike. Fevvers is an object 
wherein paradoxes are allowed to play and withinwhich there is no insistence upon 
resolution. She is both a woman and a bird, a virgin and a whore, a socially 
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responsible socialist and greedy, money-obsessed capitalist and a fetishised 
commodity, and yet at no point do any of these different roles appear to be in conflict 
- they are allowed to co-exist. She is the personification of illusion; her very name 
sounds like real "feathers, " but is, because of a sleight-of-ear with the accent of the 
language, only the illusion of "feathers. " Sage suggests that Carter herself is such a 
paradoxical figure, "the wolf in Grandma's clothing" (1994,18), or the socialist who 
writes fairy tales. Certainly the winged-woman is a theme Carter often employs, 
inviting comparisons with Mother Goose, the story-teller who facilitates illusion. 
(Carter's The Bloody Chamber is a collection of re-appraisals of Ma Goose's tales). 
Thus we see not only-fevvers but also the Chance sisters in Wise Children, who play 
and dress as feathered fairies, and la M6re Folle, the Crazy Mother of the pantomime 
and Feast of Fools in Burgundy in "In Pantoland" (Carter 1993,384-6). Dick 
Whittington's cat in "In Pantoland" also goes "on two legs more often than on four to 
stress his status as intermediary between the world of the animals and out world" 
possessing "some of the chronic ambiguity of all dark messengers between different 
modes of being7 (Carter 1993,3 86). 58 
Fevvers offers herself as an illusion - she cannot be proved to be fake or 
genuine without losing her power to facilitate creativity and liminal experience. As a 
transitional object, Fevvers guides Walser through the potential space that is the 
circus, serving as the object, %vith which we play and that reduces our anxiety of 
liminality. Like a facilitating mother she allows illusion, and like a transitional object 
she aides the acceptance of and negotiation through paradox, thus (re-)ontologising 
the subject by enabling creative play. Again to employ Winnicott's metaphor of the 
seed, Fevvers helps us to move the centre of consciousness from the shell to the 
kernel. Fevvers appropriately adapts the seed metaphor to that of an egg, saying of 
Walser (and perhaps the reader): "Let him hand himself over into my safekeeping, 
and I -will transform him. You said yourself he was unhatched, Lizzie; very well - I'll 
sit on him, I'll batch him out, I'll make a new man of him" (Carter 1984,281). 
However, while presenting herself as a fantasy, Fevvers does not "go inside" 
(Winnicott 1971,5) in that she never becomes solely an internal object of Walser's or 
the reader's fantasy, and sternly resists the attempts of Rosencreutz and the Grand 
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Duke to reduce her to such a -non-existence. 
The questionwith which we are challenged at the very outset of the book, "Is 
she fact or is she fiction? " (Carter 1984,7) echoes, while seeming to contravene, 
Winnicott's insistence that we do not challenge the ontological status of the 
transitional object. Fevvers persistently challenges Walser and the reader to doubt 
her, "Believe it or not" (7); to wonder ... How does she do it' and 'Do you think she's 
real? "' (9). However, it is Fevvers herself Nvho asks these questions, and she 
obviously does not expect, nor does she at all desire, an answer. Simply, if the "truth" 
were ever discovered, it would mark the end of her career as a confidence artist and 
the end of the reader's hesitqtion, reducing her story from the fantastic to one of 
rational or supernatural certainty. These questions, like her declaration at the novel's 
conclusion "I fooled you! " is, Carter herself explains, "a description of her being" 
(Haffenden 1985,90). Carter and Fevvers are playing with their audience, with 
Walser and the reader. Fevvers "remained unconvinced about the precise nature of 
her own illusion" (Carter 1984,159). In Siberia, when the young Escapee wishes to 
engage her in a debate on the recent mysterious disappearance of his fellow convicts, 
Fevvers' explicitly clarifies, "because I'm not in the mood for literary criticism [ ... ] 
I'm not the right one to ask questions of when it comes to what is real and what is 
not, because, like the duck-billed platypus, half the people who clap eyes on me don't 
believe what they see and the other half thinks they're seeing things" (244). At the 
novel's conclusion, she comforts Walser, "We told you no other lies nor in any way 
strayed from the honest truth. Believe it or not, all that I told you as real happenings 
were so, in fact; and as to the questions of whether I am fact or fiction, you must 
answer that for yourself! " (292). Because she does not put her own myth-making 
beyond doubt or suspicion, Fevvers shows herself to be a superior confidence 
trickster to the Colonel's capitalist Ludic Game or Mignon's Herr M.. Fewers 
succeeds as a transitional object when other marketed commodities fail, because in 
the marketplace, as a commodity, "the eyes that watch you take no account of your 
existence' (Carter 1979,168). 59 
. The status of Fevvers' wings, or a rope trick performed in Calcutta, must not 
be proved to be a genuine miracle any more than it can be exposed as an illusion. Just 
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as a fakir lying on a bed of nails asks Walser, "what [ ... ] would be the point of the 
illusion if it looked like an illusion? " (16), the fantastic loses its power if it is shown, 
beyond a doubt, to be real or fake; uncertainty is still the key. Walser finds that it is 
the limitations of Fewers' act that tempt him into belief 60 Even Walser, who is a 
reluctant player in the third space, becomes "enchanted by the paradox: if she were 
indeed a lusus naturae, a prodigy, then - she was no longer a wonder" (16 1). In a 
language that echoes and plays with Todorov's, Walser further concludes: 
She would no longer be an extraordinary woman, no more the Greatest 
Aerialisle in the world but -a freak. Marvellous, indeed, but a 
marvellous monster, an exemplary being denied the human privilege 
of flesh and blood, alway§ the object of the observer, never the subject 
of sympathy, an alien creature forever estranged. 
She owes it to herself to remain a woman, he thought. It is her 
human duty. As a symbolic woman, she has meaning, as an anomaly, 
none. 
(Carter 1984,161) 
Walser recognises that in order to be considered a subject with meaning, and not 
become merely an empty, commodified object, Fevvers must retain her humanity, 
her "flesh and blood" - she must not become simply the realisation of magical 
phantasy, and she must survive the paradox of her own being. It is this paradox that is 
at the core of creative subjectivity, and it is this uncertainty, the very doubt within our 
minds, that lies at the heart of magic realism. Like a child with the transitional object 
that exists between magic and reality, if we are to enjoy our subjectivity, if we are to 
enjoy our object, we must tolerate the uncertainty, the paradox. "If she isn't suspect, 
where's the controversy? What's the news? " (11). 
Fevvers serves as a transitional object not only for the reader and Walser but 
also for other characters we find at the circus. In particular, Mignon, the abused wife 
of Lamark and the sex-toy of the Strong-Man, is also helped by Fevvers' benevolent 
guidance. Mignon, we are told, "used to pose for the dead" (128), playing the part of 
deceased girls for another confidence artist, Herr M.. This role mirrors Mignon's own 
status as desubjectified, a character forwhom sex and her body have no meaning 
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other than through her role as a wage-slave. Herr M., like other confidence artists in 
this book, produces illusions, but these are not all productive in a Winnicottian sense. 
The illusion Herr M. offers is of the return to earth of the ghosts of recently deceased 
girls. Carter's portrait is somewhat ambivalent. On one level, we can regard his 
illusions as transitional phenomena that help the families of these deceased girls to 
overcome their mouming. However, Herr M. objectifies Mignon, increasing her 
depersonalisation, and we see Herr M. benefiting from the commodification of these 
illusions like the most opportunistic capitalist. Mignon, due to the traumas she had 
suffered throughout her young life and the constant objectification to which she is 
subjugated, is "a being without a past, without a present, yet she existed thus, without 
memory or history, only because her past was too ýIeak to think of and her future too 
terrible to contemplate; she was the broken blossom of the present tense" (13940). 
Mignon's body, when we find her in St. Petersburg, is insubstantial. She has no 
internal objects or subjective life and she is incapable of creating any. No matter 
what she eats, "she did not put on any weight, it was as though something inside her 
ate it all up before she could get to it but she didn't have worms" (133). Her empty 
insides are a defence against the trauma and abuse she is continually forced to 
undergo. "She had an exceedingly short memory, which alone saved her from 
desolation" (14 1), but because she has no internal objects, no psyche-somatic 
integration, she is incapable of experience, incapable of subjectivity. 
The only time Mignon speaks is through songs in a language she does not 
understand. The words themselves have no meaning, so she cannot find solace in 
self-articulation, but only in the aesthetic experience that the songs provide. It is not 
though language itself that we come to be subjects, but language can provide the 
objects we use in the articulation of our idiom and the realisation of our subjective 
ontology. "To sing is not to speak, " Fevvers tells the Princess, "if they [the apes] hate 
speech because it divides us from them, to sing is to rob speech of its function and 
render it divine. Singing is to speech what is dancing to walking" (153). Recall too 
Winnicott's suggestion that music may be a transitional object employed by the 
subject to help negotiate anxiety (1971,2). Winnicott also sees that the words are not 
important so much as the tune, the melody,, %vbich is as likely to be an object for the 
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infant's play as language. Under Fevvers' care - she gives "bread and milk for the 
abused child, a matemal touch" (132) - Mignon gains the confidence to leave her 
husband, put an end to the abuse and indifference she suffers both under him and the 
Strong-Man, and finds meaning and love through her relationship with the Princess of 
Abyssinia. Mignon and the Princess then also use music as a transitional object to 
bridge the gap and the anxiety between each other and between themselves and the 
tigers. Similarly, Fevvers facilitates the movement of the Strong-Man from a 
depersonalised sub-human gladly participating the patriarchal mythologies of power 
and masculinity. She acts as a mediator, slowly drawing the Strong-Man out of his 
affectless shell and helping him to communicate (literally, as she translates for him) 
his feelings to Mignon and the Princess (166-7). 
Maurice Conchis in The Magus is another figure who functions to guide 
characters and readers through a lithinal space, although he certainly does not fit the 
nurturing, matemal role most often found, offering instead play more fraught -%vith 
anxiety and horror. Conchis is the game-master who performs his role as nurturing 
caretaker with a rather more sadistic glee than Winnicott might like, but he 
nevertheless provides illusions, in the form of the elaborate masques, that tempt 
Nicholas into an imaginative potential space. And like a caretaker, Conchis 
disillusions his child, though his "Final disintoxication" is again perhaps more abrupt 
and shocking thanwhat Winnicott would recommend. Conchis himself, like Fevvers, 
seems to exist paradoxically between worlds; very literally in his case between the 
worlds of radical reason and radical unreason. As Conchis slowly and purposefully 
reveals to Nicholas through the course of their "experience" - Nicholas calls it an 
"experiment" before Conchis corrects him (235) - Conchis was initially enamoured 
by reason. 
We all regarded medicine as a religion, and we called ourselves the 
Society of Reason. We saw the doctors of the world uniting to form a 
scientific and ethical elite. We should be in every land and in every 
government, moral supen-nen who would eradicate all demagogy, all 
self-seeking politicians, reaction, chauvinism. We published a 
manifesto. 
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(FoNvIes 1977,171) 
Conchis however later distances himself these beliefs ("Merde" is written over the 
manifesto) so that Nvhen Nicholas meets him in Bourani, Conchis is trying to use 
science creatively - fittingly, he finds a creative science in something that resembles 
a cross between the spectacular masque and psychoanalysis. Conchis explains this 
transformation: 
There had always been a conflict in me betweeh mystery and meaning. 
I had pursued the latter, worshipped the latter as a doctor. As a 
socialist and rationalist. But then I saw that the attempt to scientize 
reality, to name it and categorize is and vivisect it out of existence, 
was like trying to remove the air from the atmosphere. In the creating 
of the vacuum it was the experimenter who died, because he was 
inside the vacuum. 
(Fowles 1977,410) 
This does not perfectly fit the model I am advancing here. I am not sure why Conchis 
juxtaposes mystery and meaning, as if meaning were somehow only achieved through 
rationalist methods, and it would strike me that the vacuum he describes is devoid of 
life and meaning. But learning to negotiate between the vicissitudes of reason and 
unreason, he realises that "All good science is art. All good art is science" and that 
knowledge is not of primary importance, but being: "Iwish simply to be" (409). 
Harris too provides us with such characters. Vianne is another figure who 
emerges from the carnival to nurture the creative play of people around her. Vianne 
transforms the whole town and battles the forces of rationalism while, for the most 
part, keeping her own status an ambiguous mystery. She is also a figure that mediates 
between magical and ordinary worlds. This is emphasised by the references to her 
mother, depicted as a real witch with real magical powers. "My mother was a witch. 
At least, that's what she called herself, falling so many times into the game of 
believing herself that at the end there was no telling fake from facf'(44). But Vianne 
(as Ward Jouve says of Carter) can tell fiction from fact; her magic is of a less 
marvellous, more commonplace sort: 
My mother brewed spells and philtres, I sublimated the whole into a 
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sweeter alchemy. We were never much alike, she and 1. She dreamed 
of floating, of astral encounters and secret essences: I poured over 
recipes and menus filched from restaurants Nvhere we never could 
afford to dine. 
(Harris 1999,296)61 
Vianne also mediates between the villagers and the gypsies; the inhabitants of the 
city built by Enlightened republican planners on the one hand and the nomadic 
representatives of the ancient European epistemologies on the other. "Perhaps this is 
what Reynaud senses in my little shop; " Vianne muses, "a throwback to the times 
when the word was a wider, wilder place. Before Christ - before Adonis wýs bom in 
Bethlehem or Osiris sacrificed at Easter - the cocoa bean was revered" (1999,64). 
"Jackapple" Joe Cox in Blackberry Wine functions like Fevvers or Vianne, 
pulling the depersonalised, emotionally scarred Jay into a world of productive 
uncertainty away from his defence mechanisms. Like Fevvers, he challenges rational 
credibility from the outset: "He introduced himself as Joe Cox, 'with a slanted smile, 
as if to challenge disbelief' (2000,23). In an interesting reversal, while Fevvers 
-%vields Ma Nelson's sword as a talisman to ward off danger, Joe gives Jay a small red 
flannel bag filled with the scents of sandalwood and lavender. Like Vianne, he rejects 
the rigid demarcation of what is rational and irrational, believable and unbelievable. 
He rejects the Enlightenment distinction betweenwhat is an acceptable, "medical" 
remedy and herbal or "folk" remedies. He explains to a young Jay that "a few 
hundred years ago there were no difference between magic and medicine. People just 
knew things. Believed things. Like chewin cloves to cure toothache, or pennyroyal for 
a sore throat, or rowan twigs to keep away evil spirits" (2000,54). Joe mediates 
between a variety of discourses: "With Joe, Chinese medicine rubbed shoulders 
companionably with English folklore, chemistry with mysticism" (55). 
A Recipe for Becoming: Everyday Magic 
Harris' fiction best exemplifies the focus in much contemporary magic realist fiction 
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upon the magic that exists in everyday domestic experience. Harris refers to the 
"domestic magic" (1999,56), "layman's magic" (1999,64) and "everyday magic" 
(2000) in defamiliarising the supposedly mundane tasks of the domestic sphere. This 
can be seen in the mystification of everyday experience, such as a spiritualist's claim 
inA nity that "our age is a marvellous one" (Waters 1999,100), Nvith the telegraph Iff, 
machine making everyone telepathic, or Mr. Weasley's constant amazement at 
Muggle in agical inventions such as the car and telephone. But perhaps cooking is 
particularly useful as a symbol of this sort of everyday magic. It closely resembles the 
very earnest efforts of men who set themselves the infinitely more important, and 
endlessly futile, aim of turning lead to gold. "There is a kind of alchemy in the 
transformation of base chocolate into thiswise fool's gold, " Vianne explains (1999, 
64). This magic shares obvious characteristics with the more marvellous practices of 
Nvitchcraft and Nvizardry, but is perforined in settings and with ingredients more 
familiar to everyday readers: 
There is a kind of sorcery in all cooking: in the choosing of 
ingredients, the process of mixing, grating, melting, infusing and 
flavouring, the recipes taken from ancient books, the traditional 
utensils - the pestle and mortar Nvith which my mother made her 
incense turned to a more homely purpose, her spices and aromatics 
giving up their subtleties to a baser, more sensual magic. 
(Harris 1999,62) 
Where Vianne's mother was a -, vitcb, Vianne's own magic is grounded in the world 
of everyday experience. The witches' cave is moved to the kitchen; the eye of ne-%vt 
and tongue of bat is replaced with proportions of cocoa and chilli powder; the ancient 
mystical texts are family cookbooks, passed from one generation to another; rather 
than strict, ritualistic incantations, recited precisely, spells are interpreted to personal 
taste; the spells are not meant to conjure demons but are love potions of a more 
simple sort. "This is an art I can enjoy" (1999,62) Vianne says, soon echoed by the 
reader. Perhaps as Fevvers realises, a genuine miracle in a secular age must invite 
doubt to be cast upon it if it is to have power. Fevvers cannot be proved to be a 
winged-women, or else her power as a transitional object is lost as she would likely 
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find herself upon a sterilised dissecting table. Vianne and Joe seem similarly to 
realise that their power lies not in the alchemy and necromancy of old but in brewing 
and cultivating productive paradoxes. 
Most often this conceptualisation of everyday magic is an attempt to reclaim 
power for women limited by patriarchal ideology to the domestic sphere. The 
association of magic, or unreason, with the matemal, feminine world in these novels 
attempts to serve variously feminist, anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist ends by 
rewriting the gender mythologies of patriarchy, the confinement of women. The 
mystification or simple defamiliarisation of recipes, child-rearing and women's own 
"irrational" world acts to redeem experience itself for women, denied the grand self- 
mythologising of men. For Carter, too, 'Tantasywas an everyday, domeslic business, 
she'd say" (Sage 1994,2): 
On the face of things she [Carter] is renouncing "magic"; in fact I 
think she is denying that magic is alien or strange, and so becoming a 
city of strangeness. It is the seýual tourist, or - to put it more politely - 
the orientalist, Nvho finds the city and the "arbitrary carnival" of its 
street exotic [ ... ] 
(Sage 1994,9) 
By exposing the magic of everyday experience, these authors hope to deny that 
experience is something that only happened at infrequent moments in life but is, in 
fact, something that exists in the minutiae of subjectivity - for example, in the mere 
act of breathing or crying to enjoy a musical sound. 
Harris returns to the concepts of everyday or layperson's magic in Blackberry 
Wine (2000). Here, however, rather than the domestic sphere and secrets of culinary 
sorcery being solely the domain of women, Harris offers an illustration of two men, 
62 Joe Cox and Jay Mackintosh, employing this "simple chemistry" (2000,17). While 
this novel lacks the feminist punch of Chocolat or like-minded novels that redeem 
the exii-a-ordinary experience of women, the overall effect is much the same, 
empbasising the creative potential of everyday life. In this novel, "magic, like wine, " 
I ike writing, "needs the right conditions in order to work" (2000,13). The novel 
focusses upon Joe's search for the elusive, creative impulse that inspired him long 
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ago towrite one successful, critically satisfying novel. Rather than the connection 
between magic, cooking and the possibility of creative experiencing for women, 
therefore, the connection between magic and cooking leads us to a More traditional, 
more obvious conceptual isation of creativity. "You don't write because someone sets 
you assignments! " Jay protests, "Youwrite because you need to write, or because you 
hope someone will listen, or because writing will mend something broken inside you, 
or bring something back to life" (2000,5 1). Both strategies show how a degree of 
magic, grounded in realism, offers a means of becoming through the most casual, 
everyday experiences of creativity. 
Learning to Experience Experience: 
The Journey of the Hero and Reader in the Potential Space 
In the fictions I examined, I found that without exception there is a central character 
that reflects the reader's own hesitation and attempt to negotiate paradoxical spaces. 
Todorov's second criterion of the fantastic, that hesitation must be experienced by a 
cbaracter, with whom, on some level, the reader identifies, I took initially to be a 
quirk of the formalist approach to texts that need not be rigorously applied. However, 
it seems as though the more I read the more this view is substantiated; almost without 
fail, contemporary magic realist texts offer a central characterwho makes ajourney 
from an ordinary world to one in which the potential for magic exists andwith whom 
the reader is invited to identify. Nancy Astley, Harry Potter, Nicholas Urfe, Henri, 
Marianne, Desiderio, Walser and countless others begin their respective novels in a 
rationalist, often depersonalised, world before being transformed by their creative 
experience. 
In Nights at the Circus, Walser, the New World rationalist, is initially unable 
to tolerate uncertainty or paradox. As Carter herself points out, rationalists such as 
Walser are desperate to sustain the illusion of their own scepticism, which is why 
they must employ the rationalist defence that allows them the alternative illusion of 
certainty (Haffenden 1985,89), unproductive though it is. Walser's defence against 
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the anxiety presented by Fevvers' ambiguous status takes the form of a scientific 
reasoning, "by all the la, %vs of evolution and human reason" (1984,15). He comes to 
Fevvers set upon a project to expose the great myths of his age, to "puff'Fevvers, to 
"explode" her (Carter 1984,11) which could be read in a Kleinian sense as incredibly 
aggressive phantasies about destroying the persecutory object - to resolve, once and 
for all, one way or the other, the uncertainties that Fevvers forces us to confront. Or 
we could see this through a Winnicottian perspective where infants seek to destroy 
the object in their phantasy so that it can live as an object in its own right in the 
external world: 
The subject says to the object: "I destroyed you", and the object is 
there to receive the communication. From now on the subject says: 
"Hullo object! " "I destroyed you. " "I love you. " "You have value for 
me because of your survival of my destruction of you. " "While I am 
loving you I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious)fantasy. " 
Here fantasy begins for the individual. They can now use the object 
that has survived. It is important to note that it is not only that the 
subject destroys the object because the object is placed outside the 
area of omnipotent control. It is equally significant to state this the 
other way round and to say that it is the destruction of the object that 
places the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control. 
In these ways the object develops its own autonomy and life, and (if it 
survives) contributes-in to the subject, according to its own properties. 
(Winnicott 1971,90) 
But although this form of destruction ends in love for the object, it is still an act to 
locate xvith certainty the object as either internal or external, an identification that 
Fevvers constantly resists. Again echoing Klein's theories, our narrator informs us 
that Walser's "habitual disengagement was involuntary; it Nvas not the result of 
judgement, since judgement involves the positives and negatives of belief' (19 84,10). 
This form of "judgement' 'that Walser lacks is the sort of rationalism that is based on 
the balanced perception of positives and negatives, good and bad objects that is 
characteristic of whole-objects seen in the depressive position. Walser's beloved 
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"rationalism" is not that of depressive ambivalence. On the contrary, it stems from 
the vicissitudes of love and hate and the inability to tolerate the ambivalence 
demanded by whole objects. Walser is engaged in processes of intellectualisation. 
And for Klein, Winnicott and Fairbaim alike (and also for many orthodox 
psychoanalysts), anxiety is a necessary component in mental functioning, as it is for 
the capacity to symbolise. But our narrator notes that Walser "did not know how to be 
afraid" (1984,10); he is unable tofeel, not only fear, but also love and hate. With 
Walser 
There were scarcely any of those little, what you might call personal 
touches to his personality, as if his habit of suspending belief extended 
even unto his own being. I say he had a propensity for "finding himself 
in the right place at the right time"; yet it was almost as if he himself 
were an objet trouvi, for, subjectively, himseýf he never found, since it 
was not his seýf which he sought. 
(Carter 1984,10) 
Like the depersonalised subject who seeks danger or practices to confirm its own 
somatic boundaries and psyche-somatic existence, Walser can only experience 
subjective being when "He subjected his life to a series of cataclysmic shocks 
because he loved to hear his bones rattle. That was how he knew he was alive" (1984, 
10). And, like the depersonalised subject, he lacks a capacity for self-reflection. 
Walser "bad not felt so much as one single quiver of introspection" (10), a sense of 
self-experiencing that Bollas sees as only possible once one is creatively engaged in 
the potential space (see Bollas 1992,12-32). Walser is disengaged from his 
environment and as a "kaleidoscope equipped with consciousness, " sounding very 
much the postmodern. subject of bits-and-pieces, always changing and never set in 
relations to anything but its own shallow, ever changing design. Like the narrator of 
"Flesh and the Mirror ... .. Walser had not experienced 
his experience as experience; 
sandpaper his outsides as experience might, his inwardness had been left untouched" 
(10). 
Walser himself seems to recognise his own need for a playful experience - "I 
need to have my sense of wonder polished up again" - although his decision to join 
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the circus may be motivated initially as much by the desire to resolve Fevvers' 
ambiguity as it is an attempt to seek out creative experience. He justifies his decision 
to his editor by claiming, "I don't think you realise just how much I'd like a break 
from hard news, chier' (90); he further pleads, "Keep me away from the battlefield 
for a while! ", the hostile environment in which one's defences must be so strenuously 
maintained. When Walser asks his editor, "What would you say to a series of inside 
stories of the exotic, the marvellous, of laughter and tears and thrills and all? " (90) it 
is an invitation directed to the reader to share the adventure. 
When Walserjoins the circus, he is transfon-ned into a clown, and thus begins 
the transformation of his subjective experience from the rationalistic defence to the 
creativity offered by accepting paradox. 
When Walser first put on his make-up, he looked in the mirror and did 
not recognise himself As he contemplated the stranger peering 
interrogatively back at him out of the glass, he felt the beginnings of a 
vertiginous sense of freedom that, during all the time he spent with the 
Colonel, never quite evaporated; until that last moment Nvhen they 
parted company and Walser's very self, as he had known it, departed 
from him, he experienced the freedom that lies behind the mask, 
within dissimulation, the freedom to juggle Nvith being, and, indeed, 
with the language which is vital to our being, that lies at the heart of 
the burlesque. 
(Carter 1984,103) 
Typically, Walser first meets this impending fteedom'%vith a certain anxiety. Walser 
first senses this fteedom when looking into the deceitful mirror mistrusted by 
rationalists for the potential spark it offers the imagination. He experiences a sense of 
freedom from behind the mask, a useful false-self, like Villanelle's disguises, that 
offer a means to anonymity that can enable play. As a false-self, the mask is a 
temporary defence when first entering the potential space. Winnicott does not see the 
use of a false-self itself as pathological - like all defence mechanisms, it is a question 
of degrees, 63 It is the psychic equivalent of dipping a toe into a pool before flinging 
oneself in, potentially immersing oneself completely in frighteningly cold water. This 
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persona allows Walser to play within the potential space without putting under direct 
risk his entire subjectivity. Walser's costume permits him to "juggle, " not simply 
with his identity (like trying on a new role as one would try on a new suit), but to play 
"with being. " And for Walser, language becomes the balls that we use in our play 
(phallic association intended). St. Petersburg, remember, propels Walser "towards 
hyperbole; never before has he bandied about so many adjectives. Walser-the-clown, 
it seemed, could juggle with the dictionary with a zest that would have abashed 
Walser-the-foreign-correspondenf ' (9 8). Language is an object, a toy with which we 
play in the experience of being, though not constitutive of being in itself 
When a clown, Walser seemingly parodies his own privileging of rationalism 
when being made the object of study for Lamarck's Educated Apes. Standing naked 
before the apes sitting at desks, Walser wears a dunce cap on his head as the 
Professor - also an ape - highlights aspects of Walser's physiology. The Professor 
prompts Walser to speak, as "his speech, %vas of surpassing interesf' to the apes sat 
before him, to, %vhich Walser begins, "What a piece of work is man! How noble in 
reason! How infinite in faculty! " (111). This image of a naked man wearing a dunce 
cap quoting Shakespeare while standing before studious apes, the orgasmic thrusts 
and gasps of the Strong-Man and the ape handier pulsing from the sidelines and the 
imminent escape of a tiger create a scene that,, %vhile entirely plausible, defies all 
reason. 
However, for Walser to experience the circus as a potential space, he must 
not give himself over completely to hyperbole and phantasy as he does in Siberia. 
The Walser of London is not totally consumed in St. Petersburg by the challenging, 
playful place and events that surround him - and thus Carter plays upon Bakhtin's 
own ambivalence towards the clown. Walser, for example, still posts reports off to 
the London papers. Sometimes these moments appear only as breaks in an otherwise 
chaotic space, but they are significant in that Walser, and the reader identifying with 
him, do not submit completely to the marvellous, maintaining the paradox and 
uncertainty essential to both magic realism and the potential space. Like Carter's own 
sensational prose, Walser plays creatively with words and phrases, employing them in 
such a way as to heighten his own subjective experience, but also like Carter, with 
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her dedication to materialist themes, Walser does not here entirely lose touch with 
reality. As is evident from these pages that juxtapose Walser's myth-mak-ing and the 
reality of the lives of the peasants with whom he stays, Walser's writing finds itself a 
creative space here between phantastical construction and real, material conditions. 
I am inventing an imaginary city as I go along. Towards such a city, the baboushka's 
pig now trots" (97). 
Like Walser, Desiderio (meaning, by the way, "the desired one, " as opposed 
to the one who desires) begins Infernal Desire Machines as a model of 
Enlightenment rationalism. He is immune, to a greater extent than most, to the 
assault upon reason perpetrated by Dr. Hoffman. Desiderio tells us at the onset of the 
narrative, 
I became a hero only because I survived. I survived because I 
could not surrender to the flux of mirages. I could not merge myself 
and blend with them; I could not abnegate my reality and lose myself 
for ever as others did, blasted to non-being by the ferocious artillery of 
unreason. lwas too sardonic. I was too disaffected. 
(Carter 1972,11-12) 
Like Walser, Desiderio suffers from desubjectification and depersonalisation, these 
defences acting to quash anxiety but preventing the creative experience: "I was 
always a little bored yet perfectly content"(15). Similarly, a sense of unreality 
characterises his experience - or lack thereof. "I felt as if I was watching a film 
but it was an endless film and I found it boring for none of the characters engaged my 
sympathy" (25), although perhaps this inability to identify'kvith either the Minister or 
Hoffman is due just as much to their lack of depth as characters in his world. He 
remains "indifferent" and claims that he "could summon up no interest in all this" 
(25). He enjoys opera, but because of its "the inhuman stylisation"; Nvhen a 
performance of his favourite opera, The Magic Flute, is contaminated by the 
appearance of peacocks from Dr. Hoffman's hallucinating machines, he "instantly 
became bored and irritated. Boredom was my first reaction to incipient delirium" 
(16). When the Minister sends him out of the city in order to find and assassinate Dr. 
Hoffman, Desiderio informs the reader that, "I took, %vith me no souvenirs or objects 
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of sentimental value because I had none" (40) - no transitional objects, no internal 
objects and nothing through which he can articulate his idiom. 64 
Albertina attempts to coax Desiderio from his depersonalised slumber by her 
night- time visits, encouraging him to abandon his intellectualisation defence and 
"BE AMOROUS! [ ... ] DON'T THINK, LOOK [ ... ] WHEN YOU BEGIN TO THINK, 
YOU LOSE THE POINT" (26). When Desiderio gets beyond the city boundaries in 
search of Hoffman, the reader begins to see the layers of rationalism evaporate as he 
begins to accept Albertina's invitations. As be was indifferent within the city, he 
recognises that "There was nothing in the great heap of stucco, brick and stone 
behind me to which I felt the least attachment except the memory of a certain 
mysterious dream" (40), the dream in which he is awakened to the potentialities 
offered by love, desire and Albertina: 
Under all my indifferences, I was an exceedingly romantic 
young man yet, until that time, circumstances had never presented me 
with a sufficiently grand opportunity to exercise my pent-up passion. I 
had opted for the chill restraints of formalism only out of sharp 
necessity. That, you see, was why I so bored. 
(Carter 1972,41) 
The space that lies outside the city in Infernal'Desire Machines is, briefly, a place for 
play before it is overwhelmed by the dangers of Nebulous Time. Upon leaving the 
city, Desiderio goes to the sea-side resort of S. Here, the mayor's daughter, Mary 
Anne, is sure that her father has "disintegrated. " Though she means this literally, such 
disintegration is a consequence, Winnicott says, of being unable to maintain his 
boundaries and negotiate the anxieties of liminality. It is also here that Desiderio 
finds himself more easily swayed by Hoffman's machines; he begins to feel passion 
awakened in him, he is sometimes unable to distinguish between dream and reality. 
However, like St. Petersburg, this space is not entirely free from the Minister's 
demand for compliance and Desiderio is arrested by the Minister's Determination 
Police. 
Nicholas Urfe resembles Walser and Desiderio in many respects: all men 
begin their respective novels as dedicated rationalists before being transformed with 
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the help of a facilitating transitional object. Nicholas' first paragraph of the novel 
establishes his "realist" credentials: 
I was bom in 1927, the only child of middle-class parents, both 
English, and themselves born in the grotesquely elongated shadow, 
which they never rose sufficiently above history to leave, of that 
monstrous dwarf Queen Victoria. I was sent to public school, I wasted 
two years doing my national service, I went to Oxford; and there I 
began to discover I was not the person I wanted to be. 
(FoNvIes 1977,15) 
When Nicholas speaks of Queen Victoria's shadow be means, I take it, the sexual 
puritanism that the nineteenth century is perceived to have inflicted on the twentieth. 
However, the utter banality of these facts and the dispassionate way they are related 
forces us to remember that the twentieth-century also inherited the nineteenth-century 
love of rationalism and objectivity. Again, perhaps we other Victorians are not so 
different after all. t 
Nicholas' narrative reflects his belief in reason as he constantly tries to pin 
down facts and certainties for the reader and for himself, totally unaware that the 
point of Conchis' game is to foster uncertainties. At the conclusion of the game, 
Nicholas explains that Conchis "had simply guessed that for me freedom meant the 
freedom to satisfy personal desire, private ambition. Against that he set a freedom 
that must be responsible for its actions; something much older than the existentialist 
freedom" (440). Against the fixation upon desire and the individual is an approach 
that focusses on objects and intersubjectivity. 
Murray's George Singer also attempts to ascertain the rationalist explanation 
behind his magical experiences. When a fish speaks to him at a Cumbrian aquarium, 
George looks first for a hidden microphone, assuming someone is playing a trick, 
checking in every nearby crevice and conceivable hiding spot "just to make doubly 
sure" (Murray 2001,105). Of course George, a man of his age, does not believe he 
has heard a fish talk to him. "I was cold to the marrow and for a very good reason, " 
he explains. "I had heard a disembodied voice addressing me and me alone. And it 
was 1992, the cyber-age and the age of global communication, not the age of cryptic 
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portents and primitive superstitions" (106). 1 was a middle-aged rationalist Nvho had 
accommodated to his middle-aged failure" (135-6). And so as to convince his reader 
of his trustworthiness as a sane, rationalising human, Singer assures us, 
I can see that I need to spell it out in black and white, for my 
benefit as much as anyone else's. Let it be underlined twice that I spit 
all over the notion of fairies or trans-species reincarnation. Also that I 
thoroughly dislike every anthropomorphic Walt Disney cartoon that 
has ever been made. 
(Muffay 2001,106-7) 
This last point is as much a testament to his good taste as his rationalist credentials, 
but claims like these are meant to confuse the reader, to leave us at a loss to reckon 
how such impossible events could be believed by such a seemingly nice, normal 
fellow as this. The fact that George entertains these ideas even temporarily is a 
testament to his transformation in the text. V 
It is from this potentially magically event - and the specific instructions of the 
fish - that George is prepared to receive Ken Wright's sermon that promises to 
transform his life. Wright explains - echoing Fairbairn and Bion - that "Minds are 
ten a penny [ ... ] the majority of people are deluded by the 
importance of the intellect 
[ ... ] We 
live in an age of mind worship, of mania for education and qualification, in a 
societywhere the ability to reason and dispose of things is regarded as the highest 
achievemenf'(144). And echoing Eagleton's and my own critique of postmodernism, 
Preacher Ken finds "these jet-propelled intellectuals" play at being God, "Capable of 
affirming or rejecting absolutely anything even up to and including the incalculable, 
the inimitable and the immeasurable. Nothing daunts these types" (145). Like the 
worst abusers of postmodernism, "A sure sign of their spiritual pride is that it is 
usually quite matterless whether it is for or against they are arguing. Whichever side 
of the divine their reasoning leads them, it confirms them in their sure conviction that 
the brain is the be-all and end-all" (145). These are the lessons that a talking fish 
prepares George Singer for. 65 
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Towards Negotiations 
Loma Sage says that Carter "had always taken the line that fantasy was not the 
shadow-side of a binary opposition, but bad a real life history. Being was marinated 
in magic, and (conversely) imaginary monsters had no separate sphere" (Sage 1994, 
1). At the end of most of these novels, some degree of balance is usually achieved, 
after the characters and the reader are subjected to the vicissitudes of reality and 
phantasy, creativity and compliance. In Infernal Desire Machines, this can be seen in 
Desiderio's narrative, told only after the "reality wars" are ended and he has found a 
balance between the Minister and Hoffman. In Nights at the Circus, when Fevvers 
confronts Walser in the Shaman's hut, she can feet how she has been transformed by 
the void of Siberia: She sees herself becoming "like the image on a photographic 
paper [ ... ] She 
felt her outlines waver" (290) as Walser's glare tries to envelope 
Fevvers, into becoming a being of his phantasy. "Fevvers suffered the worst crisis of 
her life: 'Am I fact? Or am I fiction? Am I what I know I am? Or am I what he thinks 
I am? "' (290). To rescue herself, and her ffiends, Fevvers tries to show Walser and 
the Shaman herwings, and it is by again becoming the transitional object that she 
recovers herself and Walser from the threatening void of internal phantasy. There 
needs, Carter suggests, to be a balance, a delicate negotiation between living in two 
worlds. Whereas the rationalists in London are tempted into the transitional zone by 
Fewers' spectacular grandeur, in the Shaman's hut it is her relative ordinariness that 
makes her a transitional object. Just as the Europeans in the cities needed something 
overtly fantastic to dislodge them from their complacently rationalist perceptions, the 
Shaman and Walser are accustomed to their grandiose hallucinations, and it is 
something of the reality in Fevvers' appearance that convinces them she is not a 
object of their making. 
No Venus, or Helen, or Angel of the Apocalypse [ ... ] only a poor 
freak 
down on her luck, and an object of the most dubious kind of reality to 
her beholders, since both the men in the god-hut were accustomed to 
hallucinations and she who looks like a hallucination but is not had no 
place in their view of things. 
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(Carter 1972,290) 
Marina Warner suggests that this movement is part of Carter's overall strategy, that 
she "needs to profane her own fabricated marvels, to blow the raspberries of sin in 
the artificial paradises of her own skilled invention. This characteristic in itself 
discomfits the reader: like the gorgeous apparition Fevvers letting rip with a fart, 
Carter's own prose keeps dirtying its own hands" (1994,247). This emphasises the 
role of the transitional object and how it is perceived differently according the needs 
of the subject. It is the gaze of the Shaman and Walser and their recognition of her as 
an object (perhaps their first transitional object) that restores Fevvers' appearance and 
status to that of a fantastic illusion. 
After Walser has been restored - hatched - by Fevvers, he is able to entertain 
uncertainty and paradox with the aid of the transitional object. Upon seeing Fevvers 
naked, "He saw, without surprise, she indeed appeared to possess no navel but he was 
no longer in the mood to draw any definite conclusions from this facf'(292). Walser 
is able to tolerate anxiety that his rationalist defence had previouslyworked so hard 
to repress. 
He was as much himself again as he would ever be, and yet that "set r' 
would never be the same again for now be knew the meaning of fear 
as it defines itself in its most violent form, that is, fear of the death of 
the beloved, of the loss of the beloved, of the loss of love. It was the 
beginning of an anxiety that would never end, except with the deaths 
of either or both; and anxiety is the beginning of conscience, which is 
the parent of the soul but is not compatible with innocence. 
(Carter 1972,292-3) 
This ability to tolerate anxiety permitsfeeling, and hence ineaning, through play. 
Walser recognises the change within himself and fortuitously expresses this new 
found sense of being to Fewers in language that is entirely consistent with that I have 
used here: 
All that seemed to happen to me in the third person as though, most of 
my life, I watched but did not live it. And now, hatched out of the 
shell of unknowing by a combination of a blow on the head and a 
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sharp spasm of erotic ecstasy, I shall have to start all over again. 
(Carter 1984,294) 
And at the novel's conclusion, we the readers are even left with the status of our 
fantastic j ourney unresolved - an exceptional case, Todorov would say. Fevvers' 
laugh to Walser's challenge leaves us no way of knoiving: Is she the "only fully- 
feathered intacta in the history of the world"? are Fevvers' wings real? is she "in- 
tacf'? and F evvers' laugh is a last denial of any attempted resolution. 
So too in Infernal Desire Machines, Desiderio recognises that although he 
does not endorse the Minister's vision of the rule of rationalism, he is loathe totally to 
abandon reason, in soineform, for Hoffman's hedonistic, unstructured rule of 
phantasy. Desiderio says, in words that could be those of a number of contemporary 
magic realist authors, that "there was still that duplicity in my heart's core. I had been 
marked out at the beginning as the Minister's man, for all my apathy, for all my 
disaffection, for 1, too, would have worshipped reason if I could ever have found her 
shrine. Reason was stamped into me as if it were a chromosome, even if I loved the 
high priestess of passion" (Carter 1972,195). When confronting Hoffman face-to- 
face in his castle, Desiderio realises that he cannot share Hoffman's dystopian vision. 
He recognises that Hoffman, like the Minister, is insisting upon compliance in a 
totalitarian way. "I knew he could never be my master. I might not want the 
Minister's world but I did not want the Doctor's world either. All at once I was 
pitched on the boms of a dilemma, for I was presented with two alternatives and it 
seemed to me that the Doctor must be wrong for neither alternative could possibly 
co-exist with the other" (207). Desiderio, from his retrospective position as narrator, 
realises not only that the satisfaction of individual desire cannot be privileged over 
"the common good, " but also that the subject cannot exist narcissistically indulging 
every phantastic whim. The solution, therefore, must lie in a balance, not in the 
vicissitudes of love and bate but from the ambivalence that accompanies whole- 
object relationships. 
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Endnotes 
1. Jack Zipes, whose readings of folk and fairy tales influenced Carter, similarly 
identifies a shift in narrative strategies in the Enlightenment: "The rise of the fairy 
tale in the Western world as the mass-mediated cultural form of the folk tale 
coincided with the decline of feudalism and the formation of the bourgeois public 
sphere" (Zipes 1979,12). 
Bakhtin perceptively appreciates how in Renaissance literature competing 
social and bourgeois visions of the body paradoxically co-existed. Of Cervantes, 
Bakbtin says 
[ ... ] bodies and objects begin to acquire a private, individual nature; 
they are rendered petty and homely and become immovable parts of 
private life, the goal of egoistic lust and possession. This is no longer 
the positive, regenerating and renewing lower stratum, but a blunt and 
deathly obstacle to ideal aspirations. In the private sphere of isolated 
individuals the images of the bodily lower stratum preserve the 
element of negation while losing almost entirely their positive 
regenerating force. Their link with life and with the cosmos is broken, 
they are narrowed down to naturalistic erotic images. 
(Bakhtin 1984,23) 
"However divided, atomized, individualized were the 'private' bodies, Renaissance 
realism did not cut off the umbilical cord which tied them to the fruitful womb of the 
earth" (1984,23). 
Fredric Jameson also identifies magic realism historically, although from a 
more specific - and I think limited - Marxist perspective. Magic realism, for 
Jameson, "betrays the overlap or the coexistence of pre-capitalist and nascent 
capitalist or technological features" (Jameson 1992,138). 
2. Carter also seems at times mistakenly to declare the end of the Age of Reason, 
although this is largely contained in The Sadeian Woman, which I discuss below. 
Zipes, for me, is more accurate in his reading of nineteenth-century fantastic 
tales. Whereas Monle6n sees the nineteenth-century gothic, such as Poe, as launching 
a relentless (transgressive) assault upon bourgeois reason, Zipes sees Poe as seeking 
to frighten "rationalistic audiences with his fantastic tales that chilled a Victorian 
mentality" (Zipes 1979,13). 
3. In this sense, Freud too was a "realisf 'in that he sought to describe the 
supernatural in completely rationalist terms. There is, of course, the well-known 
explanation for telepathy at the conclusion of Inteipretation ofDreams, though this 
too is read in completely rationalist terms (See Freud 1900,783; for a discussion on 
Freud's conceptualisation of telepathy, see Jacobus 1999,202-34). This does not stop 
D. M. Thomas from playing with Freud's conceptions of the past, present and future 
coming together uncannily and super-naturally in his Freudian novels The While 
Hotel and Eating Pavlova. 
4, Henderson seems to be attempting to negotiate a paradox between using rationalist 
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thought that is productive to our understanding of the world and a rejection of a 
disembodied rationalism that seeks to know everything and eliminate all mystery. 
While calling here for a certain "suspension of disbelief' in the analytic process, he 
elsewhere instructs that we must not fret that our analysis will "spoil" the mysteries 
maintained by theology because "Whether to analyse is to 'spoil' cannot, by 
definition, be an issue accessible to rational inquiry" (1975,113). The negotiation of 
this paradox is also attempted by several magic realist authors, which I examine 
below. 
5. This does not, for reasons that should become clear below, imply a third term 
beyond the Real and the Imaginary or the Symbolic or anything Lacanian, as some 
(for example, Schmidt) would suggest. In a general dismissal of such readings of 
Carter, Sage reckons that "You can make it sound like icritureffininine only if you 
don't quote mucW' (Sage 1994,20). 
6. Klein's concept is derived from Freud. See Freud 1905,112-2; 1916-7,370-1; 
Hinshelwood 1991,296-300, 
7. Carter does address Klein in this work, headlining a chapter "Kleinian Appendix: 
Liberty, Misanthropy and the Breast" (133). Although her reading of Klein - on 
breast envy - is interesting, it employs a different strategy from the one I am using 
here. Also, Carter only cites Klein's Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946- 
1963, thus I can only assume that she had not read the essay (published in 192 1) to 
which I have most often been referring here. (Interestingly, my copies of Klein's 
collected works, first published by the Hogarth Press in 1975, have been published by 
Virago press since 1988, during Carter's lifetime and at the press towhich she served 
as an advisor since its conception; see also Carter 1997,75, where she also briefly 
discusses Klein, in a book review written in 1988. ) 
8. Echoing the object-relations feminist critic Nancy Chodorow, Carter notes that 
Justine, as an object, "does not act, she is" (49), "to be the object of desire is to be 
defined in the passive case" (76). This conception of being (merely as a passive 
object), as opposed to doing (as an active subject), is an argument with which I agree, 
but represents an entirely different strategy from the Winnicottian conceptualisations 
of being and doing that I most often refer to here. See Chodorow 1989,23-44. 
Here is also perhaps one aspect of Sade that Lacan gets right: both limit the 
experience ofJouissance to men, as it must always be phallic in Lacan's Oedipal- 
scene. This is certainly true of Sadeian transgressions, which as Carter also 
demonstrates, will never offer real emancipation to women. 
9. In her assessment of Kristeva, Fraser finds that it "does not lead beyond 
structuralism, " branding Kristeva's project a "quasi-Lacanian neostructuralism. In the 
process, she ends up reproducing some of Lacan's most unfortunate errors. She, too, 
lapses into symbolicism, treating the symbolic order as an all-powerful causal 
mechanism" (1992,188). 
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10. Though I am not certain Foucault's essay is a response to Lacan's theory of 
transgression, Foucault's essay appears only three years after Lacan's seminar and 
seems to be a response to the same themes. 
11. See also Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, where Winterson explains that stories 
are "a way of explaining the universe while leaving the universe unexplained, it's a 
way of keeping it all alive, not boxing it into time" (1985,91). She also here objects 
to the perceived certainties offered by "histories" and the relative denigration of 
stories: 
People like to separate storytelling which is not fact from history 
which is fact. They do this so that they know what to believe and Nvbat 
not believe. This is very curious. How is it that no one will believe that 
thewhale swallowed Jonah Nvhen every day Jonah is swallowing the 
whale? [ ... 
I Because it is history. Knowing what to believe had its 
advantages. It built an empire and kept people where they belonged, in 
the realm of the wallet... 
There is order and balance to be found in stories, 
(Winterson 1985,91-3) 
12. Zamora and Farris (1995) thus posit that all magic realist texts exist between the 
"imaginary" and the "historical. " 
13. See for example Bourne Taylor and Shuttleworth (1998). 
14. Eagleton suggests in a very interesting, compelling (if somewhat wishful) reading 
that Marx did not posit the end of histoty but to put on end to Histoly, "to get out 
from under all that so that we may make a new beginning" (1996,65). 
When I say that Marx is the "rational voice of socialism, " I do not mean this 
as an insult, per se. Such a statement applies to his later works, rather than his earlier, 
more humanist writings. 
15. Diana is also ironically associated with the working and peasant classes, and was 
especially worshipped by women (Harvey). 
16. This last claim, that "time is cyclical, involving a continuous dynamic process of 
regressive recovering and renewal, driven by the recognition of inevitable loss, the 
depressive mouming, that underpins all creative psychological change, " I think 
relates to the Kleinian theory of art as reparation. 
17. See Klein 1928,1945; Hinshelwood 1991,57-67. Furthermore, the Kleinian re- 
reading of the Oedipal experience led her to postulate the depressive position, which 
removes us even further from this linear developmental model initially proposed by 
Freud. 
18. Ironically, although Kristeva correctly identifies the problems that lie at the heart 
of the patriarchal concept of History and historical time, and she recognises the 
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emergence of this generation, I still largely - though not exclusively - identify her 
Nvith what she calls the second generation, which regards women's history as purely 
cccyclical or monumental, " based on her focus on the chora, Kristeva's articulation of 
the doctrine of primary narcissism that imagines an ahistorical fusion between 
mother and baby. 
19. Carter shows the futility of a genuine Oedipal transgression in The Sadeian 
Woman. Juliette easily seduces her father, "is impregnated by him, murders him and 
subsequently aborts his child; so she rids herself of the spectre of his paternal 
authority over her by a systematic series of ritual transgressions" (Carter 1979b, 92). 1 
sense irony in the second half of this sentence, but regardless Carter makes it clear 
that while Juliette throws off the spectre of paternal authority, she adopts a new 
master in Sade. 
20. When speaking of "Jeanette" I am referring only to the character in the novel and 
am not addressing any possible parallels Nvith the life and times of the author. 
2 1.1 Nvould also be interested to undertake another re-examination of the 
transformation of city space as "reason" flocks to the suburbs for tax-breaks and 
clean, child-friendly living. 
22. Green also describes, however, the phallic mother -a term Carter uses to describe 
Sadeýs women - as the opposite of the dead mother (Green 1986,157). 
23. Carter, "not in the mood for literary criticism" (1984,244), anticipates the 
Lacanian reading, providing through Fevvers an interpretation of this symbol. 
Rosencreutz explains that it is not anything sexual he wants from Fevvers, further 
explaining, 
"For it is not: 'Honi soit qui mal y pense', but 'Yoni soit qui mal y pense, 
yoni, of course, in the Hindu, the female part, or absence, or atrocious hole, or 
dreadful chasm, the Abyss, Down Below, the vortex that sucks everything 
dreadfully down, down, downwhere Terror rules [ ... 
]" 
"So that was the signification of his gold medallion! The penis, 
represented by itself, aspires upwards, represented by the wings, but us 
dragged downwards, represented by the twining stem, by the female part, 
represented by the rose. " 
(Carter 1984,77) 
(It is worth noting, by the way, that Fewers uses "Rosencreutz" as merely a 
pseudonym for a "Member" of Parliament. ) 
24.1 mean "use" in the a general object-relations sense, that does not mean 
"exploitation. " (See Winnicott 1971,86-94) 
25. Although not likely to be accepted by many as "magic realist, " in Carter's quasi- 
gothic- urban-uncanny novel, Love (1971) Annabel is also described in terms that 
show Carter's early interest in such rationalist figures. Annabel has "no instinct for 
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self-preservation if she was confronted by ambiguities" (1), "There was nothing in 
her mythology to help her resolve this conflict" between the familiar and unfamiliar, 
the gothic, uncanny that haunts the nearby park in a northern city (3). She regards sex 
"with the abstract precision of the geometrician" (4). Depersonalised, "an object 
composed of impervious surfaces" (27), her own 
lovernaking was still permeated by unease for she understood the play 
of surfaces only superficially; she was like a blind man at a firework 
display who can only appreciate the fires in the air by interpreting 
their various degrees of magnificence through the relative enthusiasms 
of the noisy crowd. 
(Carter 1971,24) 
The touch of her lover has no effect on her (32). She does not act sexually from 
desire but because she reads in magazines what she ought to want to do (33). "She 
did not even think of herself as a body but more as a pair of disembodied eyes" (30). 
26. Interestingly, Hoffman further explains that "I should have had very little success 
in, for example, Peking - in spite of the Chinese influence on my researches" (211). 
27. It might be correctly said that Freud also participated in this rationalism, though I 
tend to give Freud more credit for less defensively trying to insist upon such a 
rationalist approach and for breaking this ground in the first place, opening the 
possibility for a non-rationalist approach that Lacan chooses to ignore. Klein too, like 
all psychoanalysts, has a rationalist tendency. As I have mentioned, her treatment of 
little Dick, in particular, has been scrutinised and criticised for the particularly harsh 
imposition of some rationalist interpretations. It has also been suggested that she 
made similar errors of... "zeal" and "enthusiasm, " let us say... in her analysis of her 
own children -a potential factor in Melitta's terrible revolt against her mother? 
(Grosskurth 1986). Torok describes Klein's early methodology in analysing her own 
children as being "precisely in the manner of a former orthodox Talmudist turned 
atheist: very scrupulously and very scientifically" (Torok et al. 1998,66). 
28. Zipes also notes that 
Folk and fairy tales have always spread word through their fantastic 
images about the feasibility of utopian alternatives, and this is exactly 
why the dominant social classes have been vexed by them. Beginning 
with the period of the Enlightenment, folk and fairy tales were 
regarded as useless for the bourgeois rationalisation process. So it is 
not by chance that the culture industry has sought to tame, regulate 
and instrumentalize the fantastic projections of these tales. 
(Zipes 1979,3) 
There is a correspondence here with the critique of Bakhtinian carnival, that it 
functions as only a safety-valve to release tension. Zipes also points out, however, 
that in the nineteenth-century "serious artists [ ... ] sought to use fantasy as a means for 
criticizing social conditions and expressing the need to develop alternative models to 
the established social orders" (1979,15). 
296 
29. Zipes, quoting Negt and Kluge, also recognises that "what was later to be called 
fantasy, was primary the result of separation and confinernerif ' (Zipes 1979,9). 
30. See also Monle6n 54-5 on the story of Pierre Rivi&e (Foucault 1978). 
3 1. See also Day's discussion of Hoffi-nan as a postmodernist (1998,89). 
32. In the recent film of Harris' novel, Father Reynard is replaced by Count Reynard, 
the mayor and local aristocrat of Lansquenet. I suspect this transformation was made 
for the benefit of American audiences, who generally mistrust government and 
believe that theirs is a classless society, and who would also not wish to cast 
organised religion in such a dark light. 
33. This metaphor and the story of Chuang Tzu is also employed by Janette Turner 
Hospital in her novel Borderline (1985), the connection with ontological crises and 
what many psychoanalysts describe as "borderline" disorders being too tempting to 
pass without mention. Borges also uses this koan. 
34. The traveller later chants, as if in a blessing: 
I am my own antithesis. 
My loins rave. I unleash negation. 
The burning arrows of negation. 
Come! 
Incinerate yourself with me! 
(Carter 1972,135) 
35. This is also true of the centaurs that Harry Potter finds outside Hogwarts, who 
"Being intelligent and capable of speech [ ... ] should not strictly speaking 
be termed a 
beast, but by its own request it has been classified as such by the Ministry of Magic" 
(Rowling 2001b, 6; see also ix-xiii). 
Carter may also be playing here with Freud's anthropological speculations in 
Totem and Tahoo. (See for example, discussions on the Sacred Stallion and the Dark 
Archer - 185. ) In wbat may be a parody of Schreber (Freud 1911), the centaurs 
"believed their god revealed himself to them in the droppings excreted by the horse 
parts of themselves since this manifested the purest essence of their equine natures 
[ ... 
j The hvice daily movement of their bowels was at once a form of prayer and a 
divine communion" (175-6). 
36. Desiderio describes that he "experienced an almost instantaneous regret as soon 
as the act was over for I could hardly imagine there was any society in the world 
which would not think that gaining carnal knowledge of one's hostess and foster 
grandmother was a gross abuse of hospitality [ ... ]" (85) which corresponds to Lacan's belief that the experience ofJouissance is proceeded by an immediate sense of guilt 
and pain - again, however, Carter's representation is meant to be a critique, not 
meant as evidence for Lacan's normalising narcissism. 
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37. Again playing with psychoanalytic theory, Carter has Desiderio quote Freud: 
I remembered the words of another German savant and quoted 
to her: ... In the unconscious, nothing can be treated or destroyed. '* Yet 
we saw the Count destroyed and the Cannibal chief. " 
"Destruction is only another aspect of being, " she [Albertina] 
said categorically and with that I had to be content. 
(Carter 1972,186) 
At the bottom of the page, there is a footnote: " Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation 
ofDreams. Desiderio. " 
Of course, Albertina's words are true, and can be easily understoodwithin a 
Kleinian (and also Winnicottian) framework of the vicissitudes of good and bad, 
creation and destruction. A similar point is made by Thomas in The White Hotel, and 
again using Freud as a direct point of reference. The novel is full of images of life 
and death, creation and destruction. Lisa writes to Thomas' fictional Freud "Good 
and evil coupling, to make the world" (Thomas 1981,171). 
38. The frozen wastelands of Russia also appear as a depersonalising void in 
Winterson's The Passion. Villanelle explains that "To survive the zero winter and 
that war we made a pyre of our hearts and put them aside for ever" (Winterson 1987, 
82). 
39. For the difference between symbolic representation and the concrete symbol, as 
'with symbolic equation, see Segal 1957. 
40. Although initially Winnicott identifies the transitional object as a fetish-object 
(see 1952,223), he later amends this to say that the transitional object may eventually 
develop into a fetish-object (195 1). Although Winnicott does not discuss the fetish at 
any length, my own reading is that the fetish emerges from an unhealthy relationship 
of the subject to its transitional object - when, for example, as I stated in Part 1, the 
commodity is fetished when relationships with objects (commodities, language) are 
substituted for personal relations (see Marx 1867,170; Bronstein 1992). 
4 1. This print can also be found on the cover of Day's book on Carter (1998). In his 
lengthy discussion of this print, Monle6n (eventually) makes the point I wish to 
emphasise here, parallel to Klein's argument on transgression. 
In a sense, the Caprichos represent the opposite side of the 
same problem addressed by Foucault in his study of madness: if reason 
and unreason could form an indistinguishable unity, if each contained 
elements of the other, if the seeds of unreason were sown by reason, 
then the principles of exclusion and confinement had been not only 
false but useless. 
(Monle6n 1990,42) 
42. Also in The Bloody Chamber, the Lady of the House of Love is described as 
having "the mysterious solitude of ambiguous states; she hovers in a no-man's land 
between life and death, sleeping and waking" (Carter 1979,205). (Like also the 
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Sleeping Beauty in Madame Schreck's brothel in Nights at the Circus) 
Peach also describes how Carter creates a "third space" in Heroes and 
Villains that rejects "conventional binarismsý' (1998,90). Although Peach does not 
cite Winnicott explicitly in this instance, given his use of Kleinian psychoanalysis 
throughout the book I assume that there is a Winnicottian influence in his usage. 
43. Waters too seems to be trying to negotiate such a paradox, in Tipping the Velvet 
torn between her heroine's fantastic adventures and her final destination working 
with the socialist movement and the suffragettes in late nineteenth-century London. 
44.1 find Winterson's idealisation of Catholicism in this regard ironically misplaced. 
It is not that the Catholic Church willingly suffers the paradox of extremes, as she 
suggests is its "great strength, " but that its art unavoidably addresses such extremes as 
a result of the Catholic Church's own tendency to promote, like the "regular 
reformers, " schizoid thinking. 
45. My evaluation of Habermas must wait for a future study. Day summarises that 
rather than rejecting, like Lyotard, the whole of Enlightenment 
ideology as an oppressive failure, Habermas prefers to see enlightened 
modernity as a project which is as yet uncompleted. Rather than 
rejecting, he prefers to develop the concept of reason, refusing the old 
centring of rationality on the individual consciousness or ego and 
arguing instead for a "change of paradigm from subject-centred to 
communicative reason" (Habermas 1987,301); a paradigm shift 
which defines reason in intersubjective terms. 
(Day 1998,103-4) 
1 sympathise with Habermas' general Nvish to develop how we perceive and use 
reason from an exclusively bourgeois conceptualisation; however, I have long been 
suspicious of Habermas' approach that, to me and my admittedly limited readings of 
his work thus far, seems to maintain too much faith in objectivity and the possibility 
of a disinterested reason. This preference is revealed by Day above, in Habermas' 
desire to move from a "subject-centred" paradigm to one based on "communicative 
reason, " which I have understood to be based on a rationalist, disembodied 
conception of language. Habermas' concept of the "public sphere" strikes me as a 
rather affectless place, and his hope for language as an objective means of measuring 
reason seems to me likely to fall into a trap similar to that Lacan has already stepped 
in. Day says that "Language is the primary medium of social interaction and it is 
language - the ordinary language of everyday social communication - that Habermas 
concentrates on in his definition of intersubjective reason" (103), but does not such 
an approach, like Saussure, Lacan and postmodem theory, privilege the signifier, 
ontologising it at the expense of the subject? These approaches seem to me not to be 
about the relations between real, embodied - and therefore interested - subjects but 
only between signs; it is, as I said in Part 1, a fetish of the commodity, where relations 
between commodities/objects/signs are mistaken for relations between people (see 
also Eagleton 1990,401-15; Habermas 1968). 
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46. Kristeva, drawing upon Bakhtin, seems to describe a similar process in her 
conceptualisation of the chora that threaten the erupt through the weaknesses in the 
Symbolic order. While not without some interest, this Lacanian reading offers us a 
transgression of the symbolic only - and, again, is therefore dependent on the 
symbolic itself. 
47. For more on the gender of carnival, see Vice 1997, especially 176-180. 
48. See also Day 1998,203. 
49. Clowns for Bakhtin not only serve the primarily epistemological concerns of truth 
but, through the grotesque, also attempt to heal psyche-somatic rupture. 
All these grotesque, parodied and clownish series of the human body 
on the one hand serve to expose the body's structure and its life and 
other hand drag into the body-matrix a heterogeneous world of things, 
phenomena and ideas that were, in the medieval [and contemporary? ] 
picture of the world, infinitely far from the body. 
(Bakhtin 1981,176) 
50. Marina Warner observes: 
The revolutionary Russian philosopher Alexander Herzen 
commented: "In church, in the palace, on parade, facing the 
department head, the police officer, the German administrator, nobody 
laughs. The serfs are deprived of the right to smile in the presence of 
the landowncrs. " (Wipe that smile off your face, says the bullying 
teacher. ) Herzen concludes: "Only equals may laugh. " So the laughter 
of the clown, the mockery of the fool, can be the expression of 
freedom, the gesture that abolishes hierarchy, cancels authority and 
faces down fear. 
(Wamer 1994,250) 
5 1. Carter, through Lizzie, presents us another, more general interpretation of the 
circus characters to which I must concede a certain degree of accuracy, even if it is 
not particularly relevant to my own reading: 
A motley crew indeed -a gaggle of strangers drawn from many diverse 
countries. Why, you might have said we constituted a microcosm of 
humanity, that we were an emblematic company, each signifying a different 
proposition in the great syllogism of life. The hazards of the j oumey reduced 
us to a little band of pilgrims abandoned in the wilderness upon whom the 
wilderness acted like a moral magnifying glass, exaggerating the blemishes of 
some and bringing out the finer points in those whom we thought had none. 
Those of us who learned the lessons of experience have ended their j ourneys 
already. 
(Carter 1984,279) 
52. Rivers are often regarded as such liminal spaces. In representing the carnival as a 
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place where the normal categories of race are overturned - Sethe and her family 
delight at the carnival of watching the white people perform for them - and by 
associating that with the river, Morrison may also be playing upon a common 
(American) archetype, such as found in Huckleberiy Finn, wherc the river is a space 
where cultural race relations are held in suspension. 
53. Although I identified it earlier as a typical space of irrationality, Desiderio's 
experience on the river with a native tribe shares some characteristics with these 
examples of the potential space. On the river, Desiderio experiences a sort of re-birth 
where he finds himself cast in the role of the infant, learning a new language and 
developing within a new family. As with Walser's re-birth in Nights, Desiderio loses 
touch with his previous life and identity (as one could say about the slave identity 
Sethe leaves behind), and like Walser, who literally forgot who he was, "Desiderio 
himself had disappeared because the river people had given [him] a new name": 
"Kiku, " meaning "founding bird" (Carter 1972,77), also paralleling Walser's final 
rebirth, the "hatching" under Fevvers at the novel's conclusion. 
54. A clich6 that Henri re-iterates: "The end of every game is an anti-climax. What 
you thought you would feel you don't feel, what you thought was so important isn't 
anymore. It's the game that exciting" (Winterson 1987,133). 
55. See Carter's Love and Harris' Blackberry Wine. 
56. Also, "A local carnival feature is its 'sense of a great city', such as St. Petersburg 
(Dostoevsky), Paris (Balzac) [ ... ] or London (Dickens)" (Vice 1997,153). 
57. Winterson also remarks, however, that "There's no Netscape Navigator to help 
me find my way around life" (2000,227). 
58. These are not the only part-human, part-animal creature that serves such a 
transitional function. Lamarck's Educated Apes, appearing in the circus with Fevvers, 
are a sort of missing link between magical animal and rational Man. 
59. At one point in this study, I thought that Carter and Fevvers' seýflreflexivity 
contributed to the success of Fevvers as a transitional object when capitalist 
commodities, although sometimes useful as imperfect substitutes, ultimately fail. 
However, a simple glance at many contemporary advertisements that are cleverly 
self-reflexive served to remind me that only being self-reflexive, laying bare the 
devices, does not itself offer a serious challenge to the established order. 
60. Walser's subsequent observation, that it is a paradox that "in a secular age, an 
authentic miracle must purport to be a hoax, in order to gain credit in the world" 
(17), is less of a paradox of the sort I wish to speak of here, and perhaps is instead 
indicative of either the cynicism that dominates our cultural experience or the lack of 
potentially creative experience. This does not indicate, I do not think, that our age is 
generally amenable to and fosters paradox, but rather is further evidence of the 
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inability of our "secular" (read: rationalist) culture to admit elements of the fantastic. 
6 1. The relationship between Vianne and her mother could be read through 
Kristeva's identification of three generations of feminist strategies. The first 
generation sought equality in a patriarchal world. Vianne's mother is like the second 
generation, who set themselves completely "outside the linear time of identities" 
(Kristeva . 1979,195). The third generation, one which Kristeva sees as newly 
emerging, "does not exclude - quite to the contrary - the parallel existence of all 
three in the same historical time, or even that they be interwoven one with the other" 
(209). 
62. With a self-reflexive wink, Harris tells us that Jay's partner Kerry, ajournalist, 
wrote a well-received book. on entitled Chocolale -A Feminist Outlook (2000,12). 1 
wonder how we are supposed to read this, however, as Kerry is presented as a 
character we are not supposed to like: a rationalist -%vho doesn't understand Jay's 
need for a magical encounter. 
63. (1) At one extreme: the False Self sets up as real and it is this that 
observers tend to think is the real person [ ... 1 (2) Less extreme: the False Self defends the True Self-, the True Self 
is, however, acknowledged as a potential and is allowed a 
secret life [ ... ] (3) More towards health: The False Self has as its main concern a 
search for such conditions which will make it possible for the 
True Self to come into its own. 
(4) Still further towards health: the False Self is built on 
identifications [ ... ] (5) In health: the False Self is represented by the -%vhole organisation of 
the polite and mannered social attitude [ ... ] (Winnicott 1960,142-3) 
64. Peach correctly suggests that Desiderio is never completely enamoured of 
Reason. "Theway in which Desiderio expresses his criticisms of the Minister of 
Determination [ ... I suggests he is sceptical of the familiar post-Enlightenment myth 
that through reason human beings become more positively human [ ... ] the appearance 
of the police reminds Desiderio that rationality played a key role in the design of the 
Holocaust, of the concentration camps and of the gas chambers" (1998,105). 
65. Although George does claim that "Even before listening to Preacher Ken on the 
subject I had never been all that impressed by cerebral intelligence per se. I have met 
too many emotionally retarded geniuses, %vhose social skills would embarrass a 
gorilla. I have known too many very bright people pathologically ashamed of the fact 
they do not possess a degree" (Murray 2001,181). 
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Postscript 
in many ways, this seems like a strange place to end this thesis. The caveats that are 
usually to be found at the end of such a study equally apply here: There can be no 
"Conclusio n" as such, since the very notion of "contemporary literature" precludes 
an end to this history - hence my use of a "Postscripf 'rather than "Conclusion. " I 
feel in many ways that I am still discovering contemporary British magic realist 
literature, and so I realise that there is much more to be done in this area. I would 
obviously like to learn more of magic realism as it is manifested in other parts of the 
world (including my home country, Canada), in order that I may better speak of the 
sources that influenced British authors but also so as to gain a better appreciation of 
the more specific political issues that British magic realist fiction - or perhaps Euro- 
American magic realism more generally -addresses. Perhaps other literary traditions 
will justify my object-relations approach to the fantastic, but perhaps in future 
analyses I will also find room for Lacanian transgressions, Freudian psychosexual 
stages, or even Jungian archetypes (however unlikely). It is surely no co-incidence 
that Peach, Williams and I find contemporary, British psychoanalytic theory a useful 
analytical strategy for reading contemporary British fiction, and I suspect that other 
magic realist traditions will require a more pluralistic, diverse theoretical approach. 
With regard to psychoanalytic and literary theory, I hope that my future 
investigations will be able to move beyond the critiques that came to dominate parts 
of my first section. I want to begin a new series of constructive engagements, 
pausing perhaps to recognise the good in my own bad objects. With postmodern 
theory in particular, having re-read what I have written until now, I could make an 
effort to consider "postmodemism" more ambivalently - although I noticed a 
similar scathing negativity in Eagleton's efforts to consider "ambivalently" 
postmodemism (see Eagleton 1996). 1 have certainly been influenced by 
postmodemism myself - how could I be otherwise, if "postmodernism" is the word 
we use to describe our mode of (cultural) production - and, like Carter's wish to 
reclaim the ideals of Enlightenment rationality, perhaps I feel a degree of frustration 
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in a potentially productive project seemingly gone awry. I also must be aware that 
the discourses I advocate here also participate in our cultural mode of production, so 
it is really inconceivable that they completely evade all the rationalist pitfalls into 
which my predecessors have fallen. That is why, throughout my critical evaluations 
of postmodern and Lacanian theory, I have tried to make modest claims as to the 
revolutionary power and potential of object-relations. I seriously doubt that it is the 
miraculous remedy that will at once rescue the subject or our culture from the 
afflictions of the Enlightenment or of postmodem. (One only has to imagine how 
any theory will be regarded in one or two hundred years time to be humbled. ) 
However, to reiterate what I said earlier, I do believe that the shift I advocate 
here will mark a significant step towards redressing our present imbalances, 
misconceptions and misdiagnoses. I do believe, like Robert Young, that "object- 
relations theory can rescue us from the bleak fragmentation of postmodern 
deconstructioif '(a term that Young uses in a non-Derridian-specific sense), without 
recourse to defence mechanisms manifested in misplaced concreteness or a 
desperate Idealism (Young 1996c). 
What psychoanalytic object relations theory has to say to 
pessimistic cultural theory is that human nature does not have to be 
thrown out at the end of listing all the determinations that contribute 
to the causality of our humanity. Object relations theory can 
accommodate all the fragmentation and breaking up of a coherent 
idea of self or humanity and make it part of a theory of human nature 
which holds out some hope of bearing the disintegrative forces in our 
cultures and societies and finding a basis for reconstruction and 
reintegration. 
(Young 1996c) 
It is, however, bad form in today's theoretical climate to be so essentialist (believing 
in "human nature"), teleological (believing that we should work to improve 
subjective experience) or - perhaps worst of all - so naively humanist (see Eagleton 
1996,93-130). Humanism in particular has become a nasty bogeyman in 
contemporary theory, and a word I have often heard ignorantly and unfairly levelled 
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at Winnicott's psychoanalytic ideology. But, as Eagleton and Young point out, 
humanism, while justly reviled in some of its previous, traditional manifestations, 
has become a straw-man upon -svhom postmodernists exercise less than precise target 
practice. While we certainly do not want to revert back to a position of regarding the 
human subject as the centre and origin of all meaning, Nve do not want to become 
"anti-humanisf'to such an extent that we find no value in -whatsoever in the human 
subject (Eagleton 1996,129; see also Young 1996c). It will not do to maintain blind 
faith in the myth of human omnipotence, nor cynically to defend against the 
responsibility that human subjects do have in the creation of meaning and the social 
relations in which we find ourselves. Both positions are employing defence 
mechanisms rather than learning to survive the paradoxes and tolerate the 
uncertainty those paradoxes entail. 
As I suggested earlier in this thesis, -1 am 
keen in future to work to examine 
further the ideological unconscious of psychoanalytic theory. I am particularly 
interested, for example, in how the doctrine of primary narcissism, the belief in an 
original, object-less state, is a manifestation of the individualist, bourgeois ideology 
underpinning orthodox psychoanalytic (Freudian and Lacanian) theory. When Freud 
or Lacan are taken up by cultural literary theory, this ideological baggage is 
inevitably brought along for the ride, though more often I suspect as an unconscious 
stowaway than a welcomed fellow-traveller. Like the infant that inevitably and 
unwittingly introjects the unwanted bad object with the good, many theorists I think, 
unwittingly or unconsciously, adopt certain unwanted ideological assumptions, 
positions that they often regard as an object foreign to themselves and their idealised 
object. This is not to say that I want to throw away the psychoanalytic baby with the 
bourgeois bathwater in which it is immersed - however, if we are to consider using 
psychoanalysis as a diagnostic tool or even cure for what ails the modem, the 
postmodem, the monadic, the isolated, the bourgeois, the capitalist, the late- 
capitalist subject, we need to be aware of how our strategies are themselves situated 
ideologically. And again like the Kleinian infant, rather than jettisoning our idealised 
object when we realise it is in the smallest way tainted, we need to be able to 
recognise and tolerate the paradoxes of love and bate, good and bad that comprise 
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any whole object. 
Finally, I do see an encouraging shift in many aspects of our cultural life and 
theoretical environment. The very existence and - more encouraging - the 
popularity of fiction that addresses these paradoxes of love and hate, subject and 
object, phantasy and reality, is evidence to me that people are thinking in ways that 
recognise and seek to tolerate paradox. In literary criticism as well, despite my many 
harsh words, it seems that there is a significant movement away from the neo- 
formalist, quasi-scientific tendencies that I have taken issue with here - though 
perhaps not as great a shift as many literary critics would assume. Just as many 
Lacanians mis-recognise the revolutionary, anti-Enlightenment importance of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, some literary critics have over-estimated the revolutionary 
power of the move from the traditional formalisms and structuralisms of, for 
example, Frye and Saussure, to post-Lacanianism, post-structuralism, post- 
modernism, post-feminism and even - it was inevitable, really - post-postmodern. 
But within psychoanalytic literary criticism there has been a subtle shift away from 
Lacan to Kleinian and object-relations theory. Some of those who brought Lacan to 
the fore in critical theory, such as Jacqueline Rose, Juliet Mitchell and Mary Jacobus 
are now pioneering this movement to object-relations. Although many 
psychoanalytic perspectives in literary criticism still engage solely with Lacanian 
theory, or in one way or another contain some of those unconscious trace elements 
and ideological suppositions of orthodox psychoanalysis, this shift to object-relations 
is not insignificant, nor is the increasing attention paid to specifically object- 
relations theorists such as Bollas, Flax, Chodorow and Jessica Benjamin and, to a 
lesser extent, American object-relations theorists such as Otto Kernberg and Heinz 
Kohut. And the recognition of paradoxes and the insistence upon their negotiation is 
not exclusive to object-relations psychoanalytic theorists: many theorists, it seems, 
such as Linda Gordon, are coming to this realisation independently of 
psychoanalysis. 
I am less optimistic, however, when I examine our larger cultural 
environment. It would be negligent of me not to suggest some practical, immediate 
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political implications of the theories I advocate here, though time and space does not 
permit a detailed analysis. We repeatedly hear that our world, in light of recent 
global political events, is plagued by uncertainty, anxiety and fear. However, while I 
agree that there is a simmering anxiety of a sort not really seen since the Cold War, 
everywhere I see a proliferation of personal and politically institutional i sed defences 
against uncertainty. As during the Cold War, there is an "us" and "them" mentality; 
both the Western alliance against terrorism and the terrorists themselves - both 
"theirs" and "ours" - are "ftindamentalists" (see Young 200 1) characterised by 
excessive pathological splitting and virulent projective identification. On the rise 
from almost all quarters is a conception of the world that is like that of the Kleinian 
paranoid-schizoid infant - complex political and social relations are thus reduced, in 
the words of the American President and his father before him, to a simple struggle 
between "good" and "evil ... . right' 
'and "wrong. " Defence mechanisms, I have 
stressed throughout this thesis, must be available to subjects when they are faced 
with overbearing anxiety, and there is no doubt that citizens in America, Europe and 
the Middle East face real threats to their lives and security. But there is little hope of 
improving the political situation, or alleviating our personal and cultural paranoia, if 
we continue to be governed by schizoid decision making. 
The realisation of depressive ambivalence is in this case not merely an 
achievement of subjective psychic maturity but a social and moral imperative. We 
must recognise the other as the whole object, capable of not only bad but also good, 
worthy of not only our hate but also our love. And both sides must see themselves in 
a similar light, acknowledging the injustices that have been perpetrated upon 
innocent civilians in their name. The Kleinian depressive position also insists, 
echoing Kant's second categorical imperative, that in our desire to assuage our 
paranoia, our hate, we not use others as a means to an end. As uncomfortable as it is, 
we have to survive these paradoxes. And the certainty with which we maintain the 
distinctions between right and wrong, good and evil, must be replaced with the 
uncertainty that necessarily accompanies the acceptance of ambivalence. This 
illustrates the relationship between certainty, knowledge and reason: The ideas of 
which so many of us feel certain right now, the need to eliminate the evil Islamic 
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baddies at any cost,, %vhich is sold to us as a completely reasonable, common sense 
position, is completely ignorant of historical, economic, political, social reality. It is 
classic scapegoating: identify the bad object, project it and identify it as "out there, " 
a not-me external myself, and destroy it. This is a "reason" based on defences 
against uncertainty and a need to hide from reality. A truly "reasonable" approach, 
one that I would endorse based on my readings of the psychoanalytic theory and 
novelists explored here, based on depressive ambivalence and one that does not 
resort to the evasion or modification of knowledge of an uncomfortable or hostile 
reality, would force us to address the historical and economic conditions that 
themselves lead to others' (schizoid) actions, for example, the continued imperialist, 
global economic and cultural hegemony of the West. Despite the painful feelings 
and anxiety that such ambivalence implies, we cannot afford these illusory 
certainties. These paradoxes must be negotiated. 
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